November 14, 2025 • 34 mins
🎓 Stefan Fuchs (Wissenschaftsjournalist) im Gespräch mit José Luis Fiori (siehe hier). José Luis Fiori ist Professor für Internationale Politische Ökonomie an der Bundesuniversität von Rio de Janeiro und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis. Er ist Autor und Herausgeber zahlreicher Bücher und gilt als herausragender Analyst des neoliberalen, globalisiertes Marktes aus der Perspektive des Südens.
/🎓 Stefan Fuchs (jornalista científico) em conversa com José Luis Fiori (aqui). José Luis Fiori é professor de Economia Política Internacional na Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro e pesquisador do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis. Ele é autor e editor de vários livros e é considerado um analista proeminente do mercado neoliberal globalizado sob a perspectiva do Sul.
/🎓 Stefan Fuchs (science journalist) in conversation with José Luis Fiori (see here). José Luis Fiori is Professor of International Political Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and a Research Fellow at the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis. He is the author and editor of numerous books and is considered an outstanding analyst of the neoliberal, globalized market from the perspective of the South.
📚 Veröffentlichungen u.a. / Publicações, entre outras / Publications a.o.:
-José Luis Fiori (Organizador): "Sobre a Guerra." Livraria Vozes, 2018.
- José Luis Fiori: "A síndrome de babel e a disputa do poder global." Livraria Vozes, 2020.
- José Luis Fiori (Organizador): "Sobre a Paz." Livraria Vozes, 2021.
- José Luis Fiori: "Uma teoria do poder global." Livraria Vozes, 2024.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:08):
Welcome to Audioarchivo.
The channel for historical interviews with writers, philosophers, activists, and intellectuals
from all over the Earth.
(00:34):
José Luis Fiore is one of the best-known political scientists in Brazil.
The professor of Politics and International Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
has written several books on issues of international, economic, and political relations from a Latin American perspective.
(00:57):
At the centre of his research are the issues of power distribution, the crisis of American hegemony,
the evolution of South America since the 1970s, and the role of wars in international politics.
In this way, José Luis Fiori developed a universal theory of global power.
(01:21):
In Fiori's work, power appears as a red thread that connects the traditional academic boundaries
between Politics, Science and History, International, Economic Politics, Sociology, and Geopolitics.
It is somewhat surprising that José Luis Fiori's long-standing research has neither his standard
(01:46):
work History, Strategy and Development for a Geopolitics of Capitalism, History, Strategy and
Development on the Geopolitics of Capitalism, nor a theory of global power, The Theory of Globality,
as well as the works he published, The War, Energy, Euronovo, Map of World Power, The Period,
(02:09):
Energy and the New World Power Charter, and On War, on The Period, were produced neither in English nor in German. Mr.
Fiori, across the globe, in all democratically organised societies, is the same experience.
The political class seems increasingly unable to represent the interests of its voters.
(02:32):
Politics suffers a forgiveness of power, becoming a ritual without content, while societies
are determined by other factors.
I, in general, am a bit reticent.
(03:12):
With these expressions that have generalised somewhat since the 1990s, they generally refer
to the end of things, the end of history, the end of politics, the end of ideology.
There are several ends, aren't there?
Which were much discussed in the 1990s.
And now, more recently, this idea in politics that is just another expression to say that political
(03:37):
life, the political space, the space of decisions, of collective discussions is losing or is losing relevance.
I have some qualifications to make about that.
I mean, I have the impression that, in fact, there are some changes in the political system,
in the electoral system, in party struggles, in the contemporary ideological framework, which
(04:02):
have made it difficult, shall we say, for a representative system of congresses, parties, and
parliaments to function according to an ideal model.
I don't know if it is according to a model that existed in history or in the past, I don't know
if there has ever been exactly that ideal model.
What I think has happened in this last decade, and everything comes together, are things that
(04:23):
refer to each other and give us this feeling of the emptiness of politics.
I think it is not an emptiness of politics, it is an emptiness of the social-democratic presence,
it is the emptiness of the socialist presence, it is the emptiness of the presence of forces
that propose change, progress, and reforms within the political space.
(04:45):
That is what I think is happening. That is what happened.
Especially in these last decades, and everyone already knows, after all, it is a recurring topic
and has been much discussed.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, after all, the end of the Soviet world, without a doubt,
had some weight, no matter how much the social-democratic forces of the world and in Europe
(05:06):
had not been supportive of the Soviet project for a long, long time, but in any case, the Soviet
project appeared as a kind of alternative, which I might not like, I might criticise, I might
find full of flaws, but it was there, it was concrete, it was tangible.
And its shadow, in contrast to it, acquired a clarity that sometimes the European social-democratic
(05:27):
project did not have by itself.
And far away, the social-democratic projects in some countries that managed to have them on
the periphery of the system, and dedicated themselves to managing capitalism.
But even while managing capitalism, in the 90s they also abdicated from a project that in the
post-war period was developmental, was pro-employment, was pro-Wealth for State, was pro-universal protection.
(05:53):
After all, it was a project of full employment and rapid growth. They also abdicated that.
So, at the time of the 90s, at the beginning of this new millennium, in fact, the parliament,
I would say, is not the politics that is empty, the parliament is empty of the ideas capable
of reforming the political system, of innovating the economic system.
This is what is missing.
(06:13):
Evidently, this is a situation that reproduces itself in a much more acute and serious way outside
of Europe, in the periphery, in Latin America.
But that is not how the conservative forces, those who try to strip the social project, the
social content of politics, treating politics merely as a form of management, more than the
(06:38):
forces of change present today, view the social project of politics as something reformed from
the past, what the state is, what needs to be reformed; isn't it a great change that has occurred?
In the last two decades, in various places around the world, well, there in our continent, in
(07:02):
Latin America, here as well, social democratic parties, socialist parties, and even old communist
parties, like in Italy and France, have adhered to an agenda of economic and social policies
that is frankly convergent with the agenda set by the new liberal conservatism of the 1980s,
which is very much identified with the figures of Mrs.
(07:25):
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; well, they are not the ones who conceived this, but in any case,
it became identified with them and the policies they implemented, particularly Margaret Thatcher here in England.
This is true, it is true, but what I think might be important to understand, at least from my
(07:45):
perspective, is that the thesis I am defending is that there is no general emptying of politics,
but rather an emptying of socialist, social democratic ideas and reformist, progressive or leftist projects.
In such a way that today, those who have been talking about reform since the 1990s are exactly
the conservative forces, from which socialists and social democrats have imported their new
(08:11):
reforms, which are reforms of a distinctly deregulating, privatising and unprotective character.
Moreover, as growth and job creation increased fiscal contribution, with fiscal contribution
they could implement social protection policies.
In this sense, in the 1950s, socialists adhered to and abandoned the idea of marching towards
(08:31):
socialism, opting instead for pro-capital policies. Why pro-capital?
Because they were interested in capitalism growing.
In the past, you tried to save it, but deep down, all the radical leftists were dreaming that
capitalism would collapse, that a crisis would come, the collapse, the finale, as the Italians used to say.
No, that is not the idea now, none of that, I don't want to hear about a crisis, I want capitalism
(08:51):
to grow, to be successful, and for mine to be successful.
And it was, in the 60s, in the 70s, European capitalism was a success and allowed this very
happy virtuous circle of growth, employment, high fiscal contribution, universal social protection,
welfare state, Keynesianism, in short, this is the golden age.
This is the golden age.
This is the 60s, 70s, when the German social democrats returned to government in 66, 67, together
(09:16):
with the democrats, in short, this story is well known.
It's when they return to government here in England as well, isn't it?
And they govern until the final crisis of this model, this period called the golden age of capitalism.
Well, this ends for various reasons that are not suitable for us to discuss here, right?
Because of the crisis of the 70s, 80s, what happened in capitalism, all the plans, will stop, will stop.
(09:40):
The truth is that the socialist social democrats are somewhat pushed aside and then return again
and are somehow called to make a third major revision of their theory.
They had already done this back in the 20s, then they did it in the 50s and a new major revision.
This major revision is what makes the social democrats, without their own ideas about economic
(10:04):
policy, capitalist management, simply do the same as they did in 1950, adhere to the dominant
movement of dominant ideas, that is, the ideas called neoliberal policies of the 90s, and everyone
starts to govern like this.
In fact, Mitterrand was the first, well, first Gonzales came right after, then Craxi came, then
(10:25):
everyone, from then on until finally the English consecrated this new idea in the 90s with the
notion of the third way.
At that moment, you see, if you remove the Soviet Union, if you, the social democratic and socialist
parties implement a policy that was originally attributed to Mrs.
(10:45):
Tati, in short, it is a conservative and liberal policy, and on top of that deregulate and dismantle
the welfare state, in fact, who emptied the space of utopia, who emptied the space of projectuality,
who emptied, which is what makes the essence of politics, the rest has always been like this.
We may not like it, but it has always been this way.
(11:06):
The representatives have always been somewhat like this, the parliament has always functioned in a certain way.
Anyway, it is those who provide the vigour, who drive, who transform politics into a vigorous,
mobilising space when it is, in fact, galvanised by ideas of futurity.
And not when it is absolutely occupied by a kind of lazy consensus around three or four commonplaces,
(11:29):
which is this discussion within the European Union, within social models, which is, in a gigantic manner, immobilism.
There is very little futurity in that, and it gives this unpleasant feeling of emptiness.
(12:00):
The military regimes in Brazil, for example, tried to achieve it with a certain protectionism
and, in the end, failed.
One of the reasons why democracy was introduced in Brazil at the end of the 1980s was the economic failure.
Why did this development policy not work?
(12:23):
In this period of economic success, referred to as the golden age by Hobsbawm, in Latin America
corresponded not to a Keynesian welfare state strategy, but to a political-economic strategy
that received the nickname, the name of developmentalism or national-developmentalism, which
certainly combined some aspects of Keynesianism with some things from your German political
(12:47):
economist, Friedrich List, from the 19th century, indeed, there was much of List.
In a strategic thinking that was formulated mainly in the Economic Commission for Latin America, CEPAL.
These policies and this developmentalist strategy that was initially implemented after the crisis
(13:12):
of 1930, when Brazil suffered, like the whole world, a loss of income from foreign trade and,
therefore, had to close in on itself, not for ideological reasons, but simply for reactive reasons
of survival, and then this prolonged into the war, and after the war, yes, one can speak of
a conscious strategy of developmentalism.
(13:35):
In this period, therefore, which lasts more or less from 1937 to 1980, in the Brazilian case,
if we measure success or failure in terms of more economic indicators, that is, economic growth,
growth rates, industrialisation rates, composition, exports, indeed, all the things that economists
(13:56):
use, and sometimes abuse, one could say that Brazilian developmentalism was an extraordinary success.
In fact, Brazil was the second country that grew the most in the world on average at 37.80%
per year, something around 7% on average.
In some years it reached 9.10% and the United States during this period only lost out, and by
(14:21):
a small margin, to Japan.
You had a resistance to all this, and were strongly sensitive to this societal thing, of grassroots
participation, of small, top social democracy, with a language somewhat close to the liberals
in their criticism of statism, right?
And without major project concerns about how to manage capitalism, because the votes were few,
(14:42):
the prospect of coming in and managing Brazilian capitalism was so distant that this problem did not arise.
When 1990, 1991 comes, the PT suffers this tremendous blow, which was the end of the experience
of real socialism, with which the PT was not in solidarity, but as I say, it is like that father
or grandfather that we do not like, but who has to be there.
It hits, unpleasant, horrific, authoritarian, in short.
(15:06):
But if he disappears, the kids do not know, they become a bit disorganised.
It takes time to find the place to sit again.
And along the way there is a kind of confession of guilt from European social democracy.
So you see a party that was born young, in 1980, at the time when developmentalism is going
down, at the time when real socialism is collapsing, at the time when Europeans are giving up
(15:31):
their universalist project of strong state terror.
And a party that composed very heterogeneous things, evidently the PT is a party that came to
power, I would say, prematurely aged. Prematurely aged. Right?
I mean, what you in Europe took at least 60 years, from the first revision of Bersta in 1894
(15:54):
to the Bade Godesberg of 1959, takes 50, almost 70 years to make this movement until reaching
what, well, in Brazil, the PT, between 1900 and... was a candidate in 1989, between the first
candidacy in 10 years, the PT, let’s say, had to... was forced to redo everything and at the
last minute still sign a sort of a Godersberg bar multiplied by 100, which was the so-called
(16:20):
Letter of Intentions, and without support from anywhere, because let’s be clear, European social
democracy is absolutely without direction, American liberals, the Democrats, are completely without a compass.
I believe that the party has come to power, has come to government, in an extremely difficult situation, extremely difficult.
(16:42):
Can one not argue that this problem of the PT in Brazil is also a problem of Brazilian democracy in general?
Because this democracy became a reality in an instant, when, finally, the major lines of policy,
(17:04):
especially economic policy, were already defined, where this asymmetry of power between the
north and the south was already cemented, through this rollback of the region, that all international
(17:25):
institutions, especially, In fact, Brazil still, let us say, the PT in government, are struggling
to consolidate, to build and consolidate, let us say, a democratic republic.
They are not governing towards socialism, I would say not even towards social democracy, but
(17:50):
we are still... it is as if you had several things to be done at the same time.
And one of them, which at this moment, from what I know, here from London is suffering a very
big blow, is this issue that we will call the construction of democratic republicanism.
And I have the impression there, from what I have seen, I already knew from when I was there,
(18:12):
anyway, they face, the PT has been facing enormous difficulties, anyway, for all parties, but
for a party that brings to the Brazilian government a worker after almost 200 years of independence,
It is a terribly unequal society, conservatives, terribly reluctant to react to Brazilian society.
(18:34):
It seems very friendly and smiling, but it is of a shocking reactionism regarding not giving
passage to the lower classes.
So, you notice today in this hateful reaction that the press has against the government, using
an argument that, anyway, I will not discuss here the provenance or not, especially because
(18:54):
I am poorly informed, but the central objective of the matter is very clear.
From the point of view of development, to create expectations, to include people, to generate
jobs, to manage, above all, to mobilise people in the sense of the idea that it is possible
for them to get there, which was something that in Brazil in the 50s, 60s, 70s, despite the
(19:18):
inequality that also existed, there was much more social mobility.
Brazil has been without social mobility for 20 years, this begins to create a feeling of insurmountability, the absence of horizons. Do you understand?
It's as if in the field of politics there is an emptying of what?
It is not of politics; you have an emptying of projects that announce, promise the future.
(19:40):
And you also have an emptying in the microcosm of people, of horizons, of possibilities, jumping
the wall, of walking, there is none. Isn't it?
So it is no use a country growing with Brazil, Brazil with the difficulties it has, growing
at a rate of 3, 4% which means nothing, zero, that is nothing, nothing.
And this is the feeling that I think is very strong; this is from a government that touches
(20:02):
on your question about sovereignty and such, I mean, from a government that completely accepted
a certain package, a certain political and economic strategy to establish itself as a workers'
party, which considered itself condemned to death in the first week simply because it was poorly
viewed by the finances, so you had to do everything right, they did everything right, they have
(20:24):
been doing everything right, however, the Brazilian economy has absolutely shocking unemployment
rates, the large cities with very high rates, 18, 19%, and the economy growing very little,
very little, which gives a low horizon.
But this apathy, this incapacity of the Lula region, which at one point caused great disappointment,
(20:46):
does not mean that, in this sense, sovereignty no longer exists.
That a country, within this world system of economic globalisation, can decide on a different
social project, on another form of society.
The issue points directly to another topic that has also been much discussed in recent times,
(21:10):
which is the existence or not of limited sovereignty in the global capitalist periphery and
Latin America in particular, affecting Brazil as well.
This is in governments with low capacity and little power to intervene in their own society effectively. This is the idea.
I think, Stephen, here I would also make a couple of preliminary qualifications.
(21:34):
Firstly, very quickly, I think that absolute sovereignty has never existed and does not exist.
This does not exist; this is an almost metaphysical concept, sovereignty.
Sovereignty, from a historical point of view, has always been a negotiated thing.
It is always a negotiation.
And your degree of sovereignty has always depended on your hierarchical position within the world state system.
(21:54):
In this sense, today, for example, Germany itself has a low degree of sovereignty to make decisions
that it would need to take to break the deadlock it is in, like France, after all.
But this depends on the circumstances, the moment, the type of negotiation you made and so on.
There is no doubt that of the 190 countries that were created in the 20th century, when the
(22:16):
20th century began there were 50, today there are 190, it is very difficult to talk about sovereignty
for at least 100, 120, there is no zero sovereignty.
They never had it, they are parties invented by the European pen at the end of their empires
and to this day they have not managed to have the internal vitality that explains and justifies
them, I mean that justifies them yes, but that enables them as sovereign states.
(22:40):
The United States did this much earlier.
In fact, he wrote the book looking at the United States.
So, these are the qualifications we need to make, do you understand?
And I make these qualifications, not to say that things do not exist.
It is because sometimes I think that we intellectuals understand that with the difficulty of
finding paths, with the difficulty of thinking strategically, with the difficulty of embracing
(23:02):
novelty to think ahead, we are very tempted to write articles and texts that are resounding and say nothing.
It is not like Fukuyama's book, about the end of history.
The book remained only by its title and everyone will know Fukuyama until his death.
I think his tomb will be the end of history.
It ended, that was his history.
Because you read the book and it does not, it does not substantiate the idea.
(23:26):
They are slogans, they are slogans.
But these slogans catch on violently.
And then you do not think anymore.
It is like in the past, in Marxist language, in the stages.
Now you are in the bourgeois stage.
Now we are in the transitional stage to who knows what.
Now they are making stages.
Ah, so they are making stages. They are making stages.
(23:47):
I mean, what does this discussion of the emptying of politics mean? What is passing?
Because otherwise it is a terminal idea. There is nothing terminal. Politics will not end. It has never ended. Do you understand? What mutations are these? Where are the challenges?
The same thing in this field of sovereignty. Where is the challenge?
Where is the challenge of that Brazilian government?
(24:07):
A massively unequal society that would require a social capitalist revolution, a true resounding
shock from a distributive point of view, would need immense imagination, creativity, boldness,
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and you have an absolutely petty, mundane policy, like the model of the monetary fund, I don't
know, it doesn't even need the fund, everyone does the same, with fund, without fund. They catapulted.
(25:00):
It is possible to analyse the hypothesis that there was fear or apprehension, especially in
the first year of Lula's government, right?
Because I can even understand from a psychological, sociological point of view, after all, it
is a very new party, an absolutely impermeable, impenetrable ruling class, willing to overthrow him at any minute.
(25:26):
After all, I understand, Latin American history does not help, does not contribute to you.
So, it is an economy that is extremely more complex than the Venezuelan economy to be managed
and that Argentina as well, which was practically dismantled.
And with an initial situation that was not Kirchner's, which already took over a broken country.
(25:47):
Therefore, it had already paid the price of the breakdown with the total destruction of the economy.
Therefore, he starts from zero.
Lula's fear, for sure, was not wanting to take on the responsibility of breaking.
Of being the government that breaks, which generally leaves, then another comes to rebuild, renegotiate and so on.
This is what Kirchner did how many years ago, this business of the breakdown of Argentina is still ongoing.
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In principle, the world of finance is much more ductile, let’s say, less courageous than people tend to say. Right?
Once things are put on the tables, they always negotiate. They always negotiate. They always negotiate.
Some, like Antonio Negri for example, wrote a book about the Empire, which is a magnificent
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and gigantic book, from my point of view, absolutely wrong from the first to the last sentence,
precisely because it does not have a kind of, a completely historical view of the process of globalization.
And an idea of a post-national thing when from my point of view globalization has always been
in all its expansive moments, its great expansive moments are exactly moments that follow the
(26:57):
victory of certain national powers that manage to impose on an ever-increasing space of the
world their currency, the advantages of their capital, their credit system and, indeed, always
from this system, their taxation system, regardless of how taxation is done on the areas affected
or incorporated into the economic territory of the dominant power.
(27:21):
I think we are watching the same thing again.
This is what is called the globalisation of capital; indeed, it is capital, yes, without a doubt,
and it is, above all, a financial globalisation, because the commercial and productive ones
had already been established through multinationals after the Second World War.
But what happens now, which is fundamental, what makes the difference in this is exactly the
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way in which this financial capital globalises alongside, it is always a block of capital and
political power that gives a new surge of globalisation that is increasingly extensive.
It is not a capital that globalises more and more and escapes political power.
(28:15):
It depends on the moment.
In the period from the 60s to the 80s, the dictatorial regime was more functional.
Currently, it will seem, without a doubt, that a democracy of this type, with a lowercase 'd'
and not uppercase, that is, with a low degree of participation and popular mobilisation, is
more functional for maintenance, even for the reasons that perhaps were at the beginning of our conversation.
(28:38):
That is, what you have today, let’s use a somewhat vague, somewhat metaphysical expression,
but to make the conversation quicker, let’s say, the macropowers, whether they are political,
military or financial, which more or less command the centres of power of the great powers and
their satellite or associated countries, generally participate a bit in politics directly, they
(29:03):
do not participate, they have intermediaries, they have their organic intellectuals, so to speak,
but they do have extremely effective instruments in the way these electoral systems are functioning,
whether by financing, let’s say, the fragmentation of the system, or favouring a bipolarity,
(29:24):
you understand, convergent from a programmatic point of view, or fragmenting the system to force
this type of composition that then has absolutely disastrous results, which they themselves
know, that is why it is very easy for them to denounce, because they are the great promoters,
aren’t they? to neutralise any possibility of constituting majorities that would be mobilised
(29:49):
actively and against their interests.
There are also within the societies of the Southwest, parts of society whose interests align
with those of transnational capital, that is, the pressure to implement a certain policy, to
promote globalisation, does not only come from outside, but also from within these societies.
(30:12):
How would you describe these transnationalised parts of societies in the Southeast?
Is there such a thing as transnational ruling elites across the globe?
From the perspective of ideas and concrete interests, there have always been, in countries like
the Latin American ones, significant parts of the transnationalised national elites.
(30:39):
Their composition and extent have changed, their preferred seating place has also changed, but
there have always been, there have always been.
This in the field of ideas, as in the field of interests, as in the field of power management,
as in the field of war management.
Our military elites have always been integrated.
(31:01):
And nowadays our financial elites, our economists, let’s say, who are the theologians of the
current era, are trained abroad and circulate in networks permanently, they are the ones who
manage central banks, but the names are always the same and so on.
Now, I think that beyond these circuits, what has indeed happened with deregulation and financial
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transnationalisation is a significant increase in the real estate and even property assets of
the Latin American bourgeois and rentier classes that are dollarised.
This is a very large part of the wealth that has not been in the country for a long time and
(31:49):
that is now even greater with the facilities that you have opened up through financial globalisation.
In this sense, it is that at some point in our conversation I told you, the greatest threat
does not come from external financiers, these generally negotiate whatever, capable of negotiating
with Argentina, at least they are the internal ones.
Including due to the weight they have in their movement from outside to inside.
(32:11):
With liabilities and assets of all kinds on one side, in different currencies, in different games.
This has also brought them immense ease.
There has never been any external challenge, there has never been any war of greater proportions,
nothing that would generate what was generated in Europe, undoubtedly, by the infinite and terrible
(32:32):
wars that you have had, that would generate some degree of solidarity within the population,
a feeling of belonging to something common, a common imaginary, what is called a nation, does not exist.
You do not belong to that same thing, you were not obliged to participate in that, right?
I mean, even, for example, in the case of India, which is a country, an extremely fragmented
(32:55):
space of power and with a very low sense of national consciousness until the 19th century, then
in the struggle for independence from England, some cultural broth was created, a feeling of
belonging to a struggle, which at least was the struggle against the English.
In the Brazilian case and in the Latin American case, but in the Brazilian case very particularly,
where the inequalities are more gigantic than in all the other sides.
(33:19):
In fact, it is as if you were living in a certain space, but with a minimal sense of belonging
to the same cause, to the same nation, to the same project.
In this sense, let us say, this urban fear that is currently growing in Brazil at giant strides, right?
(33:39):
There is something, something distant, but it relates to what Hobsbawm called primitive rebels, is that not right?
Because it is a society where the distance is so infinite that it is impossible, it is another
aspect that we had not touched upon here when talking about democracy, it is almost impossible
(34:02):
for the traditional political system, classical, of European origin, in a party form, to account
for the representation of this extraordinary inequality and, at the same time, to carry out
state policies that reach the entirety of this tattered spectrum of people who do not make up a nation.
Welcome to Audioarchivo.
The channel for historical interviews with writers, philosophers, activists, and intellectuals
from all over the Earth.
(00:34):
José Luis Fiore is one of the best-known political scientists in Brazil.
The professor of Politics and International Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
has written several books on issues of international, economic, and political relations from a Latin American perspective.
(00:57):
At the centre of his research are the issues of power distribution, the crisis of American hegemony,
the evolution of South America since the 1970s, and the role of wars in international politics.
In this way, José Luis Fiori developed a universal theory of global power.
(01:21):
In Fiori's work, power appears as a red thread that connects the traditional academic boundaries
between Politics, Science and History, International, Economic Politics, Sociology, and Geopolitics.
It is somewhat surprising that José Luis Fiori's long-standing research has neither his standard
(01:46):
work History, Strategy and Development for a Geopolitics of Capitalism, History, Strategy and
Development on the Geopolitics of Capitalism, nor a theory of global power, The Theory of Globality,
as well as the works he published, The War, Energy, Euronovo, Map of World Power, The Period,
(02:09):
Energy and the New World Power Charter, and On War, on The Period, were produced neither in English nor in German. Mr.
Fiori, across the globe, in all democratically organised societies, is the same experience.
The political class seems increasingly unable to represent the interests of its voters.
(02:32):
Politics suffers a forgiveness of power, becoming a ritual without content, while societies
are determined by other factors.
I, in general, am a bit reticent.
(03:12):
With these expressions that have generalised somewhat since the 1990s, they generally refer
to the end of things, the end of history, the end of politics, the end of ideology.
There are several ends, aren't there?
Which were much discussed in the 1990s.
And now, more recently, this idea in politics that is just another expression to say that political
(03:37):
life, the political space, the space of decisions, of collective discussions is losing or is losing relevance.
I have some qualifications to make about that.
I mean, I have the impression that, in fact, there are some changes in the political system,
in the electoral system, in party struggles, in the contemporary ideological framework, which
(04:02):
have made it difficult, shall we say, for a representative system of congresses, parties, and
parliaments to function according to an ideal model.
I don't know if it is according to a model that existed in history or in the past, I don't know
if there has ever been exactly that ideal model.
What I think has happened in this last decade, and everything comes together, are things that
(04:23):
refer to each other and give us this feeling of the emptiness of politics.
I think it is not an emptiness of politics, it is an emptiness of the social-democratic presence,
it is the emptiness of the socialist presence, it is the emptiness of the presence of forces
that propose change, progress, and reforms within the political space.
(04:45):
That is what I think is happening. That is what happened.
Especially in these last decades, and everyone already knows, after all, it is a recurring topic
and has been much discussed.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, after all, the end of the Soviet world, without a doubt,
had some weight, no matter how much the social-democratic forces of the world and in Europe
(05:06):
had not been supportive of the Soviet project for a long, long time, but in any case, the Soviet
project appeared as a kind of alternative, which I might not like, I might criticise, I might
find full of flaws, but it was there, it was concrete, it was tangible.
And its shadow, in contrast to it, acquired a clarity that sometimes the European social-democratic
(05:27):
project did not have by itself.
And far away, the social-democratic projects in some countries that managed to have them on
the periphery of the system, and dedicated themselves to managing capitalism.
But even while managing capitalism, in the 90s they also abdicated from a project that in the
post-war period was developmental, was pro-employment, was pro-Wealth for State, was pro-universal protection.
(05:53):
After all, it was a project of full employment and rapid growth. They also abdicated that.
So, at the time of the 90s, at the beginning of this new millennium, in fact, the parliament,
I would say, is not the politics that is empty, the parliament is empty of the ideas capable
of reforming the political system, of innovating the economic system.
This is what is missing.
(06:13):
Evidently, this is a situation that reproduces itself in a much more acute and serious way outside
of Europe, in the periphery, in Latin America.
But that is not how the conservative forces, those who try to strip the social project, the
social content of politics, treating politics merely as a form of management, more than the
(06:38):
forces of change present today, view the social project of politics as something reformed from
the past, what the state is, what needs to be reformed; isn't it a great change that has occurred?
In the last two decades, in various places around the world, well, there in our continent, in
(07:02):
Latin America, here as well, social democratic parties, socialist parties, and even old communist
parties, like in Italy and France, have adhered to an agenda of economic and social policies
that is frankly convergent with the agenda set by the new liberal conservatism of the 1980s,
which is very much identified with the figures of Mrs.
(07:25):
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; well, they are not the ones who conceived this, but in any case,
it became identified with them and the policies they implemented, particularly Margaret Thatcher here in England.
This is true, it is true, but what I think might be important to understand, at least from my
(07:45):
perspective, is that the thesis I am defending is that there is no general emptying of politics,
but rather an emptying of socialist, social democratic ideas and reformist, progressive or leftist projects.
In such a way that today, those who have been talking about reform since the 1990s are exactly
the conservative forces, from which socialists and social democrats have imported their new
(08:11):
reforms, which are reforms of a distinctly deregulating, privatising and unprotective character.
Moreover, as growth and job creation increased fiscal contribution, with fiscal contribution
they could implement social protection policies.
In this sense, in the 1950s, socialists adhered to and abandoned the idea of marching towards
(08:31):
socialism, opting instead for pro-capital policies. Why pro-capital?
Because they were interested in capitalism growing.
In the past, you tried to save it, but deep down, all the radical leftists were dreaming that
capitalism would collapse, that a crisis would come, the collapse, the finale, as the Italians used to say.
No, that is not the idea now, none of that, I don't want to hear about a crisis, I want capitalism
(08:51):
to grow, to be successful, and for mine to be successful.
And it was, in the 60s, in the 70s, European capitalism was a success and allowed this very
happy virtuous circle of growth, employment, high fiscal contribution, universal social protection,
welfare state, Keynesianism, in short, this is the golden age.
This is the golden age.
This is the 60s, 70s, when the German social democrats returned to government in 66, 67, together
(09:16):
with the democrats, in short, this story is well known.
It's when they return to government here in England as well, isn't it?
And they govern until the final crisis of this model, this period called the golden age of capitalism.
Well, this ends for various reasons that are not suitable for us to discuss here, right?
Because of the crisis of the 70s, 80s, what happened in capitalism, all the plans, will stop, will stop.
(09:40):
The truth is that the socialist social democrats are somewhat pushed aside and then return again
and are somehow called to make a third major revision of their theory.
They had already done this back in the 20s, then they did it in the 50s and a new major revision.
This major revision is what makes the social democrats, without their own ideas about economic
(10:04):
policy, capitalist management, simply do the same as they did in 1950, adhere to the dominant
movement of dominant ideas, that is, the ideas called neoliberal policies of the 90s, and everyone
starts to govern like this.
In fact, Mitterrand was the first, well, first Gonzales came right after, then Craxi came, then
(10:25):
everyone, from then on until finally the English consecrated this new idea in the 90s with the
notion of the third way.
At that moment, you see, if you remove the Soviet Union, if you, the social democratic and socialist
parties implement a policy that was originally attributed to Mrs.
(10:45):
Tati, in short, it is a conservative and liberal policy, and on top of that deregulate and dismantle
the welfare state, in fact, who emptied the space of utopia, who emptied the space of projectuality,
who emptied, which is what makes the essence of politics, the rest has always been like this.
We may not like it, but it has always been this way.
(11:06):
The representatives have always been somewhat like this, the parliament has always functioned in a certain way.
Anyway, it is those who provide the vigour, who drive, who transform politics into a vigorous,
mobilising space when it is, in fact, galvanised by ideas of futurity.
And not when it is absolutely occupied by a kind of lazy consensus around three or four commonplaces,
(11:29):
which is this discussion within the European Union, within social models, which is, in a gigantic manner, immobilism.
There is very little futurity in that, and it gives this unpleasant feeling of emptiness.
(12:00):
The military regimes in Brazil, for example, tried to achieve it with a certain protectionism
and, in the end, failed.
One of the reasons why democracy was introduced in Brazil at the end of the 1980s was the economic failure.
Why did this development policy not work?
(12:23):
In this period of economic success, referred to as the golden age by Hobsbawm, in Latin America
corresponded not to a Keynesian welfare state strategy, but to a political-economic strategy
that received the nickname, the name of developmentalism or national-developmentalism, which
certainly combined some aspects of Keynesianism with some things from your German political
(12:47):
economist, Friedrich List, from the 19th century, indeed, there was much of List.
In a strategic thinking that was formulated mainly in the Economic Commission for Latin America, CEPAL.
These policies and this developmentalist strategy that was initially implemented after the crisis
(13:12):
of 1930, when Brazil suffered, like the whole world, a loss of income from foreign trade and,
therefore, had to close in on itself, not for ideological reasons, but simply for reactive reasons
of survival, and then this prolonged into the war, and after the war, yes, one can speak of
a conscious strategy of developmentalism.
(13:35):
In this period, therefore, which lasts more or less from 1937 to 1980, in the Brazilian case,
if we measure success or failure in terms of more economic indicators, that is, economic growth,
growth rates, industrialisation rates, composition, exports, indeed, all the things that economists
(13:56):
use, and sometimes abuse, one could say that Brazilian developmentalism was an extraordinary success.
In fact, Brazil was the second country that grew the most in the world on average at 37.80%
per year, something around 7% on average.
In some years it reached 9.10% and the United States during this period only lost out, and by
(14:21):
a small margin, to Japan.
You had a resistance to all this, and were strongly sensitive to this societal thing, of grassroots
participation, of small, top social democracy, with a language somewhat close to the liberals
in their criticism of statism, right?
And without major project concerns about how to manage capitalism, because the votes were few,
(14:42):
the prospect of coming in and managing Brazilian capitalism was so distant that this problem did not arise.
When 1990, 1991 comes, the PT suffers this tremendous blow, which was the end of the experience
of real socialism, with which the PT was not in solidarity, but as I say, it is like that father
or grandfather that we do not like, but who has to be there.
It hits, unpleasant, horrific, authoritarian, in short.
(15:06):
But if he disappears, the kids do not know, they become a bit disorganised.
It takes time to find the place to sit again.
And along the way there is a kind of confession of guilt from European social democracy.
So you see a party that was born young, in 1980, at the time when developmentalism is going
down, at the time when real socialism is collapsing, at the time when Europeans are giving up
(15:31):
their universalist project of strong state terror.
And a party that composed very heterogeneous things, evidently the PT is a party that came to
power, I would say, prematurely aged. Prematurely aged. Right?
I mean, what you in Europe took at least 60 years, from the first revision of Bersta in 1894
(15:54):
to the Bade Godesberg of 1959, takes 50, almost 70 years to make this movement until reaching
what, well, in Brazil, the PT, between 1900 and... was a candidate in 1989, between the first
candidacy in 10 years, the PT, let’s say, had to... was forced to redo everything and at the
last minute still sign a sort of a Godersberg bar multiplied by 100, which was the so-called
(16:20):
Letter of Intentions, and without support from anywhere, because let’s be clear, European social
democracy is absolutely without direction, American liberals, the Democrats, are completely without a compass.
I believe that the party has come to power, has come to government, in an extremely difficult situation, extremely difficult.
(16:42):
Can one not argue that this problem of the PT in Brazil is also a problem of Brazilian democracy in general?
Because this democracy became a reality in an instant, when, finally, the major lines of policy,
(17:04):
especially economic policy, were already defined, where this asymmetry of power between the
north and the south was already cemented, through this rollback of the region, that all international
(17:25):
institutions, especially, In fact, Brazil still, let us say, the PT in government, are struggling
to consolidate, to build and consolidate, let us say, a democratic republic.
They are not governing towards socialism, I would say not even towards social democracy, but
(17:50):
we are still... it is as if you had several things to be done at the same time.
And one of them, which at this moment, from what I know, here from London is suffering a very
big blow, is this issue that we will call the construction of democratic republicanism.
And I have the impression there, from what I have seen, I already knew from when I was there,
(18:12):
anyway, they face, the PT has been facing enormous difficulties, anyway, for all parties, but
for a party that brings to the Brazilian government a worker after almost 200 years of independence,
It is a terribly unequal society, conservatives, terribly reluctant to react to Brazilian society.
(18:34):
It seems very friendly and smiling, but it is of a shocking reactionism regarding not giving
passage to the lower classes.
So, you notice today in this hateful reaction that the press has against the government, using
an argument that, anyway, I will not discuss here the provenance or not, especially because
(18:54):
I am poorly informed, but the central objective of the matter is very clear.
From the point of view of development, to create expectations, to include people, to generate
jobs, to manage, above all, to mobilise people in the sense of the idea that it is possible
for them to get there, which was something that in Brazil in the 50s, 60s, 70s, despite the
(19:18):
inequality that also existed, there was much more social mobility.
Brazil has been without social mobility for 20 years, this begins to create a feeling of insurmountability, the absence of horizons. Do you understand?
It's as if in the field of politics there is an emptying of what?
It is not of politics; you have an emptying of projects that announce, promise the future.
(19:40):
And you also have an emptying in the microcosm of people, of horizons, of possibilities, jumping
the wall, of walking, there is none. Isn't it?
So it is no use a country growing with Brazil, Brazil with the difficulties it has, growing
at a rate of 3, 4% which means nothing, zero, that is nothing, nothing.
And this is the feeling that I think is very strong; this is from a government that touches
(20:02):
on your question about sovereignty and such, I mean, from a government that completely accepted
a certain package, a certain political and economic strategy to establish itself as a workers'
party, which considered itself condemned to death in the first week simply because it was poorly
viewed by the finances, so you had to do everything right, they did everything right, they have
(20:24):
been doing everything right, however, the Brazilian economy has absolutely shocking unemployment
rates, the large cities with very high rates, 18, 19%, and the economy growing very little,
very little, which gives a low horizon.
But this apathy, this incapacity of the Lula region, which at one point caused great disappointment,
(20:46):
does not mean that, in this sense, sovereignty no longer exists.
That a country, within this world system of economic globalisation, can decide on a different
social project, on another form of society.
The issue points directly to another topic that has also been much discussed in recent times,
(21:10):
which is the existence or not of limited sovereignty in the global capitalist periphery and
Latin America in particular, affecting Brazil as well.
This is in governments with low capacity and little power to intervene in their own society effectively. This is the idea.
I think, Stephen, here I would also make a couple of preliminary qualifications.
(21:34):
Firstly, very quickly, I think that absolute sovereignty has never existed and does not exist.
This does not exist; this is an almost metaphysical concept, sovereignty.
Sovereignty, from a historical point of view, has always been a negotiated thing.
It is always a negotiation.
And your degree of sovereignty has always depended on your hierarchical position within the world state system.
(21:54):
In this sense, today, for example, Germany itself has a low degree of sovereignty to make decisions
that it would need to take to break the deadlock it is in, like France, after all.
But this depends on the circumstances, the moment, the type of negotiation you made and so on.
There is no doubt that of the 190 countries that were created in the 20th century, when the
(22:16):
20th century began there were 50, today there are 190, it is very difficult to talk about sovereignty
for at least 100, 120, there is no zero sovereignty.
They never had it, they are parties invented by the European pen at the end of their empires
and to this day they have not managed to have the internal vitality that explains and justifies
them, I mean that justifies them yes, but that enables them as sovereign states.
(22:40):
The United States did this much earlier.
In fact, he wrote the book looking at the United States.
So, these are the qualifications we need to make, do you understand?
And I make these qualifications, not to say that things do not exist.
It is because sometimes I think that we intellectuals understand that with the difficulty of
finding paths, with the difficulty of thinking strategically, with the difficulty of embracing
(23:02):
novelty to think ahead, we are very tempted to write articles and texts that are resounding and say nothing.
It is not like Fukuyama's book, about the end of history.
The book remained only by its title and everyone will know Fukuyama until his death.
I think his tomb will be the end of history.
It ended, that was his history.
Because you read the book and it does not, it does not substantiate the idea.
(23:26):
They are slogans, they are slogans.
But these slogans catch on violently.
And then you do not think anymore.
It is like in the past, in Marxist language, in the stages.
Now you are in the bourgeois stage.
Now we are in the transitional stage to who knows what.
Now they are making stages.
Ah, so they are making stages. They are making stages.
(23:47):
I mean, what does this discussion of the emptying of politics mean? What is passing?
Because otherwise it is a terminal idea. There is nothing terminal. Politics will not end. It has never ended. Do you understand? What mutations are these? Where are the challenges?
The same thing in this field of sovereignty. Where is the challenge?
Where is the challenge of that Brazilian government?
(24:07):
A massively unequal society that would require a social capitalist revolution, a true resounding
shock from a distributive point of view, would need immense imagination, creativity, boldness,
(24:34):
and you have an absolutely petty, mundane policy, like the model of the monetary fund, I don't
know, it doesn't even need the fund, everyone does the same, with fund, without fund. They catapulted.
(25:00):
It is possible to analyse the hypothesis that there was fear or apprehension, especially in
the first year of Lula's government, right?
Because I can even understand from a psychological, sociological point of view, after all, it
is a very new party, an absolutely impermeable, impenetrable ruling class, willing to overthrow him at any minute.
(25:26):
After all, I understand, Latin American history does not help, does not contribute to you.
So, it is an economy that is extremely more complex than the Venezuelan economy to be managed
and that Argentina as well, which was practically dismantled.
And with an initial situation that was not Kirchner's, which already took over a broken country.
(25:47):
Therefore, it had already paid the price of the breakdown with the total destruction of the economy.
Therefore, he starts from zero.
Lula's fear, for sure, was not wanting to take on the responsibility of breaking.
Of being the government that breaks, which generally leaves, then another comes to rebuild, renegotiate and so on.
This is what Kirchner did how many years ago, this business of the breakdown of Argentina is still ongoing.
(26:10):
In principle, the world of finance is much more ductile, let’s say, less courageous than people tend to say. Right?
Once things are put on the tables, they always negotiate. They always negotiate. They always negotiate.
Some, like Antonio Negri for example, wrote a book about the Empire, which is a magnificent
(26:31):
and gigantic book, from my point of view, absolutely wrong from the first to the last sentence,
precisely because it does not have a kind of, a completely historical view of the process of globalization.
And an idea of a post-national thing when from my point of view globalization has always been
in all its expansive moments, its great expansive moments are exactly moments that follow the
(26:57):
victory of certain national powers that manage to impose on an ever-increasing space of the
world their currency, the advantages of their capital, their credit system and, indeed, always
from this system, their taxation system, regardless of how taxation is done on the areas affected
or incorporated into the economic territory of the dominant power.
(27:21):
I think we are watching the same thing again.
This is what is called the globalisation of capital; indeed, it is capital, yes, without a doubt,
and it is, above all, a financial globalisation, because the commercial and productive ones
had already been established through multinationals after the Second World War.
But what happens now, which is fundamental, what makes the difference in this is exactly the
(27:43):
way in which this financial capital globalises alongside, it is always a block of capital and
political power that gives a new surge of globalisation that is increasingly extensive.
It is not a capital that globalises more and more and escapes political power.
(28:15):
It depends on the moment.
In the period from the 60s to the 80s, the dictatorial regime was more functional.
Currently, it will seem, without a doubt, that a democracy of this type, with a lowercase 'd'
and not uppercase, that is, with a low degree of participation and popular mobilisation, is
more functional for maintenance, even for the reasons that perhaps were at the beginning of our conversation.
(28:38):
That is, what you have today, let’s use a somewhat vague, somewhat metaphysical expression,
but to make the conversation quicker, let’s say, the macropowers, whether they are political,
military or financial, which more or less command the centres of power of the great powers and
their satellite or associated countries, generally participate a bit in politics directly, they
(29:03):
do not participate, they have intermediaries, they have their organic intellectuals, so to speak,
but they do have extremely effective instruments in the way these electoral systems are functioning,
whether by financing, let’s say, the fragmentation of the system, or favouring a bipolarity,
(29:24):
you understand, convergent from a programmatic point of view, or fragmenting the system to force
this type of composition that then has absolutely disastrous results, which they themselves
know, that is why it is very easy for them to denounce, because they are the great promoters,
aren’t they? to neutralise any possibility of constituting majorities that would be mobilised
(29:49):
actively and against their interests.
There are also within the societies of the Southwest, parts of society whose interests align
with those of transnational capital, that is, the pressure to implement a certain policy, to
promote globalisation, does not only come from outside, but also from within these societies.
(30:12):
How would you describe these transnationalised parts of societies in the Southeast?
Is there such a thing as transnational ruling elites across the globe?
From the perspective of ideas and concrete interests, there have always been, in countries like
the Latin American ones, significant parts of the transnationalised national elites.
(30:39):
Their composition and extent have changed, their preferred seating place has also changed, but
there have always been, there have always been.
This in the field of ideas, as in the field of interests, as in the field of power management,
as in the field of war management.
Our military elites have always been integrated.
(31:01):
And nowadays our financial elites, our economists, let’s say, who are the theologians of the
current era, are trained abroad and circulate in networks permanently, they are the ones who
manage central banks, but the names are always the same and so on.
Now, I think that beyond these circuits, what has indeed happened with deregulation and financial
(31:27):
transnationalisation is a significant increase in the real estate and even property assets of
the Latin American bourgeois and rentier classes that are dollarised.
This is a very large part of the wealth that has not been in the country for a long time and
(31:49):
that is now even greater with the facilities that you have opened up through financial globalisation.
In this sense, it is that at some point in our conversation I told you, the greatest threat
does not come from external financiers, these generally negotiate whatever, capable of negotiating
with Argentina, at least they are the internal ones.
Including due to the weight they have in their movement from outside to inside.
(32:11):
With liabilities and assets of all kinds on one side, in different currencies, in different games.
This has also brought them immense ease.
There has never been any external challenge, there has never been any war of greater proportions,
nothing that would generate what was generated in Europe, undoubtedly, by the infinite and terrible
(32:32):
wars that you have had, that would generate some degree of solidarity within the population,
a feeling of belonging to something common, a common imaginary, what is called a nation, does not exist.
You do not belong to that same thing, you were not obliged to participate in that, right?
I mean, even, for example, in the case of India, which is a country, an extremely fragmented
(32:55):
space of power and with a very low sense of national consciousness until the 19th century, then
in the struggle for independence from England, some cultural broth was created, a feeling of
belonging to a struggle, which at least was the struggle against the English.
In the Brazilian case and in the Latin American case, but in the Brazilian case very particularly,
where the inequalities are more gigantic than in all the other sides.
(33:19):
In fact, it is as if you were living in a certain space, but with a minimal sense of belonging
to the same cause, to the same nation, to the same project.
In this sense, let us say, this urban fear that is currently growing in Brazil at giant strides, right?
(33:39):
There is something, something distant, but it relates to what Hobsbawm called primitive rebels, is that not right?
Because it is a society where the distance is so infinite that it is impossible, it is another
aspect that we had not touched upon here when talking about democracy, it is almost impossible
(34:02):
for the traditional political system, classical, of European origin, in a party form, to account
for the representation of this extraordinary inequality and, at the same time, to carry out
state policies that reach the entirety of this tattered spectrum of people who do not make up a nation.
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