Ulrich Bausch: "1945-49: Re-Demokratisierung in Deutschland - Re-democratization in Germany - La ridemocratizzazione in Germania."

🎓 Christoph Burgmer im Gespräch mit Ulrich Bausch (geb. 1959). Ulrich Bausch ist Sozialwissenschaftler. Er forscht zu Fragen der amerikanischen Kulturpolitik in Deutschland zwischen 1945 und 1949. Ulrich Bausch leitete jahrelang die Volkshochschule Reutlingen und ist Mitgründer der "Reportageschule", einer privaten, verlagsunabhängigen Journalistenschule in Reutlingen. In diesem Gespräch aus dem Jahr 1994 wird die "Demokratieerziehung" der amerikanischen Besatzungsoffiziere nach der Kapitulation und Besetzung Deutschlands ab 1945 diskutiert. Als die weltoffene Politik in der Aera der Kommunistenverfolgung unter Mac Carthy (vergleichbar in mancherlei Hinsicht mit der America First Bewegung Donald Trumps) obsolet wurde, kehrten auch die Deutschen zum preussischen Obrigkeitsdenken zurück. Erst die Kulturrevolution der 1968er Bewegung, eine für die DDR Parteieliten weitgehend als Bedrohung wahrgenommene politischen Veränderung, demokratisierte kulturell und politisch die alte Bundesrepublik. Die unter nationalistischer Propaganda vollzogene Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands 1990 machte das "law & order" Denken dagegen wieder für große Bevölkerungsteile attraktiv und erlaubte Parteien unter Bekämpfung der 1968er Kulturrevolution den Anschluß an nationalistische, antisemitische und rassistische Politiken von der Kaiserzeit bis hin zum Nationalsozialismus. Sich heute die Strategien der amerikanischen Besatzungsoffiziere zur "Demokratie-Erziehung" der Deutschen zu vergegenwärtigen erscheint notwendiger denn je.

/🎓 Christoph Burgmer in conversation with Ulrich Bausch (born 1959). Ulrich Bausch is a social scientist. He researches issues relating to American cultural policy in Germany between 1945 and 1949. Ulrich Bausch was director of the Reutlingen Adult Education Centre for many years and is co-founder of the ‘Reportageschule’, a private, independent journalism school in Reutlingen. In this conversation from 1994, they discuss the ‘democracy education’ provided by American occupation officers after Germany's surrender and occupation in 1945. When cosmopolitan politics became obsolete in the era of communist persecution under McCarthy (comparable in many ways to Donald Trump's America First movement), the Germans also returned to Prussian authoritarian thinking. It was not until the cultural revolution of the 1968 movement, a political change largely perceived as a threat by the GDR party elites, that the old Federal Republic was democratised culturally and politically. The reunification of Germany in 1990, carried out under nationalist propaganda, made ‘law and order’ thinking attractive again to large sections of the population and allowed parties to combat the cultural revolution of 1968 and align themselves with nationalist, anti-Semitic and racist policies from the imperial era to National Socialism. Today, it seems more necessary than ever to recall the strategies employed by American occupation officers to ‘educate’ Germans in democracy. 

🎓 Christoph Burgmer in conversazione con Ulrich Bausch (nato nel 1959). Ulrich Bausch è un sociologo. La sua ricerca verte su questioni relative alla politica culturale americana in Germania tra il 1945 e il 1949. Ulrich Bausch ha diretto per anni l'Università popolare di Reutlingen ed è cofondatore della “Reportageschule”, una scuola di giornalismo privata e indipendente da case editrici con sede a Reutlingen. In questa conversazione del 1994 si discute dell'“educazione alla democrazia” impartita dagli ufficiali dell'esercito americano dopo la capitolazione e l'occupazione della Germania a partire dal 1945. Quando la politica cosmopolita divenne obsoleta nell'era della persecuzione dei comunisti sotto Mac Carthy (paragonabile per molti aspetti al movimento America First di Donald Trump), anche i tedeschi tornarono al pensiero autoritario prussiano. Solo la rivoluzione culturale del movimento del 1968, un cambiamento politico percepito come una minaccia dalle élite del partito della DDR, democratizzò culturalmente e politicamente la vecchia Repubblica Federale. La riunificazione della Germania nel 1990, realizzata sotto la propaganda nazionalista, ha reso nuovamente attraente per gran parte della popolazione il pensiero basato sulla “legge e ordine” e ha permesso ai partiti, combattendo la rivoluzione culturale del 1968, di riallacciarsi alle politiche nazionaliste, antisemite e razziste che andavano dall'epoca imperiale al nazionalsocialismo. Oggi sembra più che mai necessario ricordare le strategie degli ufficiali dell'occupazione americana per “educare alla democrazia” i tedeschi. 

📚 Veröffentlichungen u.a. / Publications a.o. / Pubblicazioni, tra le altre:

- Ulrich Bausch: "Die Kulturpolitik der US-amerikanischen Information Control Division in Württemberg-Baden von 19

Episode Transcript

(00:08):
Welcome to Audio Archive, the channel for historical interviews with writers, philosophers,
activists, and intellectuals from around the world.

(00:34):
Hello! How can societal diversity defend against the cult of the leader of right-wing and fascist movements?
To do this, it seems necessary to ask about the causes of the democratic deficit of well over 25% of Germans.
A working thesis could be that people are not involved in democratic processes and therefore

(00:57):
do not see or experience any advantage in democracy.
Historical analysis could also help.
For this, we will go back in this conversation to the beginnings of democracy in West Germany.
The social scientist and managing director of the adult education centre in Reutlingen, Ulrich
Bausch, who is also the head of one of the largest adult education centres in Germany, explains

(01:21):
in our conversation the beginning of West German democracy, as it was established in the American
occupation zone after the end of the war between 1945 and 1948.
Ulrich Bausch describes how the USA managed to persuade a majority of Germans to abandon their
National Socialist beliefs and particularly to introduce the youth to pluralistic ways of thinking.

(01:45):
This primarily requires breaking down outdated authoritarian structures and confronting mandate
holders in administration and politics.
In the former GDR, the economic and political elites of the Federal Republic failed to involve
people in the democratic shaping process of their own living environment.

(02:07):
Who does not remember how in the West, washed-up politicians, journalists, scientists, and whoever
else, a running gag of the time was the insurance broker who sold all sorts of things to every
East German, who settled in East Germany and genuinely believed under the constant propaganda
of a salvific national unity ideology that everything would eventually become democratic, simply

(02:33):
because they were German, while deliberately exploiting the naivety and helplessness in dealing
with pluralistic ways of thinking to install themselves as authority figures.
In contrast, the American officers.
They recognised long before the end of the war in 1945 that without the involvement of the population,

(02:54):
stabilising democratic thinking and action would be impossible.
Interestingly, they first forced German civil servants and politicians to expose their actions
to public criticism in town meetings.
Initially, this was called re-education, later re-orientation policy.

(03:15):
To break authoritarian, racist, and anti-liberal thought structures, one certainly needs more
than bananas, cars, and holidays.
Perhaps it is already too late for this in East Germany, and considering the entire also authoritarian-structured
European Union, there is a lack of cross-national resistance against far-right and fascist parties.

(03:41):
Getting rid of the authoritarian spirit of nationalist drunkenness of a Helmut Kohl and Willy
Brandt and convincing people of the advantages of a pluralistic mindset is also not a political
vision for our current elites.
Mr Bosch, what I would be interested in first are those, in the literature, it is also repeatedly

(04:03):
mentioned together, that is denazification and re-education policy.
How was this connected in the early days of the American occupation and what development did it take?
These are not developments that are directly related.
This is because different American departments had different mandates.
There were people who were tasked at a very early stage with finding locals to collaborate with

(04:29):
in the fields of culture, the press, and radio.
These people, these occupation officers had extensive powers.
They were allowed to fraternise, the term was already rejected at that time.
They were allowed to wear civilian clothes and had the opportunity to find locals and decide
based on personal criteria whether they could collaborate with these people.

(04:52):
There were other departments that were responsible for the so-called denazification and they
initially said very pragmatically, well, the old administrations, we need to replace them.
The people from the ministries must go.
They must first be put out on the street.
Then we will check how heavily they are burdened and then there is a development where one must

(05:13):
say, initially this was pursued very harshly and over time one became more lenient.
This is also reflected in the so-called GCS 1067, the directive for the occupation, which in
its first version still instructed the occupiers not to collaborate with any so-called Nazis at all.

(05:33):
It was said that, of course, party members were out of the question, and then in the fifth version,
this GCS 1067 was rewritten five times, it was said that one must not cooperate with those who
would have been ardent admirers of National Socialism.
And this formulation, ardent admirers, was of course the opportunity to interpret it very broadly

(05:55):
and opened the door to collaborate with many locals.
Ultimately, the financial politicians in Washington prevailed, as it was calculated that if
we enforced the GCS 1067 in its first version, we would need a lot of expensive American personnel.
However, if we let local officials help, it would be cheaper, and thus one cannot speak of a

(06:20):
direct causality between denazification and re-education.
The term re-education is actually a new term altogether when referring to two states, where
one state occupies another and implements a re-education policy.
From when can one speak of this re-education policy?

(06:43):
How did it come about?
I am not sure whether it is even legitimate to speak so broadly of the re-education policy,
as in a very early stage, already in January 1946, one began to speak of a re-orientation policy.
Even American occupation officers did not really like the term re-education.

(07:03):
They became more cautious and said that a re-orientation was what should be aimed for.
The term appears in American reports, re-education in the summer of 1945, then changes to re-orientation.
However, it must be said that the concept of democracy that was pursued here was oriented towards radical pluralism.

(07:30):
In all instructions, it was stated to avoid any form of propaganda, avoid overly simplistic
advertising for America, and be prepared to portray one's own country critically.
And for this reason, for example, magazines were presented in the information centres that critically
examined one's own country, such as the newspaper New Republic or Nation.

(07:54):
Now, in hindsight, there are always voices saying that when the Americans were there, it was absolutely fantastic.
We felt free, we were liberated.
However, the Americans did not initially have liberation in mind, but rather the conquest of a country.
Something that one could not possibly imagine from the American side, that one really has to

(08:16):
conquer a country from city to city and village to village, even though the resistance was completely pointless.
From the German perspective, it is portrayed in such a way and it is still the case today, that
one says, well, the Americans, when they came, we were enthusiastic and ardent supporters.
However, if you listen to original sounds from that time or read reports from that time, it
is not so straightforward to answer. So the scepticism prevailed.

(08:40):
Of course, there were individuals who perceived it as liberation.
Certainly the inmates of concentration camps, many who suffered enormously under the National
Socialists, perceived it as liberation.
But the majority was sceptical for two reasons.
Firstly, they had a guilty conscience and suspected that the enemy would pay the Germans back

(09:01):
or that they would take revenge and projected this fear onto the enemy, to whom they attributed
all sorts of bad things.
The second reason was that the anti-American propaganda under Goebbels still lived on in people's minds.
The Americans as a brutal people, in which crime and immorality prevail and who understand nothing of culture at all.

(09:25):
So this combination of a guilty conscience and strong prejudices led to a certain scepticism towards the occupiers.
And when it was seen that the Americans were initially very rigid in the confiscation of housing,
when it was seen that they also acted harshly in the initial intensification policy, these prejudices seemed to be confirmed.

But it was also quickly noticed (09:49):
With the Americans, food comes into the country.
The Americans ensure that rapes stop.
It was found that although they initially kept their distance, they generally treated the local population very fairly.
And then, of course, one was glad to be in the American sector and not in the Russian one.

(10:15):
For one knew very well what one had also done to the Russians.
And was glad to be, in a sense, in the area where there was also money.
The Americans brought a lot of material into the country and people were very pleased about that.
Especially when it became clear that the Americans were switching from the negative side to the positive side.

(10:35):
This started as early as autumn 1945.
Yes, even in summer 1945, when the Americans pragmatically said they would ensure that there were also cultural offerings.
We will ensure that locals are allowed to speak on the microphone at Radio Stuttgart.
And what was proclaimed by James F.
Burns in September 1946 was, for many simple occupiers, already a practice that had been ongoing for months.

(11:00):
A collaboration with the locals who were deemed suitable.
And the attempt to promote a different Germany through one's own positive presence.
And the more the local population noticed that new cultural impulses were coming into the country,

(11:22):
but also the care packages and material support, the more an enthusiasm for America spread.
But that was not in the initial months; rather, there had to be an approach attempt from both sides for months.
There was also initial widespread scepticism among the Americans towards the Germans.
Not among all, but especially in the army sector.

(11:45):
There were films from the American army for the soldiers, where the soldiers were warned.
So the Gestapo and so on, they were all in civilian clothes now and could not be recognised,
but one had to be extremely cautious even of German women, as they were dangerous people and
one did not know where there were werewolf actions.
But this scepticism also subsided.

(12:07):
Many Americans were completely astonished that the NSDAP disappeared almost overnight, that
everyone said, we are victims, no one was there, no one saw anything.
For many Americans, it was initially completely inexplicable.
But nevertheless, and I would like to probe this a bit further, such a study as that conducted

(12:28):
by Adorno on the authoritarian character, other studies as well, which were conducted in the
USA during and before the war, which demonstrated a connection between National Socialism and
the willingness to murder industrially and certain group structures and socialisation structures.
To what extent have these works influenced this re-education policy, the policy of the Americans,

(12:55):
the cultural policy of the Americans, as it developed since 1946?
I am not sure whether these studies had any significant influence at all.
It is indeed true that Horkheimer and Adorno worked for the Office of Strategic Services, the
predecessor organisation of the CIA, produced a whole series of studies, and pointed out the

(13:18):
authoritarian character and many other aspects.
But what ultimately was decisive for the occupation concept was something entirely different.
After the occupation of the Rhineland following the First World War, it was felt that an occupation
without local expertise would fail.
And then a manual for the occupation period was created, which was Colonel Hunt, and he wrote

in the manual (13:41):
It will not work if we do not let people with local and subject expertise make decisions on the ground.
Then, by the way, even before Hitler had declared war on the United States, so-called Civil
Affairs Training Schools were established, where occupation officers were prepared for the occupation

(14:06):
period and contacts with Germans, including emigrants, were already being made.
Emigrants were also employed as teachers, and there was very thorough preparation.
Then it was said that we must employ emigrants as occupation officers in Germany.
For example, in Stuttgart, in the cultural sector, William Saylor was given responsibility for the theatres.

(14:29):
William Saylor was a native of Stuttgart.
This is just an example to illustrate that it was said that people who are familiar with the
local area should also work for us.
And that these people were allowed to take action.
Individuals who, on the one hand, try to embody the American mission, that is, a concept of
democracy which mainly consists of checks and balances, not just elections that lead to power,

(14:51):
but also control of power.
On the other hand, these individuals had identified with the German cultural nation.
They had grown up in the German sphere.
They also saw themselves as part of this European space and wanted, for the sake of their own
identity, to help the other Germany, which is represented by Mann, Kafka, Goethe, and so on, to break through.

(15:16):
And that is why this persistent policy of the Americans to impose a different conception of
democracy, above all, and this was very important for the Americans, an entirely uncontrolled cultural operation.
And for many locals at that time in Germany, it was completely unimaginable that the authorities
should have no influence in the cultural sector.

(15:36):
To delve a bit deeper into this, the concept of culture and the concept of cultural policy probably
best illustrate these two different conceptions, as they were customary in Germany and how they
were then perceived by the Americans.
What did the Americans bring to the German concept of culture, which understood itself as high

(15:59):
culture, that was new and added to it?
So the concept of cultural policy played absolutely no role at that time.
The Americans said, ultimately we let demand decide what is offered.
And different forms of music were presented, and it was said, well, if there is a strong demand

(16:20):
for newer American music, then that should also be provided.
And many locals did not like that, saying, well no, we actually don't want that.
And the occupying officers then conducted opinion polls on what was desired.
And it turned out that the views of the so-called functionaries, such as mayors and district

(16:40):
administrators, differed quite significantly from the views of the general public.
So it was said, new American music or necessarily, that's just wonderful.
Whereas the so-called functionaries were very sceptical and expressed that this was actually
not suitable for the locals.
To what extent were the emerging American houses integrated into a structure that controlled

(17:05):
what the American houses disseminated and also organised by the Americans?
So one must imagine this quite pragmatically; it depended on the individuals who carried it out.
You will not find directives in the archives in Washington that say, well, you must set up American
houses according to a very specific conception.

(17:25):
The first conceptual drafts, if one can call them that, I don't know, that I found date back
to the summer of '47.
In the early phase, there were people who were commissioned to ensure that information about America was provided.
Make sure that English-language literature comes into the country, that the international press

(17:45):
is made available to the Germans.
And initially, this was not intended for the general public, but for journalists, for publishers,
for people active in the media sector.
It was only at a later point that it was opened up to the general public, although it had to
be said that very few people knew English at that time and the material available was mainly in English.

(18:08):
But it depended on the individuals which cultural offerings came into the country, often simply based on personal backgrounds.
Mike Weil had a friend who was active in the Danish resistance and then he had an evening event,
a lecture with discussion, which was also done in this form for the first time, about the Danish resistance during National Socialism.

(18:29):
And due to such personal contacts and also because of the personal interests of the respective
occupying officers, the first cultural offerings came into the country.
Much of what the Americans brought in terms of culture was completely new to the Germans.
So they said one thing, the format of the lecture with a subsequent question and answer discussion.
I found notes there that precisely dictated how to ask questions and how to respond.

(18:55):
But also libraries, what else counts as part of that?
What new concepts were brought into the country that were actually completely unknown here?
The Americans had an interest.
They also wanted to show that there is newer classical American music.
And this initially met with rejection.
Then an organisation was founded, called the Friends and Foes of Modern Music.

(19:22):
And this was set up in a very elitist manner.
Initially, only 40 handpicked Germans were allowed to attend these concerts.
This was deliberately organised in an elitist manner.
And precisely because it was elitist and exclusive, locals became curious.
And there was such a strong demand for new American music that the offerings could not keep up with this demand.

(19:48):
What was certainly much more important for the occupation was the idea of Ralph Lewis from Heidelberg
to bring the so-called Town Meetings to Germany.
This was then run here under the motto, the people ask, the officials answer.
And these events were extraordinarily well attended.
It is reported that each event attracted over 1000 visitors.

(20:09):
The events were then broadcast outdoors.
The town halls, where this took place, could hardly accommodate the demand from visitors.
For many locals, it was truly quite unusual and also liberating that one could simply go and question the authorities.
Mike Weil told me that for many mayors and district leaders, it was initially extraordinarily
difficult to be questioned by the common people.

(20:33):
They had the greatest difficulties with it.
However, over time they also realised that it was an ideal platform for presentation.
And they would have also learned to use it for themselves and for their own image.
But this matter was very important for the Americans, as it embodied a kind of American grassroots
democracy, where decisions are made in small local units and politics had to be transparent.

(20:58):
And to make politics transparent, there was the instruction that any question could be asked,
it just had to be short and precise.
For such discussion events, the facilities of the American Houses were used.
How did one even come to establish such American Houses?
The American Houses are actually a product of the United States Information Centers.

(21:22):
And these, in turn, originated from the small libraries that had initially been set up for young German journalists.
So, these young German journalists were to be provided with international press for research purposes.
Then it expanded, and thus they became information centres.
And then it was said that the name information centre didn't quite fit.

(21:46):
A small competition was held, a prize was announced, and it was said, please find a better term
for our United States Information Center.
And some person in Stuttgart then had the idea to call it America House.
There was a first prize, and since then the places have been called America House.
The intellectual climate in the American Houses was also influenced by the so-called pre-McCarthy era.

(22:09):
The pre-McCarthy era is understood as a political climate of liberalism and progressive thinking.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt spread a spirit of renewal in the United States for more liberalism and social justice.
And against this background, the open and progressive spirit in the American Houses is also to be understood.

(22:32):
There were never any interventions from the Pentagon, for example in the early days, when critical
material about America itself was displayed in the American Houses.
There was only one intervention when the Live magazine published a cover photo showing a young American couple in lederhosen.

(22:52):
And then McClure, the head of Information Control in Germany, wrote about it, "Aren't WE actually
the allies of Germany?" So this impression of a sudden close friendship between Germany and
America was not to be created.
But there were no problems at all when critical material about the United States was also displayed in the American Houses.

(23:14):
That was the so-called pre-McCarthy era.
And many occupation officers reported to me that they had the greatest difficulties under McCarthy.
They witnessed how the libraries were cleansed.
And there was also an occupation officer who had great influence here in Württemberg, who was
then permanently expelled from the country by McCarthy.
Can you narrow that down a bit in time and say again what specific consequences that had?

(23:39):
It was then that with the Truman Doctrine, which was in March, April 1947, the Cold War began to dawn.
There were then the first instructions that the United States had to be presented very positively.
There was then the instruction that the lectures should definitely be held in English and not in German.

(24:00):
And then with the currency reform in 1948, there was a decline in the cultural offerings of the American Houses.
Due to the currency reform, the American Houses suddenly lacked money.
The currency reform destroyed the reserves of the American Houses.
And then many American Houses also withdrew to a narrower presentation of America and not to

(24:24):
a broad interesting cultural offering.
So one could say that the Truman Doctrine was in a way the announcement of the Cold War.
And the currency reform then nullified many cultural offerings in the American Houses.
And what consequences did the McCarthy era have for the American Houses?

(24:47):
Did it, for example, result in libraries being purged, books being removed, even before the
founding of the Federal Republic?
There was the scissors in the head.
In the American Houses, one could not completely escape the pressure from McCarthy.
And care was taken not to present offensive, in quotation marks, material.

(25:10):
However, what did not happen were concrete purges and arrests in the American Houses.
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