September 14, 2026 • 20 mins
This episode introduces the core concepts behind offensive C# development for authorized penetration testing and red-team environments. The walkthrough follows a simplified offensive-tool lifecycle, beginning with host reconnaissance and progressing through persistence mechanisms and dynamic retrieval of additional components.The focus is on understanding how C# can interact directly with the Windows operating system and its APIs.1. Host Reconnaissance and System InformationThe episode begins with local reconnaissance using built-in C# functionality.The application demonstrates how to collect information such as:
- Operating system details
- Computer and host name
- Current working directory
- Process identifier
- Network configuration
- IPv4 address
- Current user's security context
- WindowsIdentity
- WindowsPrincipal
- Opening registry locations with appropriate permissions
- Creating or modifying registry values
- Associating a value with an executable path
- Properly releasing registry resources
- Verifying startup entries through Windows administrative interfaces
- The requested operation
- The supplied resource or argument
- Receiving a resource location
- Parsing the supplied URL
- Determining the remote file name
- Constructing a local destination
- Saving the retrieved file in the user's temporary directory
- Unexpected system reconnaissance
- Suspicious privilege checks
- Unusual registry modifications
- Unknown startup entries
- Unexpected outbound network connections
- Files created in temporary directories
- Applications retrieving executable content from external locations
- How C# can interact with Windows system information
- How applications can assess their current security context
- The fundamentals of Windows registry-based persistence
- How command parsing can provide application control logic
- How applications can retrieve external resources dynamically
- Why temporary directories and startup locations are important forensic artifacts
- How offensive-development techniques can translate into defensive detect
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Imagine for a second that you've just, I don't know,
parachuted into a pitch black room.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Oh, man.
Speaker 1 (00:05):
Right. Like you have absolutely no idea where you are.
You don't know the dimensions of the space. You don't
know if you're surrounded by tripwires.
Speaker 2 (00:12):
Total sensory deprivation.
Speaker 1 (00:14):
Exactly. And you certainly don't know who holds the master
keys to the doors.
Speaker 2 (00:17):
The stakes there are just, well, they're incredibly high.
Speaker 1 (00:21):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (00:21):
And honestly, the moment a piece of custom code executes, like,
That very first millisecond it lands on a target system,
it experiences that exact same blindness.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
Just zero context.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Right, zero context. It has execution flow, sure, but it
has no idea where it is.
Speaker 1 (00:38):
Which is wild to think about. And today, for this
deep dive, we are stepping right into the shoes of
an offensive cybersecurity professional.
Speaker 2 (00:46):
Yeah, a red teamer or a penetration tester. Exactly.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
We're looking at the actual mechanics of a custom application
built entirely from scratch in C-Sharp.
Speaker 2 (00:55):
And our mission today is really to trace the life
cycle of that payload.
Speaker 1 (00:59):
Right, because we want to understand how a program dynamically
establishes its own situational awareness, how it anchors itself into
the architecture to survive a system reboot.
Speaker 2 (01:11):
And then finally, how it reaches out into the void
to pull down reinforcements.
Speaker 1 (01:15):
Yeah. And if you're listening right now, you probably already
know your way around an IDE, right? You understand the
fundamental building blocks of programming, and you're deeply curious about
how those concepts map directly to, well, offensive security and
system operations.
Speaker 2 (01:31):
So we're definitely skipping the 101 level definitions today.
Speaker 1 (01:34):
Oh, absolutely. We aren't going to sit here and tell
you what an array is.
Speaker 2 (01:37):
No, but we are going to look at how mismanaging
an array can instantly, like, completely burn a red team operation.
Speaker 1 (01:44):
Yes, and how to architect that C-sharp payload step by
step so it runs flawlessly, totally under the radar. Right.
Speaker 2 (01:51):
And to do that effectively, we have to look at
the execution flow sequentially. The payload has to map its
environment before it can even attempt to manipulate it.
Speaker 1 (02:00):
Which brings us right back to our pitch black room.
We've landed. The process is running in memory. But we're blind.
Speaker 2 (02:07):
Totally blind.
Speaker 1 (02:08):
So that very first move has to be gathering critical
environmental telemetry, right? And storing it in some structured way.
Speaker 2 (02:17):
Because if we don't have state, we don't have an operation.
Speaker 1 (02:20):
Exactly. So why not just, I don't know, run a
quick script and print the output? Why do we need
a dedicated class for this?
Speaker 2 (02:26):
Well, structuring that state is paramount. Like in a C-sharp environment,
we really don't want to just execute a series of
disparate API calls, dump the output to a console, and
then just lose those references.
Speaker 1 (02:38):
Right, because we need them later.
Speaker 2 (02:39):
Exactly. We need an in-memory repository of truth about the system.
So the first architectural move is initializing a dedicated class,
which we can call General info.
Speaker 1 (02:51):
Okay, general info.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
Yeah, and when the constructor for that class fires, it
aggressively queries the operating system and populates its internal variable.
Speaker 1 (02:59):
Building a reusable object?
Speaker 2 (03:01):
Right, a reusable object that the entire rest of the
payload is going to rely on.
Speaker 1 (03:05):
Okay, so let's break down the telemetry that constructor is
actually pulling. First up, the code leverages the built-in environment class, right?
It pulls the OS version.
Speaker 2 (03:14):
Yeah, but there's a nuance there. C Sharp doesn't natively
hand that back as a simple text string. Oh, really? No,
it returns an operating system object. So the payload actually
has to explicitly invoke a toastering method to serialize that data.
Speaker 1 (03:31):
Oh, okay. But why is that specific OS string so
critical for the payload to hold on to?
Speaker 2 (03:35):
Because the payload has to know the exact rules of
the environment it just entered.
Speaker 1 (03:39):
Like version differences.
Speaker 2 (03:41):
Exactly. An API call or like a registry path that
works perfectly on Windows 11. might throw a fatal exception
on an unpatched Windows Server 2016 box.
Speaker 1 (03:51):
Oh, wow. So the RS version literally dictates the operational
branch the code takes next.
Speaker 2 (03:55):
Precisely. And alongside that, the environment class is used to
capture the current username and the current executing directory.
Speaker 1 (04:02):
Right, because knowing if your payload is running out of
some restricted system 32 folder versus, say, a user's downloads directory.
Speaker 2 (04:09):
It changes your entire execution strategy.
Speaker 1 (04:12):
It dictates your boundaries. Okay, so the environment gives us
our location and identity, but the payload also needs to
understand its own footprint in memory, right?
Speaker 2 (04:21):
Yeah, and for that, the code taps into the process class.
Speaker 1 (04:25):
By calling getCurrentProcess.
Speaker 2 (04:26):
Right. It grabs both its own executing name and its
unique process ID, the PID.
Speaker 1 (04:31):
PID, yeah.
Speaker 2 (04:32):
And maintaining a reference to your own PID is a
really vital defense mechanism for the payload itself.
Speaker 1 (04:39):
Wait, defense against what itself?
Speaker 2 (04:41):
Basically, yeah. Because if the next stage of the operation involves, say,
injecting malicious threads into other run-of-the-processes.
Speaker 1 (04:49):
Like hollowing out a legitimate instance of explorer.x or something.
Speaker 2 (04:52):
Exactly. The payload needs to ensure it doesn't accidentally target
its own process or its parent process.
Speaker 1 (04:58):
Oh, because that would cause a cascade and crash.
Speaker 2 (05:00):
Right. It would just destroy itself.
Speaker 1 (05:01):
Wow. Okay. So we have the OS, the user, our location,
and our PID footprint. I guess the next logical requirement
is the network topology.
Speaker 2 (05:09):
Yeah. The payload needs to know its address on the grid.
Speaker 1 (05:11):
So it hits the DNS class to grab the local
host name and then feeds that host name into a
get host by name method, right?
Speaker 2 (05:18):
Exactly. To retrieve the network interfaces and filter down to
the primary IPv4 address.
Speaker 1 (05:24):
But isn't that network telemetry like a massive red flag
or rather a way to spot a trap?
Speaker 2 (05:28):
It absolutely is. It's often the very first indicator of
a sandbox environment.
Speaker 1 (05:33):
Like an antivirus lab. Right.
Speaker 2 (05:36):
If that IP address routes back to a known security
vendor's analysis subnet, Or if the host name is just
some default string generated by an automated malware tool.
Speaker 1 (05:45):
A sophisticated payload can check those variables and just immediately
terminate itself.
Speaker 2 (05:48):
Exactly. It just quietly exits to avoid detection.
Speaker 1 (05:51):
That's so smart. But assuming the coast is clear and
we're on a real target, there's one final check in
this recon phase. And this is kind of the fork
in the road that determines the entire fate of the operation,
isn't it?
Speaker 2 (06:04):
Oh, for sure. The privilege check. Right.
Speaker 1 (06:05):
The payload utilizes Windows Identity and Windows Principle to interrogate
the operating system's security token. It's explicitly asking the system,
am I executing within an administrator context?
Speaker 2 (06:18):
And the outcome of that query defines the payload's entire
operational ceiling.
Speaker 1 (06:23):
Meaning?
Speaker 2 (06:24):
Meaning, if the token holds that Windows built-in role administrator role,
the payload has the authority to interact with system-wide services,
Deep registry hives, protected memory spaces.
Speaker 1 (06:35):
It's got the master keys.
Speaker 2 (06:36):
Exactly. But if it's running as a standard user, it
is heavily compartmentalized.
Speaker 1 (06:41):
And trying to perform an administrative action without that token,
it doesn't just quietly fail, right?
Speaker 2 (06:47):
No, no, not at all. It generates an unauthorized access exception.
Speaker 1 (06:50):
The OS intercepts the violation.
Speaker 2 (06:52):
Yeah, denies the request, and crucially, it logs the event.
Speaker 1 (06:56):
Which is essentially a massive flare shot straight up into
the security operations center.
Speaker 2 (07:00):
Exactly. Which perfectly illustrates why packaging all this telemetry into
a single persistent general info object is so incredibly crucial.
Speaker 1 (07:08):
Oh, I see. So the subsequent modules of the payload
don't need to risk making noisy, repetitive queries to the OS. Right.
Speaker 2 (07:15):
They just reference the state already safely stored in that object.
The recon phase is complete.
Speaker 1 (07:20):
Okay, so our object is populated. We have situational awareness.
We know we have admin rights. But right now, this
tool only exists in volatile memory. If the target user
finishes their shift, closes their laptop, and shuts down the machine,
our payload evaporates.
Speaker 2 (07:37):
It's gone.
Speaker 1 (07:38):
So we have to anchor ourselves to the system before
that power cycle happens.
Speaker 2 (07:43):
This brings us to the necessity of persistence. The goal
here is to ensure the payload automatically executes upon reboot.
Speaker 1 (07:50):
And to conceptualize this, we're looking at interacting directly with
the Windows registry, specifically targeting the current user's startup keys. Yeah.
It's kind of a classic maneuver of wedging a heavy
book in the door so you don't have to pick
the lock a second time.
Speaker 2 (08:03):
That's a great way to look at it. And to
do this in C Sharp, we have to import a
specific package. Microsoft.Win32.Registry.
Speaker 1 (08:11):
Because the registry is basically the central nervous system of
Windows configurations, right?
Speaker 2 (08:15):
Exactly. Everything the OS does at boot is dictated by
these keys.
Speaker 1 (08:19):
So the payload specifically targets the HKCU software Microsoft Windows
current version run key. Right.
Speaker 2 (08:26):
That specific path. Because when a user authenticates and the
desktop environment loads... Windows inherently trusts the values in this
path and just executes them.
Speaker 1 (08:36):
So the payload uses the open subkey method to access
this directory.
Speaker 2 (08:40):
Yes. But this is where that privilege check from our
recon object really pays off.
Speaker 1 (08:45):
Oh, because of the right flag?
Speaker 2 (08:47):
Exactly. When invoking open subkey, the payload must pass a
boolin argument, a right flag that's set to true.
Speaker 1 (08:54):
Because you aren't just reading the registry.
Speaker 2 (08:56):
No, you are demanding permission to mutate it.
Speaker 1 (08:58):
And if a developer skips that privilege check, assumes they
have admin rights, and passes that true flag in a
restricted context.
Speaker 2 (09:06):
The common language runtime throws that access exception we mentioned earlier. Boom. Yeah,
the process terminates, the persistence fails, and the defender gets
an alert.
Speaker 1 (09:14):
But if the rights are verified, the handle opens successfully.
Speaker 2 (09:17):
Right. And once that handle is open, the code uses
set value. It assigns an arbitrary string name. Let's just
call the registry entry Red Team Developer. And points it
to the absolute file path of our executing payload.
Speaker 1 (09:30):
And wait, we don't even have to blindly search the
hard drive for that path, do we? Because we already
captured our current executing directory in the general info object
in phase one.
Speaker 2 (09:39):
Exactly. We just passed the variable.
Speaker 1 (09:41):
Man, that modular architecture really pays dividends.
Speaker 2 (09:44):
It builds on itself perfectly. Yeah. But once the value
is set, the payload has to execute one of the
most easily overlooked steps in managed code.
Speaker 1 (09:53):
Resource cleanup.
Speaker 2 (09:54):
Yeah. The dispose method.
Speaker 1 (09:56):
Because when you open a connection to an unmanaged resource
like the Windows registry, you're acquiring a lock on system memory. Right.
Speaker 2 (10:03):
And if you just let the method finish without explicitly
closing that handle and calling dispose, you create a memory leak.
Speaker 1 (10:10):
Or a locked file state. Exactly.
Speaker 2 (10:12):
It's poor coding hygiene. And in an offensive context, leaving
dangling handles is a fantastic way to leave forensic artifacts
for incident responders.
Speaker 1 (10:21):
Yeah, managing your garbage collection and releasing handles ensures the
system remains stable. I mean, the last thing a persistent
agent wants to do is degrade the performance of the
host machine.
Speaker 2 (10:30):
Because that immediately draws the user's suspicion. Why is my
computer so slow today?
Speaker 1 (10:34):
Right, exactly. But, okay, I have to push back on
the specific factor, though.
Speaker 2 (10:38):
Okay, go for it.
Speaker 1 (10:39):
Writing a binary path directly into the current version run
key is incredibly loud. It is. Every modern endpoint detection
and response platform, every EDR is hooking those startup keys.
It's literally one of the first places threat hunters look.
So why would a modern payload leverage such an archaic
(11:00):
persistence mechanism?
Speaker 2 (11:02):
Well, it's a completely valid critique. I mean, in a
highly mature enterprise environment, dropping a raw executable path into
the run key will almost certainly trigger an EDR behavioral block.
Red teams typically rely on much stealthier techniques, you know, hijacking,
modifying scheduled tasks, or abusing Windows management instrumentation. However, examining
(11:22):
the run key method is foundational.
Speaker 1 (11:24):
How so?
Speaker 2 (11:25):
Because it exposes the core philosophy of operating system architecture.
Windows must inherently trust specific configuration pathways to function.
Speaker 1 (11:32):
Okay, I see.
Speaker 2 (11:32):
By manipulating that baseline trust... Defenders learn exactly what to monitor,
and offensive engineers learn the real parameters of system behavior.
Speaker 1 (11:42):
It's the prerequisite knowledge before you move on to the
stealthy stuff. Like, you have to understand how the front
door works before you start looking for structural flaws in
the foundation.
Speaker 2 (11:50):
Precisely.
Speaker 1 (11:51):
Okay. So we've mapped the environment, and we've anchored our
payload to survive a reboot.
Speaker 2 (11:57):
Yep.
Speaker 1 (11:58):
But functionally, our executable is just a scout right now.
It's super lightweight. To do any real heavy lifting, it
needs dynamic capabilities.
Speaker 2 (12:06):
It needs to pull down secondary modules because a static
agent is effectively a dead agent.
Speaker 1 (12:11):
Right. So the payload requires an expansion mechanism.
Speaker 2 (12:14):
Which involves architecting an operations class and within that class,
building a command parser.
Speaker 1 (12:19):
The parser acts as a routing table for remote instructions.
Speaker 2 (12:22):
Exactly.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
I look at the command parser like a radio dispatcher
breaking down an encoded message into actionable orders.
Speaker 2 (12:29):
Exactly.
Speaker 1 (12:30):
A string of text comes over the wire from the
command and control server. To the underlying memory, it's just
a continuous block of characters, right?
Speaker 2 (12:38):
Right.
Speaker 1 (12:38):
Let's say the string is downloadhttpswebsite.com slash file.html. The parser
has to dynamically dissect that string and map it to
an execution flow.
Speaker 2 (12:50):
So the code utilizes the native string split method using
the space character as the delimiter.
Speaker 1 (12:55):
Oh, nice.
Speaker 2 (12:55):
It slices that continuous block into an array. So the
element at the zero index, the word download, is routed
through conditional logic.
Speaker 1 (13:02):
So if the action matches the string download, the payload
initializes the corresponding function.
Speaker 2 (13:07):
Right. And the element at the first index, the URL,
is passed as the operational argument to that function.
Speaker 1 (13:13):
And for the actual network request, we don't need to
manually construct HTTP headers or handle TCP handshakes from scratch. No.
Speaker 2 (13:20):
C Sharp makes that easy. It provides the system.net namespace.
Speaker 1 (13:23):
Right. So we can instantiate a web client object to
manage the connection, reach out to the internet, and just
pull the file down.
Speaker 2 (13:31):
Exactly. But this introduces a massive strategic problem.
Speaker 1 (13:35):
The drop zone. Where do we save the file? Yes.
Speaker 2 (13:38):
Hiding it deep in System32 might sound stealthy, but writing
to system-critical folders introduces enormous friction with access control lists.
Speaker 1 (13:48):
You're just constantly battling file permissions.
Speaker 2 (13:50):
Exactly. So instead, the payload opts to resolve the current
user's temp directory.
Speaker 1 (13:55):
Wait, why drop the file in the temp folder? Wouldn't
a hidden folder be way better?
Speaker 2 (13:59):
You'd think so, but the temp directory is actually a
brilliant strategic compromise.
Speaker 1 (14:03):
Why?
Speaker 2 (14:04):
Because the operating system inherently enforces relaxed write permissions there.
Legitimate applications are just constantly dumping temporary caches, installation fragments,
and log files into that path all day long.
Speaker 1 (14:15):
Oh, I see. It's like hiding a leaf in a
pile of leaves.
Speaker 2 (14:18):
Precisely. If a threat hunter opens a temp folder... they
are immediately confronted with thousands of randomly generated alphanumeric folders
and orphan.tm files.
Speaker 1 (14:28):
So a newly dropped executable just blends seamlessly into the
native entropy of the operating system.
Speaker 2 (14:37):
Security through obscurity, leveraging the natural messiness of the environment.
Speaker 1 (14:40):
That is wild. But to successfully drop the file into
that temp directory, the web client requires a specific local
file name to write to, right?
Speaker 2 (14:51):
Yes, it does.
Speaker 1 (14:51):
And the payload only received a full URL from the
command and control server.
Speaker 2 (14:55):
Right, so it has to dynamically extract the file name
from the very end of that web address.
Speaker 1 (15:00):
Which requires another round of string manipulation. Yep.
Speaker 2 (15:02):
The code takes the target URL and splits it again,
this time using the forward slash character as the delimiter.
Speaker 1 (15:08):
Okay, so that generates a new array containing every segment
of the URL structure.
Speaker 2 (15:13):
And the file name naturally resides in the very last
segment of that array.
Speaker 1 (15:16):
Right. But extracting that last piece introduces a classic software
engineering trap, one that has apparently burned countless red team payloads.
Speaker 2 (15:23):
Oh, yeah. The zero index trap.
Speaker 1 (15:25):
Tell me about the zero index trap.
Speaker 2 (15:27):
So in C Sharp, arrays are zero indexed. The counting
begins at zero, not one. If a URL splits into
four segments, the indices are zero, one, two, and three. Right.
Speaker 1 (15:36):
That makes sense.
Speaker 2 (15:37):
But newer developers often write logic that asks the array
for the item matching its total length. So if the
length is 4, they ask for the item at index 4.
Speaker 1 (15:47):
But index 4 doesn't exist.
Speaker 2 (15:49):
Exactly. The payload attempts to read unallocated memory, and the
common language runtime violently intervenes.
Speaker 1 (15:56):
It throws an index out of range exception.
Speaker 2 (15:58):
Yep. The process crashes immediately.
Speaker 1 (16:00):
Oh, wow.
Speaker 2 (16:00):
And if this happens during a live operation, you don't
just fail to download the secondary module. you lose your
executing process.
Speaker 1 (16:07):
And your persistence might not have even fully triggered yet.
Speaker 2 (16:10):
Right. Plus, the operating system generates an application crash log
that points directly to your malicious binary.
Speaker 1 (16:17):
A tiny mathematical oversight, literally just failing to request the
array length minus one, destroys the entire foothold.
Speaker 2 (16:25):
It highlights how offensive security isn't just about clever exploits.
It is about rigorous, fault-tolerant software engineering.
Speaker 1 (16:33):
Every unhandled exception is a beacon to the defense.
Speaker 2 (16:36):
The precision required is absolute. You are operating in a
hostile environment where the operating system is actively monitoring for anomalies.
Speaker 1 (16:46):
Which makes looking back at the entire sequence we've conceptually
built so fascinating.
Speaker 2 (16:51):
It really is.
Speaker 1 (16:51):
Let's summarize the architecture real quick. We've engineered a multi-stage
C-sharp tool, right? It initializes by querying the OS, networking,
and security tokens to build a stateful reconnaissance object. It
leverages that exact state to acquire right access to the registry,
wedging itself into the system startup to survive reboot while
(17:12):
carefully disposing of its resource handles.
Speaker 2 (17:15):
Crucial step.
Speaker 1 (17:15):
And finally, it dynamically parses remote commands to pull in
new files, safely navigating arrays to drop them in the
chaotic camouflage of the temp directory.
Speaker 2 (17:24):
It is a modular, highly cohesive sequence. but analyzing it
from the perspective of the developer is really only half
the battle. We need to invert the lens.
Speaker 1 (17:32):
And view this exact sequence from the perspective of the defense.
Speaker 2 (17:36):
Yeah.
Speaker 1 (17:36):
So let's turn this over to you, the listener. Let's
do a quick thought exercise. Put yourself in the seat
of an analyst at a network security operations center.
Speaker 2 (17:44):
Okay, a SOC analyst. Yeah.
Speaker 1 (17:47):
You aren't looking at static signatures or known malicious file
hashes because the payload we just discussed is a custom
compiled C-sharp binary.
Speaker 2 (17:55):
It has literally never been seen in the wild before. Right.
Speaker 1 (17:59):
So what kind of behavioral heuristics would you configure your
system alerts to catch? What would you try to build?
Speaker 2 (18:06):
Think about the velocity of the execution. A completely unknown
binary executes. And within milliseconds, it requests a token check
to verify administrator privileges.
Speaker 1 (18:16):
And then immediately opens a handle to the current version
run registry key.
Speaker 2 (18:20):
Passes a right flag, sets a value.
Speaker 1 (18:22):
And then immediately initiates an outbound HTTP connection using the system.net.webclient
class to an untrusted domain.
Speaker 2 (18:29):
No human user behaves like that?
Speaker 1 (18:31):
No standard application installer updates its registered persistence and reaches
out for secondary payloads in a time frame measured in
CPU cycles.
Speaker 2 (18:39):
The sequence of those API calls, stacked right on top
of each other, creates a behavioral fingerprint that is far
louder than any static file hash.
Speaker 1 (18:47):
So defending modern networks requires tracking that behavior.
Speaker 2 (18:50):
Exactly. You look for the combination of privilege escalation checks
tied to persistence mechanisms. When you understand how the code
has to architect its foothold, you know exactly which intersections
to monitor.
Speaker 1 (19:03):
Yeah, that makes so much sense. So we've broken down
the architecture. We've looked at the defensive implications. But I
want to leave you with one final structural problem to
mull over. Okay. We built a great parser for downloading files, right?
It's acting as a switchboard, patiently listening for instructions from
the command and control server.
Speaker 2 (19:22):
Ready to download the next module.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
Exactly. But what happens to the payload if that C2
server gets seized by law enforcement or the domain is
sinkholed or just goes offline?
Speaker 2 (19:31):
Well, the payload's primary lifeline is severed. It is sitting
in the registry, executing perfectly on every boot, but parsing
empty air.
Speaker 1 (19:39):
So the provocative thought exercise for you to explore on
your own is, How does a sophisticated persistence mechanism like
the one we built adapt if its infrastructure simplifies? disappears?
Speaker 2 (19:51):
It's a great question. Does the developer implement a domain
generation algorithm to dynamically search for new C2 addresses?
Speaker 1 (19:59):
Or do they program the payload to start broadcasting peer-to-peer requests,
searching for other infected machines on the local subnet to
act as proxy routers?
Speaker 2 (20:07):
The architecture never stops evolving. I mean, when one communication
channel is burned, the engineering merely shifts to a more resilient,
decentralized model.
Speaker 1 (20:16):
But the underlying concepts of state, persistence, and execution remain
exactly the same.
Speaker 2 (20:21):
It's an endless engineering arms race.
Speaker 1 (20:23):
It really is. The room might be pitch black when
your payload first parachutes in, but once you understand how
to structure your telemetry and handle your execution flow, you
realize you're operating within a highly complex, highly logical ecosystem.
Speaker 2 (20:35):
Keep dissecting the architecture. Yeah.
Speaker 1 (20:37):
Keep questioning the mechanics, keep exploring the cat and mouse game,
and we'll see you on the next deep dive.
Imagine for a second that you've just, I don't know,
parachuted into a pitch black room.
Speaker 2 (00:05):
Oh, man.
Speaker 1 (00:05):
Right. Like you have absolutely no idea where you are.
You don't know the dimensions of the space. You don't
know if you're surrounded by tripwires.
Speaker 2 (00:12):
Total sensory deprivation.
Speaker 1 (00:14):
Exactly. And you certainly don't know who holds the master
keys to the doors.
Speaker 2 (00:17):
The stakes there are just, well, they're incredibly high.
Speaker 1 (00:21):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (00:21):
And honestly, the moment a piece of custom code executes, like,
That very first millisecond it lands on a target system,
it experiences that exact same blindness.
Speaker 1 (00:32):
Just zero context.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Right, zero context. It has execution flow, sure, but it
has no idea where it is.
Speaker 1 (00:38):
Which is wild to think about. And today, for this
deep dive, we are stepping right into the shoes of
an offensive cybersecurity professional.
Speaker 2 (00:46):
Yeah, a red teamer or a penetration tester. Exactly.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
We're looking at the actual mechanics of a custom application
built entirely from scratch in C-Sharp.
Speaker 2 (00:55):
And our mission today is really to trace the life
cycle of that payload.
Speaker 1 (00:59):
Right, because we want to understand how a program dynamically
establishes its own situational awareness, how it anchors itself into
the architecture to survive a system reboot.
Speaker 2 (01:11):
And then finally, how it reaches out into the void
to pull down reinforcements.
Speaker 1 (01:15):
Yeah. And if you're listening right now, you probably already
know your way around an IDE, right? You understand the
fundamental building blocks of programming, and you're deeply curious about
how those concepts map directly to, well, offensive security and
system operations.
Speaker 2 (01:31):
So we're definitely skipping the 101 level definitions today.
Speaker 1 (01:34):
Oh, absolutely. We aren't going to sit here and tell
you what an array is.
Speaker 2 (01:37):
No, but we are going to look at how mismanaging
an array can instantly, like, completely burn a red team operation.
Speaker 1 (01:44):
Yes, and how to architect that C-sharp payload step by
step so it runs flawlessly, totally under the radar. Right.
Speaker 2 (01:51):
And to do that effectively, we have to look at
the execution flow sequentially. The payload has to map its
environment before it can even attempt to manipulate it.
Speaker 1 (02:00):
Which brings us right back to our pitch black room.
We've landed. The process is running in memory. But we're blind.
Speaker 2 (02:07):
Totally blind.
Speaker 1 (02:08):
So that very first move has to be gathering critical
environmental telemetry, right? And storing it in some structured way.
Speaker 2 (02:17):
Because if we don't have state, we don't have an operation.
Speaker 1 (02:20):
Exactly. So why not just, I don't know, run a
quick script and print the output? Why do we need
a dedicated class for this?
Speaker 2 (02:26):
Well, structuring that state is paramount. Like in a C-sharp environment,
we really don't want to just execute a series of
disparate API calls, dump the output to a console, and
then just lose those references.
Speaker 1 (02:38):
Right, because we need them later.
Speaker 2 (02:39):
Exactly. We need an in-memory repository of truth about the system.
So the first architectural move is initializing a dedicated class,
which we can call General info.
Speaker 1 (02:51):
Okay, general info.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
Yeah, and when the constructor for that class fires, it
aggressively queries the operating system and populates its internal variable.
Speaker 1 (02:59):
Building a reusable object?
Speaker 2 (03:01):
Right, a reusable object that the entire rest of the
payload is going to rely on.
Speaker 1 (03:05):
Okay, so let's break down the telemetry that constructor is
actually pulling. First up, the code leverages the built-in environment class, right?
It pulls the OS version.
Speaker 2 (03:14):
Yeah, but there's a nuance there. C Sharp doesn't natively
hand that back as a simple text string. Oh, really? No,
it returns an operating system object. So the payload actually
has to explicitly invoke a toastering method to serialize that data.
Speaker 1 (03:31):
Oh, okay. But why is that specific OS string so
critical for the payload to hold on to?
Speaker 2 (03:35):
Because the payload has to know the exact rules of
the environment it just entered.
Speaker 1 (03:39):
Like version differences.
Speaker 2 (03:41):
Exactly. An API call or like a registry path that
works perfectly on Windows 11. might throw a fatal exception
on an unpatched Windows Server 2016 box.
Speaker 1 (03:51):
Oh, wow. So the RS version literally dictates the operational
branch the code takes next.
Speaker 2 (03:55):
Precisely. And alongside that, the environment class is used to
capture the current username and the current executing directory.
Speaker 1 (04:02):
Right, because knowing if your payload is running out of
some restricted system 32 folder versus, say, a user's downloads directory.
Speaker 2 (04:09):
It changes your entire execution strategy.
Speaker 1 (04:12):
It dictates your boundaries. Okay, so the environment gives us
our location and identity, but the payload also needs to
understand its own footprint in memory, right?
Speaker 2 (04:21):
Yeah, and for that, the code taps into the process class.
Speaker 1 (04:25):
By calling getCurrentProcess.
Speaker 2 (04:26):
Right. It grabs both its own executing name and its
unique process ID, the PID.
Speaker 1 (04:31):
PID, yeah.
Speaker 2 (04:32):
And maintaining a reference to your own PID is a
really vital defense mechanism for the payload itself.
Speaker 1 (04:39):
Wait, defense against what itself?
Speaker 2 (04:41):
Basically, yeah. Because if the next stage of the operation involves, say,
injecting malicious threads into other run-of-the-processes.
Speaker 1 (04:49):
Like hollowing out a legitimate instance of explorer.x or something.
Speaker 2 (04:52):
Exactly. The payload needs to ensure it doesn't accidentally target
its own process or its parent process.
Speaker 1 (04:58):
Oh, because that would cause a cascade and crash.
Speaker 2 (05:00):
Right. It would just destroy itself.
Speaker 1 (05:01):
Wow. Okay. So we have the OS, the user, our location,
and our PID footprint. I guess the next logical requirement
is the network topology.
Speaker 2 (05:09):
Yeah. The payload needs to know its address on the grid.
Speaker 1 (05:11):
So it hits the DNS class to grab the local
host name and then feeds that host name into a
get host by name method, right?
Speaker 2 (05:18):
Exactly. To retrieve the network interfaces and filter down to
the primary IPv4 address.
Speaker 1 (05:24):
But isn't that network telemetry like a massive red flag
or rather a way to spot a trap?
Speaker 2 (05:28):
It absolutely is. It's often the very first indicator of
a sandbox environment.
Speaker 1 (05:33):
Like an antivirus lab. Right.
Speaker 2 (05:36):
If that IP address routes back to a known security
vendor's analysis subnet, Or if the host name is just
some default string generated by an automated malware tool.
Speaker 1 (05:45):
A sophisticated payload can check those variables and just immediately
terminate itself.
Speaker 2 (05:48):
Exactly. It just quietly exits to avoid detection.
Speaker 1 (05:51):
That's so smart. But assuming the coast is clear and
we're on a real target, there's one final check in
this recon phase. And this is kind of the fork
in the road that determines the entire fate of the operation,
isn't it?
Speaker 2 (06:04):
Oh, for sure. The privilege check. Right.
Speaker 1 (06:05):
The payload utilizes Windows Identity and Windows Principle to interrogate
the operating system's security token. It's explicitly asking the system,
am I executing within an administrator context?
Speaker 2 (06:18):
And the outcome of that query defines the payload's entire
operational ceiling.
Speaker 1 (06:23):
Meaning?
Speaker 2 (06:24):
Meaning, if the token holds that Windows built-in role administrator role,
the payload has the authority to interact with system-wide services,
Deep registry hives, protected memory spaces.
Speaker 1 (06:35):
It's got the master keys.
Speaker 2 (06:36):
Exactly. But if it's running as a standard user, it
is heavily compartmentalized.
Speaker 1 (06:41):
And trying to perform an administrative action without that token,
it doesn't just quietly fail, right?
Speaker 2 (06:47):
No, no, not at all. It generates an unauthorized access exception.
Speaker 1 (06:50):
The OS intercepts the violation.
Speaker 2 (06:52):
Yeah, denies the request, and crucially, it logs the event.
Speaker 1 (06:56):
Which is essentially a massive flare shot straight up into
the security operations center.
Speaker 2 (07:00):
Exactly. Which perfectly illustrates why packaging all this telemetry into
a single persistent general info object is so incredibly crucial.
Speaker 1 (07:08):
Oh, I see. So the subsequent modules of the payload
don't need to risk making noisy, repetitive queries to the OS. Right.
Speaker 2 (07:15):
They just reference the state already safely stored in that object.
The recon phase is complete.
Speaker 1 (07:20):
Okay, so our object is populated. We have situational awareness.
We know we have admin rights. But right now, this
tool only exists in volatile memory. If the target user
finishes their shift, closes their laptop, and shuts down the machine,
our payload evaporates.
Speaker 2 (07:37):
It's gone.
Speaker 1 (07:38):
So we have to anchor ourselves to the system before
that power cycle happens.
Speaker 2 (07:43):
This brings us to the necessity of persistence. The goal
here is to ensure the payload automatically executes upon reboot.
Speaker 1 (07:50):
And to conceptualize this, we're looking at interacting directly with
the Windows registry, specifically targeting the current user's startup keys. Yeah.
It's kind of a classic maneuver of wedging a heavy
book in the door so you don't have to pick
the lock a second time.
Speaker 2 (08:03):
That's a great way to look at it. And to
do this in C Sharp, we have to import a
specific package. Microsoft.Win32.Registry.
Speaker 1 (08:11):
Because the registry is basically the central nervous system of
Windows configurations, right?
Speaker 2 (08:15):
Exactly. Everything the OS does at boot is dictated by
these keys.
Speaker 1 (08:19):
So the payload specifically targets the HKCU software Microsoft Windows
current version run key. Right.
Speaker 2 (08:26):
That specific path. Because when a user authenticates and the
desktop environment loads... Windows inherently trusts the values in this
path and just executes them.
Speaker 1 (08:36):
So the payload uses the open subkey method to access
this directory.
Speaker 2 (08:40):
Yes. But this is where that privilege check from our
recon object really pays off.
Speaker 1 (08:45):
Oh, because of the right flag?
Speaker 2 (08:47):
Exactly. When invoking open subkey, the payload must pass a
boolin argument, a right flag that's set to true.
Speaker 1 (08:54):
Because you aren't just reading the registry.
Speaker 2 (08:56):
No, you are demanding permission to mutate it.
Speaker 1 (08:58):
And if a developer skips that privilege check, assumes they
have admin rights, and passes that true flag in a
restricted context.
Speaker 2 (09:06):
The common language runtime throws that access exception we mentioned earlier. Boom. Yeah,
the process terminates, the persistence fails, and the defender gets
an alert.
Speaker 1 (09:14):
But if the rights are verified, the handle opens successfully.
Speaker 2 (09:17):
Right. And once that handle is open, the code uses
set value. It assigns an arbitrary string name. Let's just
call the registry entry Red Team Developer. And points it
to the absolute file path of our executing payload.
Speaker 1 (09:30):
And wait, we don't even have to blindly search the
hard drive for that path, do we? Because we already
captured our current executing directory in the general info object
in phase one.
Speaker 2 (09:39):
Exactly. We just passed the variable.
Speaker 1 (09:41):
Man, that modular architecture really pays dividends.
Speaker 2 (09:44):
It builds on itself perfectly. Yeah. But once the value
is set, the payload has to execute one of the
most easily overlooked steps in managed code.
Speaker 1 (09:53):
Resource cleanup.
Speaker 2 (09:54):
Yeah. The dispose method.
Speaker 1 (09:56):
Because when you open a connection to an unmanaged resource
like the Windows registry, you're acquiring a lock on system memory. Right.
Speaker 2 (10:03):
And if you just let the method finish without explicitly
closing that handle and calling dispose, you create a memory leak.
Speaker 1 (10:10):
Or a locked file state. Exactly.
Speaker 2 (10:12):
It's poor coding hygiene. And in an offensive context, leaving
dangling handles is a fantastic way to leave forensic artifacts
for incident responders.
Speaker 1 (10:21):
Yeah, managing your garbage collection and releasing handles ensures the
system remains stable. I mean, the last thing a persistent
agent wants to do is degrade the performance of the
host machine.
Speaker 2 (10:30):
Because that immediately draws the user's suspicion. Why is my
computer so slow today?
Speaker 1 (10:34):
Right, exactly. But, okay, I have to push back on
the specific factor, though.
Speaker 2 (10:38):
Okay, go for it.
Speaker 1 (10:39):
Writing a binary path directly into the current version run
key is incredibly loud. It is. Every modern endpoint detection
and response platform, every EDR is hooking those startup keys.
It's literally one of the first places threat hunters look.
So why would a modern payload leverage such an archaic
(11:00):
persistence mechanism?
Speaker 2 (11:02):
Well, it's a completely valid critique. I mean, in a
highly mature enterprise environment, dropping a raw executable path into
the run key will almost certainly trigger an EDR behavioral block.
Red teams typically rely on much stealthier techniques, you know, hijacking,
modifying scheduled tasks, or abusing Windows management instrumentation. However, examining
(11:22):
the run key method is foundational.
Speaker 1 (11:24):
How so?
Speaker 2 (11:25):
Because it exposes the core philosophy of operating system architecture.
Windows must inherently trust specific configuration pathways to function.
Speaker 1 (11:32):
Okay, I see.
Speaker 2 (11:32):
By manipulating that baseline trust... Defenders learn exactly what to monitor,
and offensive engineers learn the real parameters of system behavior.
Speaker 1 (11:42):
It's the prerequisite knowledge before you move on to the
stealthy stuff. Like, you have to understand how the front
door works before you start looking for structural flaws in
the foundation.
Speaker 2 (11:50):
Precisely.
Speaker 1 (11:51):
Okay. So we've mapped the environment, and we've anchored our
payload to survive a reboot.
Speaker 2 (11:57):
Yep.
Speaker 1 (11:58):
But functionally, our executable is just a scout right now.
It's super lightweight. To do any real heavy lifting, it
needs dynamic capabilities.
Speaker 2 (12:06):
It needs to pull down secondary modules because a static
agent is effectively a dead agent.
Speaker 1 (12:11):
Right. So the payload requires an expansion mechanism.
Speaker 2 (12:14):
Which involves architecting an operations class and within that class,
building a command parser.
Speaker 1 (12:19):
The parser acts as a routing table for remote instructions.
Speaker 2 (12:22):
Exactly.
Speaker 1 (12:22):
I look at the command parser like a radio dispatcher
breaking down an encoded message into actionable orders.
Speaker 2 (12:29):
Exactly.
Speaker 1 (12:30):
A string of text comes over the wire from the
command and control server. To the underlying memory, it's just
a continuous block of characters, right?
Speaker 2 (12:38):
Right.
Speaker 1 (12:38):
Let's say the string is downloadhttpswebsite.com slash file.html. The parser
has to dynamically dissect that string and map it to
an execution flow.
Speaker 2 (12:50):
So the code utilizes the native string split method using
the space character as the delimiter.
Speaker 1 (12:55):
Oh, nice.
Speaker 2 (12:55):
It slices that continuous block into an array. So the
element at the zero index, the word download, is routed
through conditional logic.
Speaker 1 (13:02):
So if the action matches the string download, the payload
initializes the corresponding function.
Speaker 2 (13:07):
Right. And the element at the first index, the URL,
is passed as the operational argument to that function.
Speaker 1 (13:13):
And for the actual network request, we don't need to
manually construct HTTP headers or handle TCP handshakes from scratch. No.
Speaker 2 (13:20):
C Sharp makes that easy. It provides the system.net namespace.
Speaker 1 (13:23):
Right. So we can instantiate a web client object to
manage the connection, reach out to the internet, and just
pull the file down.
Speaker 2 (13:31):
Exactly. But this introduces a massive strategic problem.
Speaker 1 (13:35):
The drop zone. Where do we save the file? Yes.
Speaker 2 (13:38):
Hiding it deep in System32 might sound stealthy, but writing
to system-critical folders introduces enormous friction with access control lists.
Speaker 1 (13:48):
You're just constantly battling file permissions.
Speaker 2 (13:50):
Exactly. So instead, the payload opts to resolve the current
user's temp directory.
Speaker 1 (13:55):
Wait, why drop the file in the temp folder? Wouldn't
a hidden folder be way better?
Speaker 2 (13:59):
You'd think so, but the temp directory is actually a
brilliant strategic compromise.
Speaker 1 (14:03):
Why?
Speaker 2 (14:04):
Because the operating system inherently enforces relaxed write permissions there.
Legitimate applications are just constantly dumping temporary caches, installation fragments,
and log files into that path all day long.
Speaker 1 (14:15):
Oh, I see. It's like hiding a leaf in a
pile of leaves.
Speaker 2 (14:18):
Precisely. If a threat hunter opens a temp folder... they
are immediately confronted with thousands of randomly generated alphanumeric folders
and orphan.tm files.
Speaker 1 (14:28):
So a newly dropped executable just blends seamlessly into the
native entropy of the operating system.
Speaker 2 (14:37):
Security through obscurity, leveraging the natural messiness of the environment.
Speaker 1 (14:40):
That is wild. But to successfully drop the file into
that temp directory, the web client requires a specific local
file name to write to, right?
Speaker 2 (14:51):
Yes, it does.
Speaker 1 (14:51):
And the payload only received a full URL from the
command and control server.
Speaker 2 (14:55):
Right, so it has to dynamically extract the file name
from the very end of that web address.
Speaker 1 (15:00):
Which requires another round of string manipulation. Yep.
Speaker 2 (15:02):
The code takes the target URL and splits it again,
this time using the forward slash character as the delimiter.
Speaker 1 (15:08):
Okay, so that generates a new array containing every segment
of the URL structure.
Speaker 2 (15:13):
And the file name naturally resides in the very last
segment of that array.
Speaker 1 (15:16):
Right. But extracting that last piece introduces a classic software
engineering trap, one that has apparently burned countless red team payloads.
Speaker 2 (15:23):
Oh, yeah. The zero index trap.
Speaker 1 (15:25):
Tell me about the zero index trap.
Speaker 2 (15:27):
So in C Sharp, arrays are zero indexed. The counting
begins at zero, not one. If a URL splits into
four segments, the indices are zero, one, two, and three. Right.
Speaker 1 (15:36):
That makes sense.
Speaker 2 (15:37):
But newer developers often write logic that asks the array
for the item matching its total length. So if the
length is 4, they ask for the item at index 4.
Speaker 1 (15:47):
But index 4 doesn't exist.
Speaker 2 (15:49):
Exactly. The payload attempts to read unallocated memory, and the
common language runtime violently intervenes.
Speaker 1 (15:56):
It throws an index out of range exception.
Speaker 2 (15:58):
Yep. The process crashes immediately.
Speaker 1 (16:00):
Oh, wow.
Speaker 2 (16:00):
And if this happens during a live operation, you don't
just fail to download the secondary module. you lose your
executing process.
Speaker 1 (16:07):
And your persistence might not have even fully triggered yet.
Speaker 2 (16:10):
Right. Plus, the operating system generates an application crash log
that points directly to your malicious binary.
Speaker 1 (16:17):
A tiny mathematical oversight, literally just failing to request the
array length minus one, destroys the entire foothold.
Speaker 2 (16:25):
It highlights how offensive security isn't just about clever exploits.
It is about rigorous, fault-tolerant software engineering.
Speaker 1 (16:33):
Every unhandled exception is a beacon to the defense.
Speaker 2 (16:36):
The precision required is absolute. You are operating in a
hostile environment where the operating system is actively monitoring for anomalies.
Speaker 1 (16:46):
Which makes looking back at the entire sequence we've conceptually
built so fascinating.
Speaker 2 (16:51):
It really is.
Speaker 1 (16:51):
Let's summarize the architecture real quick. We've engineered a multi-stage
C-sharp tool, right? It initializes by querying the OS, networking,
and security tokens to build a stateful reconnaissance object. It
leverages that exact state to acquire right access to the registry,
wedging itself into the system startup to survive reboot while
(17:12):
carefully disposing of its resource handles.
Speaker 2 (17:15):
Crucial step.
Speaker 1 (17:15):
And finally, it dynamically parses remote commands to pull in
new files, safely navigating arrays to drop them in the
chaotic camouflage of the temp directory.
Speaker 2 (17:24):
It is a modular, highly cohesive sequence. but analyzing it
from the perspective of the developer is really only half
the battle. We need to invert the lens.
Speaker 1 (17:32):
And view this exact sequence from the perspective of the defense.
Speaker 2 (17:36):
Yeah.
Speaker 1 (17:36):
So let's turn this over to you, the listener. Let's
do a quick thought exercise. Put yourself in the seat
of an analyst at a network security operations center.
Speaker 2 (17:44):
Okay, a SOC analyst. Yeah.
Speaker 1 (17:47):
You aren't looking at static signatures or known malicious file
hashes because the payload we just discussed is a custom
compiled C-sharp binary.
Speaker 2 (17:55):
It has literally never been seen in the wild before. Right.
Speaker 1 (17:59):
So what kind of behavioral heuristics would you configure your
system alerts to catch? What would you try to build?
Speaker 2 (18:06):
Think about the velocity of the execution. A completely unknown
binary executes. And within milliseconds, it requests a token check
to verify administrator privileges.
Speaker 1 (18:16):
And then immediately opens a handle to the current version
run registry key.
Speaker 2 (18:20):
Passes a right flag, sets a value.
Speaker 1 (18:22):
And then immediately initiates an outbound HTTP connection using the system.net.webclient
class to an untrusted domain.
Speaker 2 (18:29):
No human user behaves like that?
Speaker 1 (18:31):
No standard application installer updates its registered persistence and reaches
out for secondary payloads in a time frame measured in
CPU cycles.
Speaker 2 (18:39):
The sequence of those API calls, stacked right on top
of each other, creates a behavioral fingerprint that is far
louder than any static file hash.
Speaker 1 (18:47):
So defending modern networks requires tracking that behavior.
Speaker 2 (18:50):
Exactly. You look for the combination of privilege escalation checks
tied to persistence mechanisms. When you understand how the code
has to architect its foothold, you know exactly which intersections
to monitor.
Speaker 1 (19:03):
Yeah, that makes so much sense. So we've broken down
the architecture. We've looked at the defensive implications. But I
want to leave you with one final structural problem to
mull over. Okay. We built a great parser for downloading files, right?
It's acting as a switchboard, patiently listening for instructions from
the command and control server.
Speaker 2 (19:22):
Ready to download the next module.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
Exactly. But what happens to the payload if that C2
server gets seized by law enforcement or the domain is
sinkholed or just goes offline?
Speaker 2 (19:31):
Well, the payload's primary lifeline is severed. It is sitting
in the registry, executing perfectly on every boot, but parsing
empty air.
Speaker 1 (19:39):
So the provocative thought exercise for you to explore on
your own is, How does a sophisticated persistence mechanism like
the one we built adapt if its infrastructure simplifies? disappears?
Speaker 2 (19:51):
It's a great question. Does the developer implement a domain
generation algorithm to dynamically search for new C2 addresses?
Speaker 1 (19:59):
Or do they program the payload to start broadcasting peer-to-peer requests,
searching for other infected machines on the local subnet to
act as proxy routers?
Speaker 2 (20:07):
The architecture never stops evolving. I mean, when one communication
channel is burned, the engineering merely shifts to a more resilient,
decentralized model.
Speaker 1 (20:16):
But the underlying concepts of state, persistence, and execution remain
exactly the same.
Speaker 2 (20:21):
It's an endless engineering arms race.
Speaker 1 (20:23):
It really is. The room might be pitch black when
your payload first parachutes in, but once you understand how
to structure your telemetry and handle your execution flow, you
realize you're operating within a highly complex, highly logical ecosystem.
Speaker 2 (20:35):
Keep dissecting the architecture. Yeah.
Speaker 1 (20:37):
Keep questioning the mechanics, keep exploring the cat and mouse game,
and we'll see you on the next deep dive.
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