March 7, 2025 • 42 mins
Christoph Burgmer im Gespräch mit Johannes Agnoli (1925-2003). Der italienische Politikwissenschaftler Johannes Agnoli lehrte am Otto-Suhr-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin und gilt als einer der einflußreichsten Theoretiker:innen der außerparlamentarischen Opposition. Seine Kritik an der repräsentativen Demokratie erweitert er in diesem Gespräch auf das Europa der EU, dass er als "Europäische Privilegienodnung" beschreibt. Begriffe wie Freiheit und Gleichheit sind für ihn schon im Jahr 2000 als dieses Gespräch aufgezeichnet wurde (Im Intro wird 2006 genannt, was falsch ist. Die Redaktion), inhaltsleere Parolen einer europäischen Elite.
Christoph Burgmer in conversation with Johannes Agnoli (1925-2003). The Italian political scientist Johannes Agnoli taught at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Free University of Berlin and is regarded as one of the most influential theorists of the extra-parliamentary opposition. In this interview, he extends his criticism of representative democracy to the Europe of the EU, which he describes as a European order of privilege. Even in 2000, when this interview was recorded (The intro mentions 2006, which is wrong. The editors), he considered democratic concepts such as freedom and equality to be empty slogans of an european elite.
Christoph Burgmer in conversazione con Johannes Agnoli (1925-2003). Il politologo italiano Johannes Agnoli ha insegnato all'Otto-Suhr-Institut della Libera Università di Berlino ed è considerato uno dei più influenti teorici dell'opposizione extraparlamentare. In questa intervista, estende la sua critica alla democrazia rappresentativa all'Europa dell'UE, che descrive come un ordine europeo di privilegi. Già nel 2000, quando l'intervista è stata registrata (l'introduzione cita il 2006, ma è sbagliato. I redattori), egli considerava concetti democratici come libertà e uguaglianza come vuoti slogan di un'élite europea.
Veröffentlichungen u.a. / publications a.o. / Pubblicazioni tra le altre:
- Johannes Agnoli / Peter Brückner: "Die Transformation der Demokratie. Theorie der außerparlamentarischen Opposition." Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt a.M. 1968. (antiquarisch)
- Johannes Agnoli: " Die Transformation der Demokratie und verwandte Schriften (herausgegeben von Barbara Görres Agnoli), Konkret-Literatur-Verlag, Hamburg 2004.
Weitere Neuauflagen der Texte von Johannes Agnoli im Stuttgarter Schmetterling Verlag, u.a.:
- Johannes Agnoli: "Die subversive Theorie." Schmetterling Verlag, Stuttgart 2025. (Neuauflage)
Siehe auch die Texte von Peter Brückner (1922-1982):
- Peter Brückner: "Das unbefangen Menschliche." Wagenbach Verlag, Berlin 2022.
- Peter Brückner: "Das Abseits als sicherer Ort." Kindheit und Jugend zwischen 1933-1945. Mit einem Vorwort von Barbara Sichtermann. Wagenbach Verlag, Berlin 2019.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Host (00:08):
Welcome to audioarchiv, the channel for historical interviews with female writers, philosophers,
activists, and intellectuals from around the world.
Johannes Agnoli (00:34):
Hello. The Future of Europe, we held a conversation in 2006 in Berlin with Johannes Agnoli about
the political future of Europe.
An enlightening conversation about freedom, equality, and brotherhood, the slogans of the French
Revolution and their significance in the present, about the paralysis of national institutions
(00:58):
in times of globalisation, about the authoritarian character of European politics, about the
freedom of capital and the Marxist concept of equality.
But first, some biographical details about Johannes Agnoli.
Johannes Agnoli was born in Italy in 1925, became politically active during Italian fascism,
(01:20):
survived the Second World War in a British prisoner of war camp in Egypt, emigrated from Italy
to Germany, and most recently worked as a professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin.
By then, he was already one of the most prominent leftist thinkers in Germany.
The book The Transformation of Democracy, published in 1967 together with social psychologist
(01:46):
Peter Brückner, is considered the most influential work of the extra-parliamentary left in Germany,
according to Johannes and Julius and Peter Brückner's publications in the show notes.
Although largely ignored in the present and dismissed as old leftist nonsense, even denounced
(02:06):
by the left, it anticipates developments that have become reality.
Johannes Agnoli describes how unfree European societies are in our conversation.
For social participation in political decisions, individual freedom, and social equality are
consistently being dismantled in Europe.
(02:28):
In favour of capital interests, a racist migration policy, and the dramatic increase in military
spending, they are not even allowed.
The national bourgeois societies with their historically grown state institutions, according
to Johannes Agnoli, fail at the idea of emancipation due to their national limitations.
(02:51):
Their failure is the basis for the success of neo-fascist and far-right parties.
Despite all this, Johannes Agnoli counters this new, conservatively fascist European reality
with the utopia of a European society of the free and equal.
Host (03:09):
Mr Agnoli, liberty, equality, brotherhood, the slogans of the French Revolution, what do they mean today for Europe?
Johannes Agnoli (03:17):
It depends on the perspective from which the matter is viewed; if we consider the neoliberal
side, for example, very little remains of the French, essentially Jacobin slogan.
But they still cling to the idea that liberty should be for capital.
And equality should consist in the famous equality of opportunity.
(03:40):
In itself, an interesting position of this equality of opportunity, as equality of opportunity
presupposes the inequality of success, the equality of opportunity.
I consider what the slogan of the German Wehrmacht was.
Every soldier carries in his backpack, it says, the Marshall's baton.
With the small difference that there were five to six million soldiers and a dozen marshals.
(04:04):
In this respect, equality of opportunity is the equality of the powerful to assert themselves.
And liberty is, of course, the freedom to assert oneself in the market, as one can.
Conversely, we take this slogan as very important.
I still consider this to be correct for developing countries.
For them, liberty does not mean freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, freedom of presence;
(04:27):
it means freedom from hunger and need.
And equality means having the same access to wealth as is usual in industrial nations.
Although even in industrial nations, the same access to wealth is no longer guaranteed in the meantime.
For it has also been shown in the so-called industrial nations that society is a fractured society.
(04:50):
So we should consider what liberty and equality mean?
Let us set aside the fragility; today we would rather speak of solidarity in a fractured society.
On the other hand, there is the freedom of entrepreneurs, the freedom of capital, the freedom
of the market, this peculiar form of freedom that consists in the market being a democratic
(05:12):
undertaking, as everyone can choose the goods they want.
And on the other hand, there remains really the exact opposite of this restricted late-bourgeois
concept of liberty and equality.
That is the utopia stated in the Communist Manifesto, the association of liberty and equality.
However, the so-called real socialism has forgotten a sentence in communism (05:30):
the freedom of
each individual is the prerequisite for the freedom of all.
There is, however, a significant difference between the Jacobin concept of equality, which truly
meant a levelling in the sense of a homogenisation towards the petty bourgeoisie, as the Jacobins
(05:53):
were ideologues and also representatives of the petty bourgeoisie.
The thesis of Rosu was also adopted by the Jacobins.
Restriction of property, thus no capital accumulation, but only small property and equality.
And the Marxist concept of freedom is the freedom of each individual.
This presents equality, but in the Marxist view, it is the same right to satisfy one's own needs,
(06:19):
not equality in the needs themselves.
Today, where are we talking about freedom and equality?
I say myself, a utopia at its core, because the reality today, which is grey in Europe, guarantees
freedom and equality only in the circumscribed sense of the constitution.
And there we know what equality means (06:39):
the same right for all to have access to positions.
We know that this is a fiction.
In fact, much of what is constitutional life, constitutional norm is a fiction, but as Hans
Kelsen said in England, a representative of parliamentarism, it is a necessary fiction.
In this necessary fiction, it seems to me that the slogan of freedom and equality has become a slogan.
(07:04):
We are all equal, we are all free. What do we want?
We have, so to speak, realised the ideal.
So we live, like Leibniz in his theory, we actually live in.
What is it called, I believe, Genscher is in the best state of German history, indeed in the
best state in the world.
The Federal Republic of Germany is also, in terms of freedom and equality, in a sense the symbol
(07:28):
of realised, final, realised, preserved democracy.
In reality, there is an enormous gap between this formal freedom and equality that exists, and
a truly materially grounded freedom and equality in the sense, for example, of the Communist Manifesto.
Host (07:45):
I would like to perhaps go back once more to the emergence of this concept as a slogan of the French Revolution.
They say, the Jacobin of the petty bourgeois revolution, yet a bearer of a utopia that continues
to resonate to this day.
Johannes Agnoli (07:58):
Yes, that is correct. First of all, one must say, freedom, freedom, liberté d'accord.
But the actual social content, particularly from Rousseau and also among the Jacobins, of the
word freedom was something different.
Not freedom of opinion, but independence.
Above all, for Rousseau, the concept of independence plays a much more important role than the concept of freedom.
(08:22):
Independence was, in a sense, the foundation of civil freedom.
For it also meant independence from the old feudal lords, from absolute kings.
And indeed, even today, when we look at this perspective, we consider, who is independent today?
I have always spoken earlier about dependent measures.
(08:43):
The measures of the population live in a dependent state.
The state may be one of prosperity, that is conceivable.
But independence is not present.
That is why I speak of formal freedom.
Not that I would be against formal freedom.
It would be ridiculous if I were against the freedom of opinion. Not at all.
(09:03):
But one must see that, in content, this does not correspond to what would be socially possible and to freedom.
It is fundamentally set by the free development of personality.
But this free development is completely constrained, entirely restricted by all sorts of norms,
principles, considerations, and so on.
(09:23):
The question is whether the actual content of the word freedom is not to be found among the
Jacobins, but perhaps among the anarchists.
That may be, one can discuss that.
As for the Jacobins, that was, as I said, the first great petty-bourgeois revolution, which
is well known to have failed.
And they really adhered, in principle, coming from Rousseau, to the principle of social equality
(09:49):
by reducing, let us say calmly, the citizen to the owner, and indeed to the small owner.
I once read somewhere that Rousseau was an ideologue of capitalism, which is completely wrong.
Rousseau was an opponent of capital accumulation.
They were always oriented, no bourgeoisie among small owners.
(10:10):
They did not see that the small owners are, in a sense, the diffuse social basis for the creation of large property.
Host (10:20):
If we take that as a prerequisite.
Why is the concept of freedom still upheld in society, in today's society, in European societies?
And what is it projected onto when we think of a united Europe?
Johannes Agnoli (10:36):
Yes, so initially, to hold on to this concept is indeed correct, I would say, I would like to
put it differently, one does not hold on to this concept, as the concept has become completely installed.
One clings to this fiction.
Ideologically speaking, no state in the world can call itself undemocratic.
(10:57):
We know that the real socialist countries called themselves people's democracies.
And today, in the current situation, someone who would say, 'away with freedom', would not even be understood.
Even, what is this Austrian half-Nazi Halder, he also speaks of freedom, because he has a cultural
(11:19):
position from a European perspective, or also from a North American perspective, without which
one cannot politically operate at all.
No matter what someone, even a politician, wants, they will always talk about freedom.
Equality is somewhat more difficult.
And if you observe, there is a lot of talk about freedom in the press, in comments.
(11:44):
But from the perspective of equality, one is somewhat positive, because one knows very well
that freedom can be worked with as a slogan.
The principle of equality can also have an explosive effect.
It cannot necessarily, if it remains a slogan. That is freedom.
Equality, brotherhood, solidarity, humanity, peace of the world.
These are loud slogans, but it may be that some of these slogans, as I said, are capable of
(12:11):
breaking this crust in which we live, because we live in a crusted society.
Host (12:16):
The interview continues shortly. Like us if you enjoy it.
Johannes Agnoli (12:22):
From a European perspective, one must see that probably one of the many difficulties on the
way to this unity of Europe is that the various national societies also have a very different understanding here.
Let us take Germany and Italy.
For Germany, the concept of freedom is directly connected.
(12:45):
Not only connected, it is integrated into the concept of the rule of law.
For the diffuse Italian population, not now bound by party or party politics, freedom is something
that always has to do with, I would say, with an attack, but with a distancing from the state.
(13:07):
This means that in Germany, freedom is linked with statehood, in Italy, not in France.
I don't know enough about it, but France is probably also divided.
I know some French people who, when they talk about freedom, do not think of the state, but
rather as something that stands outside the state, not against the state, but outside the state.
(13:27):
And indeed, outside the state one must be careful, not in the sense of privatisation, but in
the sense that society can, like reality, be different from the state-organised reality.
This is of course simply the case in Italy, to develop such thoughts, when they consider that
(13:49):
in Italy society continues to go on, continues to live, continues to exist, develops, while the state is a. A catastrophe.
I say the state is inefficient, public administration does not work, and society continues to
live on in such a situation.
Of course, the coupling of freedom equals the rule of law for the statement of.
(14:13):
Do you also think that when people talk about the rule of law? Of course.
In Italy, they talk about the rule of law.
Every time a judge is against someone, then the lawyer says, they are gone.
The Rosconia example for the concept of.
Host (14:27):
Equality in relation to Europe, I would provocatively say now.
This concept of equality has already undergone such a reinterpretation that it only means the
equality of everyone being able to use the Euro.
Johannes Agnoli (14:43):
Now it is such that people outside Germany were very surprised that initially the monetary union
came, in the perspective that the monetary union is of course only a first important step towards political unity.
This belongs to the German tradition.
Do not forget that the customs union was before the founding of the Empire, that the currency
(15:04):
reform was before the founding of the Federal Republic and the monetary union with the GDR was before reunification.
I try to explain this.
Many Italians ask me, why the Euro, Euro, Euro, in German Euro and not first the unity.
Yes, that is the German tradition.
First, the economy must be united, then perhaps over time.
(15:25):
If over time we come to a European state, then we will probably have to rethink what equality
means in a European state?
Because even within nation-states this equality is only a formal slogan.
Not even a formal reality, it is a formal slogan.
Well, they spoke of the European state, now they are outliving themselves.
(15:49):
A European state can be such a state.
I would like to state at the outset that there is a historically seen society, as seen a very
close connection between the creation of the free market and the creation of the nation-state.
I do not want to raise the question of priority (16:07):
does the economy come first or does politics come first?
It is a historical question.
Was the state first and then capital, or are they somehow coupled?
In any case, there is this internal market, nation-state.
If the internal market disappears, what does the nation-state have to do with it?
(16:28):
So we will have within the European market, with or without the Euro, now with the Euro, obviously
a new form of state that remains from the state.
A new form of state.
And one must consider what role the classical bourgeois institutions have in the new form of state.
(16:49):
Perhaps we already have a taste of this in that the Council of Ministers in Brussels is completely
removed from all so-called democratic control.
For while there is a European Parliament, there are European elections, but if within the nation-state
the executive has priority over the legislative, then we notice in Europe that the situation is even worsening.
(17:13):
The European Parliament has much less to do than a national parliament.
On the other hand, I must say, in this context there is a principle of separation of powers,
which has anyway been laid to rest in the constitution itself.
When it is said, I state at the outset, in a normal bourgeois, democratic state, politics is essentially made through laws.
(17:39):
But in the constitution it states that the Chancellor determines the guidelines of politics,
thus also the guidelines of legislation.
Apart from the curious case that in the constitution the Federal Council is also part of the legislative.
But the Federal Council represents the state executives.
So we have a nice mess.
Probably there will no longer be a mess in Europe as a standard, because we will not have a bourgeois constitutional state.
(18:05):
We will experience a modernisation of this state towards, I always say, I have previously spoken
of an authoritarian rule of law.
It is likely to go in this direction.
A rule of law in that respect, because I am convinced that it is to be assumed, very strongly
assumed, that these fundamental rights, these human rights will not be laid aside.
(18:30):
In this respect, the state will remain a Western country, but it will probably take on a completely
different form than that of civil constitutionalism.
There may also be a European constitution, and I am curious to see what this European constitution will look like.
Host (18:47):
However, you have written in one of your books that no conservative hope can be fulfilled purely
institutionally if the hope for radical change does not concern itself with the institutions.
That means, if the inhabitants of Europe do not care about the institutions, is there then a radical, revolutionary potential present?
Johannes Agnoli (19:11):
Restlessness, restlessness. We do not know that.
So I mean, the fall has become world history.
The fall of the Berlin Wall. Everywhere, even in Italy.
The wall has completely fallen.
The fall of the wall has shown our grandmothers the incompetence of our social sciences.
For the fall of the wall has shown that we are not capable of making predictions.
(19:36):
We can formulate hypotheses, but a forecast is simply not possible.
So we do not know how things will develop.
We can only assume that due to the socio-economic situation, the development will not proceed
as it did with the formation of the democratic nation-state.
Brussels is just one example, a foretaste of that.
(19:59):
If we also think of the now notoriously infamous globalisation, we see the matter even more
sharply on a global scale.
We can see the matter even more clearly.
If many demand that this wild capital should be tamed by a political form, it is hardly conceivable
(20:21):
that the taming could occur through a civil constitutional state on a global scale.
In other words, we are going.
This is just a conjecture, not a forecast, a working hypothesis from which one should proceed.
A working hypothesis that, as I said, we are heading towards harder times, politically harder times.
(20:49):
That freedom and equality, as the nearby Frenchman comes, are increasingly becoming mere slogans.
There is still one more thing, we are creating a state in Europe within or summarising, that
is, an organisational summary of a society that is still torn apart, not by being still torn
(21:09):
apart, but that is facing a problem that is probably unsolvable.
The problem of mass unemployment.
I say that this is unsolvable because it is said that unemployment is structurally conditioned,
that is, it is a permanent state.
This unemployment leads to the fact that even within a possible European state, even within
(21:33):
the state of the so-called industrial nations, there is an element present that could potentially be negative.
We do not know that.
Perhaps this is the famous principle of hope by Ernst Bloch.
We can hope that this potential is a negative potential, that is, a potential that leads to
(21:54):
a breaking situation, which again might be able to stimulate a kind of democratisation.
There is still one more thing.
We live here happily and contentedly, even the unemployed are not doing as badly as in the previous
century and forget that this concerns about 1/5 of the world population. What about the others? Is that a potential?
(22:21):
They are currently living in resignation, we know that. Is that a potential?
What will come of it?
Are we sure, shall we say, are we sure that these industrial nations will not one day come to
use their potential, their military potential, to solve this problem?
(22:45):
What the ancient Romans did not achieve against the barbarian invasions.
In Italian, this is not called migration, it is called barbarian invasions.
With others here, how are such problems solved on a European scale?
The European state will probably have to deal with the immigrant or immigrants question.
(23:09):
For if this continues, this wave of immigration will not only come from the east but especially
from the south, from Africa, probably also reaching Central Europe.
Italy has already reached it, Spain too, France as well, but not yet Central Europe.
And it seems to me that the cherished forms of the bourgeois state cannot cope with this.
(23:33):
Unless society really opens up, that society truly accepts this state and tries to cope with it socially. So not just acceptance.
Not just tolerance, but really a kind of, how should one say, merging, not taking it for granted
(23:55):
that we no longer have uniform national societies.
Host (24:00):
And yet Europe appears, especially in light of the immigration from the south, more than a confederation, as a proper state.
Johannes Agnoli (24:11):
Yes, that is also a problem when one speaks of Europe becoming a unity.
How can one, by what means and in what timeframe, be able to cope with the fact that the individual
states have completely different, not only constitutional forms but also entirely different political structures.
(24:33):
Starting from electoral law to the relationship between the famous three branches of government,
even down to age itself.
Let us take a federal state like the Federal Republic, a central state like France, and a state
like Italy, which is trying to incorporate some federal elements.
(24:54):
Not to mention the English, for they are already facing this, aren't they?
That is one of the difficulties.
And how this can then become an instance capable of providing a political form that can deal
with the aforementioned problems of immigrants coming from the south, with the current institutions, I consider impossible.
(25:18):
The current institutions were not historically created for such problems at all.
National parliaments, national governments, even cases, structures have nothing to do with it at all.
Now one is starting to talk about regionalism.
And now you can already see here the emergence of a completely new element.
It is said that the Alpine region is a region in itself, regardless of whether Switzerland,
(25:43):
Austria, France, Italy, or Germany. A region in itself.
How will this integrate into this new city?
The question is, of course, that the new state must come, not because the state chooses something
beautiful, but because we live in a capitalist-producing society.
(26:06):
And Marx is still right in this regard.
A capitalist-producing society needs a political form.
The view, the Swabian immigrant Berle held this view, at the beginning of the 80s, I believe.
I have the book in Italian, but the book has not been published there, about the capitalist revolution.
(26:28):
What is meant, in his view, is that the corporation has become so strong that it no longer needs the state.
In reality, it shows that the multinational, internationally established corporation still requires
a political form, especially when the problems, as they have presented them, come knocking at the door.
(26:50):
Capital also needs global capital, which requires the corresponding political form.
I merely say that the institutions we have now were not created in the last century to deal with these problems.
And now, the outlook will certainly not be that we will have a greater wave of democratisation
(27:11):
in the form of the state, but rather we will have authoritarian forms.
I repeat, with a rule of law character and probably with the maintenance of certain fictions,
although with the fiction of elections it is a bit inconceivable that global capital would have
(27:33):
a worldwide electoral legislation, because I mean, one cannot vote globally at all.
These are all problems of the European state.
Then one must ask, is it necessary or not?
I would not pose the question that way.
It has often been the mistake of the left to criticise reality, always from the idea of a differently structured law.
(28:02):
And I always say, it makes no sense to fight against the establishment of a European state,
just as it made no sense to fight against the introduction of the Euro.
Host (28:14):
The interview will continue shortly.
Like us if you enjoy it.
Johannes Agnoli (28:19):
I do not know how it was in Germany.
In Italy, the entire left was against the introduction of the Euro, but it came.
It is much better, regardless of whether one is on the left or the right, if one simply thinks
democratically about how we should respond to this allegedly authoritarian European state.
(28:41):
How should we act socially within it?
How should we live, think, and do within it?
That is much more important.
I always consider it misguided to go against reality.
Probably, the European state will come to a political agreement in the long run, because a currency
(29:02):
unit without a unified political form is nonsense.
There are difficulties to overcome.
I spoke earlier about the individual institutions, elections, legislature, executive.
What about the tax system, for example?
It varies in all countries.
Will we have a unified tax system when we already have a single currency?
(29:25):
Consider that a single currency must contend with a dozen different tax systems. That simply isn't feasible.
And now it leads us towards authoritarianism.
Which political authority could establish a unified tax legislation in Europe?
Other than through authoritarian methods?
(29:46):
It cannot be done otherwise, as the population is still bound by national borders.
And when a change in the tax system is mentioned, the population of a particular country will
react quite differently at elections than the population of another country.
Perhaps Italy is an exception.
(30:08):
The Italians strongly desire a European state, not because they think more European than others,
but to rid themselves of their own political class and the tax legislation they consider poor.
To overcome their own political difficulties.
They mean that when Europe is established, until recently it was said, we will have German conditions.
(30:35):
Meanwhile, it seems that in Germany, politics and corruption are as intertwined as in Italy.
With one difference, that must be stated. However.
I recently heard that Schäuble apologised for the wrongdoing of the CDU.
Berlusconi does not apologise but attacks the judges, saying they are red judges, leftist judges who are persecuting me.
(30:58):
In this respect, Germany is better than Italy.
There is much hypocrisy, precisely this assertion of guilt and the great plea for forgiveness. There is much hypocrisy.
On one side we saw corruption, on the other side we saw hypocrisy.
What does politics have to do with morality?
Even Machiavelli posed the question.
(31:19):
What does it matter, one shouldn't get worked up about it.
Host (31:22):
I would like to return to another point, namely that the expression of civil society is the nation-state.
What is the expression of European society? The authoritarian supranational state.
Johannes Agnoli (31:39):
The authoritarian supranational state. It will probably call itself a state.
This is a tradition that has taken hold, that the political form is called a state.
So it is likely that it will go in this direction, with a power mechanism that is likely to
be completely different from today's power mechanism.
I say the power mechanism assumes that politics is indeed essential power.
(32:04):
And not politics, that is a formulation of mine, is the institutionalisation of the rule of man over man.
The rule of man over man is a social phenomenon that institutionalises itself in the form of the state.
And in this European society, which will be even more torn than the current individual national
(32:30):
societies, this tornness will be caught by institutions that are accordingly, I say harder,
more precise, perhaps more efficient, but which no longer correspond to the ideals of bourgeois
democracy that have really sunk into fiction.
As I said, I do assume that the so-called human rights will not be put aside, but they will
(32:55):
not be expanded, because the declaration of human rights is something very beautiful.
Mind you, we are glad that it will be realised to some extent, perhaps somewhat with limitations.
But what this torn and yet politically unified, possibly unified Europe needs is not only the
(33:19):
declaration of human rights, but the safeguarding of certain social rights.
And how this safeguarding will look, I have some doubts, because it is very casually referred
to as reform of the welfare state.
The reform of the welfare state precisely means the dismantling of social rights.
(33:40):
The dismantling of social rights is associated with something else, which can in turn lead back
to the problem of equality.
So we will not have a society of that kind, housing bonds.
But freedom without equality means nothing more than a system of privileges.
Already the famous saying liberal free rein for the capable. What about the incapable?
(34:04):
How many capable people are there in a society?
Free rein for the capable.
That is, this expanded social concept of the freedom of the individual to do as he pleases,
as long as he is able to, leads to a place of privileges.
We already have a system of privileges, but probably on a European scale, the privileges will also be stronger.
(34:26):
That is, what is referred to in Italy as hippoteri forti, the strong powers, will be even stronger in a united Europe.
The strong powers are not the politicians; it is the capital that is meant.
Also the church, also the trade unions, these are the strong powers.
With the trade unions, it will be more difficult, for it is well known that despite the slogan
(34:50):
of internationalism, capital operates and thinks much more internationally than the trade unions,
which are much more tied to national interests.
They too must break through this, and then, when it comes to European trade unions, they will
also belong to the strong powers.
Perhaps strong trade unions are a guarantee for rights to freedom.
(35:16):
I do not want to say a guarantee for rights to freedom, but a guarantee that a spark of equality aspirations is indeed present.
Even if the trade unions, regarding equality, I do not know how it has become in Germany by
now, have come under pressure in terms of equality.
Unemployed people on one side, religious surveys on the other.
(35:38):
What does equality mean here, what does equality mean?
They defend the interests of the workers.
But there is not only work; there are also many other people in the world, and we want to see
how the trade unions develop.
Host (35:50):
One question refers again to the point we had before, namely society, that is, the members of
this society, who have more or less, rather less voluntarily identified with the nation-state
(36:15):
over the last 200 years, arising from a revolutionary situation.
Europe is a technocratically created unit of bureaucrats and politicians sitting at tables.
How is this supposed to lead to this subjugation, this categorisation of individual consciousness
(36:39):
under these socially European conditions?
Johannes Agnoli (36:43):
One will formally or verbally hold on to this ideal of the French Revolution, but in reality,
one will not take it into account.
For I once read somewhere, back to John Locke, that is a very nice slogan; one can also protect
John Locke very well, but ideals are values that are no longer viable today.
(37:06):
Or they are only viable in the sense of a resistance against reality.
Host (37:11):
For that means they still contain a potential.
Johannes Agnoli (37:16):
As long as there is a societal potential, this societal potential will try to make these slogans a reality.
The question is, where is the potential?
At a congress in Halle, Klaus Off said there is no alternative potential.
Then I asked, how does one know that? We do not know.
(37:38):
That is what we said, we do not know.
We can only hope that indeed a, I call it negative potential against the existing social order,
that a negative potential, conscious potential arises.
For these values, freedom and equality, even solidarity, are only possible with a negative potential.
(38:02):
They can only be realised through negative potential.
For the entire positivity of society is heading in a completely different direction, in the
opposite direction, also in the so-called globalisation.
What does freedom, equality, solidarity mean here?
We notice that solidarity cannot be coupled with, let us say calmly, capital accumulation.
(38:29):
The former Italian managing director of Fiat, Romiti, who is famous for calling on the government
to create jobs every Sunday.
He was once asked in an interview why Fiat does not create jobs but rather reduces them.
His answer was the purpose of an entrepreneur is to make profits in the market and not to create jobs.
(38:52):
That is the logic of capital.
And this logic of capital translates into the logic of the state.
The state does not have the task of guaranteeing freedom and equality.
The state has the task of guaranteeing and organising the reproduction and capitalist production of society. That is its task.
That within this organisation the so-called human rights are still present as a slogan and that one.
(39:18):
I strongly assume that one will indeed try to restrict the limitation of these rights somewhat
again, so that it is not, let us say, obvious.
There will therefore perhaps be a form of hidden authoritarianism.
I also assume, by no means totalitarianism again, mind you.
(39:40):
But on the other hand, we repeatedly notice what freedom and equality mean today.
I mean, they exist, but I am, for example, freer than any worker or employee in a department store. I am indeed freer. She cannot.
The employee in the department store cannot have the freedom that I have.
(40:03):
So, what is the old slogan called?
They are all the same, but one is richer than the other.
Host (40:10):
From this equality arises something like a responsibility of scientists or intellectuals.
An enlightenment in quotation marks.
Johannes Agnoli (40:21):
Perhaps it is a reason for my advanced everyday life.
I am always sceptical when a special intellectual responsibility is spoken of.
The intellectual has the same responsibility as the street sweeper.
The street sweeper has the responsibility for the street, the intellectual has his.
What does intellectual responsibility entail? Perhaps for the truth.
There are those who do not exactly rave about the truth.
(40:44):
Responsibility is something quite peculiar.
For I am told, for example, that I would be against responsibility, against taking on responsibility
in political life, because I consider it irresponsible, I consider it irresponsible, to engage
in this political system and partake in political power.
(41:08):
And to think that one is particularly progressive.
One is still able to coexist with this negative potential and become part of the negative potential.
Thus, the responsibility lies in the fact that when there is an intellectual responsibility,
regardless of whether someone is a professor or just a brain, the intellectual responsibility
(41:28):
lies in recognising that in this society the actual principle of hope is based on negation.
We need a negative potential, we need courage.
That would be the actual responsibility.
The courage to simply say no to this society.
For the time being, all alone and in the hope that it will change.
Host (41:50):
Thank you for being with Audio Archive.
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And don't forget the like button.
Until next week, your Audio Archive team.
Welcome to audioarchiv, the channel for historical interviews with female writers, philosophers,
activists, and intellectuals from around the world.
Johannes Agnoli (00:34):
Hello. The Future of Europe, we held a conversation in 2006 in Berlin with Johannes Agnoli about
the political future of Europe.
An enlightening conversation about freedom, equality, and brotherhood, the slogans of the French
Revolution and their significance in the present, about the paralysis of national institutions
(00:58):
in times of globalisation, about the authoritarian character of European politics, about the
freedom of capital and the Marxist concept of equality.
But first, some biographical details about Johannes Agnoli.
Johannes Agnoli was born in Italy in 1925, became politically active during Italian fascism,
(01:20):
survived the Second World War in a British prisoner of war camp in Egypt, emigrated from Italy
to Germany, and most recently worked as a professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin.
By then, he was already one of the most prominent leftist thinkers in Germany.
The book The Transformation of Democracy, published in 1967 together with social psychologist
(01:46):
Peter Brückner, is considered the most influential work of the extra-parliamentary left in Germany,
according to Johannes and Julius and Peter Brückner's publications in the show notes.
Although largely ignored in the present and dismissed as old leftist nonsense, even denounced
(02:06):
by the left, it anticipates developments that have become reality.
Johannes Agnoli describes how unfree European societies are in our conversation.
For social participation in political decisions, individual freedom, and social equality are
consistently being dismantled in Europe.
(02:28):
In favour of capital interests, a racist migration policy, and the dramatic increase in military
spending, they are not even allowed.
The national bourgeois societies with their historically grown state institutions, according
to Johannes Agnoli, fail at the idea of emancipation due to their national limitations.
(02:51):
Their failure is the basis for the success of neo-fascist and far-right parties.
Despite all this, Johannes Agnoli counters this new, conservatively fascist European reality
with the utopia of a European society of the free and equal.
Host (03:09):
Mr Agnoli, liberty, equality, brotherhood, the slogans of the French Revolution, what do they mean today for Europe?
Johannes Agnoli (03:17):
It depends on the perspective from which the matter is viewed; if we consider the neoliberal
side, for example, very little remains of the French, essentially Jacobin slogan.
But they still cling to the idea that liberty should be for capital.
And equality should consist in the famous equality of opportunity.
(03:40):
In itself, an interesting position of this equality of opportunity, as equality of opportunity
presupposes the inequality of success, the equality of opportunity.
I consider what the slogan of the German Wehrmacht was.
Every soldier carries in his backpack, it says, the Marshall's baton.
With the small difference that there were five to six million soldiers and a dozen marshals.
(04:04):
In this respect, equality of opportunity is the equality of the powerful to assert themselves.
And liberty is, of course, the freedom to assert oneself in the market, as one can.
Conversely, we take this slogan as very important.
I still consider this to be correct for developing countries.
For them, liberty does not mean freedom of opinion, freedom of religion, freedom of presence;
(04:27):
it means freedom from hunger and need.
And equality means having the same access to wealth as is usual in industrial nations.
Although even in industrial nations, the same access to wealth is no longer guaranteed in the meantime.
For it has also been shown in the so-called industrial nations that society is a fractured society.
(04:50):
So we should consider what liberty and equality mean?
Let us set aside the fragility; today we would rather speak of solidarity in a fractured society.
On the other hand, there is the freedom of entrepreneurs, the freedom of capital, the freedom
of the market, this peculiar form of freedom that consists in the market being a democratic
(05:12):
undertaking, as everyone can choose the goods they want.
And on the other hand, there remains really the exact opposite of this restricted late-bourgeois
concept of liberty and equality.
That is the utopia stated in the Communist Manifesto, the association of liberty and equality.
However, the so-called real socialism has forgotten a sentence in communism (05:30):
the freedom of
each individual is the prerequisite for the freedom of all.
There is, however, a significant difference between the Jacobin concept of equality, which truly
meant a levelling in the sense of a homogenisation towards the petty bourgeoisie, as the Jacobins
(05:53):
were ideologues and also representatives of the petty bourgeoisie.
The thesis of Rosu was also adopted by the Jacobins.
Restriction of property, thus no capital accumulation, but only small property and equality.
And the Marxist concept of freedom is the freedom of each individual.
This presents equality, but in the Marxist view, it is the same right to satisfy one's own needs,
(06:19):
not equality in the needs themselves.
Today, where are we talking about freedom and equality?
I say myself, a utopia at its core, because the reality today, which is grey in Europe, guarantees
freedom and equality only in the circumscribed sense of the constitution.
And there we know what equality means (06:39):
the same right for all to have access to positions.
We know that this is a fiction.
In fact, much of what is constitutional life, constitutional norm is a fiction, but as Hans
Kelsen said in England, a representative of parliamentarism, it is a necessary fiction.
In this necessary fiction, it seems to me that the slogan of freedom and equality has become a slogan.
(07:04):
We are all equal, we are all free. What do we want?
We have, so to speak, realised the ideal.
So we live, like Leibniz in his theory, we actually live in.
What is it called, I believe, Genscher is in the best state of German history, indeed in the
best state in the world.
The Federal Republic of Germany is also, in terms of freedom and equality, in a sense the symbol
(07:28):
of realised, final, realised, preserved democracy.
In reality, there is an enormous gap between this formal freedom and equality that exists, and
a truly materially grounded freedom and equality in the sense, for example, of the Communist Manifesto.
Host (07:45):
I would like to perhaps go back once more to the emergence of this concept as a slogan of the French Revolution.
They say, the Jacobin of the petty bourgeois revolution, yet a bearer of a utopia that continues
to resonate to this day.
Johannes Agnoli (07:58):
Yes, that is correct. First of all, one must say, freedom, freedom, liberté d'accord.
But the actual social content, particularly from Rousseau and also among the Jacobins, of the
word freedom was something different.
Not freedom of opinion, but independence.
Above all, for Rousseau, the concept of independence plays a much more important role than the concept of freedom.
(08:22):
Independence was, in a sense, the foundation of civil freedom.
For it also meant independence from the old feudal lords, from absolute kings.
And indeed, even today, when we look at this perspective, we consider, who is independent today?
I have always spoken earlier about dependent measures.
(08:43):
The measures of the population live in a dependent state.
The state may be one of prosperity, that is conceivable.
But independence is not present.
That is why I speak of formal freedom.
Not that I would be against formal freedom.
It would be ridiculous if I were against the freedom of opinion. Not at all.
(09:03):
But one must see that, in content, this does not correspond to what would be socially possible and to freedom.
It is fundamentally set by the free development of personality.
But this free development is completely constrained, entirely restricted by all sorts of norms,
principles, considerations, and so on.
(09:23):
The question is whether the actual content of the word freedom is not to be found among the
Jacobins, but perhaps among the anarchists.
That may be, one can discuss that.
As for the Jacobins, that was, as I said, the first great petty-bourgeois revolution, which
is well known to have failed.
And they really adhered, in principle, coming from Rousseau, to the principle of social equality
(09:49):
by reducing, let us say calmly, the citizen to the owner, and indeed to the small owner.
I once read somewhere that Rousseau was an ideologue of capitalism, which is completely wrong.
Rousseau was an opponent of capital accumulation.
They were always oriented, no bourgeoisie among small owners.
(10:10):
They did not see that the small owners are, in a sense, the diffuse social basis for the creation of large property.
Host (10:20):
If we take that as a prerequisite.
Why is the concept of freedom still upheld in society, in today's society, in European societies?
And what is it projected onto when we think of a united Europe?
Johannes Agnoli (10:36):
Yes, so initially, to hold on to this concept is indeed correct, I would say, I would like to
put it differently, one does not hold on to this concept, as the concept has become completely installed.
One clings to this fiction.
Ideologically speaking, no state in the world can call itself undemocratic.
(10:57):
We know that the real socialist countries called themselves people's democracies.
And today, in the current situation, someone who would say, 'away with freedom', would not even be understood.
Even, what is this Austrian half-Nazi Halder, he also speaks of freedom, because he has a cultural
(11:19):
position from a European perspective, or also from a North American perspective, without which
one cannot politically operate at all.
No matter what someone, even a politician, wants, they will always talk about freedom.
Equality is somewhat more difficult.
And if you observe, there is a lot of talk about freedom in the press, in comments.
(11:44):
But from the perspective of equality, one is somewhat positive, because one knows very well
that freedom can be worked with as a slogan.
The principle of equality can also have an explosive effect.
It cannot necessarily, if it remains a slogan. That is freedom.
Equality, brotherhood, solidarity, humanity, peace of the world.
These are loud slogans, but it may be that some of these slogans, as I said, are capable of
(12:11):
breaking this crust in which we live, because we live in a crusted society.
Host (12:16):
The interview continues shortly. Like us if you enjoy it.
Johannes Agnoli (12:22):
From a European perspective, one must see that probably one of the many difficulties on the
way to this unity of Europe is that the various national societies also have a very different understanding here.
Let us take Germany and Italy.
For Germany, the concept of freedom is directly connected.
(12:45):
Not only connected, it is integrated into the concept of the rule of law.
For the diffuse Italian population, not now bound by party or party politics, freedom is something
that always has to do with, I would say, with an attack, but with a distancing from the state.
(13:07):
This means that in Germany, freedom is linked with statehood, in Italy, not in France.
I don't know enough about it, but France is probably also divided.
I know some French people who, when they talk about freedom, do not think of the state, but
rather as something that stands outside the state, not against the state, but outside the state.
(13:27):
And indeed, outside the state one must be careful, not in the sense of privatisation, but in
the sense that society can, like reality, be different from the state-organised reality.
This is of course simply the case in Italy, to develop such thoughts, when they consider that
(13:49):
in Italy society continues to go on, continues to live, continues to exist, develops, while the state is a. A catastrophe.
I say the state is inefficient, public administration does not work, and society continues to
live on in such a situation.
Of course, the coupling of freedom equals the rule of law for the statement of.
(14:13):
Do you also think that when people talk about the rule of law? Of course.
In Italy, they talk about the rule of law.
Every time a judge is against someone, then the lawyer says, they are gone.
The Rosconia example for the concept of.
Host (14:27):
Equality in relation to Europe, I would provocatively say now.
This concept of equality has already undergone such a reinterpretation that it only means the
equality of everyone being able to use the Euro.
Johannes Agnoli (14:43):
Now it is such that people outside Germany were very surprised that initially the monetary union
came, in the perspective that the monetary union is of course only a first important step towards political unity.
This belongs to the German tradition.
Do not forget that the customs union was before the founding of the Empire, that the currency
(15:04):
reform was before the founding of the Federal Republic and the monetary union with the GDR was before reunification.
I try to explain this.
Many Italians ask me, why the Euro, Euro, Euro, in German Euro and not first the unity.
Yes, that is the German tradition.
First, the economy must be united, then perhaps over time.
(15:25):
If over time we come to a European state, then we will probably have to rethink what equality
means in a European state?
Because even within nation-states this equality is only a formal slogan.
Not even a formal reality, it is a formal slogan.
Well, they spoke of the European state, now they are outliving themselves.
(15:49):
A European state can be such a state.
I would like to state at the outset that there is a historically seen society, as seen a very
close connection between the creation of the free market and the creation of the nation-state.
I do not want to raise the question of priority (16:07):
does the economy come first or does politics come first?
It is a historical question.
Was the state first and then capital, or are they somehow coupled?
In any case, there is this internal market, nation-state.
If the internal market disappears, what does the nation-state have to do with it?
(16:28):
So we will have within the European market, with or without the Euro, now with the Euro, obviously
a new form of state that remains from the state.
A new form of state.
And one must consider what role the classical bourgeois institutions have in the new form of state.
(16:49):
Perhaps we already have a taste of this in that the Council of Ministers in Brussels is completely
removed from all so-called democratic control.
For while there is a European Parliament, there are European elections, but if within the nation-state
the executive has priority over the legislative, then we notice in Europe that the situation is even worsening.
(17:13):
The European Parliament has much less to do than a national parliament.
On the other hand, I must say, in this context there is a principle of separation of powers,
which has anyway been laid to rest in the constitution itself.
When it is said, I state at the outset, in a normal bourgeois, democratic state, politics is essentially made through laws.
(17:39):
But in the constitution it states that the Chancellor determines the guidelines of politics,
thus also the guidelines of legislation.
Apart from the curious case that in the constitution the Federal Council is also part of the legislative.
But the Federal Council represents the state executives.
So we have a nice mess.
Probably there will no longer be a mess in Europe as a standard, because we will not have a bourgeois constitutional state.
(18:05):
We will experience a modernisation of this state towards, I always say, I have previously spoken
of an authoritarian rule of law.
It is likely to go in this direction.
A rule of law in that respect, because I am convinced that it is to be assumed, very strongly
assumed, that these fundamental rights, these human rights will not be laid aside.
(18:30):
In this respect, the state will remain a Western country, but it will probably take on a completely
different form than that of civil constitutionalism.
There may also be a European constitution, and I am curious to see what this European constitution will look like.
Host (18:47):
However, you have written in one of your books that no conservative hope can be fulfilled purely
institutionally if the hope for radical change does not concern itself with the institutions.
That means, if the inhabitants of Europe do not care about the institutions, is there then a radical, revolutionary potential present?
Johannes Agnoli (19:11):
Restlessness, restlessness. We do not know that.
So I mean, the fall has become world history.
The fall of the Berlin Wall. Everywhere, even in Italy.
The wall has completely fallen.
The fall of the wall has shown our grandmothers the incompetence of our social sciences.
For the fall of the wall has shown that we are not capable of making predictions.
(19:36):
We can formulate hypotheses, but a forecast is simply not possible.
So we do not know how things will develop.
We can only assume that due to the socio-economic situation, the development will not proceed
as it did with the formation of the democratic nation-state.
Brussels is just one example, a foretaste of that.
(19:59):
If we also think of the now notoriously infamous globalisation, we see the matter even more
sharply on a global scale.
We can see the matter even more clearly.
If many demand that this wild capital should be tamed by a political form, it is hardly conceivable
(20:21):
that the taming could occur through a civil constitutional state on a global scale.
In other words, we are going.
This is just a conjecture, not a forecast, a working hypothesis from which one should proceed.
A working hypothesis that, as I said, we are heading towards harder times, politically harder times.
(20:49):
That freedom and equality, as the nearby Frenchman comes, are increasingly becoming mere slogans.
There is still one more thing, we are creating a state in Europe within or summarising, that
is, an organisational summary of a society that is still torn apart, not by being still torn
(21:09):
apart, but that is facing a problem that is probably unsolvable.
The problem of mass unemployment.
I say that this is unsolvable because it is said that unemployment is structurally conditioned,
that is, it is a permanent state.
This unemployment leads to the fact that even within a possible European state, even within
(21:33):
the state of the so-called industrial nations, there is an element present that could potentially be negative.
We do not know that.
Perhaps this is the famous principle of hope by Ernst Bloch.
We can hope that this potential is a negative potential, that is, a potential that leads to
(21:54):
a breaking situation, which again might be able to stimulate a kind of democratisation.
There is still one more thing.
We live here happily and contentedly, even the unemployed are not doing as badly as in the previous
century and forget that this concerns about 1/5 of the world population. What about the others? Is that a potential?
(22:21):
They are currently living in resignation, we know that. Is that a potential?
What will come of it?
Are we sure, shall we say, are we sure that these industrial nations will not one day come to
use their potential, their military potential, to solve this problem?
(22:45):
What the ancient Romans did not achieve against the barbarian invasions.
In Italian, this is not called migration, it is called barbarian invasions.
With others here, how are such problems solved on a European scale?
The European state will probably have to deal with the immigrant or immigrants question.
(23:09):
For if this continues, this wave of immigration will not only come from the east but especially
from the south, from Africa, probably also reaching Central Europe.
Italy has already reached it, Spain too, France as well, but not yet Central Europe.
And it seems to me that the cherished forms of the bourgeois state cannot cope with this.
(23:33):
Unless society really opens up, that society truly accepts this state and tries to cope with it socially. So not just acceptance.
Not just tolerance, but really a kind of, how should one say, merging, not taking it for granted
(23:55):
that we no longer have uniform national societies.
Host (24:00):
And yet Europe appears, especially in light of the immigration from the south, more than a confederation, as a proper state.
Johannes Agnoli (24:11):
Yes, that is also a problem when one speaks of Europe becoming a unity.
How can one, by what means and in what timeframe, be able to cope with the fact that the individual
states have completely different, not only constitutional forms but also entirely different political structures.
(24:33):
Starting from electoral law to the relationship between the famous three branches of government,
even down to age itself.
Let us take a federal state like the Federal Republic, a central state like France, and a state
like Italy, which is trying to incorporate some federal elements.
(24:54):
Not to mention the English, for they are already facing this, aren't they?
That is one of the difficulties.
And how this can then become an instance capable of providing a political form that can deal
with the aforementioned problems of immigrants coming from the south, with the current institutions, I consider impossible.
(25:18):
The current institutions were not historically created for such problems at all.
National parliaments, national governments, even cases, structures have nothing to do with it at all.
Now one is starting to talk about regionalism.
And now you can already see here the emergence of a completely new element.
It is said that the Alpine region is a region in itself, regardless of whether Switzerland,
(25:43):
Austria, France, Italy, or Germany. A region in itself.
How will this integrate into this new city?
The question is, of course, that the new state must come, not because the state chooses something
beautiful, but because we live in a capitalist-producing society.
(26:06):
And Marx is still right in this regard.
A capitalist-producing society needs a political form.
The view, the Swabian immigrant Berle held this view, at the beginning of the 80s, I believe.
I have the book in Italian, but the book has not been published there, about the capitalist revolution.
(26:28):
What is meant, in his view, is that the corporation has become so strong that it no longer needs the state.
In reality, it shows that the multinational, internationally established corporation still requires
a political form, especially when the problems, as they have presented them, come knocking at the door.
(26:50):
Capital also needs global capital, which requires the corresponding political form.
I merely say that the institutions we have now were not created in the last century to deal with these problems.
And now, the outlook will certainly not be that we will have a greater wave of democratisation
(27:11):
in the form of the state, but rather we will have authoritarian forms.
I repeat, with a rule of law character and probably with the maintenance of certain fictions,
although with the fiction of elections it is a bit inconceivable that global capital would have
(27:33):
a worldwide electoral legislation, because I mean, one cannot vote globally at all.
These are all problems of the European state.
Then one must ask, is it necessary or not?
I would not pose the question that way.
It has often been the mistake of the left to criticise reality, always from the idea of a differently structured law.
(28:02):
And I always say, it makes no sense to fight against the establishment of a European state,
just as it made no sense to fight against the introduction of the Euro.
Host (28:14):
The interview will continue shortly.
Like us if you enjoy it.
Johannes Agnoli (28:19):
I do not know how it was in Germany.
In Italy, the entire left was against the introduction of the Euro, but it came.
It is much better, regardless of whether one is on the left or the right, if one simply thinks
democratically about how we should respond to this allegedly authoritarian European state.
(28:41):
How should we act socially within it?
How should we live, think, and do within it?
That is much more important.
I always consider it misguided to go against reality.
Probably, the European state will come to a political agreement in the long run, because a currency
(29:02):
unit without a unified political form is nonsense.
There are difficulties to overcome.
I spoke earlier about the individual institutions, elections, legislature, executive.
What about the tax system, for example?
It varies in all countries.
Will we have a unified tax system when we already have a single currency?
(29:25):
Consider that a single currency must contend with a dozen different tax systems. That simply isn't feasible.
And now it leads us towards authoritarianism.
Which political authority could establish a unified tax legislation in Europe?
Other than through authoritarian methods?
(29:46):
It cannot be done otherwise, as the population is still bound by national borders.
And when a change in the tax system is mentioned, the population of a particular country will
react quite differently at elections than the population of another country.
Perhaps Italy is an exception.
(30:08):
The Italians strongly desire a European state, not because they think more European than others,
but to rid themselves of their own political class and the tax legislation they consider poor.
To overcome their own political difficulties.
They mean that when Europe is established, until recently it was said, we will have German conditions.
(30:35):
Meanwhile, it seems that in Germany, politics and corruption are as intertwined as in Italy.
With one difference, that must be stated. However.
I recently heard that Schäuble apologised for the wrongdoing of the CDU.
Berlusconi does not apologise but attacks the judges, saying they are red judges, leftist judges who are persecuting me.
(30:58):
In this respect, Germany is better than Italy.
There is much hypocrisy, precisely this assertion of guilt and the great plea for forgiveness. There is much hypocrisy.
On one side we saw corruption, on the other side we saw hypocrisy.
What does politics have to do with morality?
Even Machiavelli posed the question.
(31:19):
What does it matter, one shouldn't get worked up about it.
Host (31:22):
I would like to return to another point, namely that the expression of civil society is the nation-state.
What is the expression of European society? The authoritarian supranational state.
Johannes Agnoli (31:39):
The authoritarian supranational state. It will probably call itself a state.
This is a tradition that has taken hold, that the political form is called a state.
So it is likely that it will go in this direction, with a power mechanism that is likely to
be completely different from today's power mechanism.
I say the power mechanism assumes that politics is indeed essential power.
(32:04):
And not politics, that is a formulation of mine, is the institutionalisation of the rule of man over man.
The rule of man over man is a social phenomenon that institutionalises itself in the form of the state.
And in this European society, which will be even more torn than the current individual national
(32:30):
societies, this tornness will be caught by institutions that are accordingly, I say harder,
more precise, perhaps more efficient, but which no longer correspond to the ideals of bourgeois
democracy that have really sunk into fiction.
As I said, I do assume that the so-called human rights will not be put aside, but they will
(32:55):
not be expanded, because the declaration of human rights is something very beautiful.
Mind you, we are glad that it will be realised to some extent, perhaps somewhat with limitations.
But what this torn and yet politically unified, possibly unified Europe needs is not only the
(33:19):
declaration of human rights, but the safeguarding of certain social rights.
And how this safeguarding will look, I have some doubts, because it is very casually referred
to as reform of the welfare state.
The reform of the welfare state precisely means the dismantling of social rights.
(33:40):
The dismantling of social rights is associated with something else, which can in turn lead back
to the problem of equality.
So we will not have a society of that kind, housing bonds.
But freedom without equality means nothing more than a system of privileges.
Already the famous saying liberal free rein for the capable. What about the incapable?
(34:04):
How many capable people are there in a society?
Free rein for the capable.
That is, this expanded social concept of the freedom of the individual to do as he pleases,
as long as he is able to, leads to a place of privileges.
We already have a system of privileges, but probably on a European scale, the privileges will also be stronger.
(34:26):
That is, what is referred to in Italy as hippoteri forti, the strong powers, will be even stronger in a united Europe.
The strong powers are not the politicians; it is the capital that is meant.
Also the church, also the trade unions, these are the strong powers.
With the trade unions, it will be more difficult, for it is well known that despite the slogan
(34:50):
of internationalism, capital operates and thinks much more internationally than the trade unions,
which are much more tied to national interests.
They too must break through this, and then, when it comes to European trade unions, they will
also belong to the strong powers.
Perhaps strong trade unions are a guarantee for rights to freedom.
(35:16):
I do not want to say a guarantee for rights to freedom, but a guarantee that a spark of equality aspirations is indeed present.
Even if the trade unions, regarding equality, I do not know how it has become in Germany by
now, have come under pressure in terms of equality.
Unemployed people on one side, religious surveys on the other.
(35:38):
What does equality mean here, what does equality mean?
They defend the interests of the workers.
But there is not only work; there are also many other people in the world, and we want to see
how the trade unions develop.
Host (35:50):
One question refers again to the point we had before, namely society, that is, the members of
this society, who have more or less, rather less voluntarily identified with the nation-state
(36:15):
over the last 200 years, arising from a revolutionary situation.
Europe is a technocratically created unit of bureaucrats and politicians sitting at tables.
How is this supposed to lead to this subjugation, this categorisation of individual consciousness
(36:39):
under these socially European conditions?
Johannes Agnoli (36:43):
One will formally or verbally hold on to this ideal of the French Revolution, but in reality,
one will not take it into account.
For I once read somewhere, back to John Locke, that is a very nice slogan; one can also protect
John Locke very well, but ideals are values that are no longer viable today.
(37:06):
Or they are only viable in the sense of a resistance against reality.
Host (37:11):
For that means they still contain a potential.
Johannes Agnoli (37:16):
As long as there is a societal potential, this societal potential will try to make these slogans a reality.
The question is, where is the potential?
At a congress in Halle, Klaus Off said there is no alternative potential.
Then I asked, how does one know that? We do not know.
(37:38):
That is what we said, we do not know.
We can only hope that indeed a, I call it negative potential against the existing social order,
that a negative potential, conscious potential arises.
For these values, freedom and equality, even solidarity, are only possible with a negative potential.
(38:02):
They can only be realised through negative potential.
For the entire positivity of society is heading in a completely different direction, in the
opposite direction, also in the so-called globalisation.
What does freedom, equality, solidarity mean here?
We notice that solidarity cannot be coupled with, let us say calmly, capital accumulation.
(38:29):
The former Italian managing director of Fiat, Romiti, who is famous for calling on the government
to create jobs every Sunday.
He was once asked in an interview why Fiat does not create jobs but rather reduces them.
His answer was the purpose of an entrepreneur is to make profits in the market and not to create jobs.
(38:52):
That is the logic of capital.
And this logic of capital translates into the logic of the state.
The state does not have the task of guaranteeing freedom and equality.
The state has the task of guaranteeing and organising the reproduction and capitalist production of society. That is its task.
That within this organisation the so-called human rights are still present as a slogan and that one.
(39:18):
I strongly assume that one will indeed try to restrict the limitation of these rights somewhat
again, so that it is not, let us say, obvious.
There will therefore perhaps be a form of hidden authoritarianism.
I also assume, by no means totalitarianism again, mind you.
(39:40):
But on the other hand, we repeatedly notice what freedom and equality mean today.
I mean, they exist, but I am, for example, freer than any worker or employee in a department store. I am indeed freer. She cannot.
The employee in the department store cannot have the freedom that I have.
(40:03):
So, what is the old slogan called?
They are all the same, but one is richer than the other.
Host (40:10):
From this equality arises something like a responsibility of scientists or intellectuals.
An enlightenment in quotation marks.
Johannes Agnoli (40:21):
Perhaps it is a reason for my advanced everyday life.
I am always sceptical when a special intellectual responsibility is spoken of.
The intellectual has the same responsibility as the street sweeper.
The street sweeper has the responsibility for the street, the intellectual has his.
What does intellectual responsibility entail? Perhaps for the truth.
There are those who do not exactly rave about the truth.
(40:44):
Responsibility is something quite peculiar.
For I am told, for example, that I would be against responsibility, against taking on responsibility
in political life, because I consider it irresponsible, I consider it irresponsible, to engage
in this political system and partake in political power.
(41:08):
And to think that one is particularly progressive.
One is still able to coexist with this negative potential and become part of the negative potential.
Thus, the responsibility lies in the fact that when there is an intellectual responsibility,
regardless of whether someone is a professor or just a brain, the intellectual responsibility
(41:28):
lies in recognising that in this society the actual principle of hope is based on negation.
We need a negative potential, we need courage.
That would be the actual responsibility.
The courage to simply say no to this society.
For the time being, all alone and in the hope that it will change.
Host (41:50):
Thank you for being with Audio Archive.
Follow us, and you won't miss an episode.
And don't forget the like button.
Until next week, your Audio Archive team.
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