đ Christoph Burgmer im GesprĂ€ch mit Ekkehardt Krippendorff (1934-2018). Der Berliner Politikwissenschaftler Ekkehardt Krippendorff entstammte jener 68 Generation, die an der Transition der reaktionĂ€ren Nachkriegs-Bundesrepublik der 50er und 60er Jahre hin zu einer demokratischen Gesellschaft groĂen Anteil hatten. Ekkehardt Krippendorff, ein ĂŒberzeugter EuropĂ€er und einer der BegrĂŒnder der modernen Friedensforschung lehrte an den UniversitĂ€ten Bologna, Sussex, Urbino Italien und der UniversitĂ€t von Tokio. Seit 1978 war er Professor fĂŒr Politik an der Freien UniversitĂ€t Berlin. In diesem GesprĂ€ch wird der Niedergang der Sozialdemokratie, die sozialen Verwerfungen und die fehlende demokratische Perspektive Europas diskutiert.
/đ Christoph Burgmer in conversation with Ekkehardt Krippendorff (1934-2018). Berlin political scientist Ekkehardt Krippendorff was part of the 1968 generation that played a major role in the transition from the reactionary post-war Federal Republic of the 1950s and 1960s to a democratic society. Ekkehardt Krippendorff, a staunch European and one of the founders of modern peace research, taught at the University of Bologna, Sussex, Urbino Italy and the University of Tokyo. From 1978 onwards, he was Professor of Politics at the Free University of Berlin. This conversation discusses the decline of social democracy, social upheaval and the lack of democratic prospects in Europe.
/đ Christoph Burgmer in conversazione con Ekkehardt Krippendorff (1934-2018). Il politologo berlinese Ekkehardt Krippendorff apparteneva alla generazione del '68, che ha avuto un ruolo importante nella transizione dalla Repubblica Federale Tedesca reazionaria del dopoguerra degli anni '50 e '60 a una societĂ democratica. Ekkehardt Krippendorff, convinto europeista e uno dei fondatori della moderna ricerca sulla pace, ha insegnato all'UniversitĂ di Bologna, nel Sussex, a Urbino in Italia e all'UniversitĂ di Tokyo. Dal 1978 era professore di scienze politiche alla Libera UniversitĂ di Berlino. In questa conversazione si discute del declino della socialdemocrazia, dei disagi sociali e della mancanza di prospettive democratiche in Europa.
đ Veröffentlichungen u.a. / Publications a.o. / Pubblicazioni, tra le altre:
- Ekkehardt Krippendorff: "MilitÀrkritik." Mit einem Vorwort von Johan Galtung. Suhrkampg Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1999.
- Ekkehardt Krippendorff: "Die Kunst nicht regiert zu werden. Ethische Politik von Sokrates bis Mozart." Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1999.
- Ekkehardt Krippendorff: "Die Kultur des Politischen. Wege aus den Diskursen der Macht. Kadmos Verlag, Berlin 2009.
- Ekkehardt Krippendorff: "LebensfÀden. Zehn autobiographische Versuche." Graswurzel Verlag, Heidelberg 2012.
đ audio archiv is self-financed. All podcasts are free of charge. If you like the podcast, leave us your comment đȘ¶ and  give us your like đ«¶. Or make a donation: Become a patron... or buy us a fresh â coffee â. Thank you for your support đđŠđ
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:08):
Welcome to Audio Archive, the channel for historical interviews with writers, philosophers,
activists, and intellectuals from around the world.
(00:34):
Hello, the conversation with the Berlin political scientist took place in 2006.
Eckhardt Krippendorff stated that Europe no longer has an intellectual basis.
In particular, European social democracy and European trade unions, once advocates of a socially
united Europe, have forgotten, in favour of national power preservation, that the foundation
(01:00):
for a united Europe lies in the social sphere, in the notably European redistribution of societal wealth.
As a consequence, the inhabitants of Portugal and Spain, France and Germany, as well as those
of Eastern European countries, are turning to authoritarian, fascist, and far-right parties.
(01:20):
At the European level, German democracy is at stake.
Those who only want to ban the AfD fail to recognise the European, the global dimension and
are trapped in nationalist arguments.
Parties like the AfD, the Portuguese Chega, the Spanish Vox, or the French Rassemblement National
(01:40):
may use nationalist rhetoric, but they wish to be the spokespersons of a euro-nationalist capital.
The fact that the current European unification is now being militarily coordinated after the
market as a second step suits them.
For here, the European right sees a first prerequisite for their future rule and offers to become
(02:04):
the militarily-industrial, the nationalist-political basis for European capital.
Whether European capital actually needs them, who knows.
For European companies are already cleverly pitting European democracies against each other
and weakening trust in them.
While they benefit from the free movement of job searching in the capital-oriented European
(02:27):
labour market, they combat, at the national level together with the so-called centrist parties,
in Germany CDU, Greens, SPD, and FDP, the social security systems of the people.
A common, non-competitive European social policy would be the fundamental prerequisite for a democratic Europe.
(02:50):
The centrist parties have dismantled social rights across Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
They are thus co-responsible for the rise of far-right and fascist parties.
For democratic consciousness still unfolds in the kitchen and not in the salon.
The beginning of the conversation with Eckhardt Krippendorff has been lost.
(03:14):
We start with his analysis of the historical dimension of capitalism in a globalised world.
...which played with the two blocs, so the whole non-aligned movement, and that has many detailed consequences.
All of them now have no alternative, they can no longer play capitalism against state socialism politically and economically.
(03:40):
In this respect, the term globalisation is indeed correct.
The new aspect actually lies only in the term or in overcoming this resistance, which took 100
years to organise and articulate.
And it has initially disappeared from world history within a decade.
This does not mean that the argument against global capitalism or against capitalism has been defeated.
(04:06):
Only this specific answer has been defeated.
This Europe has emerged from the economic necessity of the Steel and Coal Community, but also
from the experiences one had with National Socialism.
Today, one has the impression that what remains is only the economic variant, which increasingly
(04:27):
positions this Europe as a counter-model against American economic hegemony.
Is it permissible to think of globalisation and the development of Europe historically up to today?
Or are there aspects of European unification that have little to do with globalisation to this day?
(04:52):
Yes, if one thinks historically, I find it important to remember a significant formulation,
which the media, which has always been very illuminating, is historically what was possible.
The Europe we have today is not necessarily the logically consistent outcome of what has become,
but it is something different from what was possible.
(05:13):
What was possible in the first years after the collapse of the Third Reich was a federalist
Europe born out of resistance, where the Italians and the French were very strong.
A Europe of cultures and not of states.
Particularly strong at that time, I am talking about 1947, 1948, were the Germans, one must
(05:40):
say, the West Germans, because we already had the Cold War or the Wall in a broader sense, so
the Germans and the Italians.
They were particularly strong, someone like Altiero Spinelli for instance, who came from the
resistance and repeatedly addressed and discussed the idea of Europe from below, as they rightly put it.
(06:01):
The Italians and the Germans were very strong in favour of this Europe.
The actual opponents of this early Europe of European integration, speaking politically and
economically, were the French, because the French now also felt like a victorious power and
wanted, this may sound a bit harsh, to take revenge, but they did not want to allow the racism of Germany to resurface.
(06:22):
In this respect, it was a significant historical achievement by Schuman and Adenauer to break
out of this national state logic and to set something in motion with the Coal and Steel Community
that could lead to such European unification.
Nevertheless, even into the 1950s, this Europe from below was a reality and thousands, tens
(06:43):
of thousands, one could say hundreds of thousands were also committed.
I find it very important to see that the Franco-German rapprochement and then, if one may say
so, friendship, is one of the great historical achievements, perhaps the only one of the major
post-war achievements that Europe has delivered.
(07:04):
When we see the younger generations, they can hardly imagine that there was a stereotype in
Germany and France, that was the hereditary enemy.
France, the hereditary enemy, has been so for ages and is unthinkable.
So today, this is simply a completely unthinkable constellation, this is a great achievement
(07:27):
and it is also a result of this Europe from below, particularly what communities have accomplished,
such as community partnerships, community festivals, town twinning, school partnerships everywhere, Franco-German grammar schools, etc.
This is a great achievement from below.
In this respect, one could say, if we now jump to the present, that the Europe of today, this
(07:51):
Maastricht Europe, is actually a betrayal of this grassroots work that has been done there and
that it has not been able to be incorporated into a Europe that is also completely deficient from a democratic perspective.
It has not become a democratic one; it is a bureaucratic or, as you have also suggested, an
economic Europe, a Europe of large corporations.
(08:14):
And it is not the Europe that the European enthusiasts of the first hour, that is, the late
40s and early 50s, wanted.
In this respect, it is a real betrayal.
Now, betrayal is a moral category, but it gains its substance when one looks at whether this
Europe is truly supported by the Europeans.
(08:35):
And when we look around today and see resentment everywhere, especially now in Berlin, it is
not a group of Black people who are still identifiable, or of Chinese people who are also still
identifiable, but rather Italians who are being beaten up.
So Europeans, I do not want to make a distinction now, but I just want to say that this is also
(08:55):
a cultural shortcoming of this Europe, that it has not identified from the bottom up or that
the base has not really kept pace with what the political class has done, for whom Europe was
and is the Maastricht Europe, the Europe of capital, and has not addressed the democratisation from the outset.
So to make Europe a great foundational idea.
(09:18):
And that is why this resentment comes from the base.
And what affects the Italians today can affect the Swedes tomorrow and also affects the Swedes
or the English who come to Germany.
And the same unfortunately reproduces itself in other parts of Europe.
This absence of a democratic base for the grand idea of Europe has enormous negative consequences.
(09:38):
I also do not want to speak solely about Haider of Austria.
Is this also a consequence of globalisation, as it was released as a buzzword in the 90s, that
this Europe has been thrown back into nationalisms and that this nationalism is also gladly carried forward by politicians?
(10:03):
At this point, I believe one must consider the concept of Europe and the problem of globalisation from an economic perspective.
That is to say, what globalisation brings about, negatively speaking, and I believe there are
predominantly negative consequences that we are dealing with here, is the marginalisation, that
(10:26):
is, the pushing to the margins of groups, strata, classes that no longer fit, that no longer
fit into the economic reproduction process of capital. People are becoming redundant.
And they are becoming redundant in Europe, but also in other parts of the world.
In Europe, they are becoming redundant among other reasons because there are cheaper labour
(10:47):
forces for capital, thus better profit opportunities in Asia or Latin America or wherever.
And in this respect, it then rebounds back on Europe, because there is mass unemployment here,
which is particularly strong in Germany, but also in other countries.
This mass unemployment, that is to say, mass unemployment is also a form of not being integrated
(11:10):
and of not being able to identify with one's own society, which excludes me, in which I have
no place, in which I have no identity, where I cannot go anywhere, where I have no contact with
my colleagues, thus in work, also having a societal view, a societal connection.
(11:30):
This marginalisation, the expulsion of entire groups then acts back and says here Germany to
the Germans or France to the French and so on and so forth.
For this primitive racism, there is also a more refined racism, but this primitive brutal racism,
for which an Italian is just as much a foreigner as a Black person from Africa, who is externally
(11:56):
identifiable, seeks this pseudo-identification, saying Germany to the Germans.
And this is in this respect a result of this globalisation, which makes people redundant.
Globalisation knows no national borders.
Does it not know European ones, even if not borders, then restrictions?
Is it possible in light of this global capital of globalisation? It is possible.
(12:21):
A great deal is possible.
What we have learned, however, from the collapse of the so-called real existing socialism, is what is all possible.
So the thought, if someone had told us in the 1980s that it would be possible to dissolve the
Soviet Union into many small nation-states again, which would then have their national currencies,
(12:43):
national economies and national foreign ministries, thus Georgia all of a sudden, that would have been completely unthinkable.
This means that politically much more is possible than our imagination usually concedes, our narrow-minded imagination. So, everything is possible.
Or a great deal is possible.
Not everything, but a great deal is possible.
(13:04):
This means it is also possible for Europe to organise politically or politically-economically
with its own social policy.
At the moment, I do not see this opportunity being taken.
I do not see that the opportunity is being taken.
This means that, at the moment, the interest is not in a common social policy or a common employment
(13:27):
policy, but the primary interest is in a strategic cooperation of Europe, military, strategic
cooperation within the framework of NATO.
And that seems to me to be the most important and also problematic, to be very cautious, or
I would say it more clearly, the negative trend at the moment is that Europe is indeed being
united militarily and is becoming militarily effective in both the literal and metaphorical
(13:52):
sense, that is, efficiently organised.
And the second point is that capital is organising itself.
This means that everything related to the Euro, which is potentially a world strategy and not a European strategy.
So only a European social policy, a European economic policy, could possibly aim for a blockage
(14:13):
or a slowdown, if you will, of globalisation within the European framework.
But this requires a very strong state.
There would have had to be a strong nation-state, which we no longer have.
So a strong European state, and at the moment I cannot see that we have a chance of that.
Especially because the signals are wrongly set, because it is focused on a military, power-political
(14:38):
strengthening of Europe, so not on a social-political strengthening, for which they again need,
that was the starting point of our considerations, they need a democratic basis.
And no one wants that.
I was just about to mention that.
In your last book, you quoted Michel Foucault, the famous French structuralist and political
(15:00):
activist, who noted as early as the 1960s that a cultural form had emerged in Europe, a moral
and political way of thinking, which is the art of not being governed, or rather the art of
not being governed in this way and at any cost.
(15:21):
With this, he is clearly opposing domination, against political and economic elites, who have
governed this Europe to this day in an almost absolutist manner.
However, there is absolutely nothing to feel of this in present-day Europe.
Thanks to globalisation, globalisation is precisely the antithesis that effectively disempowers people.
(15:47):
Yes, one could almost say there is a contradiction between a European perspective and globalisation.
It is not just almost; one must say there is this contradiction.
For globalisation is not the same as Europeanisation.
Europe as a perspective is a grand perspective, a magnificent one, a historically legitimised perspective.
(16:08):
For there is no law that has ever stated in European history that Europe must break apart these
nation-states or must form itself nationally.
And it seems very important to me, if you allow me, to take a small detour or perhaps even a large detour.
The detour is that one must think about how it comes to be that this Europe, which we are creating
(16:34):
today and about which intellectuals speak differently in Germany and in other countries, has
no basis in the intellectual realm.
And that it is not even being aspired to.
In the intellectual realm, which means in the mythologisation of the European thought.
I want to put it more concretely.
Moreover, Adenauer and de Gasperi had an idea of, and this is not mine, but I must first state
(17:01):
it, the idea of a Catholic Europe, in which something like Aachen and Charlemagne played a role.
And the exclusion, that was the West and anti-communist, I will leave that aside for a moment,
but it was an intellectual concept for Europe.
Not merely a Europe of corporations.
(17:23):
So this intellectual concept, the Catholic in a broader sense, the Christian Western Europe.
It is not the Europe that I want.
I must keep emphasising this.
But it had a dignity that became much greater.
What do you mean by dignity?
A worth, an inner worth.
A historical worth, a historical substance that goes far beyond and is entirely different from
(17:47):
that which is only legitimised by a large market area.
And secondly, it has the chance of being anchored in the societal base.
If you go back again, what actually is Europe?
Where does it actually come from?
And one must strive again, not only that politics in Europe was invented in the Greek polis,
(18:14):
but also that Europe at the beginning of this Europe stood mythologically in a love and peace relationship.
I express myself more clearly.
Europe was a beautiful woman whom Zeus fell in love with, who transformed himself into a bull to approach her.
(18:36):
He abducted her to the island of Crete and in Crete fathered children with her, sons who were the culture of Minos.
And the Minoan culture is still, if you will, mysterious to this day, a completely peaceful culture.
So archaeology shows us that Minos, surprisingly, had no fortifications in Crete, what remains,
(18:59):
and no weapons have been found.
It was a peaceful culture.
At the beginning of Europe stands such a great myth, a love relationship that produces peace.
When one considers this, why do we have so little sensitivity for it or why has our political
(19:20):
class never endeavoured to found Europe spiritually, to return to these important origins.
Our entire literary culture still lives off the great heritage of Greek classicism, from those
few years, decades of the Greek cultural polis, etc.
(19:40):
I mentioned Adenauer and De Gasperi earlier, that was such an approach, at least to give this
Europe a spiritual dimension again.
And that seems to be completely unrecognised today as necessary or it is utterly absurd that
someone thinks about it, that it is thematised, also in our literary, intellectual, cultural elite, public sphere, etc. Not to mention politics.
(20:07):
In this I see a very significant absence.
Europe has no soul, the Europe of Maastricht.
It only has a common currency and now a possibly common army and a large market.
And if we do nothing to give this Europe a soul, then it is built on sand and is reversible.
As we have seen (20:28):
Even the Soviet Union could fall apart again.
So even this Europe with a common currency, a common army, as the Soviet Union ultimately also
had, can fall apart again.
And whether Europe then falls apart peacefully, like the Soviet Union, well, we are not there
yet, but that is certainly an open question.
(20:49):
Is Europe the antipode, is Europe being built up as the antipode to the USA?
In the medium term, the major competitor to American economic and political power?
This is certainly the hope and perspective of an important, perhaps currently dominant part
(21:10):
of the European class, the political class, but also of the European economic decision-makers,
that they want to represent a counterweight to the USA, thus becoming a great power Europe.
This is such a very realistic perspective and, on the detour, which is more than a detour, through
(21:30):
defence policy, the strategic cooperation of Europe, for which the whole Kosovo story plays
a central role, by the way.
It has been demonstrated to all Europeans how they are being taken for a ride by the USA, by
American politics, by military politics.
That will not happen to them again. They will suspect that.
(21:51):
Now Europe is organising itself militarily.
On this detour, great power Europe is a realistic perspective.
When I say realistic, I mean one that is being pursued by the probably currently dominant political
classes, especially those who still see themselves as social democratic, saying, we are setting
(22:13):
ourselves apart from the USA.
But that is one thing.
It is unfortunately not just the alternative that I would advocate, but one that I hope will
develop as an alternative to the American concept of globalisation.
Namely, a social Europe and not a militarily power-political competitive Europe, but Europe
(22:36):
that practices other ways of dealing with a, I say this with all caution, reformed or modified capitalism.
What makes the diversity of Europe a plus, a strength to be leveraged.
And that stands in opposition to the comparatively one-dimensional American culture.
(22:59):
And if we manage to say that Europe's diversity is culturally and economically rewarding, because
it integrates more, because it provides space for more people.
If Europe becomes a homogenised society, a uniform sauce, so many differences will fall away,
so many fascinating friction surfaces that have made Europe great will be marginalised.
(23:23):
Such a great power Europe, as much as it is aspired to by the dominant classes because they
want to compete with the USA, is not the perspective I would bet on, even if it means Europe overcomes national sovereignty.
You have just mentioned it, social democrats who, in any case, dream in some parts that there
(23:44):
should be a Europe between communism and capitalism, grandly announced, Schröder and Blair are
the leading forces of the third way.
This naturally raises the question of whether social democracy is not actually the better pathfinder
for this great power Europe than the CDU was.
(24:06):
Yes, I would indeed strike that out as a question mark.
Indeed, that is the case.
Since social democracy no longer has the evil wind of communism blowing in its neck, that it
no longer has to fear competition from the left and has to distance itself from it while simultaneously
(24:27):
having to develop something else, since then social democracy has run out of breath and is increasingly
becoming the true assistant of capital.
This means that it now has to consider new alliance partners or new perspectives seriously,
(24:48):
which are based on what was also the starting point of our conversation, in the criticism of globalization.
The criticism of globalization means the resumption of the critique of capitalism and that this
critique of capitalism is not refuted by the fact that it was perverted into a state and power-political
(25:12):
ideology and societal formation in the real existing Soviet Union.
This serious consideration of the critique of capitalism, which is not outdated, which must
be enriched by another critique, for which the Greens once stood, the entire ecological problematics,
(25:32):
that this is still valid, yes, more valid than ever, and if that were to become a perspective
of a new Europe, so red-green in that sense, Europe manages to maintain prosperity without ruining
the environment for future generations to such an extent that it suffers irreparable, unrepairable
(25:54):
damage, then that would be an alternative to the USA.
However, if it merely copies the USA, politically competes, as the social democratic perspectives
or policies currently seem to be everywhere, then that is a project on which one can only say,
I basically don't care whether it's Europe or America, then we might as well align ourselves
(26:17):
under the great hegemony of America.
The countries from the Eastern Bloc, the former Eastern Bloc, that is, the countries located
east of Germany, plus Turkey, which should soon be included in the EU, if they are taken in
(26:37):
under this aspect of globalisation and competition that we have discussed in detail, will this
not further promote nationalisms and racisms, if there is no European thought behind it in the
sense we have also discussed?
(26:58):
Yes, because this expansion is, at least initially, as it is presented and argued and publicly
sold, fundamentally a market matter again and not a cultural expansion.
So if we look again from the German perspective, if only, letâs say, 10 or 20 percent of the
(27:18):
energies that went into German-French understanding in the 50s and 60s, if 22 percent of that
went into German-Polish or German-Russian understanding, to say nothing of it, then a lot would be gained.
But I see only very few, very timid approaches and no massive government policy behind it, thus
(27:42):
failing to culturally underpin the economic expansion.
And in this respect, the reaction, the basic reaction will actually be catastrophic.
Thank you for joining us at Audioarchiv.
Follow us, so you won't miss an episode.
And don't forget the like button.
(28:02):
See you next week, your Audioarchiv team.
Welcome to Audio Archive, the channel for historical interviews with writers, philosophers,
activists, and intellectuals from around the world.
(00:34):
Hello, the conversation with the Berlin political scientist took place in 2006.
Eckhardt Krippendorff stated that Europe no longer has an intellectual basis.
In particular, European social democracy and European trade unions, once advocates of a socially
united Europe, have forgotten, in favour of national power preservation, that the foundation
(01:00):
for a united Europe lies in the social sphere, in the notably European redistribution of societal wealth.
As a consequence, the inhabitants of Portugal and Spain, France and Germany, as well as those
of Eastern European countries, are turning to authoritarian, fascist, and far-right parties.
(01:20):
At the European level, German democracy is at stake.
Those who only want to ban the AfD fail to recognise the European, the global dimension and
are trapped in nationalist arguments.
Parties like the AfD, the Portuguese Chega, the Spanish Vox, or the French Rassemblement National
(01:40):
may use nationalist rhetoric, but they wish to be the spokespersons of a euro-nationalist capital.
The fact that the current European unification is now being militarily coordinated after the
market as a second step suits them.
For here, the European right sees a first prerequisite for their future rule and offers to become
(02:04):
the militarily-industrial, the nationalist-political basis for European capital.
Whether European capital actually needs them, who knows.
For European companies are already cleverly pitting European democracies against each other
and weakening trust in them.
While they benefit from the free movement of job searching in the capital-oriented European
(02:27):
labour market, they combat, at the national level together with the so-called centrist parties,
in Germany CDU, Greens, SPD, and FDP, the social security systems of the people.
A common, non-competitive European social policy would be the fundamental prerequisite for a democratic Europe.
(02:50):
The centrist parties have dismantled social rights across Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
They are thus co-responsible for the rise of far-right and fascist parties.
For democratic consciousness still unfolds in the kitchen and not in the salon.
The beginning of the conversation with Eckhardt Krippendorff has been lost.
(03:14):
We start with his analysis of the historical dimension of capitalism in a globalised world.
...which played with the two blocs, so the whole non-aligned movement, and that has many detailed consequences.
All of them now have no alternative, they can no longer play capitalism against state socialism politically and economically.
(03:40):
In this respect, the term globalisation is indeed correct.
The new aspect actually lies only in the term or in overcoming this resistance, which took 100
years to organise and articulate.
And it has initially disappeared from world history within a decade.
This does not mean that the argument against global capitalism or against capitalism has been defeated.
(04:06):
Only this specific answer has been defeated.
This Europe has emerged from the economic necessity of the Steel and Coal Community, but also
from the experiences one had with National Socialism.
Today, one has the impression that what remains is only the economic variant, which increasingly
(04:27):
positions this Europe as a counter-model against American economic hegemony.
Is it permissible to think of globalisation and the development of Europe historically up to today?
Or are there aspects of European unification that have little to do with globalisation to this day?
(04:52):
Yes, if one thinks historically, I find it important to remember a significant formulation,
which the media, which has always been very illuminating, is historically what was possible.
The Europe we have today is not necessarily the logically consistent outcome of what has become,
but it is something different from what was possible.
(05:13):
What was possible in the first years after the collapse of the Third Reich was a federalist
Europe born out of resistance, where the Italians and the French were very strong.
A Europe of cultures and not of states.
Particularly strong at that time, I am talking about 1947, 1948, were the Germans, one must
(05:40):
say, the West Germans, because we already had the Cold War or the Wall in a broader sense, so
the Germans and the Italians.
They were particularly strong, someone like Altiero Spinelli for instance, who came from the
resistance and repeatedly addressed and discussed the idea of Europe from below, as they rightly put it.
(06:01):
The Italians and the Germans were very strong in favour of this Europe.
The actual opponents of this early Europe of European integration, speaking politically and
economically, were the French, because the French now also felt like a victorious power and
wanted, this may sound a bit harsh, to take revenge, but they did not want to allow the racism of Germany to resurface.
(06:22):
In this respect, it was a significant historical achievement by Schuman and Adenauer to break
out of this national state logic and to set something in motion with the Coal and Steel Community
that could lead to such European unification.
Nevertheless, even into the 1950s, this Europe from below was a reality and thousands, tens
(06:43):
of thousands, one could say hundreds of thousands were also committed.
I find it very important to see that the Franco-German rapprochement and then, if one may say
so, friendship, is one of the great historical achievements, perhaps the only one of the major
post-war achievements that Europe has delivered.
(07:04):
When we see the younger generations, they can hardly imagine that there was a stereotype in
Germany and France, that was the hereditary enemy.
France, the hereditary enemy, has been so for ages and is unthinkable.
So today, this is simply a completely unthinkable constellation, this is a great achievement
(07:27):
and it is also a result of this Europe from below, particularly what communities have accomplished,
such as community partnerships, community festivals, town twinning, school partnerships everywhere, Franco-German grammar schools, etc.
This is a great achievement from below.
In this respect, one could say, if we now jump to the present, that the Europe of today, this
(07:51):
Maastricht Europe, is actually a betrayal of this grassroots work that has been done there and
that it has not been able to be incorporated into a Europe that is also completely deficient from a democratic perspective.
It has not become a democratic one; it is a bureaucratic or, as you have also suggested, an
economic Europe, a Europe of large corporations.
(08:14):
And it is not the Europe that the European enthusiasts of the first hour, that is, the late
40s and early 50s, wanted.
In this respect, it is a real betrayal.
Now, betrayal is a moral category, but it gains its substance when one looks at whether this
Europe is truly supported by the Europeans.
(08:35):
And when we look around today and see resentment everywhere, especially now in Berlin, it is
not a group of Black people who are still identifiable, or of Chinese people who are also still
identifiable, but rather Italians who are being beaten up.
So Europeans, I do not want to make a distinction now, but I just want to say that this is also
(08:55):
a cultural shortcoming of this Europe, that it has not identified from the bottom up or that
the base has not really kept pace with what the political class has done, for whom Europe was
and is the Maastricht Europe, the Europe of capital, and has not addressed the democratisation from the outset.
So to make Europe a great foundational idea.
(09:18):
And that is why this resentment comes from the base.
And what affects the Italians today can affect the Swedes tomorrow and also affects the Swedes
or the English who come to Germany.
And the same unfortunately reproduces itself in other parts of Europe.
This absence of a democratic base for the grand idea of Europe has enormous negative consequences.
(09:38):
I also do not want to speak solely about Haider of Austria.
Is this also a consequence of globalisation, as it was released as a buzzword in the 90s, that
this Europe has been thrown back into nationalisms and that this nationalism is also gladly carried forward by politicians?
(10:03):
At this point, I believe one must consider the concept of Europe and the problem of globalisation from an economic perspective.
That is to say, what globalisation brings about, negatively speaking, and I believe there are
predominantly negative consequences that we are dealing with here, is the marginalisation, that
(10:26):
is, the pushing to the margins of groups, strata, classes that no longer fit, that no longer
fit into the economic reproduction process of capital. People are becoming redundant.
And they are becoming redundant in Europe, but also in other parts of the world.
In Europe, they are becoming redundant among other reasons because there are cheaper labour
(10:47):
forces for capital, thus better profit opportunities in Asia or Latin America or wherever.
And in this respect, it then rebounds back on Europe, because there is mass unemployment here,
which is particularly strong in Germany, but also in other countries.
This mass unemployment, that is to say, mass unemployment is also a form of not being integrated
(11:10):
and of not being able to identify with one's own society, which excludes me, in which I have
no place, in which I have no identity, where I cannot go anywhere, where I have no contact with
my colleagues, thus in work, also having a societal view, a societal connection.
(11:30):
This marginalisation, the expulsion of entire groups then acts back and says here Germany to
the Germans or France to the French and so on and so forth.
For this primitive racism, there is also a more refined racism, but this primitive brutal racism,
for which an Italian is just as much a foreigner as a Black person from Africa, who is externally
(11:56):
identifiable, seeks this pseudo-identification, saying Germany to the Germans.
And this is in this respect a result of this globalisation, which makes people redundant.
Globalisation knows no national borders.
Does it not know European ones, even if not borders, then restrictions?
Is it possible in light of this global capital of globalisation? It is possible.
(12:21):
A great deal is possible.
What we have learned, however, from the collapse of the so-called real existing socialism, is what is all possible.
So the thought, if someone had told us in the 1980s that it would be possible to dissolve the
Soviet Union into many small nation-states again, which would then have their national currencies,
(12:43):
national economies and national foreign ministries, thus Georgia all of a sudden, that would have been completely unthinkable.
This means that politically much more is possible than our imagination usually concedes, our narrow-minded imagination. So, everything is possible.
Or a great deal is possible.
Not everything, but a great deal is possible.
(13:04):
This means it is also possible for Europe to organise politically or politically-economically
with its own social policy.
At the moment, I do not see this opportunity being taken.
I do not see that the opportunity is being taken.
This means that, at the moment, the interest is not in a common social policy or a common employment
(13:27):
policy, but the primary interest is in a strategic cooperation of Europe, military, strategic
cooperation within the framework of NATO.
And that seems to me to be the most important and also problematic, to be very cautious, or
I would say it more clearly, the negative trend at the moment is that Europe is indeed being
united militarily and is becoming militarily effective in both the literal and metaphorical
(13:52):
sense, that is, efficiently organised.
And the second point is that capital is organising itself.
This means that everything related to the Euro, which is potentially a world strategy and not a European strategy.
So only a European social policy, a European economic policy, could possibly aim for a blockage
(14:13):
or a slowdown, if you will, of globalisation within the European framework.
But this requires a very strong state.
There would have had to be a strong nation-state, which we no longer have.
So a strong European state, and at the moment I cannot see that we have a chance of that.
Especially because the signals are wrongly set, because it is focused on a military, power-political
(14:38):
strengthening of Europe, so not on a social-political strengthening, for which they again need,
that was the starting point of our considerations, they need a democratic basis.
And no one wants that.
I was just about to mention that.
In your last book, you quoted Michel Foucault, the famous French structuralist and political
(15:00):
activist, who noted as early as the 1960s that a cultural form had emerged in Europe, a moral
and political way of thinking, which is the art of not being governed, or rather the art of
not being governed in this way and at any cost.
(15:21):
With this, he is clearly opposing domination, against political and economic elites, who have
governed this Europe to this day in an almost absolutist manner.
However, there is absolutely nothing to feel of this in present-day Europe.
Thanks to globalisation, globalisation is precisely the antithesis that effectively disempowers people.
(15:47):
Yes, one could almost say there is a contradiction between a European perspective and globalisation.
It is not just almost; one must say there is this contradiction.
For globalisation is not the same as Europeanisation.
Europe as a perspective is a grand perspective, a magnificent one, a historically legitimised perspective.
(16:08):
For there is no law that has ever stated in European history that Europe must break apart these
nation-states or must form itself nationally.
And it seems very important to me, if you allow me, to take a small detour or perhaps even a large detour.
The detour is that one must think about how it comes to be that this Europe, which we are creating
(16:34):
today and about which intellectuals speak differently in Germany and in other countries, has
no basis in the intellectual realm.
And that it is not even being aspired to.
In the intellectual realm, which means in the mythologisation of the European thought.
I want to put it more concretely.
Moreover, Adenauer and de Gasperi had an idea of, and this is not mine, but I must first state
(17:01):
it, the idea of a Catholic Europe, in which something like Aachen and Charlemagne played a role.
And the exclusion, that was the West and anti-communist, I will leave that aside for a moment,
but it was an intellectual concept for Europe.
Not merely a Europe of corporations.
(17:23):
So this intellectual concept, the Catholic in a broader sense, the Christian Western Europe.
It is not the Europe that I want.
I must keep emphasising this.
But it had a dignity that became much greater.
What do you mean by dignity?
A worth, an inner worth.
A historical worth, a historical substance that goes far beyond and is entirely different from
(17:47):
that which is only legitimised by a large market area.
And secondly, it has the chance of being anchored in the societal base.
If you go back again, what actually is Europe?
Where does it actually come from?
And one must strive again, not only that politics in Europe was invented in the Greek polis,
(18:14):
but also that Europe at the beginning of this Europe stood mythologically in a love and peace relationship.
I express myself more clearly.
Europe was a beautiful woman whom Zeus fell in love with, who transformed himself into a bull to approach her.
(18:36):
He abducted her to the island of Crete and in Crete fathered children with her, sons who were the culture of Minos.
And the Minoan culture is still, if you will, mysterious to this day, a completely peaceful culture.
So archaeology shows us that Minos, surprisingly, had no fortifications in Crete, what remains,
(18:59):
and no weapons have been found.
It was a peaceful culture.
At the beginning of Europe stands such a great myth, a love relationship that produces peace.
When one considers this, why do we have so little sensitivity for it or why has our political
(19:20):
class never endeavoured to found Europe spiritually, to return to these important origins.
Our entire literary culture still lives off the great heritage of Greek classicism, from those
few years, decades of the Greek cultural polis, etc.
(19:40):
I mentioned Adenauer and De Gasperi earlier, that was such an approach, at least to give this
Europe a spiritual dimension again.
And that seems to be completely unrecognised today as necessary or it is utterly absurd that
someone thinks about it, that it is thematised, also in our literary, intellectual, cultural elite, public sphere, etc. Not to mention politics.
(20:07):
In this I see a very significant absence.
Europe has no soul, the Europe of Maastricht.
It only has a common currency and now a possibly common army and a large market.
And if we do nothing to give this Europe a soul, then it is built on sand and is reversible.
As we have seen (20:28):
Even the Soviet Union could fall apart again.
So even this Europe with a common currency, a common army, as the Soviet Union ultimately also
had, can fall apart again.
And whether Europe then falls apart peacefully, like the Soviet Union, well, we are not there
yet, but that is certainly an open question.
(20:49):
Is Europe the antipode, is Europe being built up as the antipode to the USA?
In the medium term, the major competitor to American economic and political power?
This is certainly the hope and perspective of an important, perhaps currently dominant part
(21:10):
of the European class, the political class, but also of the European economic decision-makers,
that they want to represent a counterweight to the USA, thus becoming a great power Europe.
This is such a very realistic perspective and, on the detour, which is more than a detour, through
(21:30):
defence policy, the strategic cooperation of Europe, for which the whole Kosovo story plays
a central role, by the way.
It has been demonstrated to all Europeans how they are being taken for a ride by the USA, by
American politics, by military politics.
That will not happen to them again. They will suspect that.
(21:51):
Now Europe is organising itself militarily.
On this detour, great power Europe is a realistic perspective.
When I say realistic, I mean one that is being pursued by the probably currently dominant political
classes, especially those who still see themselves as social democratic, saying, we are setting
(22:13):
ourselves apart from the USA.
But that is one thing.
It is unfortunately not just the alternative that I would advocate, but one that I hope will
develop as an alternative to the American concept of globalisation.
Namely, a social Europe and not a militarily power-political competitive Europe, but Europe
(22:36):
that practices other ways of dealing with a, I say this with all caution, reformed or modified capitalism.
What makes the diversity of Europe a plus, a strength to be leveraged.
And that stands in opposition to the comparatively one-dimensional American culture.
(22:59):
And if we manage to say that Europe's diversity is culturally and economically rewarding, because
it integrates more, because it provides space for more people.
If Europe becomes a homogenised society, a uniform sauce, so many differences will fall away,
so many fascinating friction surfaces that have made Europe great will be marginalised.
(23:23):
Such a great power Europe, as much as it is aspired to by the dominant classes because they
want to compete with the USA, is not the perspective I would bet on, even if it means Europe overcomes national sovereignty.
You have just mentioned it, social democrats who, in any case, dream in some parts that there
(23:44):
should be a Europe between communism and capitalism, grandly announced, Schröder and Blair are
the leading forces of the third way.
This naturally raises the question of whether social democracy is not actually the better pathfinder
for this great power Europe than the CDU was.
(24:06):
Yes, I would indeed strike that out as a question mark.
Indeed, that is the case.
Since social democracy no longer has the evil wind of communism blowing in its neck, that it
no longer has to fear competition from the left and has to distance itself from it while simultaneously
(24:27):
having to develop something else, since then social democracy has run out of breath and is increasingly
becoming the true assistant of capital.
This means that it now has to consider new alliance partners or new perspectives seriously,
(24:48):
which are based on what was also the starting point of our conversation, in the criticism of globalization.
The criticism of globalization means the resumption of the critique of capitalism and that this
critique of capitalism is not refuted by the fact that it was perverted into a state and power-political
(25:12):
ideology and societal formation in the real existing Soviet Union.
This serious consideration of the critique of capitalism, which is not outdated, which must
be enriched by another critique, for which the Greens once stood, the entire ecological problematics,
(25:32):
that this is still valid, yes, more valid than ever, and if that were to become a perspective
of a new Europe, so red-green in that sense, Europe manages to maintain prosperity without ruining
the environment for future generations to such an extent that it suffers irreparable, unrepairable
(25:54):
damage, then that would be an alternative to the USA.
However, if it merely copies the USA, politically competes, as the social democratic perspectives
or policies currently seem to be everywhere, then that is a project on which one can only say,
I basically don't care whether it's Europe or America, then we might as well align ourselves
(26:17):
under the great hegemony of America.
The countries from the Eastern Bloc, the former Eastern Bloc, that is, the countries located
east of Germany, plus Turkey, which should soon be included in the EU, if they are taken in
(26:37):
under this aspect of globalisation and competition that we have discussed in detail, will this
not further promote nationalisms and racisms, if there is no European thought behind it in the
sense we have also discussed?
(26:58):
Yes, because this expansion is, at least initially, as it is presented and argued and publicly
sold, fundamentally a market matter again and not a cultural expansion.
So if we look again from the German perspective, if only, letâs say, 10 or 20 percent of the
(27:18):
energies that went into German-French understanding in the 50s and 60s, if 22 percent of that
went into German-Polish or German-Russian understanding, to say nothing of it, then a lot would be gained.
But I see only very few, very timid approaches and no massive government policy behind it, thus
(27:42):
failing to culturally underpin the economic expansion.
And in this respect, the reaction, the basic reaction will actually be catastrophic.
Thank you for joining us at Audioarchiv.
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And don't forget the like button.
(28:02):
See you next week, your Audioarchiv team.
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