July 12, 2023 • 34 mins
Welcome to the Conflict Tipping podcast from Mediate.com, where we explore social conflict and what to do about it. In this episode, we explore the effects of party polarization on electoral participation with Dr. Morgan Le Corre Juratic, a postdoctoral researcher at Aarhus University in Denmark. She recently completed her PhD at the European University Institute, focusing on party competition, political behavior, and support for democracy. Get ready to uncover the fascinating insights from her doctoral research and gain a deeper understanding of the impact of polarization on democratic processes.
We discuss:
- Party polarization: Examining the rise of extreme parties and its impact on party competition.
- Motivating turnout: How polarization can influence people's motivation to participate in elections.
- Clarifying political alternatives: Understanding how polarization makes party positions more distinct and aids voter decision-making.
- Emotions and indifference: Exploring the emotional responses triggered by party polarization, including fear, anxiety, and indifference towards all parties.
- Implications for democracy: Discussing the potential consequences of increased indifference and declining trust in the political system.
Join us on the Conflict Tipping podcast as we delve into these intriguing topics with Dr. Juratic and uncover the intricate relationship between party polarization, emotions, and electoral participation.
Where to learn more:
- Morgan's Twitter: https://twitter.com/morganlcj
- Her website: https://www.morganlecorrejuratic.com/
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Laura May (00:10):
Welcome to the Conflict Tipping podcast from Mediate.com,
the podcast that explores socialconflict and what we can do about it.
I'm your host, Laura May,and today I have with me Dr.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic, postdoctoralresearch at Aarhus University in Denmark.
She recently defended her PhD at theEuropean University Institute in Florence,
(00:32):
Italy, and her research interests includeparty competition, political behavior,
and people's support for democracy.
So welcome Morgan.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (00:42):
Thanks a lot and thanks for giving me the opportunity
to talk about these topics with you.
Laura May (00:48):
I feel like the opportunity is all mine and that
of our listeners, so we're, we'relucky to have you with us today.
And so I wanna jump straight in andask you about your doctoral research
that you've just finished and graduatedfrom last week as we record this.
So congratulations again
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (01:05):
Thank you.
Laura May (01:06):
because you researched the effects of party polarization
on electoral participation.
Firstly, what does that mean?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (01:17):
So um, Party polarization as it happened in Europe.
So basically we just experiencedin the past 20 years a lot
of extreme parties emerging.
So when you think about yeah the AF D in Germany, like it used to be
not a thing to have a radical rightparty in Germany to be allowed.
(01:39):
And then they emergeagain in the past years.
So this kind of polarization andthen finding is, does that actually
make people want to participatemore in elections or, or not at all?
So that's basicallywhat is this all about.
Laura May (01:54):
Okay.
And so when you talk about participatingin elections, do you mean as in
voting or as in running for office?
Like what actually does that mean?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (02:02):
No, basically turnout, like, does that motivate
people to show up in elections and vote?
Laura May (02:09):
Great.
And what led you there?
Like why did you decide to dedicateyears of your life to researching
the ascent of finding this out?
Tell me why.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (02:18):
Yes.
So Basically it all started from thisobservation that in the early 2000 Europe
we had quite established party systems.
So with two mainstream parties competingand alternating in power for years.
And then that has changedquite a bit in the past year.
So when you see the AFD or when youthink about on the other side of the
(02:43):
political spectrum, so on the radicalleft after the economic crisis.
You, you've seen Podemosin Spain emerging.
So we did observe a lot of this happeningin European multi-party systems.
And and that is quite a striking change.
And then I.
I think I related also to whathas been going on a lot in the US.
(03:03):
So we do talk a lot about polarizationin the US and its consequences, and
there is big debate about is thatgood news or bad news for democracy.
So we tend to focus a lot onthe potential dangers this
polarization has for democracy.
So it feels that people are becomingquite opposed to each other.
(03:24):
And that is a badconsequence for democracy.
But then last American elections,we have seen the highest turnouts
as well in the past 50 years.
So could polarization actually bea good thing for democracy and,
and revive a bit the electoratebecause having an active electrode is
important for, for our system to work.
(03:45):
So having this debate in mind, andobserving that a different kind of
polarization was happening in Europetoo, what's what, what's going on?
Is that good or bad news for, forthe working of our democracies?
Laura May (03:58):
And was there a personal element for you?
Like were you living in one ofthese countries that was affected
by increasing polarization?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (04:06):
So I'm, I come from France and
we do as any other Europeancountries experience polarization.
And I feel, I mean, one of my firstpersonal political memories actually
when Le Pen ne made it to thesecond round of French elections.
So the radical right.
Coming to yeah, the second roundof elections for the first time.
(04:27):
And I remember the huge protest goingon to say this is not possible as a
reaction to, to this urgent, to thissudden urge of of the radical right.
So that's, is related to this.
And then I think polarization inferenceto is, is a big thing at the moment.
So yeah, we're really wondering whatcould be the consequences of that.
(04:49):
So I guess that all comesfrom there, in a way.
Laura May (04:53):
And so if I understand correctly, basically the idea is you get
all these extreme parties popping up.
They're moving away from each otherto various ends of various spectrums,
and then people wanna come and votemore so they can have their say.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (05:08):
Yeah, exactly.
So if you think about polarisationas this like more extreme offers, you
could see it as an opportunity in a way.
So you have more options to choose from.
And that should motivate peopleto participate because now they
feel, oh, now I have a good optionfor me that represents me, that
used to not be there before.
(05:28):
So that could be the positive side of it.
So I have more choice now.
Also the way that polarization couldmobilize people is that it it has this
it clarifies a bit what are the offers.
If you have more extremeparties then it's, it's clearer.
Okay?
They are much differentcompared to the others.
So that clarifies a bit the offersand that should help the people who
(05:52):
usually do not really understand, or ifparties overlap, okay, I do not really
get what's the difference between them,then that should motivate these people
to say, "okay, I have clear informationthat now I have this extreme offer".
So that should be theway it mobilize people.
Laura May (06:09):
So parties are kind of going from this amorphous blob of ideas, which
I don't really get, and maybe don'treally represent me to these kind of
extreme niche parties that really havemy particular cause at their center.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (06:23):
Yeah,
Laura May (06:24):
in the case of AFD, not my particular cause
that as some other person.
Yeah.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic: Yeah, no, no, exactly. (06:30):
undefined
So clarifying a bit, okay, now, Ihave a real alternative that I can
vote for, so that, that would bea bit, the mechanism behind it?
And then there is this other mechanismthat Does not correspond to the ideal
way of we think about how democracyshould work, and it's more that people
turn out more because actually they havestrong feelings about this party and
(06:55):
their opponents and they're like, theywill do everything they can to prevent
the other party to access power, right?
So that, that is more the other side ofthe coin that is not so much related to
policy offers or ideological position,but more to this affective component.
And that is far from, related to a morerational way of making a voting decision.
(07:19):
So that's, That would bethe other side of the coin.
Laura May (07:22):
It's like when we hear comparisons between US politics,
where it's obviously really clearlyDemocrats versus Republicans and
sports team where it's like, oh,I wanna be on the winning team.
I wanna crush the opponents.
This is definitely a healthyway to run a country.
But I mean, you study Europe though morethan the US and I'm just really curious,
(07:43):
I mean, what makes Europe particularlyinteresting to study in this context?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (07:48):
Yeah, so Europe is interesting for several reasons, but
it's mainly because compared to the USwe have really these multi-party systems
compared to the us two party system.
So one argument, again, is thatpolarization should clarify a
bit these political alternatives.
And the US it is pretty clear, right?
So if you have the Republican partymoving away from the democratic
(08:12):
party, it's pretty clear how differentthey are and there's no option.
It's either or.
So it, it is pretty clearwhat are the alternatives.
But when you have, such as in Europeanmulti-party systems, so many parties
that compete, does polarization reallyhelp to clarify these alternatives?
Like it's not, it's not for sure, right?
It could actually be moreconfusing if you have all kind of
(08:35):
party offers in all directions.
The additional thing with the Europeanparty system and multi-party system
is that parties do not competeonly on one mega issue left right,
but they compete on economicissues on more societal issues.
And sometimes these do not clearlyoverlap on one single, left, right axis.
(08:56):
Like some parties areconservative economically, and
then conservative on uh, the moresocietal issues on immigration.
But other are conservative on the societalissues and liberal on the economic issues.
So all of that makes a bit,this clarifying mechanism does
that really happen in Europe?
So that was why it wasso interesting to see.
(09:19):
The second thing that makes Europeinteresting, again, as opposed to the
US, is that for this negative effectof polarization to happen so that it
increases more groups, citizens, groupdivision, and it makes people vote more
for this reason than for the ideologicalpositions of parties, then it suppose that
(09:39):
you have a strong partisan to begin with.
And in the US again, it's prettyclear, so people self-identify quite
quickly as Republican or Democrat.
But if you ask in Europe anyone, doyou feel closer to any party, there's
at least a good third and maybe moreoften half of them that say no, I don't
feel close to any party in particular.
(10:00):
So that could mean that maybe thisnegative effects of polarization
do not really happen as muchin Europe compared to the Us.
So those are the two main reasonwhy it's interesting to look at a
bit more what happens in multi-partysystems compared to two party systems.
Laura May (10:19):
And as you were talking about the European party
systems, where you've kind of gotpeople all over the show, right?
So rather than one line, you'vegot a constellation of parties.
Do one issue partiesfall into this as well?
I mean, can a one issue party say, I mean,we often see marijuana parties, right?
And they're a one issue party.
(10:40):
They're like, we're gonnacampaign for legalization
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (10:42):
Mm-hmm.
Laura May (10:43):
Do they also polarize in the same way?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (10:47):
So I guess that's a bit more tricky in that sense
that you also have the single issueparty, or you have also the parties
that are more the owner of some issues.
So if you think about the GreenParty, they're really known for
their position on green policies.
But they're all part ofthis polarization system.
(11:09):
So you have also this single offer party.
So it's really unclear how howdoes that work for citizens?
Do they perceive that as an alternative,or they rather go for parties that
compete all across the issues?
So that adds to the complexityof the party systems when you
have this single issue party.
Yes.
Laura May (11:28):
I mean, as you were talking about this being a, a Brexit nerd, it
struck me that one of the axes along whichparties compete is that of Euroscepticism,
so whether people are pro EU or anti-eu.
You were doing your PhD over a verytumultuous time in Europe, from the
Brexit referendum through the UK exiting,and so you will have seen a lot going
(11:52):
on here, in terms of which way partiesgo, or polarize along which axis.
I mean, how did that play out?
What did that look like?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (12:00):
So it's interesting because, yeah, the Brexit
issue of course was very critical in theUK and, if there is another country where
there is one axis of competition and asingle issue where parties compete, it
really would be the UK where you showthat the main structuring issue was this
Brexit issue for pro and against Brexit.
(12:20):
So that is clearly salient.
When you look at other countries inthe EU, you do have a rising conflict
of parties on this specific EU issue.
And there again, it's unclearhow does that affect citizens'
attitudes toward the EU.
So again, you could think thatokay, this clarifies a bit and
(12:43):
you would see the surge of uh,euroskeptic views also among citizens.
But then it seems that it'snot really the case actually.
This polarization might beconfusing a bit more citizens on
the issue in a multi-party system.
So it's not that they becomeEurosceptic, but they become more mixed
about their views on the EU issue.
(13:03):
So beyond the Uk, I guess why it ispretty straightforward that you have a
clear polarization of attitudes towardsthe EU following parties polarization.
It's not necessarily thecase across EU countries.
It's more that as a result uh, citizensbecome much more mixed about this.
Laura May (13:25):
That's really interesting because I can understand that if I
have a whole bunch of concerns, so,say that, for example, I'm really
into train infrastructure and I'manti-immigration, and I want lots
of really good public education.
I want people in vocational trades-by the way, I'm obviously not
anti-immigration, I'm a migrant butI've got this whole of the mixed
(13:46):
bag, and I found this one partythat seems to fit those things,
but then they're really pro Eu.
I'm like, all right, okay, well, I'mgonna be listening to this party.
Right?
They're the closest I've got.
Is that sort of how it works?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (14:00):
Yeah, basically.
So the EU issue is a bit more peculiarcompared to any issue because it is
even more complex . So parties thatyou know the position on some issues,
then you would trust them to have theright position on the EU issue, even
if you don't know enough about the Eu.
(14:21):
So you would kind offollow the party queue.
But it doesn't seem to be the caseactually because people do not blindly
follow this Eurosceptic trend at all.
But it's more like mixed.
There is a lot of people who say "Ihave neither good or bad opinion
about the EU" that don't really followthis Eurosceptic queue at place.
(14:42):
So I guess that's that's what reallyhappens with this EU issue in particular.
Laura May (14:48):
Yeah, I, I suppose, having always that Brexit head on, I think,
oh, this issue is so, so salient.
It's sort of that thing whichhelps structures everything
else, but it sounds like that'snot the case on mainland Europe.
Maybe there's exceptions forHungary, Poland, I don't know,
but that's really interesting.
But I wanna just circle back for amoment, because earlier you were talking
(15:08):
a bit about this idea of affectivepolarization because you mentioned
polarization of parties as parties movingaway from each other, and you mentioned
affective polarization as the actualpeople feeling things towards each other.
And so what kinds of emotionspopped up in your research?
What seemed relevant?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (15:28):
So when you look at effective polarization, what
you would expect, the type of emotionsyou would expect from people are
really hates, anger or even disgusttowards your political opponents.
Those would be the emotion you wouldbe expecting if you would observe more
effective polarization among citizens.
(15:48):
But what happens is that while doing theresearch, actually that was not the main
thing, the main emotions that I observed.
And that's I did through by observingpeople's reaction to party polarization
in focus group discussions.
So people with very different viewsof politics talking together and
reacting to party polarization.
(16:11):
They did not react with more anger,hate, or disgust towards their
political opponents in the groupor outside towards the parties.
What was actually very striking isthat there were two other emotions,
type of emotions that were very salientas a reaction to party polarization.
The first one is actuallyfear and anxiety.
(16:34):
And this was particularly salientwhen the discussion was about party
polarization on more societal issues.
So if you take immigration for example.
And there, citizens' reactionwere a bit like, "okay.
Parties are really playing with people'sfear on these issues to make us turnout".
And I think that was actually veryinteresting because in works of
(16:56):
political psychology fear and anxietyare usually not associated at all with
activism or electoral participation.
But that was really one type ofemotions that were really salient
in group discussion, especiallypolarization on migration.
And then the second type of emotions,and there was a bit all across different
(17:17):
groups, was a form of indifference.
And it was not hate towards youropponent's party, but actually even
not caring about all other, allparties, without distinction that
it's your opponent party or your own.
So undistinguished disgust orindifference towards all parties.
And that was not expected actually,I was really expecting more this
(17:40):
affective polarization going on.
But no, there is this strong indifferenceas a reaction to party being more divided.
Laura May (17:48):
That is so interesting.
Because I'm a bit of a nerd foremotions in politics myself.
Right.
And what you've just said is sodifferent to what I observed in the
UK context, and it's unsurprisingbecause of course, emotions are, are
cultural and culturally contingent.
And this is a very different circumstance.
But I found it really fascinatingthat you described fear and anxiety
(18:12):
around social issues such as migration.
When I did focus groups with Brexiteers,I heard a lot of anxiety, yes, but
that, that led to compassion, right.
For both immigrants and for people whothey saw as, as "more British"- in heavy
inverted commas, cuz people who listeningcan't see me doing inverted commas.
And then this compassion in turn kindof led to a backlash in activism.
(18:36):
And yeah, I mean the only apathy that Iencountered was apathy towards victims.
So either there was compassion or therewas apathy towards victims . So it's
so interesting to me that you hadthese other very different findings.
Before I was talking about this idea ofUS politics as being sports teams, and it
(18:56):
was kind of similar in in Brexit as well.
There was a lot of like enthusiasticschadenfreude when the vote came down
with people being like, "Hey, suck it.
We won".
But it sounds like these things weretotally absent from these European
contexts in which you did your focusgroups, which is absolutely fascinating.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (19:11):
So, yeah, my hunch is that among any
European countries, if I may stillintegrate UK in, in a European
Laura May (19:18):
It's allowed,
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (19:19):
So yeah, so that might be closer to a classical two
party system and on one single dimension.
So closer to the partycompetition you have in the US.
So, so my hunch is thatthat could be related.
So again, it's clear who is your campand the other camp , who is a Brexiter
and who is not, compared to otherEuropean party multi-party systems.
(19:40):
So that, that would be myhunch of what's going on here.
Laura May (19:43):
Great.
And the other part of yourresearch was of course the
electoral participation element.
So what were your findings withthese fearful people, these apathetic
people or indifferent people?
What did that actually implyfor electoral participation?
Because I'm wondering if maybe anxietyand apathy is more desirable than
schadenfreude and rage for a democracy.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (20:08):
Yeah.
And that's the whole story.
So on the one hand you could think,okay, so it's good for democracy.
We don't have so much affectivepolarization, and people do not
participate more because of these reasons.
But what I find is not so goodeither, in a different way.
So I do find experimentally thatparty polarization leads to more
(20:29):
in difference and it does nothave any effect on participation.
So so we don't know exactlylike, it, it doesn't decrease
or increase electoral turnout.
But the bad thing about if peoplemore and more as a result of
party polarization become moreindifferent or dislike all parties.
(20:50):
What about their trust forthe system, the way it works.
What about the support forrepresentative democracy?
That could be in the long run prettybad news actually for the functioning
of our representative democracy.
So I don't have a very optimisticresult and findings about participation.
Laura May (21:10):
Yeah, this idea, I think of people becoming more indifferent
to the system or having less trustin the system is really salient.
Especially when we see demagogues, really,saying that "I will represent the people
who voted for me and not represent thewhole country or the whole constituency".
And so when you've got, you know, thesetiny little parties and you've got one
(21:32):
saying, "well, I'll represent just whovoted for me" and every other interest
gets left in the dust, I could I wouldn'ttrust that system probably myself.
I'd be like, well, I'll just haveto wait for my turn and then it
becomes quite, quite toxic for yourbelief in democracy and probably
for society itself I should imagine.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (21:50):
Yeah, because on the one hand you have all these people
becoming more and more indifferent andnot trusting the system and then not
participating anymore, and the only onesthat are still participating are those
more maybe affectively polarized thatrepresent a minority of the people and
then push the system even further away.
So it could be a vicious circle wherewe have more dropout from those people
(22:15):
who are not so partisan, and whobecome more indifferent or disgusted
by all parties regardless of theposition, while you have still the
most extreme that still participateand maintain and even make the system
even more polarized on the long run.
So that could be, not toooptimistic again . Yeah.
Laura May (22:34):
And it's kind of ironic, right, because if these demagogues or
these really highly politicized or ratherpolarized parties with maybe extreme
views, you know, they'll often claim, "oh,we're representing a silent majority".
But actually when those parties gainpower and only represent a niche interest,
They're creating the silent majority, cuzeveryone else is becoming indifferent and
(22:57):
losing trust in them and in the system.
So yeah, it's, it's kind of ironic, right?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic: Yeah, a little bit. (23:04):
undefined
Laura May (23:06):
No, it sounds like a really fascinating project that you did and
this work that you continue to do.
Speaking of which, whatare you working on now?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (23:15):
So now, that I moved so much into, yeah, this
questions about what does that mean forsupport for democracy, and implication
for citizen support for democracy.
I started working on this postdocproject called DEMNORM where
we look at these questions.
I still focus a lot on elite'sresponsibility in harming or changing
(23:36):
support for democracy among citizens.
And here, we have stillthis puzzle in mind.
So when you ask citizen directly,they all seem to support democracy
quite strikingly, and that hasn'tchanged in the past 20 years.
But when you look at political eventsof for example a group of people
storming the capitol in the Us,that's not properly what you call a
(24:00):
democratic behavior in our system.
And we see all these kind of eventshappening in established democracies.
So we really wonder,okay, what's going on?
And maybe support for democracy isactually more of a social norm than a
deep down felt value, meaning that itwould be uh, more sensitive to what you
think your friends do or think aboutdemocracy or sensitive to changes in
(24:25):
what your political elites are sayingare the boundaries of democracy.
So yeah, that's basically the,the project we're working on now.
And it's just starting actually.
Laura May (24:36):
Hmm.
Amazing.
It sounds a bit like we say webelieve in democracy, cuz that's a
social thing, but deep down we'reall little mini authoritarians or
mini communists or what have you.
Is that how it's looking at this stage?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (24:50):
So I, I'm not saying that no one is
deep down supporting democracy.
I, I think this is still the case,but, when you just ask directly
do you support for democracy?
Everyone will say, yeah, of course we do.
But then when you diga bit more into that...
and if you suddenly have your friends ornetworks or group of partisans that do
(25:12):
something that is not really considereddemocratic or you believe that they don't
think it is that important to support someaspect of democracy, then uh, you would
quickly change and follow whatever yournetwork is doing compared to sticking
to a strong value of democratic support.
(25:34):
That's the idea behind that.
Laura May (25:36):
And so earlier you mentioned this idea of the storming
of the Capitol building as an exampleof an antidemocratic thing, right?
An antidemocratic action.
What are some of the other ones you'veseen or you've encountered going on?
I asked because a couple of weeksago I spoke with Ben Abrams about
this idea of the Rise of the Massesand increasing protest movements.
(25:57):
And I mean, sure.
Obviously I'm speaking to a Frenchperson and I think about all the protests
in the streets of Paris and in Francemore broadly about pension ages or
industrial rights and things like that.
And so those, I see myself perhapsas an expression of at least people
power, if not democracy, right?
Like people are really going outthere and, and demanding this.
(26:18):
And so I'm wondering, other thanthis example of the storming of the
Capitol building, which is reallyobviously like an insurrection right?
Like, yeah.
I'm wondering what are theseother uprisings and movements
you would actually considerbeing against democratic norms?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (26:35):
So there are clear examples, so storming
the Capitol is a clear undemocraticbehavior when you increasingly
contest elections results as well.
Or you would mobilize againstcontested or close election
result of you barely losing.
That could also be considered likefear, violation of what is democratic
(26:56):
or not, and then it all depends abit on the norms and the boundaries.
Like is it okay, in democracy,how do people talk about it?
Is it okay in the democracy to be violentagainst the police when you strike?
Is it okay to be violentagainst different properties?
Is it okay to block the streetsin a democracy and all of this?
(27:20):
I guess you could argue that there startsto be more contested or more not so
clear cut democratic and undemocratic.
And this is where I think elite'srole is really important in defining,
okay, what are the boundaries?
What have we alwaysdone that is democratic?
If you start allowing for this more grayarea action, does that spill over to
(27:43):
more like clear democratic violation?
How do elites themself have a rolein really defining the boundaries of
democracies and how does that influencepeople's views or what is acceptable
or not acceptable to do in democracies.
Laura May (27:58):
As you are talking, I'm reminded of Australia.
Because later this yearthere's gonna be a referendum
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (28:07):
Mm-hmm.
Laura May (28:07):
about the inclusion of what's known as the Voice, a
permanent representation ofAustralian Aboriginal Peoples within
Parliament, to obviously give inputon those issues that affect them.
And so already you see around thereferendum this idea of having a body
within Parliament as not being democratic.
(28:29):
And so this whole idea of whatdemocracy is and isn't is currently
getting underway in Australia.
And I'll be very curious, I'm hopeI'm allowed to vote this year,
like last time there was a votethey banned everyone overseas from
voting, which I found very upsetting.
But luckily I was in Australia.
But I'll be really curious to see,given the nature of these discussions
(28:49):
around whether it's democratic or not,if there will be any fallout in the wake
of being what happened obviously in theUS and obviously Australia also being
a Murdoch, media dominated country.
So that'll be, I think, reallysomething to keep an eye on.
With that said, I avoid studyingAustralian politics myself.
It's too close.
So someone else, someone could listento this podcast and go, hmm, that's
(29:11):
a great idea for a study they cando, pretty please, and send it to me.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (29:15):
Here is a research product for someone else.
Laura May (29:17):
Exactly.
We're just giving them away for free now.
This is great.
And so, what can we takeaway from all of this?
What are the implicationsof your research?
What should we do as well aspractitioners, as people, as you know,
people who may not hold democratic valuesdeep in our hearts, at least we say we do.
What are the implications?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (29:38):
So I do have pretty gloomy results
from my dissertation, but Idon't think it's a lost cause.
And one thing is we do focus a loton specific parts of the population.
So the most like partisans,activists, and these are the ones
we see on the news and I get that.
And sometimes their behaviorcan be quite shocking.
(29:58):
So I see why we focus so much on them.
But then I really think we shouldalso look at people's reactions who
are not particularly partisan or, orextreme because these also have very
important implications for, for democracyand democratic support probably.
So I think we should pay abit more attention to this
(30:19):
people's reaction as well.
And I think, there, you could uh, reallysee that they could be convinced back
again by uh, a healthy party competition.
And I think elected elites andpoliticians really underestimate how
people perceive these polarizationas strategies, but not so much as
genuine political alternatives.
(30:41):
So, we have this need to make a coalitionat the end of the day after elections,
people perceive that, and they are veryconscious that there needs to be some
kind of consensus in our multi-partysystem because in most of our system,
we need to have a coalition betweenthese parties at the end of the day.
So when one uh, during the campaignthere are offering this very polarized
(31:01):
offer, but then the next week theyhave to agree with each other.
It's really perceived likea non honest strategy from
parties to behave like this.
And there is somedemand for more consensus.
So elites should also be aware that thereis this demand and people will be aware
that this is not a genuine party offer.
So I think more could be done.
(31:22):
And parties should be partlyaware of their responsibility
in creating these dynamics.
Laura May (31:27):
It's like you say, really extreme stuff to capture an audience
and you have to immediately backdown the moment you get into power.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (31:33):
Yeah, exactly.
So most of our multi-party system needs tofind Government, a consensus of some kind.
Laura May (31:41):
In Belgium for many years, there was the, I think, unofficial
cordon that, I can't say it.
I, I, I said before we started recording.
I can't pronounce any French.
Whereby parties wouldn't form coalitionswith the really hardcore racist wing.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (31:54):
Yeah.
Laura May (31:55):
Then as you've seen that wing gain a lot more power.
They've actually had todrop that and start forming
coalitions in different ways.
And of course, you know, everyonehas to sort of step down their views
because for democracy, yeah, we doneed at least a measure of consensus.
So I can see that that would bechallenging and in the case of Belgium,
potentially quite problematic as someonewho's been an immigrant in Belgium.
(32:18):
But anyway.
And I wanna ask you reallya cheeky question because I
mentioned Australia before.
What's your take on compulsory voting?
Democratic, non-democratic?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (32:29):
Okay.
I think so.
Maybe it's not so much relatedto my specific research, but I
think compulsory voting willbe quite democratic in my view.
So to be sure that we don't get theoverrepresentation of specific groups.
Actually I've read some researchrecently that having compulsory
(32:50):
voting was making people feel moreinvolved overall in the system.
So it has beneficial effects I thinkthat we should think about as well.
Yeah, I think that could havegood consequences for the way our
representative democracies work actually.
So that's my hot takeon compulsory voting.
Laura May (33:09):
I love a hot take and I mean, I'll say as another lesson
from Australia, as long as youhave a barbecue or the whatever is
relevant in your country, votingday sausage, I think you'll be fine.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (33:20):
Yep.
Laura May (33:21):
Thank you so much for joining me today, Morgan, and for those who
are interested in learning more aboutyour work, where can they find you?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (33:29):
So I guess the easiest way would be on Twitter actually,
where I try to publish how the researchis going and the findings in quick ways.
So find me on Twitter and thenon my website, find more on
my work and ongoing projects.
Laura May (33:46):
I can vouch for your Twitter.
It's how I found your workso clearly that's effective.
And I'll include both the linksin the podcast description.
So again, Morgan, thank youso much for joining me today.
And until next time, this isLaura May with the Conflict
Tipping podcast from Mediate.com.
Welcome to the Conflict Tipping podcast from Mediate.com,
the podcast that explores socialconflict and what we can do about it.
I'm your host, Laura May,and today I have with me Dr.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic, postdoctoralresearch at Aarhus University in Denmark.
She recently defended her PhD at theEuropean University Institute in Florence,
(00:32):
Italy, and her research interests includeparty competition, political behavior,
and people's support for democracy.
So welcome Morgan.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (00:42):
Thanks a lot and thanks for giving me the opportunity
to talk about these topics with you.
Laura May (00:48):
I feel like the opportunity is all mine and that
of our listeners, so we're, we'relucky to have you with us today.
And so I wanna jump straight in andask you about your doctoral research
that you've just finished and graduatedfrom last week as we record this.
So congratulations again
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (01:05):
Thank you.
Laura May (01:06):
because you researched the effects of party polarization
on electoral participation.
Firstly, what does that mean?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (01:17):
So um, Party polarization as it happened in Europe.
So basically we just experiencedin the past 20 years a lot
of extreme parties emerging.
So when you think about yeah the AF D in Germany, like it used to be
not a thing to have a radical rightparty in Germany to be allowed.
(01:39):
And then they emergeagain in the past years.
So this kind of polarization andthen finding is, does that actually
make people want to participatemore in elections or, or not at all?
So that's basicallywhat is this all about.
Laura May (01:54):
Okay.
And so when you talk about participatingin elections, do you mean as in
voting or as in running for office?
Like what actually does that mean?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (02:02):
No, basically turnout, like, does that motivate
people to show up in elections and vote?
Laura May (02:09):
Great.
And what led you there?
Like why did you decide to dedicateyears of your life to researching
the ascent of finding this out?
Tell me why.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (02:18):
Yes.
So Basically it all started from thisobservation that in the early 2000 Europe
we had quite established party systems.
So with two mainstream parties competingand alternating in power for years.
And then that has changedquite a bit in the past year.
So when you see the AFD or when youthink about on the other side of the
(02:43):
political spectrum, so on the radicalleft after the economic crisis.
You, you've seen Podemosin Spain emerging.
So we did observe a lot of this happeningin European multi-party systems.
And and that is quite a striking change.
And then I.
I think I related also to whathas been going on a lot in the US.
(03:03):
So we do talk a lot about polarizationin the US and its consequences, and
there is big debate about is thatgood news or bad news for democracy.
So we tend to focus a lot onthe potential dangers this
polarization has for democracy.
So it feels that people are becomingquite opposed to each other.
(03:24):
And that is a badconsequence for democracy.
But then last American elections,we have seen the highest turnouts
as well in the past 50 years.
So could polarization actually bea good thing for democracy and,
and revive a bit the electoratebecause having an active electrode is
important for, for our system to work.
(03:45):
So having this debate in mind, andobserving that a different kind of
polarization was happening in Europetoo, what's what, what's going on?
Is that good or bad news for, forthe working of our democracies?
Laura May (03:58):
And was there a personal element for you?
Like were you living in one ofthese countries that was affected
by increasing polarization?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (04:06):
So I'm, I come from France and
we do as any other Europeancountries experience polarization.
And I feel, I mean, one of my firstpersonal political memories actually
when Le Pen ne made it to thesecond round of French elections.
So the radical right.
Coming to yeah, the second roundof elections for the first time.
(04:27):
And I remember the huge protest goingon to say this is not possible as a
reaction to, to this urgent, to thissudden urge of of the radical right.
So that's, is related to this.
And then I think polarization inferenceto is, is a big thing at the moment.
So yeah, we're really wondering whatcould be the consequences of that.
(04:49):
So I guess that all comesfrom there, in a way.
Laura May (04:53):
And so if I understand correctly, basically the idea is you get
all these extreme parties popping up.
They're moving away from each otherto various ends of various spectrums,
and then people wanna come and votemore so they can have their say.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (05:08):
Yeah, exactly.
So if you think about polarisationas this like more extreme offers, you
could see it as an opportunity in a way.
So you have more options to choose from.
And that should motivate peopleto participate because now they
feel, oh, now I have a good optionfor me that represents me, that
used to not be there before.
(05:28):
So that could be the positive side of it.
So I have more choice now.
Also the way that polarization couldmobilize people is that it it has this
it clarifies a bit what are the offers.
If you have more extremeparties then it's, it's clearer.
Okay?
They are much differentcompared to the others.
So that clarifies a bit the offersand that should help the people who
(05:52):
usually do not really understand, or ifparties overlap, okay, I do not really
get what's the difference between them,then that should motivate these people
to say, "okay, I have clear informationthat now I have this extreme offer".
So that should be theway it mobilize people.
Laura May (06:09):
So parties are kind of going from this amorphous blob of ideas, which
I don't really get, and maybe don'treally represent me to these kind of
extreme niche parties that really havemy particular cause at their center.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (06:23):
Yeah,
Laura May (06:24):
in the case of AFD, not my particular cause
that as some other person.
Yeah.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic: Yeah, no, no, exactly. (06:30):
undefined
So clarifying a bit, okay, now, Ihave a real alternative that I can
vote for, so that, that would bea bit, the mechanism behind it?
And then there is this other mechanismthat Does not correspond to the ideal
way of we think about how democracyshould work, and it's more that people
turn out more because actually they havestrong feelings about this party and
(06:55):
their opponents and they're like, theywill do everything they can to prevent
the other party to access power, right?
So that, that is more the other side ofthe coin that is not so much related to
policy offers or ideological position,but more to this affective component.
And that is far from, related to a morerational way of making a voting decision.
(07:19):
So that's, That would bethe other side of the coin.
Laura May (07:22):
It's like when we hear comparisons between US politics,
where it's obviously really clearlyDemocrats versus Republicans and
sports team where it's like, oh,I wanna be on the winning team.
I wanna crush the opponents.
This is definitely a healthyway to run a country.
But I mean, you study Europe though morethan the US and I'm just really curious,
(07:43):
I mean, what makes Europe particularlyinteresting to study in this context?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (07:48):
Yeah, so Europe is interesting for several reasons, but
it's mainly because compared to the USwe have really these multi-party systems
compared to the us two party system.
So one argument, again, is thatpolarization should clarify a
bit these political alternatives.
And the US it is pretty clear, right?
So if you have the Republican partymoving away from the democratic
(08:12):
party, it's pretty clear how differentthey are and there's no option.
It's either or.
So it, it is pretty clearwhat are the alternatives.
But when you have, such as in Europeanmulti-party systems, so many parties
that compete, does polarization reallyhelp to clarify these alternatives?
Like it's not, it's not for sure, right?
It could actually be moreconfusing if you have all kind of
(08:35):
party offers in all directions.
The additional thing with the Europeanparty system and multi-party system
is that parties do not competeonly on one mega issue left right,
but they compete on economicissues on more societal issues.
And sometimes these do not clearlyoverlap on one single, left, right axis.
(08:56):
Like some parties areconservative economically, and
then conservative on uh, the moresocietal issues on immigration.
But other are conservative on the societalissues and liberal on the economic issues.
So all of that makes a bit,this clarifying mechanism does
that really happen in Europe?
So that was why it wasso interesting to see.
(09:19):
The second thing that makes Europeinteresting, again, as opposed to the
US, is that for this negative effectof polarization to happen so that it
increases more groups, citizens, groupdivision, and it makes people vote more
for this reason than for the ideologicalpositions of parties, then it suppose that
(09:39):
you have a strong partisan to begin with.
And in the US again, it's prettyclear, so people self-identify quite
quickly as Republican or Democrat.
But if you ask in Europe anyone, doyou feel closer to any party, there's
at least a good third and maybe moreoften half of them that say no, I don't
feel close to any party in particular.
(10:00):
So that could mean that maybe thisnegative effects of polarization
do not really happen as muchin Europe compared to the Us.
So those are the two main reasonwhy it's interesting to look at a
bit more what happens in multi-partysystems compared to two party systems.
Laura May (10:19):
And as you were talking about the European party
systems, where you've kind of gotpeople all over the show, right?
So rather than one line, you'vegot a constellation of parties.
Do one issue partiesfall into this as well?
I mean, can a one issue party say, I mean,we often see marijuana parties, right?
And they're a one issue party.
(10:40):
They're like, we're gonnacampaign for legalization
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (10:42):
Mm-hmm.
Laura May (10:43):
Do they also polarize in the same way?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (10:47):
So I guess that's a bit more tricky in that sense
that you also have the single issueparty, or you have also the parties
that are more the owner of some issues.
So if you think about the GreenParty, they're really known for
their position on green policies.
But they're all part ofthis polarization system.
(11:09):
So you have also this single offer party.
So it's really unclear how howdoes that work for citizens?
Do they perceive that as an alternative,or they rather go for parties that
compete all across the issues?
So that adds to the complexityof the party systems when you
have this single issue party.
Yes.
Laura May (11:28):
I mean, as you were talking about this being a, a Brexit nerd, it
struck me that one of the axes along whichparties compete is that of Euroscepticism,
so whether people are pro EU or anti-eu.
You were doing your PhD over a verytumultuous time in Europe, from the
Brexit referendum through the UK exiting,and so you will have seen a lot going
(11:52):
on here, in terms of which way partiesgo, or polarize along which axis.
I mean, how did that play out?
What did that look like?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (12:00):
So it's interesting because, yeah, the Brexit
issue of course was very critical in theUK and, if there is another country where
there is one axis of competition and asingle issue where parties compete, it
really would be the UK where you showthat the main structuring issue was this
Brexit issue for pro and against Brexit.
(12:20):
So that is clearly salient.
When you look at other countries inthe EU, you do have a rising conflict
of parties on this specific EU issue.
And there again, it's unclearhow does that affect citizens'
attitudes toward the EU.
So again, you could think thatokay, this clarifies a bit and
(12:43):
you would see the surge of uh,euroskeptic views also among citizens.
But then it seems that it'snot really the case actually.
This polarization might beconfusing a bit more citizens on
the issue in a multi-party system.
So it's not that they becomeEurosceptic, but they become more mixed
about their views on the EU issue.
(13:03):
So beyond the Uk, I guess why it ispretty straightforward that you have a
clear polarization of attitudes towardsthe EU following parties polarization.
It's not necessarily thecase across EU countries.
It's more that as a result uh, citizensbecome much more mixed about this.
Laura May (13:25):
That's really interesting because I can understand that if I
have a whole bunch of concerns, so,say that, for example, I'm really
into train infrastructure and I'manti-immigration, and I want lots
of really good public education.
I want people in vocational trades-by the way, I'm obviously not
anti-immigration, I'm a migrant butI've got this whole of the mixed
(13:46):
bag, and I found this one partythat seems to fit those things,
but then they're really pro Eu.
I'm like, all right, okay, well, I'mgonna be listening to this party.
Right?
They're the closest I've got.
Is that sort of how it works?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (14:00):
Yeah, basically.
So the EU issue is a bit more peculiarcompared to any issue because it is
even more complex . So parties thatyou know the position on some issues,
then you would trust them to have theright position on the EU issue, even
if you don't know enough about the Eu.
(14:21):
So you would kind offollow the party queue.
But it doesn't seem to be the caseactually because people do not blindly
follow this Eurosceptic trend at all.
But it's more like mixed.
There is a lot of people who say "Ihave neither good or bad opinion
about the EU" that don't really followthis Eurosceptic queue at place.
(14:42):
So I guess that's that's what reallyhappens with this EU issue in particular.
Laura May (14:48):
Yeah, I, I suppose, having always that Brexit head on, I think,
oh, this issue is so, so salient.
It's sort of that thing whichhelps structures everything
else, but it sounds like that'snot the case on mainland Europe.
Maybe there's exceptions forHungary, Poland, I don't know,
but that's really interesting.
But I wanna just circle back for amoment, because earlier you were talking
(15:08):
a bit about this idea of affectivepolarization because you mentioned
polarization of parties as parties movingaway from each other, and you mentioned
affective polarization as the actualpeople feeling things towards each other.
And so what kinds of emotionspopped up in your research?
What seemed relevant?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (15:28):
So when you look at effective polarization, what
you would expect, the type of emotionsyou would expect from people are
really hates, anger or even disgusttowards your political opponents.
Those would be the emotion you wouldbe expecting if you would observe more
effective polarization among citizens.
(15:48):
But what happens is that while doing theresearch, actually that was not the main
thing, the main emotions that I observed.
And that's I did through by observingpeople's reaction to party polarization
in focus group discussions.
So people with very different viewsof politics talking together and
reacting to party polarization.
(16:11):
They did not react with more anger,hate, or disgust towards their
political opponents in the groupor outside towards the parties.
What was actually very striking isthat there were two other emotions,
type of emotions that were very salientas a reaction to party polarization.
The first one is actuallyfear and anxiety.
(16:34):
And this was particularly salientwhen the discussion was about party
polarization on more societal issues.
So if you take immigration for example.
And there, citizens' reactionwere a bit like, "okay.
Parties are really playing with people'sfear on these issues to make us turnout".
And I think that was actually veryinteresting because in works of
(16:56):
political psychology fear and anxietyare usually not associated at all with
activism or electoral participation.
But that was really one type ofemotions that were really salient
in group discussion, especiallypolarization on migration.
And then the second type of emotions,and there was a bit all across different
(17:17):
groups, was a form of indifference.
And it was not hate towards youropponent's party, but actually even
not caring about all other, allparties, without distinction that
it's your opponent party or your own.
So undistinguished disgust orindifference towards all parties.
And that was not expected actually,I was really expecting more this
(17:40):
affective polarization going on.
But no, there is this strong indifferenceas a reaction to party being more divided.
Laura May (17:48):
That is so interesting.
Because I'm a bit of a nerd foremotions in politics myself.
Right.
And what you've just said is sodifferent to what I observed in the
UK context, and it's unsurprisingbecause of course, emotions are, are
cultural and culturally contingent.
And this is a very different circumstance.
But I found it really fascinatingthat you described fear and anxiety
(18:12):
around social issues such as migration.
When I did focus groups with Brexiteers,I heard a lot of anxiety, yes, but
that, that led to compassion, right.
For both immigrants and for people whothey saw as, as "more British"- in heavy
inverted commas, cuz people who listeningcan't see me doing inverted commas.
And then this compassion in turn kindof led to a backlash in activism.
(18:36):
And yeah, I mean the only apathy that Iencountered was apathy towards victims.
So either there was compassion or therewas apathy towards victims . So it's
so interesting to me that you hadthese other very different findings.
Before I was talking about this idea ofUS politics as being sports teams, and it
(18:56):
was kind of similar in in Brexit as well.
There was a lot of like enthusiasticschadenfreude when the vote came down
with people being like, "Hey, suck it.
We won".
But it sounds like these things weretotally absent from these European
contexts in which you did your focusgroups, which is absolutely fascinating.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (19:11):
So, yeah, my hunch is that among any
European countries, if I may stillintegrate UK in, in a European
Laura May (19:18):
It's allowed,
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (19:19):
So yeah, so that might be closer to a classical two
party system and on one single dimension.
So closer to the partycompetition you have in the US.
So, so my hunch is thatthat could be related.
So again, it's clear who is your campand the other camp , who is a Brexiter
and who is not, compared to otherEuropean party multi-party systems.
(19:40):
So that, that would be myhunch of what's going on here.
Laura May (19:43):
Great.
And the other part of yourresearch was of course the
electoral participation element.
So what were your findings withthese fearful people, these apathetic
people or indifferent people?
What did that actually implyfor electoral participation?
Because I'm wondering if maybe anxietyand apathy is more desirable than
schadenfreude and rage for a democracy.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (20:08):
Yeah.
And that's the whole story.
So on the one hand you could think,okay, so it's good for democracy.
We don't have so much affectivepolarization, and people do not
participate more because of these reasons.
But what I find is not so goodeither, in a different way.
So I do find experimentally thatparty polarization leads to more
(20:29):
in difference and it does nothave any effect on participation.
So so we don't know exactlylike, it, it doesn't decrease
or increase electoral turnout.
But the bad thing about if peoplemore and more as a result of
party polarization become moreindifferent or dislike all parties.
(20:50):
What about their trust forthe system, the way it works.
What about the support forrepresentative democracy?
That could be in the long run prettybad news actually for the functioning
of our representative democracy.
So I don't have a very optimisticresult and findings about participation.
Laura May (21:10):
Yeah, this idea, I think of people becoming more indifferent
to the system or having less trustin the system is really salient.
Especially when we see demagogues, really,saying that "I will represent the people
who voted for me and not represent thewhole country or the whole constituency".
And so when you've got, you know, thesetiny little parties and you've got one
(21:32):
saying, "well, I'll represent just whovoted for me" and every other interest
gets left in the dust, I could I wouldn'ttrust that system probably myself.
I'd be like, well, I'll just haveto wait for my turn and then it
becomes quite, quite toxic for yourbelief in democracy and probably
for society itself I should imagine.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (21:50):
Yeah, because on the one hand you have all these people
becoming more and more indifferent andnot trusting the system and then not
participating anymore, and the only onesthat are still participating are those
more maybe affectively polarized thatrepresent a minority of the people and
then push the system even further away.
So it could be a vicious circle wherewe have more dropout from those people
(22:15):
who are not so partisan, and whobecome more indifferent or disgusted
by all parties regardless of theposition, while you have still the
most extreme that still participateand maintain and even make the system
even more polarized on the long run.
So that could be, not toooptimistic again . Yeah.
Laura May (22:34):
And it's kind of ironic, right, because if these demagogues or
these really highly politicized or ratherpolarized parties with maybe extreme
views, you know, they'll often claim, "oh,we're representing a silent majority".
But actually when those parties gainpower and only represent a niche interest,
They're creating the silent majority, cuzeveryone else is becoming indifferent and
(22:57):
losing trust in them and in the system.
So yeah, it's, it's kind of ironic, right?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic: Yeah, a little bit. (23:04):
undefined
Laura May (23:06):
No, it sounds like a really fascinating project that you did and
this work that you continue to do.
Speaking of which, whatare you working on now?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (23:15):
So now, that I moved so much into, yeah, this
questions about what does that mean forsupport for democracy, and implication
for citizen support for democracy.
I started working on this postdocproject called DEMNORM where
we look at these questions.
I still focus a lot on elite'sresponsibility in harming or changing
(23:36):
support for democracy among citizens.
And here, we have stillthis puzzle in mind.
So when you ask citizen directly,they all seem to support democracy
quite strikingly, and that hasn'tchanged in the past 20 years.
But when you look at political eventsof for example a group of people
storming the capitol in the Us,that's not properly what you call a
(24:00):
democratic behavior in our system.
And we see all these kind of eventshappening in established democracies.
So we really wonder,okay, what's going on?
And maybe support for democracy isactually more of a social norm than a
deep down felt value, meaning that itwould be uh, more sensitive to what you
think your friends do or think aboutdemocracy or sensitive to changes in
(24:25):
what your political elites are sayingare the boundaries of democracy.
So yeah, that's basically the,the project we're working on now.
And it's just starting actually.
Laura May (24:36):
Hmm.
Amazing.
It sounds a bit like we say webelieve in democracy, cuz that's a
social thing, but deep down we'reall little mini authoritarians or
mini communists or what have you.
Is that how it's looking at this stage?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (24:50):
So I, I'm not saying that no one is
deep down supporting democracy.
I, I think this is still the case,but, when you just ask directly
do you support for democracy?
Everyone will say, yeah, of course we do.
But then when you diga bit more into that...
and if you suddenly have your friends ornetworks or group of partisans that do
(25:12):
something that is not really considereddemocratic or you believe that they don't
think it is that important to support someaspect of democracy, then uh, you would
quickly change and follow whatever yournetwork is doing compared to sticking
to a strong value of democratic support.
(25:34):
That's the idea behind that.
Laura May (25:36):
And so earlier you mentioned this idea of the storming
of the Capitol building as an exampleof an antidemocratic thing, right?
An antidemocratic action.
What are some of the other ones you'veseen or you've encountered going on?
I asked because a couple of weeksago I spoke with Ben Abrams about
this idea of the Rise of the Massesand increasing protest movements.
(25:57):
And I mean, sure.
Obviously I'm speaking to a Frenchperson and I think about all the protests
in the streets of Paris and in Francemore broadly about pension ages or
industrial rights and things like that.
And so those, I see myself perhapsas an expression of at least people
power, if not democracy, right?
Like people are really going outthere and, and demanding this.
(26:18):
And so I'm wondering, other thanthis example of the storming of the
Capitol building, which is reallyobviously like an insurrection right?
Like, yeah.
I'm wondering what are theseother uprisings and movements
you would actually considerbeing against democratic norms?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (26:35):
So there are clear examples, so storming
the Capitol is a clear undemocraticbehavior when you increasingly
contest elections results as well.
Or you would mobilize againstcontested or close election
result of you barely losing.
That could also be considered likefear, violation of what is democratic
(26:56):
or not, and then it all depends abit on the norms and the boundaries.
Like is it okay, in democracy,how do people talk about it?
Is it okay in the democracy to be violentagainst the police when you strike?
Is it okay to be violentagainst different properties?
Is it okay to block the streetsin a democracy and all of this?
(27:20):
I guess you could argue that there startsto be more contested or more not so
clear cut democratic and undemocratic.
And this is where I think elite'srole is really important in defining,
okay, what are the boundaries?
What have we alwaysdone that is democratic?
If you start allowing for this more grayarea action, does that spill over to
(27:43):
more like clear democratic violation?
How do elites themself have a rolein really defining the boundaries of
democracies and how does that influencepeople's views or what is acceptable
or not acceptable to do in democracies.
Laura May (27:58):
As you are talking, I'm reminded of Australia.
Because later this yearthere's gonna be a referendum
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (28:07):
Mm-hmm.
Laura May (28:07):
about the inclusion of what's known as the Voice, a
permanent representation ofAustralian Aboriginal Peoples within
Parliament, to obviously give inputon those issues that affect them.
And so already you see around thereferendum this idea of having a body
within Parliament as not being democratic.
(28:29):
And so this whole idea of whatdemocracy is and isn't is currently
getting underway in Australia.
And I'll be very curious, I'm hopeI'm allowed to vote this year,
like last time there was a votethey banned everyone overseas from
voting, which I found very upsetting.
But luckily I was in Australia.
But I'll be really curious to see,given the nature of these discussions
(28:49):
around whether it's democratic or not,if there will be any fallout in the wake
of being what happened obviously in theUS and obviously Australia also being
a Murdoch, media dominated country.
So that'll be, I think, reallysomething to keep an eye on.
With that said, I avoid studyingAustralian politics myself.
It's too close.
So someone else, someone could listento this podcast and go, hmm, that's
(29:11):
a great idea for a study they cando, pretty please, and send it to me.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (29:15):
Here is a research product for someone else.
Laura May (29:17):
Exactly.
We're just giving them away for free now.
This is great.
And so, what can we takeaway from all of this?
What are the implicationsof your research?
What should we do as well aspractitioners, as people, as you know,
people who may not hold democratic valuesdeep in our hearts, at least we say we do.
What are the implications?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (29:38):
So I do have pretty gloomy results
from my dissertation, but Idon't think it's a lost cause.
And one thing is we do focus a loton specific parts of the population.
So the most like partisans,activists, and these are the ones
we see on the news and I get that.
And sometimes their behaviorcan be quite shocking.
(29:58):
So I see why we focus so much on them.
But then I really think we shouldalso look at people's reactions who
are not particularly partisan or, orextreme because these also have very
important implications for, for democracyand democratic support probably.
So I think we should pay abit more attention to this
(30:19):
people's reaction as well.
And I think, there, you could uh, reallysee that they could be convinced back
again by uh, a healthy party competition.
And I think elected elites andpoliticians really underestimate how
people perceive these polarizationas strategies, but not so much as
genuine political alternatives.
(30:41):
So, we have this need to make a coalitionat the end of the day after elections,
people perceive that, and they are veryconscious that there needs to be some
kind of consensus in our multi-partysystem because in most of our system,
we need to have a coalition betweenthese parties at the end of the day.
So when one uh, during the campaignthere are offering this very polarized
(31:01):
offer, but then the next week theyhave to agree with each other.
It's really perceived likea non honest strategy from
parties to behave like this.
And there is somedemand for more consensus.
So elites should also be aware that thereis this demand and people will be aware
that this is not a genuine party offer.
So I think more could be done.
(31:22):
And parties should be partlyaware of their responsibility
in creating these dynamics.
Laura May (31:27):
It's like you say, really extreme stuff to capture an audience
and you have to immediately backdown the moment you get into power.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (31:33):
Yeah, exactly.
So most of our multi-party system needs tofind Government, a consensus of some kind.
Laura May (31:41):
In Belgium for many years, there was the, I think, unofficial
cordon that, I can't say it.
I, I, I said before we started recording.
I can't pronounce any French.
Whereby parties wouldn't form coalitionswith the really hardcore racist wing.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (31:54):
Yeah.
Laura May (31:55):
Then as you've seen that wing gain a lot more power.
They've actually had todrop that and start forming
coalitions in different ways.
And of course, you know, everyonehas to sort of step down their views
because for democracy, yeah, we doneed at least a measure of consensus.
So I can see that that would bechallenging and in the case of Belgium,
potentially quite problematic as someonewho's been an immigrant in Belgium.
(32:18):
But anyway.
And I wanna ask you reallya cheeky question because I
mentioned Australia before.
What's your take on compulsory voting?
Democratic, non-democratic?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (32:29):
Okay.
I think so.
Maybe it's not so much relatedto my specific research, but I
think compulsory voting willbe quite democratic in my view.
So to be sure that we don't get theoverrepresentation of specific groups.
Actually I've read some researchrecently that having compulsory
(32:50):
voting was making people feel moreinvolved overall in the system.
So it has beneficial effects I thinkthat we should think about as well.
Yeah, I think that could havegood consequences for the way our
representative democracies work actually.
So that's my hot takeon compulsory voting.
Laura May (33:09):
I love a hot take and I mean, I'll say as another lesson
from Australia, as long as youhave a barbecue or the whatever is
relevant in your country, votingday sausage, I think you'll be fine.
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (33:20):
Yep.
Laura May (33:21):
Thank you so much for joining me today, Morgan, and for those who
are interested in learning more aboutyour work, where can they find you?
Morgan Le Corre Juratic (33:29):
So I guess the easiest way would be on Twitter actually,
where I try to publish how the researchis going and the findings in quick ways.
So find me on Twitter and thenon my website, find more on
my work and ongoing projects.
Laura May (33:46):
I can vouch for your Twitter.
It's how I found your workso clearly that's effective.
And I'll include both the linksin the podcast description.
So again, Morgan, thank youso much for joining me today.
And until next time, this isLaura May with the Conflict
Tipping podcast from Mediate.com.
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