Guest Post: Part 2 We The People Studios Signature Verification & Mail in Voting

Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Ms course we speak more day tripping on the haters.
It can take free you from day lockdown for the

(00:24):
last day as many time, I.

Speaker 2 (00:37):
Don't know if I quite Yeah.

Speaker 3 (00:52):
Hello, welcome everybody, Thank you for joining us again today.
I am Shelby Bus, Chairman of We the People as
the Alliance. On my right here is Brian Blim, Director
of Government Affairs and our attorney for We the People
USA Alliance, and to his right is Chris Handel, our
data and information and Technology director. I'm also a pretty

(01:18):
great data analyst, and you're going to find out today
some of the things that he's been working on and
what we've been doing as an organization in regards to
signature verification.

Speaker 4 (01:28):
So I think the first thing we should.

Speaker 3 (01:30):
Do is just kind of do a recap of the
first go round. We covered two phases of signature verification,
including ballot harvesting and ballot mules, and Chris, do you
want to talk a little bit about those first two
phases of sigvaar Yeah.

Speaker 5 (01:47):
Yeah, So when a ballot goes into the mail, it
goes to the post office, and it goes from the
post office directly over to run Beck and then run
Beck counts them for the first time when they arrive
at Runback rather than at the post office, and they
take pictures of all those envelopes and then they transmit
pictures over to the Berkopa County mittech What is miracle

(02:09):
is Micktech's down.

Speaker 3 (02:10):
For Americopa County elections populations.

Speaker 6 (02:13):
That's exactly it.

Speaker 5 (02:14):
Yes, So those images go over to Micktech where they
have a signature verification stations set up. And in signature verification,
a bunch of people who volunteer to do that, I
get paid for it. So people that get paid to
do that that are like patriots who want to get
involved in signator verification. Also, they have people who are

(02:38):
short term employees like short term employment agency employees doing
that and they go through first level and second level
signature verification. First level is just a first look where
they have one or up to three reference signatures, but
they have to scroll to look at more than one.

(03:01):
And then if if that signature gets approved, then it
goes directly to.

Speaker 6 (03:08):
Directly to.

Speaker 5 (03:10):
Over to Runback that that got approved and the envelopes
get matched that way as approved signatures, or if they
get what's called exceptioned, which is basically a nice term
for failed first level. They go on to manager's level.
If they fail manager's level, then they go on to curing.
And so we're going to talk about curing today. That
was my shortest version.

Speaker 4 (03:32):
Very good job.

Speaker 3 (03:33):
Now, Bryant, you were the attorney in the carry Like
Pase for twenty twenty two. Part of what we did
in that trial was exposed some of the tremendous flaws
with signature verifications. So, based on what Chris described as
the process, yes, do you believe that that was adequately.

Speaker 4 (03:53):
Done in twenty twenty two and that they followed the law.

Speaker 2 (03:56):
No, I do not believe that they followed the law
that it was adequately done. I just want to just
a little disclaimer here. When Chris said they go to
Runback where they are counted first and not at the
post office. I just want to sort of clarify something.
They're counting Runback is not counting the votes. Runback is

(04:18):
counting the absolute number of early ballots that were delivered
to run Back by Maricopa County employees after receiving them
at the post office or through dropboxes or whatever the
case may be. And so there's supposed to be a
total number that run back counts using the machine, so
it's not counting ballots, but.

Speaker 5 (04:40):
Still envelopes, still envelopes sealed with the ballots inside.

Speaker 2 (04:46):
And so yeah, we don't, we absolutely do not believe
that the Maricopa County Recorder in the twenty twenty two
general election followed Arizona law. You know. The problem was
Judge Thompson came out after we present our findings to
the court, and in trial number two of Carrie Lake v. Hobbes,

(05:08):
the judge found that the law allows discretion to the
recorder to determine whether or not signatures are valid or not,
and that he had no authority to overrule that. And
so that was the net result of you know, signature
verification related to related to the Lake Vihubs truck twenty

(05:35):
twenty two electionarned. We've learned a lot more since then.

Speaker 4 (05:39):
Yeah, we've absolutely learned a lot more.

Speaker 3 (05:42):
And I think something that's interesting is when we got
the twenty twenty two data, we were doing that in
preparation of the trial to compare it with our videos,
compare it with the audit we had done in twenty
twenty and then we had requested later to have them
send over twenty twenty.

Speaker 4 (06:02):
Actually we requested at the same time.

Speaker 3 (06:04):
Is that correct. We got the twenty twenty two data
subsequent to that, and when we did that, we didn't
really get a chance to analyze it because we were
so busy in the trials. So part of what we're
going to cover today, in addition to the cuing, is.

Speaker 4 (06:23):
We're going to cover the.

Speaker 3 (06:27):
Twenty twenty timing data along with the twenty twenty four
timing data and then talk about how that relates, how
these three things relate twenty twenty, twenty twenty two, and
twenty twenty four. I think it's important, especially for those
viewers that didn't watch the last episode, to maybe play
video outlining some of the concerns I said in the

(06:49):
previous episode, and I stand by this. I believe mail
in ballots and signature verification are criminal. I think that
it is an affront to the American election system, and
it's how we make changes to that. It's going to
be very difficult for anybody to say that we have
a free, safe and fair election. Do you guys have
anything to add to that, I mean, do you agree

(07:10):
with that opinion?

Speaker 2 (07:11):
I wholeheartedly agree with that opinion. Early ballots, I think,
as we've seen, allow, you know, at a systemic level
them to influence the outcome of our elections, whether whether
we're talking about the twenty twenty general election, where after
the election was over, Maricopa County received just the day

(07:32):
after the election, eighteen thousand ballot affidavit envelopes with voted
ballots within those envelopes that they promptly then added to
the mix and counted. And so you know that the
ability for fraud in our elections based upon mail in

(07:52):
voting is huge. It's huge. It's out there and it's real,
and it's something that we need to come to terms with.
That know, is there any other what other countries in
the world allow no excuse just you know, ballots flying
everywhere through the US Postal Service. I don't know of
any countries other than maybe some of the Western democracies

(08:15):
that have the same problems we're having politically, that allow
widespread use of mail in voting because of the fraud.

Speaker 5 (08:23):
Yeah, and I think that I think that people generally
accept it, and it's becoming more there, you know, the
influences over our elections are trying to make it more
and more acceptable. Here in Arizona during COVID, we signed
up eighty percent of the population to accept a mail
in ballot. Now, when I was living in California, I

(08:46):
grew up in living in California for several years. A
decade before I came to Arizona, I signed up to
get a mail in ballot. I thought it was a
matter of convenience. I always intended it to take it
into the polling location, but just in case I can't,
I I'll sign up for mail in ballot.

Speaker 6 (09:05):
For me, it wasn't necessity. It was just convenience.

Speaker 5 (09:08):
And here in Arizona since COVID, they're saying that eighty
percent of the voters in Arizona like mail in ballots.

Speaker 6 (09:16):
Well that's not actually the case.

Speaker 5 (09:18):
Eighty percent of the voters in Arizona got signed up
for mail in ballots and they've left themselves on the
mail in voter role. But I would suspect that many
of them are like me, who just stay on it
as a matter of convenist because they don't know what's
wrong with mail in voting. And we're about to show
you some of the weaknesses that are just gaping holes

(09:39):
in the system, the potential of letting in fraud, and
the reason that we should all get off of mail
and mail in voting.

Speaker 2 (09:48):
Well, and I think just to add to that, a
lot of people get registered to vote through motor voter
right you go get a driver's license in the state
of Arizona. A lot of these individuals who then are
subsequently registered to vote are being put on the permanent
early voting list whatever they call it I used to

(10:09):
be now is able and you know, if we change
the names somehow, and and so a lot of these
folks are landing on this permanent early voting list, and
then they're not actual voters. They're not people who who
really are interested in participating in politics. And that's their choice.

(10:32):
You know that we're a free country. They can vote,
they can choose not to vote, and a lot and
so we have voter roles then that have a substantial
amount of or a substantial number of people on the
voter rules that that are not participants in our democracy themselves,
that are being mailed ballots that then can be picked

(10:55):
up intercepted some way, shape or form, and then traffic I.

Speaker 3 (11:00):
Want to add to that. They were talking about pebble
versus avils. So it used to be called the permanent
early voting list, and now they call it the active
early voting list because it gives you more of a
warm and fuzzy feeling that somehow, if they're an active voter,
this is more likely to be a good voter. However,
the biggest issue we have with that is you can

(11:23):
not vote for two federal cycles, which is four years,
and still be considered an active voter. So if somebody
registers to vote and then moves out of that house,
say two months after an election, that mail in ballot
is still going to go out for four additional years
as long as I mean a piece of mail is

(11:45):
that returned back to the county recorder's office, And even
if it is, there's no guarantee that a ballot won't
go out for it. So one of the things we
talked about last week was the ballot affidavit envelope audit
that we did, where we found duplicate voters, we found
ten percent egregious signatures.

Speaker 4 (12:04):
That didn't match.

Speaker 3 (12:05):
We found envelopes that were signed by people other than
the voter. So it's clear that there is a significant
problem in how these ballots are verified and processed. So
I want to play for you a video we played
last week. It's a short video called are we really
supposed to believe that? This video is some excerpts from

(12:27):
trial that we had during the Lake v. Hobbes, where
you can hear the attorney for the county and for
Katie Hobbes talking about, well, it's okay if we have
these issues, because we have a backup plan.

Speaker 4 (12:40):
Steve, can you play that video please?

Speaker 7 (12:48):
Plaintiff's chain of custody claims seems to hinge on this
notion that perhaps some number of ballots were injected into
the batches that runback. Even if there were fifty five
hundred five in ballots somehow injected into the process, every
ballot received by Maricopa County is processed, checked against the
voter registration record to make sure the person hasn't already voted,

(13:11):
and then verified by a multi level signature review process.
There is no evidence or even reason to believe that
it had any effect on the number of votes lawfully counted.

Speaker 5 (14:01):
We're supposed to believe now there's two hundred and seventy
four thousand crooks out there that all got hold the
Great envelopes, and so.

Speaker 2 (14:07):
All these fake ballots got through. Are we really supposed
to believe that?

Speaker 5 (14:17):
So basically what he's saying here is at the beginning
they gave the justification that, you know, even if half
a million bad ballots get into the system, we're safe
because we have a multiple level sounds really good, doesn't it,
multiple level signature verification going on. And then at the
end they give the reverse argument that even if a

(14:39):
bunch of bad ballots get in, or even if even
if signature verification fails, there's just no way that fifty
one hundred thousand and half a million bad ballots are
going to get in there. So it's it's all circular logic.
Either one can fail because they got the other one,
except you know, they could both fail. And we're going

(14:59):
to show you some ways that signature verification and curing fails. Well,
you know, and they were talking pretty big numbers, right, yeah, right, examples.

Speaker 2 (15:09):
Right, you know, what did Lake v. Hobbs come down to?
What did Ahamaday the three Hobbs seventeen thousand? The Lake v.

Speaker 6 (15:20):
Hobbs or Homiday.

Speaker 4 (15:21):
Was two and eighty one.

Speaker 2 (15:27):
So this is the type of fraud. Then that can
impact races across the board, right, Yeah, no doubt.

Speaker 3 (15:36):
So so last week Chris and I talked about some
of those envelopes when we talked about the timing data
in twenty twenty two, and I just want to kind
of recap what that looks like for those people that
may not have tuned in last week and talk about
what is timing data.

Speaker 4 (15:58):
We we knew in the.

Speaker 3 (16:00):
Velopes that there were a lot of ballots went through
that never got exceptioned. As Chris had explained, So you
have a reviewer and they look at it and they say,
this signature doesn't match. That's an exception. So we knew
that there were a lot of ballots where the signatures
just did not match, but there was no exception. And
you know, Chris had the idea of we need to

(16:21):
drill and deeper on that, and so we acquired the
timing data, which Chris so brilliantly helped the county develop,
and we were able to analyze that timing data with
our audit findings and also with video that we were
able to line up with that timing data and for
twenty twenty two, one of the most popular examples of

(16:42):
that is who we call user.

Speaker 4 (16:44):
One three four.

Speaker 3 (16:45):
Steeve, can you put up exhibit to user one three four?

Speaker 5 (16:52):
So yeah, back in okay, So we talked about last time,
the fact that we had access to all of those
signature verification information, all of the valid affidavit envelopes images
from twenty twenty as well as the reference signatures. That
we did an analysis of that, and we found that

(17:15):
a reasonable rejection rate or a reasonable exception rate, at
least at first level, somewhere between ten and twenty percent.
And what we're seeing here is user one thirty four.
Oh and also it would reasonably take around four to
five maybe is as much as fifteen seconds to evaluate
a signature. And what we're seeing on the left here

(17:36):
is User one thirty four, who takes approximately two point
four to six or average of two point four seconds
per envelope to look at them. And by the way,
it takes about a second for the screen to load,
so that's really more like one point four seconds average.
And his pass rate, his pass rate is what is it,

(17:57):
ninety six point nine eight percent, ninety eight point ninety
eight There you go. Okay, so this guy isn't doing
CD intra verification. He's just clicking as fast as he
can and passing as many as he can. It's very
rare for him to have to uh to set an
exception and send a ballot FI David envelope image onto

(18:19):
level two.

Speaker 2 (18:20):
Now this is this is also the user who was
just right there front and center, right, Yeah, coincidentally coincidentally
to be the guy on camera right. And so now
if you were to look at that chart, you could
you could actually follow his his behavior and patterns right
every click. You could tell when he was taking a nap.

(18:42):
He literally fell asleep at one point, didn't.

Speaker 4 (18:45):
He multiple times?

Speaker 2 (18:46):
And that shows in that graph, does it not? Where
there are very long points in time.

Speaker 6 (18:53):
Yeah, that's right, right.

Speaker 5 (18:55):
We didn't take out some of those breaks as they're
in there his data.

Speaker 2 (18:58):
Right, So it's in there is data. But at one
of those points, this gentleman is actually sleeping. And we
you know, do we have that video? I don't know.
I don't know if we have it here for Shure.

Speaker 3 (19:09):
To Night, but yeah, we have it.

Speaker 4 (19:11):
We don't have a cue.

Speaker 3 (19:12):
Maybe can producer Steve maybe throw that up at the end.
We'll throw that up just before we wrap.

Speaker 2 (19:18):
Up that we can just you know, we can just
prefer people to we the People USA Alliance's YouTube channel
where they can find it.

Speaker 3 (19:27):
There, there you go.

Speaker 2 (19:28):
And so but I thought that was pretty interesting, and
that actually resulted in some changes to the signature verification
process for twenty twenty four, didn't it, Chris.

Speaker 6 (19:37):
Yeah, that's right, that's right. That inspired the what was
the bill? What do we call that bill?

Speaker 3 (19:44):
It's the Timeline Extension Bill. Yeah, yeah, the Timeline Extension Bill.
And you know, as as Brian had eloquently said, the
judge never ruled that Mayrkopa County did signature verification in
a way that we all find acceptable. Basically, he pointed
out the fact that it just says you have to

(20:06):
compare in statute, it doesn't define what that looks like.
So based on that, and there were many other changes
made in that Timeline Extension Bill, the Arizona Secretary of
State signature verification process was actually adopted into statute where
they made some very specific changes.

Speaker 4 (20:28):
Steve, can you put up.

Speaker 3 (20:29):
Image three please? Timeline Extension Bill. Brian, do you want
to talk a little bit about, you know, why it
was important to get this adopted in the statute and
how that would have affected the Kerry Lake case and
what it could do for future litigation.

Speaker 2 (20:47):
Well, you know, the whole, the whole rationale behind the
Timeline Extension Bill is that the court, the court, the
court found that it was left to the recorder's discretion
to determine whether or not signatures were valid or not
because there weren't really any standard set for the recorder

(21:10):
to verify signatures. Right, It's simply compare one to the other,
and if it looks okay, it looks okay, and if
it doesn't look okay, well then it doesn't count, you know,
or you can try to cure whatever the case may be.
And so it put all of the discretion within the
Maricopa County Recorder's office, as an elected officer of the court,

(21:31):
to determine whether or not these signatures were better good.
And he had his process, and we've looked at his
process and we've been talking about his process, and so
the intent behind the Timeline Extension Bill was to put
some teeth into it. Now, Katie Hobbs, when she was
the Secretary of State, she had developed this this little

(21:54):
booklet you don't know what it's called, Chris, about signature verification.

Speaker 3 (21:58):
Right, it's the Arizona Secretary of State Signature Verification guideline.
Right's trained our auditors to use when we performed the audit. Right,
And it was actually developed in partnership with the EAC,
and it was it was adopted wholly from Colorado Signature
Verification Manual.

Speaker 2 (22:18):
Yeah, oh well, and so you know basically what it
calls for is the it codifies that manual, right, because
what did we learn at Lake V. Hobbes. Well, what
we learned at Lake V. Hobbes is that what we
learned at Lake V. Hobbs was that you know, they

(22:41):
they told people, let's put bray Valen's Wayles's said, yes,
we train our signature verifiers to use this signature verification
guide here, right, And this is the Katie Hobbs twenty
twenty Signature Verification Manual.

Speaker 5 (22:55):
And we said last time, that's it's really quite a
good manual. It teach us how people how to do
forensics signature verification. You can't make anybody an expert in
four hours, but it does as good a job as
you can do.

Speaker 3 (23:07):
He talks about all the different characteristics you have to
check that if you were looking at the image on
the screen.

Speaker 4 (23:14):
It outlined each of.

Speaker 3 (23:16):
Those you have to look at the local characteristics, the
broad characteristic pen lift.

Speaker 4 (23:21):
Right, there's there's a lot of different a.

Speaker 3 (23:24):
Lot of different things you have to look at in
both local and broad characteristics, which cannot be done in
one to three seconds, would you agree?

Speaker 2 (23:34):
And so that's the point and that's the point. And
so the intent following Lake v. Hobbes was to make
the county recorder beholden to some set of standards, right,
and so the Arizona Legislature, the bill was drafted by
Alex Koaladen, who should be the next Secretary of State

(23:56):
because Adrian Fontes is just a flat failure, like you
Americopa County's recorder. But he drafted the bill with a
specific intention of making the recorder accountable to some set
of standards, and he adopted you know, this was written
by Katie Hobbs, who was then the Democrat Secretary of

(24:19):
State for the state of Arizona. Adopted her standards and
codified them into law. And so the result is now,
if they're not going to do signature verification according to
the law as it's codified, then you can bring that
election challenge and the judge isn't necessarily left saying, oh,

(24:42):
I have to defer to the discretion of the county recorder.
There are actually set standards.

Speaker 5 (24:47):
Right right, And I think we made this correction last
time that we're certain that Katie Hobbs did not in
fact write this herself, but it was written under her
authority and provided under her authority.

Speaker 2 (24:58):
Oh yeah, Katie Hobbs couldn't write something like.

Speaker 3 (25:00):
This, Yeah, no way, And I just yeah, I wanted
to make sure we're not giving credit where credit is
not due.

Speaker 4 (25:09):
So gonna We're gonna show you some different data.

Speaker 3 (25:12):
We're going to show you a little bit about what
twenty twenty four look like post Timeline Extension bill, and
then we're going to walk you through a process of
comparing twenty twenty, twenty twenty two and twenty twenty four
so you can see what signature verification under a communist
leader such as Adrian Fonts as a county recorder versus

(25:35):
Stephen Richer are our former Bye bye Stephen County Recorder,
and what that transition looked like over a course of time. So, Chris,
before we show the images of twenty twenty four, we
have a couple examples to show. Do you want to
talk a little bit about your overall assessment of the

(25:56):
data for twenty twenty four and whether you believe that
the Timeline Extension Bill did have some impact on the
twenty twenty four process.

Speaker 5 (26:06):
Well, I think that I think the data show what
the point that we want to make here it. I
think it made a small difference, but it's clear that
they did not enforce it, they didn't pay attention to it,
because there are still there's still people doing the same
thing they they were before. So yeah, let's put up
let's put up the first one, number four, So this

(26:31):
is this would be an example of somebody who's doing
their job. So on the left, it's the number of
seconds an average is user forty five is a good
example of a conscientious person who takes about what is
it seven point three seconds average and as much as
what is it like fifteen seconds there at the beginning.

(26:53):
You know, it's interesting they got a little more confident.
They sped up over time, but there's still a good
scatter and the average.

Speaker 6 (27:00):
Seven point three seconds.

Speaker 5 (27:01):
So they're taking their time to evaluate these signatures, and
I'm going to write what we see is their pass rate,
or the number of the sceptions that they're making.

Speaker 6 (27:11):
Thank you.

Speaker 5 (27:12):
That's eighty two point nine five pass rate, which means
the rejection rate of about seventeen percent. Right, And in
our findings again from twenty twenty and it's we think
the incoming signatures in any one year are going to
be very similar. We had a pass right of between
ten and twenty percent, or I mean a reject rate

(27:32):
of ten to twenty percent.

Speaker 6 (27:34):
And that's what this shows.

Speaker 5 (27:35):
So we have we have a person and there's a
very organic scatter of data all over the map where
some days he found more bad signatures, some days he
found fewer bad signatures, and it looks very organic and reasonable.
And the averages you know in the in the eighties,

(27:56):
in the in the low eighty percent. So this is
this is an example of somebody who's doing a good job.
So let's take a look at the next.

Speaker 4 (28:04):
One number, number five.

Speaker 5 (28:12):
Okay, this is an example, like we showed you before
from the twenty twenty two election. This person is taking
two point nine seconds average, and again it takes the
screen about a second to load, so that's one point
nine seconds average, and I mean some of those are
shorter than one point nine seconds, and his pass rate

(28:36):
is ninety eight point four two percent pass rate. This
is somebody who's missing the vast majority of bad signatures.
And you can see that he's finding some bad signatures.
So it's not like he's getting all the good envelopes. Now,
he's getting the same the same flow of data that

(28:57):
everyone else is getting. But he's really he's responding to
it differently. He's responding to it saying that he can
do this in a shorter time and more of his
signatures are good. So this is somebody not not doing
what the timeline expension bills requires him to do.

Speaker 2 (29:11):
And can I can I ask a question about both
of those graphs, and I think this is an important question.
Graph number four, do we know how many total ballot
EFFID even envelopes that user verified?

Speaker 6 (29:23):
Yes, I think it's been there.

Speaker 4 (29:25):
Yeah, forty five thousand, seven hundred.

Speaker 2 (29:27):
And sixty six thousand, seven hundred and sixty six.

Speaker 6 (29:31):
This guy is not a minor contributor.

Speaker 2 (29:33):
No, this this, this individual, you know, verified a substantial
number of signatures. And what are the dates they started
work on and ended work on they carried through the election.

Speaker 6 (29:44):
The green line it looks.

Speaker 3 (29:45):
Like October fourteenth was the first day fifteenth, thank you Steve,
through November seventh, so they worked beyond election day.

Speaker 2 (29:56):
Yeah, the Green Line's election right, that's correct? Okay, yes,
all right, so that I mean that's a substantial number
of ballots.

Speaker 5 (30:03):
Yeah, and he worked the whole time, so it's not
like this little tiny snapshot, not a small number of ballots.
This guy's a major contributor and a contributor over time.

Speaker 3 (30:14):
And there's the other user, yes, seventeen thy sixteen ballots
verified by user one sixty six.

Speaker 2 (30:21):
How many days did they work relatively.

Speaker 3 (30:23):
Speaking, October twenty third through November seventh?

Speaker 2 (30:30):
They started about eight days later. And just do we
know how many hours a day each shift working. There's
eight hour shift and then there's a three hour shift.

Speaker 6 (30:41):
There is a two shifts.

Speaker 5 (30:43):
There's a day shift, it's seven hours of work, and
then and after an evening shift doesn't go overnight, it's
just another three and a half hours.

Speaker 3 (30:53):
Now now, based on analyzing that, when we did our
twenty twenty two audit, our auditors, on average, the really
good auditors could get somewhere around eight hundred ballot AFFIDAVID
envelopes done in the course of an eight hour period.
I've also talked to very highly experienced including full time
America but County Elections Department staff that state that their

(31:15):
daily averages are around seven hundred and fifty a day.
So when you look at these people that are able
to verify thirty ballot ALFHI David envelopes in thirty seconds,
such as mister Magoo user one, three four in twenty
twenty two, you kind of can get a correlation idea

(31:35):
between the amount of ballots they're cranking out and their
acceptance and rejection rates, and so you graph that out
as well.

Speaker 4 (31:43):
Is that correct, Chris?

Speaker 3 (31:44):
We mapped out what we're calling the touch data, or
how many ballot Affhidavid envelopes were touched by each user,
and then we also outlined the workload, and then we
were able to correlate that with what the findings were
an overall acceptance and rejection.

Speaker 6 (32:03):
Yeah.

Speaker 5 (32:04):
So yeah, let's let's start with twenty twenty two's that's
kind of our foundation.

Speaker 6 (32:12):
Yeah, okay, so what we see here is this is
number of touches.

Speaker 5 (32:19):
So okay, so a touch would be an envelope being evaluated,
whether it's evaluated the first time, the second time, the
third time, anytime an envelope is evaluated that that qualifies
as a touch. Sometimes or I guess a majority of
the envelopes are going to come in and they're going
to be approved on the very first touch that's approved

(32:40):
at level one, and there are several envelopes that that
have several touches. And so what we have here is
the let's see it down the left hand side, touches.

Speaker 6 (32:54):
Or a good signature.

Speaker 5 (32:55):
So we've got about eighty percent or above ninety percent
of those that came in as good touches, and these
are touches over time. You can see the dates starting
from September, the end of September all the way through
the end of November, and the dots are the number
of touches per day. You can see by the size

(33:18):
of the dot the number of touches that were done
per day.

Speaker 2 (33:22):
And so.

Speaker 5 (33:25):
Most of them are good signatures, but they're coming in
about ninety percent in twenty twenty.

Speaker 6 (33:31):
Early on they're higher.

Speaker 5 (33:33):
Into the election, the percentage approval rate goes down to
ninety percent, which is natural, that's more organic. That's the
kind of the thing that we saw during the election.
And there's some a lot of variation around election time.
But the point here is that in the vast majority

(33:54):
of these the largest dots have an approval rating of
just above ninety percent. That's relatively reasonable as far as
approval rate for the number of touches.

Speaker 3 (34:08):
But the overall, when you look at twenty twenty two,
the overall good signatures or final disposition of good signatures
was at ninety two point five eight percent, which what
they're essentially saying is that the only seven and a
half percent of those ballots were bad. Would you say
that's a good indicator that several mismatched or inappropriate ballots

(34:31):
may have entered into the system in twenty twenty two.

Speaker 5 (34:34):
Yeah, we lost a lot in twenty twenty two, and
we saw that elsewhere in the data. But as a foundation,
this is what we saw in twenty twenty two, and
we saw the problems that we saw.

Speaker 6 (34:46):
In twenty twenty two.

Speaker 5 (34:47):
So we'll go on and look at twenty twenty four
and twenty twenty and we'll see some contrasts.

Speaker 3 (34:52):
Why don't we look at twenty twenty right, Why don't
we go kind of backwards and see what signature verification
under Adrian fi Tes.

Speaker 5 (35:03):
Okay, so dramatically, what we see here, something happened on
the twenty nine. Okay, what you see here as an
extremely high acceptance rate all the way up to the
twenty nine. Now you see two yellow charts, and it's
a little hard to see what's going on in those

(35:23):
yellow charts. I'll just explain. On the bottom one is
a yellow chart that shows signature verification overall, and the
bottom bar is the number of exceptions. This is rejections
at level one, number of rejections that happened overall in
the election. And what is that number? It's twenty one?

(35:48):
What is I can't read the chart from here.

Speaker 3 (35:51):
Yeah, it's going to be approximately twenty four thousand exceptions
occurred overall. Yeah, and this doesn't mean they were rejected.
Let's make that clear. These are just ones where the
first level worker, the average citizen looking at the envelopes
said about twenty four thousand of those ballad alphadavit envelopes

(36:15):
needed at least a second look if nothing else.

Speaker 5 (36:18):
That's right, That's right, okay, And then we had some
other categories. The second bar up is labeled NS, which
stands for no signature. So those were those were obvious
in the data, and then you know that the numbers
go down pretty dramatically after that. So now the top
chart is what happened before the twenty ninth, and like

(36:40):
I said, something happened on the twenty ninth in twenty
twenty where the exceptions don't even make the chart. In fact,
there were no exceptions before the twenty ninth. This is
the twenty eighth and before no exceptions.

Speaker 3 (36:55):
So what you're saying is for the first approximate fifteen
to twenty days of signature verification, not one ballot offa
David envelope was exceptioned or sent for an additional review.
As am I hearing that correct, not.

Speaker 5 (37:11):
One ballot affidavit envelope was determined at first level signature
verification as having been exceptioned or rejected to be sent
on to either second level or curing.

Speaker 6 (37:25):
In fact, the.

Speaker 5 (37:27):
Big bar that you see is what is that approximately
five hundred and that is just the no signatures, the
ex's or the exceptions don't even make the chart because
it's zero. There aren't any, all right, So just just
to make clear that our viewers are understanding this process, right,

(37:52):
they take these signatures and then they have them reviewed
by a citizen somebody that goes works THEEL. They compare
what's in the registration record with what's on the ballot
Affidavid envelope, and that's called level one.

Speaker 2 (38:06):
Correct, that's right. And when they so an exception is
when the person at level one says I'm not sure
about that, they kick it as a as a as
a questionable and then that goes up to level two,
level two or a manager's level, level two or demand
or is level two manager's level? Yes? Yes, right, okay,

(38:26):
So I just I want to ask you, is this
a good time to talk about that the emails between
you and Ray Venezuela with respect to the twenty twenty.

Speaker 3 (38:34):
Data, before we do that real quick, before we do that,
how many ballot alpha Davids does that represent Chris?

Speaker 4 (38:42):
Because that was not on the graph.

Speaker 3 (38:43):
So when you say from the first day they did
signature verification until October twenty ninth, not one ballot alpha
David envelope was either rejected or exception aside from five
hundred plus without a saygnature signature. Okay, how many ballots
do you know? How many ballots that represents?

Speaker 6 (39:05):
I do happen to know that information.

Speaker 5 (39:07):
So it was approximately one point three million, it's in
it's more specifically one point two eighty six million ballots
through the system without anybody questioning the signature at all,
either first level or second level or curing.

Speaker 3 (39:25):
And that would really explain the fact that only one
percent of ballot Alpha David envelopes were rejected in twenty
in twenty twenty, and that doesn't even mean they were rejected.
They still could have gotten through in cuing right all
in all, only one percent of them were even questioned.
And that shows the egregious findings that we had in

(39:48):
our audit that we presented to the Senate. I mean
some of the things that we saw, and if you
didn't watch last week's show, please go back, even if
you just kind of fast forward through it. Look at
some of those images of just the egregiousness of what
they allowed into the system and ballots they allowed to
be counted.

Speaker 6 (40:07):
Yeah.

Speaker 5 (40:07):
So there there's one figure missing here and that's the scale.
So there are one point nine million ballot affidavit envelopes
or BALLOTFFIDAVID envelopes came through the system. So out of
one point nine million one point three got in without
a single exception, and that means that six hundred thousand

(40:28):
were responsible for you could you put that graph back
up for us, just real quick, six hundred the remaining
six hundred thousand were responsible for. Yes, that's right, number seven. Yeah,
we're responsible for that bottom line down there. So really
that that entire number of exceptions all happened, and you

(40:49):
can see that in the graph where it starts to
dip down, all that entire that entire lower bar is
responsible for or as an indication of what happened in
the remaining six hundred thousand. So again, one point three
million made it through without a single exception, and all
of the exceptions belonged to the remaining six hundred thousand.

Speaker 2 (41:09):
And that's the just about twenty four thousand exceptions.

Speaker 6 (41:13):
Is that right? Yes, that's right about twenty four thousand.

Speaker 3 (41:15):
Which constitutes ten percent of the remaining six hundred thousand. Yeah,
which is purely consistent with our audit findings.

Speaker 6 (41:23):
So, Chris, what changed at six hundred, right?

Speaker 3 (41:27):
What changed on October twenty eighth in the Elections department?
Do we know what changed to create such a drastic
disparage in what the findings were.

Speaker 5 (41:41):
We know a couple of things that changed, and we
can do you want to skip twenty twenty four and
go on to the next set of graphs.

Speaker 6 (41:50):
We know a couple of things that changed.

Speaker 5 (41:52):
One thing is that, well, they obviously changed processes because
they didn't exception anything in that beginning. And the other
thing that change, and we'll show this on a graph,
is that a completely different group of people did the
one point three million than the people who did the
remaining six hundred thousand. We'll show this visually, but that's

(42:13):
two big differences and a different process for that first
one point three and it was done by a different
group of people.

Speaker 2 (42:21):
So they what you're saying is they treated one group
of ballots differently than they treated another group of ballots. Yeah,
would that be I mean, you know an equal protection
of the lawes, don't you?

Speaker 6 (42:35):
I do?

Speaker 2 (42:35):
I do.

Speaker 6 (42:36):
Let me ask my attorney about that.

Speaker 2 (42:38):
That in substance, right, when we pass a law, we
treat groups of people equally, right, we don't call out
a specific group of people and say, well, we're going
to treat you differently. And I think this is the
biggest problem with vote by male system in Arizona. I
think it violates the United States Constitution's Equal Protections Clause

(43:01):
because it treats groups of people based on how they
vote differently. It treats their signature differently. Right, like under
Arizona law. If you look at what is it five
five seven Title sixteen Arizona's election statutes, if you go
to a polling place and vote, even if you go
vote early, right, you still are voting a ballot that

(43:24):
you stick into a ballot AFFIDAVID envelope. But what do
you have to do?

Speaker 3 (43:28):
You have to show your ID.

Speaker 2 (43:30):
You have to show some form of ID. You have
to prove you are the registered voter reasonably so, and
you have to show some form of identification to show
that yes, that's the address that is on your registration record.
You know, if you're missing street like Glendale Street or
something like that and you just Glendale, they're not going

(43:52):
to gig you for that. But you have to you
have to show this identification and prove that you're the
registered voter. What do you have to do? Do you know?
To get a you're to vote your mail in ballot,
you need an ID, Chris, you sure don't?

Speaker 6 (44:09):
You just drop it? In the mail you drop it in,
even where you drop it in a dropbox, right.

Speaker 2 (44:13):
Even worse, somebody else votes on your behalf. And that's
the problem we have, you know that I believe is
taking place on a fairly wide scale in the state
of Arizona. And that's that something we're held bound to
get more signatures to verify, to prove. But I think
it's an equal protection issue. And then within the context
of an ongoing election, right you have some signatures being

(44:37):
verified by one process and then boom, the process changes
and verification becomes different from another process. And I think
that's another significant equal protection issue because who votes who?
Do you know who votes closer to election day?

Speaker 6 (44:54):
Chris, I think it's mostly Republicans.

Speaker 2 (44:57):
Republicans Republicans typically vote closer to election day, A lot
of them vote on election day, and so to to
to treat these ballots disparately, to treat them differently, I
think violates the equal protection clause that you know, you
got all these all these people out running around Sue

(45:20):
and Trump always violating the law, violating the law. Look
at Adrian Fontes, you know, and how much he violated
the law in twenty twenty he wanted to put every
Americo County voter on the permanent early voting list, right.
They wanted to just carte blanche mail at votes to everybody.
And you know, there's some indication that they actually double

(45:42):
mailed the entire voter registration database, or at least those
on the Pebble list, And so, you know, we have
to get to a point where we're treating voters equally.

Speaker 3 (45:52):
And producer Steve actually has a stat on that seventy
percent of day of voters or voters who drop off
their mail in ballot on election day, are typically Republican
or right leaning independent.

Speaker 2 (46:08):
Yeah, well, maybe those are the people that they intended
to exception.

Speaker 6 (46:12):
That doesn't seem fair.

Speaker 3 (46:17):
So the county they when we requested this data during
the public records exchange, Rave Avenzuela, the elections director at
Americopa County, he engaged in some communication regarding that public
record to kind of pre disclaim why there were one

(46:38):
point three million ballot affidavit envelopes without a single exception,
and although there were components of that that may have
made sense. Do you want to talk a little bit
about that email exchange and and what you believe the
actual facts surrounding Whether that makes a difference the findings.

Speaker 5 (47:00):
Is, well, I think we might have to go off
road here as far as our as far as our
order is concerned, can we what do you think about
going to number six and number seven?

Speaker 6 (47:12):
I think number seven.

Speaker 3 (47:14):
We already did seven. That's the one that has that explained.

Speaker 8 (47:19):
Oh I'm sorry, yeah, we're seven. Yeah, we didn't do.

Speaker 5 (47:25):
Workload okay, right right, well yeah, okay, sure, sure, sure, okay,
we're still on road here. Yeah, let's let's take a
look at that. Let's take a look at number or fourteen. Then, So,

(47:46):
when I was negotiating with the county to get the
original data, they put in a little note. They put
in a little note to me to say, hey, when
you get the twenty twenty data, just know that we
didn't do any exceptions on that data. So the twenty
twenty data has no exceptions. Well, it turns out that

(48:09):
that is not true. What happened was they didn't do
any exceptions on the first one point three million. But
it is not true that they didn't do any exceptions
at all. So they they knew what was in the data.
They tried to explain ahead of time but they didn't
actually explain it. So what we found was that we've

(48:31):
got we've got a violation here, a Fourteenth Amendment violation,
an equal treatment, equal application of the law rather than
you know, just a different, different process from twenty twenty
to twenty twenty two. So this is their attempt to
explain it ahead of time, knowing what they did, which

(48:52):
it actually doesn't fully explain what we found in the
data when we got it.

Speaker 4 (48:56):
I really love what he puts.

Speaker 3 (48:57):
Serresis bottom of the first paragraph for our internal tracking
needs a pending code, so this would be an exception
or a no signature, has no significance, and only the
final disposition is what a statue or statutorily required to report.
So basically saying it doesn't matter whether they were exception,

(49:19):
not exception, or any of that. That's not relevant data
to you, and frankly, we're not required by law to
provide it. He says it in a very eloquent, nice way,
but that's essentially what I see him saying. Do you
have any thoughts on this, Brian?

Speaker 2 (49:34):
Yeah, you know what I was. I was reading it
and I thought, oh my god, that's funny, because you know,
Kim wonderful, Kim, if you're doing a lot of work
trying to get some interesting data we're going to be
talking about soon from the Maricopa County Recorder. And they
got all snippy with her today, right, they said, Wow,
we're not required to give you explanations or answer questions,

(49:56):
but right, here's here's Maricopa County. Once once Chris asked
for the data and actually taught them how how to
create these reports. Right, because you know your employer knows
everything you do on your complete un right, So how
many times did he hit h during the day something

(50:17):
like that? And and and so Chris walks them through
the process. There's a fabulous man here, by the way.
You know, y'all, y'all owe him in Maricopa County big
time because he does phenomenal work. But you know here
they are attempting in advance. Is it consciousness of guilt?
Have you ever heard of that expression?

Speaker 6 (50:36):
Right?

Speaker 3 (50:37):
Right?

Speaker 2 (50:37):
Consciousness guilt? Right?

Speaker 3 (50:39):
Oh, yeah, we're gonna look at this and he's gonna
so we need to pre excuse ourselves.

Speaker 2 (50:44):
Yeah, let's give an excuse that sounds plausible in advance
of him actually looking at this data. Because if things
were done legitimately, there would be exceptions in the previous data,
and they're correct, that's right, of course, but we have
significant equal protection of the law violations taking place in

(51:05):
the twenty twenty general election, which everyone knows was a
huge anti Trump effort, an anti mega effort, and it's
been nothing but that in Maricopa County ever since. And
so this is a big issue, and this is a
big problem. A lot of votes, and treating voters in

(51:26):
different manners based upon when their vote happens to come
in should be frowned upon by all counties, should be
frowned upon by all voters.

Speaker 3 (51:39):
Now you also analyzed twenty twenty four, so this is
post timeline extension bill signature verification. I looked at the
same dataset and compared what does that look like by touch,
by date, and what is the exception rate that Steve?
Can you put up side number eight? Please? Do you

(52:02):
want to explain what we're looking at here and how
this varies from what we saw in twenty twenty and
twenty twenty two.

Speaker 5 (52:10):
So what we see here is a little bit of
extra time taken and a little bit higher exception rate,
and so okay, So we see two things. Really, we
see a slight difference in the exception rate, like they're
paying a little more attention to the law, but overall

(52:33):
there's really not there's not a significant change in behavior.
We see very much the same shape of graph that
we saw in twenty twenty two. So not a lot
of response through the Timeline Extension bill. Not a significant
showing here to indicate that they really they really cared

(52:54):
about what happened in that bill or what they're required
to do by the bill.

Speaker 2 (52:57):
So basically about two percent more were exceptioned right at
level one from.

Speaker 3 (53:04):
Twenty twenty two, and I think it was another significant
number from twenty twenty. So our overall good signatures in
twenty twenty was ninety eight point nine percent was overall good.

Speaker 4 (53:21):
Then we go to.

Speaker 3 (53:22):
Twenty twenty two and I believe it was what like
ninety four percent, and now we're at ninety point forty percent,
So there is some improvement. And we can also see
that exceptions we had one points three, right, how many
ballot affidavits did we have in twenty twenty four compared

(53:42):
to one point nine and we have three times the
number of exceptions, So there was some improvement, but we're
still not quite quite there, right, right?

Speaker 2 (53:51):
And I think another difference I see and correct me
if I'm wrong, But there were far more dots and
roughly about the two hundred thousand per day approval that
took place in twenty twenty two, is that correct?

Speaker 3 (54:05):
Right?

Speaker 2 (54:06):
Right? So the volume per day was lower and the
exception rate was lower. But still, you know what, do
you what do you think my account for that? Because
I've got I've got my ideas. What accounts for a
lot of the same pattern taking place with do you

(54:26):
see a lot of people just hitting.

Speaker 5 (54:28):
Well, you know what I think happened is they just
they just took a little more time to emulate the
idea that they were they were rejecting more or be
more conscientious, well a little slower, We're more people were.

Speaker 2 (54:42):
Not allowed to know who's actually doing this work.

Speaker 5 (54:45):
I was going to mention that, yeah, we will. We
went to trial to find that out.

Speaker 2 (54:49):
Yeah, and so they they do. They have the ability
to hire the same speed clickers that they they've used
in the past to speed clickers, that's the question.

Speaker 4 (55:02):
Sure, Yeah, I'm not sure they do.

Speaker 6 (55:05):
No way for us to know at this point.

Speaker 2 (55:06):
Now we know Stephen Richer was in bed with was
in bed with States United. So maybe maybe they just
used States United referrals to hire people signature verification, right, right, Stefan.

Speaker 5 (55:20):
So when I asked for this data, originally I asked
them to anonymize the users, just give them random user numbers,
but give you know, be consistent about which users which
that who's doing the actual evaluations or the dispositions.

Speaker 6 (55:36):
And they gave me that. I figured I'd have less.

Speaker 5 (55:39):
Of an argument if I asked them to randomize and
anonymize the people. And then after the trial we went
we went back and asked in a public records request, well,
who are these actual people? They gave us some of them.
They gave us the whistleblowers in the trial, and they
gave us which one was Steven Richer. And Steven Richer
when he did when he did signature verification in his

(56:01):
socks in his home, he did a miserable job. And
I'll present that data at some point. He did signature
verification for three days and did his worst day was
his last day.

Speaker 6 (56:15):
The third day. He didn't get better, he got worse
at it.

Speaker 2 (56:18):
You have just summed up Stephen Richard's entire career as
Maricopa County's recorder, right, he did a shit job.

Speaker 3 (56:28):
Welled something else out here too. We know for a fact,
this is an absolute fact, that in twenty twenty they
instituted a process where people could do signature verification from home.
We know they did it in twenty twenty, We know
they did it in twenty twenty two. We have actual

(56:52):
witnesses that have come forward in twenty twenty four saying
they did signature verification remotely from home again in twenty
twenty four, So we don't even have any actual oversight.
So when these people are going through, if they're speed clicking,
whatever they're doing, they can do this remotely from home,

(57:15):
which is not something provided foreign statute. Right. It also
begs the question why we can as an organization we
have to fight to review those signatures, yet we have
employees that are accessing what they're calling, you know, Security
of the States right.

Speaker 4 (57:35):
Envelopes in their underwear at home.

Speaker 3 (57:39):
Do you think that that is a problem that they're
claiming that these are protected records and they're allowing people
to access them from home, especially without disclosing who these
people are.

Speaker 2 (57:52):
I think it's a huge problem. You know. For all
we know, they've got norm eyes and sitting on the
other end with a you know, direct log in access
to Americo pecanty recorders, you know, signature verification database. We
don't know who these people are. We don't know the
level of security on their systems. Chris, have you ever

(58:14):
heard anything about these people having you know, Uber secure systems.

Speaker 5 (58:18):
Yeah, we didn't even know they were doing this at
home until we until we got the disposition data and
we looked and we found that, hey, we can see
a certain number of people on camera, and we can
see everybody who's in the signature verification department, and there's
more users during those times than we can see. So
that's how we discovered that people were doing it home.

Speaker 2 (58:38):
Well, you know, presumably we were assuming there are people
from doing it at home. Right. I do a lot
of work myself, you know, from from national parks or
from out in the wild when I have Wi Fi access.
Isn't it possible that we have you know, we could
have foreigners doing this. We could have people doing this,

(59:01):
you know, just on their little iPads, you know, while
they're you know somewhere in Washington State or wherever. We
don't know what's truly taking place in this process too.

Speaker 5 (59:11):
Yeah, And when we went to court to ask for
these names, we asked them to reveal the actual people,
because especially for twenty twenty, I said on the stand
that I'd really like to talk to those people who
did signature verification before the twenty ninth and twenty twenty
when those one point three million ballots went through without
a single exception, just to ask them, what were your

(59:33):
instructions and why did it end up this way? They
must have been given separate instructions. And the outcome of
that trial is that I think you'll you'll remember this better.
But the I think the judge actually said that he'd
be setting precedents against any precedents that he'd set before,
as far as being able to know the identities of

(59:55):
employees of the government, employees of the county, and these
are all county employees. He said that I would have
to set a precedence that is, uh, that's unusual, that's
never been set before. And yet he did it anyway,
He denied us the ability didn't know those names.

Speaker 2 (01:00:11):
You know, and I know exactly you know why he
did that. You know, you had Stephen Richer and his
you know, cabal of lefty friends out there talking this
huge game that that MAGA is violent, right, that we
you know, we're going to go out and intimidate people,
and we're going to go string people up, and we're

(01:00:32):
going to go do all of this stuff. And that
was the core of Stephen Richer. And you know, I
believe people he might be related to, we're going to
talk about later in the future, you know, making MAGA
appear to be extremist, appear to be violent. And then
we have this trial, right, and I thought, I thought
we made our case. I thought the judge was on board.

(01:00:56):
But then before the judge issued his order, what happened.
Some left wing extremist tries to kill President Donald Trump
and then the judge issues his order and it was, no,
you can't know these people, right, And so I don't
think it was necessarily a slam against us, and that

(01:01:16):
it was proving Stephen Richer right. But when somebody attempts
to assassinate the leading presidential candidate and a former president,
you know that that that sort of signifies that the
level of intensity in our political dynamics absolutely is a
little bit heightened, and it's it's fairly well heightened in

(01:01:37):
Maricopa County because Maricopa County is one of the major
counties in the state of Arizona. And that's the only reason,
you know, really for any of us to be here,
that that is just brazenly corrupt in its election processes.

Speaker 3 (01:01:53):
Well before we get into curing, because that was an
area we did not cover last week, and it's it's
really important, and I think it's super important that those
viewing at home that maybe aren't as connected to this
as we are, understand the carrying process. The graphs we
just showed you that details a correlation between exception rates

(01:02:15):
and the number of balad affidavit's process by day. We
also have this displayed by individual user workload and how
how much they.

Speaker 4 (01:02:27):
Did and their exception rates.

Speaker 3 (01:02:30):
So it would be volume versus correlation of exception and
so we're calling that workload by date.

Speaker 4 (01:02:37):
And why don't we do.

Speaker 3 (01:02:39):
You want to take a look at the twenty twenty
two graphs, let's.

Speaker 6 (01:02:42):
Take to kind of establish the baseline.

Speaker 4 (01:02:48):
That would be number nine.

Speaker 5 (01:02:49):
Steve, Okay, So what we see here along the bottom
is date and along the left hand side is worker.
So they again they numbered the workers with anonymous numbers
and or sequential numbers.

Speaker 6 (01:03:09):
So this is worker. I believe it's one through.

Speaker 5 (01:03:12):
I think there were one hundred and fifty five workers
in the twenty twenty two.

Speaker 6 (01:03:18):
And what you see is what they did every day.

Speaker 2 (01:03:22):
So on.

Speaker 5 (01:03:26):
Let's see all the way back in September they had
they just had a trickle of ballots coming in, and
then really on October seventeenth they really started to come
into gear and started to do evaluations as signatures. Now
the dots that you see for each worker, and again
the workers are on the left hand, the left hand
access date across the bottom, so on the date October seventeenth,

(01:03:50):
about in the middle there they really start doing some work.
And the dots are sized and colored by the a
number of evaluations that each did. So anything five k
to ten k is actually going to be a different color.

Speaker 3 (01:04:05):
It's so Chris, you're telling me, even though we know
and even this graph shows that the average worker performed
less than eight thousand evaluations a day. That there were
several people that did five to ten thousand ballot Alfhi
davits in a single day.

Speaker 6 (01:04:24):
That is the purple dots.

Speaker 5 (01:04:25):
Anywhere a purple dot appears, that's between five k and
ten K evaluations by that person on that day.

Speaker 6 (01:04:34):
That is what that says.

Speaker 2 (01:04:36):
That's crazy.

Speaker 4 (01:04:38):
Yeah, and this is twenty twenty two.

Speaker 6 (01:04:40):
Is twenty twenty two. That's so.

Speaker 3 (01:04:42):
Why don't we take a look then at what twenty
twenty look like again under communist Adrian Fontes. Yes, let's
look at graph number ten if you would please see.

Speaker 8 (01:05:01):
Wow, well it looks different, yeah, just different a little bit.

Speaker 5 (01:05:06):
Well, let me explain what's different about this. Remember I
said that the first one point three million went out
went through without a single exception. I also said that
that first one point three million was done by a different.

Speaker 6 (01:05:18):
Group of people.

Speaker 5 (01:05:19):
Okay, So again across the bottom we see really signature
verification kicking into gear on October twelfth.

Speaker 6 (01:05:27):
That's the first.

Speaker 5 (01:05:28):
Time we see some significant dots. Although we see a
smattering before that, it really kicks into gear on October twelfth.
And we have user numbers down the left hand side.
Now look at the higher user numbers. For the most part,
they they're all they all start on the on October twelfth.

(01:05:49):
But then where you see the shift there, that's October
twenty ninth. Okay, it's like the entire staff that was
working on up to October through October twenty eighth at
the top and a little bit down at the bottom there,
the entire staff stops working and a whole new staff

(01:06:09):
comes on on October twenty ninth on the right hand
side where you see that differentiation line there, and they
do the rest of They do the remaining six hundred thousand,
and that's the group that started having more exceptions. They
actually have the first exceptions in the election. Now, the

(01:06:30):
other thing to notice is we've got some major players
in here with some purple dots, but we had to
add a different color dot here where we've got people
individuals doing over ten thousand, over ten thousand envelopes in
a single day. Those are the red dots. Now, I

(01:06:51):
want to point out the line on the bottom. That's
the series of red dots that go all the way
through the twenty ninth.

Speaker 6 (01:06:59):
You is there number eleven.

Speaker 5 (01:07:01):
He's kind of the exception, and we we think there's
a reason for that, and so we're going to kind
of ignore him. But if you, well, you want to
explain the reason for that, it's it's would be incoming
ballots that came into the polling centers that where the
ID was checked right.

Speaker 2 (01:07:18):
Right, Yeah, And so basically basically what happens is if
you go vote an early ballot at a vote center,
as opposed to taking your mail in ballot and dropping
it in the mail or dropping it at a drop box,
then you are required by Arizona law to show an
i D right ID verification requirements one apply if you

(01:07:43):
go to a vote center and you vote an early ballot.
And so basically what we have learned, what we learned
in Lake v. Hobbes is trial number one from Ravel Venezuela,
is that they take these ballots that are draw off,
you know, or voted at a vote center because they

(01:08:04):
have already been ID verified, they do not signature verify them.
And so what they're doing is they're uploading them through
a batch process. Now, this is just an assumption. You know,
we don't know that that actually is what this represents,
but we do know that that Rave Allenswela did testify

(01:08:26):
that there were a couple of managerial levels employees who
had the ability to batch upload, and we have seen
that inconsistent data where you know, they're just dumping volumes
of these pre approved ballots into the system.

Speaker 3 (01:08:41):
Now, some of these users, Chris, they analyzed in one
single day over twenty thousand ballot Affi David envelopes. Is
that correct?

Speaker 5 (01:08:52):
Well, yeah, you can see there anything over anything that
has a red dot is going to be over ten
thousand ballots and a couple of these well actually a
couple of the ones on the bottom, or twenty five
thousand in a day. But there's a lot of red
dots here that are over ten thousand evaluated in a
single day.

Speaker 4 (01:09:10):
So I'm going to point something out.

Speaker 3 (01:09:12):
Okay, the average signature verification worker doesn't work more than
seven hours, especially if you consider a lunch break. That's right,
probably even maybe fewer. If you take seven hours and
you multiply that by the number of minutes and then
turn it into seconds, an average workday is only twenty
five thousand, two hundred seconds, which would mean that these

(01:09:35):
users would have had to have maintained a pace of
one ballot Alphi David per second per seven to seven
and a half hour straight without changing their pattern, without
slowing down their rhythmic clicks on the computer, in order
to achieve what the data is showing they achieved. I
think my opinion is that's pretty solid evidence that these

(01:10:00):
are most likely being digitally entered or manipulated. I don't
see how a human can maintain that clicking pace. I
think that's a Guiney's World Book record if a human
can sit there for eight hours straight clicking at the
exact same pace, And.

Speaker 2 (01:10:15):
That assumes they don't even take their break to get
a red bull has wings right, and so you know,
there's these machines doing this process. That's but ultimately the
question is, and that was for twenty twenty.

Speaker 5 (01:10:29):
Well, yeah, first, that first group of people, by the way,
is one hundred and eleven users, and the second group
of people that came on in their twenty ninth is
over eighty users.

Speaker 6 (01:10:38):
It's fewer users, but.

Speaker 4 (01:10:40):
Fewer users performing more work.

Speaker 5 (01:10:42):
Performing the last six hundred thousand ballots at high speed.
So so you know, frankly, that first one hundred and
eleven users, it doesn't really matter whether they're a machine
or a person. Many of them look like the data
would indicate that they were actual people and and so,
but it doesn't really matter. They sat there under somebody's

(01:11:05):
instructions and approved every single one of those ballot affidavit envelopes.

Speaker 2 (01:11:10):
Well, you know, here's what Adrian Fontes did in twenty
twenty that that people don't know and they should know
is Adrian Fontes violated Arizona law. And that was determined
by the then Attorney General who issued a big report
because what did Adrian Fontes do. He hired runback to
use their automatic, their AI whatever you want to call it,

(01:11:34):
signature verification program, signature verification. Yeah, yeah, And so when
he did did run back, then send them to Maricopa
County with a little cute code.

Speaker 5 (01:11:45):
In twenty twenty, they had a signal down at the
bottom of the screen. There was a little bar with
a color indicating a predisposition for the user. And apparently
even there there I presume there were there were maybe
some predisposed that we should have been exceptioned in that
one point three million. So again in that one point

(01:12:05):
three million, those eleven of the one hundred and eleven
people just ignored even that bar, even the predisposition. But
that was also available to those to those eighty or
so people after the twenty ninth and they apparently paid
attention more attention to that bar or maybe they didn't,
but they at least they exceptioned at.

Speaker 6 (01:12:24):
A more normal rate.

Speaker 2 (01:12:25):
Right.

Speaker 3 (01:12:25):
So we see twenty twenty, which was obviously an egregious situation, right,
this is a stop Trump at all costs Communist County
recorder running our elections in twenty twenty, and we see
what is humanly impossible amounts of processing and extraordinarily high
levels of acceptance rates. Then we move into twenty twenty two,

(01:12:48):
which is Stephen Richer, Okay, and we still see huge
numbers of abnormal amounts of workload processing.

Speaker 6 (01:13:00):
The original data for the trial.

Speaker 3 (01:13:02):
Right, And and maybe this is humans like mister Magoo
user one three four click click click click click. Right,
that's that's inherently natural, that's right. So after they know
that we're receiving this data, and after we've exposed this publicly,
and then fast forward to incorporating the Timeline Extension Bill,

(01:13:25):
what does twenty twenty four look like for us?

Speaker 6 (01:13:28):
Let's take a look.

Speaker 4 (01:13:30):
That would be graph eleven.

Speaker 5 (01:13:35):
Well, we don't see any significant improvement over twenty twenty,
at least from this point of view. Things kicked into
gear after October fourteenth. You can see that there's still
lots of purple five to ten k ballots process by
a person on a day. Lots of that going on,

(01:13:56):
and that that comes out in the data as well.

Speaker 6 (01:13:59):
I mean it's or.

Speaker 5 (01:14:00):
As the individual workers, we can see that kind of
behavior going on.

Speaker 3 (01:14:04):
Still, now here's something I want to point out for
those looking at this graph, because I think this is
critical and please correct me, Cris if I'm wrong. This
looks very consistent day by day as far as for
the most part, the number of workers that they used
on a daily basis. They used a total of two
hundred and twenty workers to perform signature verification on what

(01:14:30):
was approximately one point four million ballot affidavits. So they
literally use nearly twice as many workers to perform signature
verification on a half a million less ballots, and they
were still having to hyper process and speed click to
get the job done. Again, do you not think this

(01:14:51):
may be credible data supporting.

Speaker 4 (01:14:54):
The idea that non human.

Speaker 3 (01:14:57):
Interactions were being done in twenty twenty. The fact that
we're able to do a half a million more with
fewer users less consistent. I mean, I just I'm dumbfounded
because I'm looking at this in this light for the
first time, and it's it feels like a mic dropped

(01:15:19):
me that there is no way it's quote unquote literally
humanly possible to process the data they did in twenty
twenty utilizing the staff they used.

Speaker 5 (01:15:31):
Yeah, and I think that I think that we need
to know who these people are, not to not to
make life difficult for them, but just to have a
conversation with them and find out what their instructions were.

Speaker 2 (01:15:44):
Now, somebody needs to have a conversation, whether maybe Pam
Bondy can give them a call.

Speaker 4 (01:15:48):
This is crazy and I'm not kidding.

Speaker 2 (01:15:50):
It's not too busy dressing up like combat Barbie.

Speaker 4 (01:15:54):
I mean, Brian, you're you're the attorney in the room.

Speaker 3 (01:15:57):
And I'm I'm not exaggerating when I tell you, guys,
we looked at these graphs, you know, before the show,
but we didn't.

Speaker 4 (01:16:03):
Like really look at them.

Speaker 3 (01:16:06):
And I just feel like I'm having this profound epiphany
here looking at this that I mean, this is this
is evident?

Speaker 2 (01:16:13):
Right, Yeah, you know, I think looking at twenty twenty four,
I think that what happened is we had a huge
impact in drawing attention to a significant problem right with Arizona,
specifically a Maricopa County selections. And so their response to
that that impact, their response to the noise we were

(01:16:36):
making was to increase the number of people they have
actually doing signature verification. How many do they how many
seats did they have? But do you know, I don't
I don't know. They don't give.

Speaker 4 (01:16:49):
Me a favorite book. Twenty twenty workload backup number ten. Yeah,
can you put that back up for.

Speaker 3 (01:16:55):
Me, please?

Speaker 2 (01:16:55):
And so you know they they have they have a
lower exception rate.

Speaker 5 (01:17:00):
But we know they did it. They know they did
it off campus, you know. And when I say they
did it at home, they did it anywhere they happened
to be, which included some people's offices and right and
maybe some people's homes.

Speaker 6 (01:17:14):
They once they were given the capability to do it.

Speaker 5 (01:17:17):
Outside SIG, they could literally do it anywhere they have.

Speaker 2 (01:17:20):
Their concert So they could sit right at a cafe
on Main Street next to the sidewalk doing signature verification
in public. Yeah, that's right, they could have, right, But
you know then it's it's it's wrong for anybody else
to have that data.

Speaker 3 (01:17:36):
And so I had Steve pulled a twenty twenty graft
back up because I just I want to confirm with you, Chris, that.

Speaker 4 (01:17:43):
For the highest volume days.

Speaker 3 (01:17:46):
The end of the election, these new workers, these approximately
eighty new workers came onto the scene and eighty workers
performed thirty percent more signature verification than two hundred and
twenty workers did in twenty twenty four, with obviously a

(01:18:09):
considerably lower exception rate. But am I looking at that correctly?

Speaker 8 (01:18:13):
That is one point three million compared to the one
point four and there was one point nine in this graph,
one point one point nine million, with the majority of
them being done after October twenty ninth, right, six hundred
thousand done in that last window by eighty less than
eighty workers were performed. And then when we go to

(01:18:36):
twenty twenty four, Stee, you've put.

Speaker 6 (01:18:37):
Up well what this number?

Speaker 3 (01:18:39):
Oh wait, hold on, Yeah.

Speaker 5 (01:18:41):
It's the block on the in the middle. The block
in the middle, that's one hundred and eleven people doing
one point three million. The block on the lower right
is a little over eighty people doing six hundred thousand.

Speaker 3 (01:18:56):
Okay, so one point three million.

Speaker 6 (01:18:58):
One point three right out, little block.

Speaker 4 (01:19:01):
In the middle.

Speaker 3 (01:19:01):
Even one hundred and eleven people did this, Yeah, get
the same amount?

Speaker 5 (01:19:06):
How many purple and red dots there are. That's those
people ripping through that data. Some people are you know,
some people aren't doing a lot during the day, but
there are a lot of people doing ripping through that
with purple and red dots.

Speaker 4 (01:19:20):
Now put number eleven backups.

Speaker 2 (01:19:24):
You've you've heard of a bump stock, haven't you? Right,
you fired one round and then it's a stock you
attached to your semi automatic rifle that will keep the
trigger mechanisms up the next one. Yeah, that's right, right,
So I.

Speaker 6 (01:19:38):
Mean, do they have enter buttons that have bump stocks?

Speaker 5 (01:19:42):
You know, I don't know if they que the if
they if they buffer the accept button.

Speaker 6 (01:19:47):
I suspect they do.

Speaker 3 (01:19:48):
How many lawsuits are we going to get for our
people developing arthritis from moving their fingers so fast? Okay,
so this is the same number of ballot Alpha David
envelopes essentially done over the course of more days, using
nearly a hundred actually using more than one hundred more workers.

Speaker 4 (01:20:10):
It can't be done, Chris.

Speaker 6 (01:20:12):
Yeah, it still can't be done, right, It still can't
be done.

Speaker 5 (01:20:15):
Even though this looks a lot healthier than twenty twenty,
it doesn't have the obvious problems that twenty twenty exposed
to us. They improve some things, but this is still yeah,
this is still fraudulent signature.

Speaker 4 (01:20:30):
But that's okay.

Speaker 3 (01:20:30):
Signature verification can suck, mules can exist. We can have
a thousand meals, right, two hundred thousand meals, twenty thousand meals,
and we can have a really flawed signature verification process
because we have curing.

Speaker 5 (01:20:47):
That's she's a champion of transitions. That is an excellent
transits talk about let's talk about care. And I had
a question, but then she changed the subject. Now, so
I want to say one more thing. Maybe this will
remind you of the question. So we do know my question?

Speaker 6 (01:21:03):
Oh you do? Okay, carry on.

Speaker 2 (01:21:05):
So what you're saying is that if I am qualified
and they set my computer up to do signature verification, right,
I can go sit at a Diamondbacks game in general
stadium seating and cure ballot Affidavid envelopes while I'm watching the.

Speaker 6 (01:21:21):
Game in your underwear if you choose.

Speaker 2 (01:21:24):
Wow.

Speaker 5 (01:21:25):
Yeah, signature verification remotely does not require full clothing. So
I mean there's there's no requirement.

Speaker 2 (01:21:33):
Good, you know, yeah, sign me up. Where do we go?

Speaker 3 (01:21:36):
When I think about the people that I know have
done remote signature verification, predominantly people like Christi Pesser, Hully,
ray allanceway Las, Stephen Richer.

Speaker 4 (01:21:49):
The idea of having that done with minimal clothing.

Speaker 6 (01:21:54):
Let's not think about that.

Speaker 4 (01:21:55):
Yeah, I haven't eaten dinner.

Speaker 5 (01:21:58):
Yeah, so I want to say one more thing about that.
So so we joke about knowing the identity of these people. Truly,
it's our attitude that it's the management who's really responsible
for issuing the instructions. I think these people, for the
most part, do what they're told to do. I think
it's I think it's it's an indication of something that

(01:22:19):
these one hundred and eleven people all did the same
thing at the beginning, and then the remaining eighty did
something else. Clearly, we got two sets of people following
different instructions, and it's the people who gave the instructions
that I'm really interested in. Referring to Pambondi.

Speaker 2 (01:22:35):
Well well, and and just going back, you know, on
that very subject, we know that after Fontes, god is
you know, ass handed to him. Stephen Richard comes on
board and he keeps the exact same staff and processes. Right,

(01:22:56):
that's right, and so you know, you would expect than
in twenty twenty two with the same staff and no
change to processes that we're aware of other than you know,
Ray Allen Zwelan is email to you trying to you know,
excuse meself to bite the bullet in advance and say, oh, yeah,

(01:23:17):
we didn't. You know, we didn't do this in advance,
even though they you know, we know they did for
the six hundred thousand. You would expect with the same
personnel and the same staff, the same result, right, And
that's essentially you know what we gets r minus.

Speaker 6 (01:23:35):
They're doing what they know how to do, and that's
what we're seeing.

Speaker 3 (01:23:37):
Right aside the data giving a higher confidence level based
on appearance, the data is not speaking to that. The
data is showing that we have not made an incredible
amount of improvement between twenty twenty and twenty twenty four.

Speaker 2 (01:23:57):
Well, I think, I think ultimately, when push come to shove,
I think that is why Steven Richer is so hell
bent on restricting our First Amendment rights, you know, as
voters and as people who do election integrity work.

Speaker 5 (01:24:14):
Oh that sounds like a subject for yeah, yeah, yeah.

Speaker 6 (01:24:18):
That's a good one.

Speaker 4 (01:24:19):
Now, can we talk about curing.

Speaker 6 (01:24:20):
Let's talk about caring.

Speaker 3 (01:24:23):
This is your favorite topics, one of my favorites in
the world, and you've been working really hard to figure
out a thousand ways to expose the failures of curing.
Do you want to explain to those who may not
know what curring is?

Speaker 6 (01:24:36):
Just just true real quick?

Speaker 5 (01:24:38):
So yeah, So what happens if okay, so we talked
about level one, bunch of normal people doing SIG there.
Level two is manager's level. These are experienced employees and
they're also long term employees of the county. They can
also be elected officials. We have elected officials showing up
to do manager level signature verification. So if it does

(01:25:00):
not get approved and get assigned as a GS or
good signature at level two, if it still is a
question signature, and now that's a that's a new category
as opposed to level one exception, Level two is question signature,
then it goes on to curing. Now, curing is the

(01:25:20):
last opportunity for this for this ballot to count. And
what they do is they get a hold of to
some means, they get in touch with the voter and
verify the signature on the on the ballot FI David envelope. Now,
if you or I, you or I were about to
we're gonna invent a process.

Speaker 6 (01:25:39):
For doing for doing curing.

Speaker 5 (01:25:41):
What we do is we we come up with this
process where our county employee, whether it's you know, one
of those patriots who's done it to help out with
the process, or it's a long term employee, or in
the case of the county, what they also do is
they have a they have a call center called the
Stars Center that's kind of a shared resource in the

(01:26:03):
county that does it's a call center and they call
and do this they do this curing process. What we
would do if we invented this process is step one
would be we call the voter and we'd say to
the voter, you know, I have an envelope here with
that has your signature on it, but I need to
verify that you are this person. And so they maybe

(01:26:26):
exchange personally identifiable information by the last four of the
security of the sub security number or the driver's license number,
some way to verify for sure that they're talking to
that voter. So that once they and they do this
thing called text to cure, we'll see in it we'll
see in a minute here. So they're so they're they're

(01:26:50):
talking to this voter, and they're they're going to verify
that the voter is who the right person, and then
I'll explain to them the reason that I've contacted you
is because the signature on your ballot Affidavid envelope that
I have in front of me does not match any
of the references in the file. And it's been through
a two step process to verify that. They can't nobody,

(01:27:12):
even the best people, even the managers, can't find a
match for you in the file. And so that's step one,
is you verify the county employee verifies that they're talking
to the right person. Then step two would be for
that person to be able to see that signature that
doesn't match. So, I mean, how are they going to

(01:27:34):
know whether or not that's their signature other than to
look at it and say, you know, thumbs up, that's
my signature. Going to accept that envelope and the ballot
that's in it because I know that's mine, wellit down.

Speaker 3 (01:27:47):
I mean, experts like Ravell and Suela and Scott Jared
have said that it has to be their ballot because
they're very careful and they only issued one ballot, right, So,
I mean, what are the issues here is I think
that they're trying to claim that that's not an issue.
That if you mailed a ballot and they received a ballot,
then if you claim you mailed a ballot, it must

(01:28:09):
be your ballot, right, And that's the claim they're trying
to make, totally disregarding the fact that thousands of duplicate
ballots get mailed out every single election cycle, and we
know that's truthful. Right. How many people have we personally
encountered that said they received more than one ballot affidavit
envelope and the mail. So, if by some chance there's

(01:28:33):
a secondary mail in ballot that got sent to the
same address, intercepted by an organ accepted by the post office,
maybe even just stolen out of the mailbox by you know,
a cat burglar, whatever the scenario, there could in fact
be another ballot affidavit invelope out there someone else could sign.

Speaker 5 (01:28:54):
Yeah, you know, there's several reasons for that. Some of
them are small scale reasons that some of those are
large reasons. And I think this is a good time
to watch the videos that we have some real life
examples of how this can this can go wrong.

Speaker 3 (01:29:10):
And full disclosure, we are not professional actors, so the
depictions you see here are completely fake.

Speaker 2 (01:29:17):
I can I can verify that neither one is a
professional actor, you know.

Speaker 6 (01:29:22):
But it's funny stuff here we're going to watch come.

Speaker 2 (01:29:26):
On, But I mean, speaking of duplicate ballots, it was
funny to watch the debates take place or the different
town halls take place during the twenty twenty four primary
election between Stephan Richard, Justin Heap, and the other other
candidates involved, because one of the most significant questions wasn't

(01:29:47):
it was how many people in the audience have received
more than one ballot in an election site?

Speaker 3 (01:29:53):
That was Justin Heap asked that question. And what did
the hands look like in the audience?

Speaker 2 (01:29:58):
Yeah, a lot of people raise their hands because you've
got a lot of duplication going on. You've got you
really need to focus on cleaning up the voter registration.

Speaker 5 (01:30:07):
And how do you know, well, we're going to see that.
How do you know they're looking at your balance?

Speaker 2 (01:30:12):
Let's watch Steve.

Speaker 4 (01:30:13):
Could you play video twelve?

Speaker 3 (01:30:15):
Please? Hello, Hello, Yes, I am looking for Jeff Brown.

(01:30:38):
This is Jeff Hi, Jeff. This is Sue from the
Maricopa County Elections Department, and I was reaching out to
you today because there is a problem with your most
recent ballot. Did you mail in a mail in ballot
this year?

Speaker 6 (01:30:52):
Yes?

Speaker 1 (01:30:52):
I did.

Speaker 6 (01:30:53):
I did mail in a ballot.

Speaker 3 (01:30:54):
Okay. Before we can proceed, I am going to need
to verify your identity. Do you have a access to
a phone where I can text you? I do, go ahead, okay, wonderful.

Speaker 5 (01:31:08):
Oh I see looks like you want me to send
a picture of my driver's license.

Speaker 3 (01:31:13):
Yes, sir, Okay, I.

Speaker 9 (01:31:14):
Happen to have I happen to have my license in
my hand. Okay, okay, I think I think I sent it.
Did you get it?

Speaker 3 (01:31:29):
Okay? I do see that that has come over. So
thank you so much for verifying your identity. Now I
just need to ask you a couple of questions. Did
you send in a mail in ballot in this most
recent election?

Speaker 5 (01:31:43):
I did send in a ballot?

Speaker 3 (01:31:45):
Wonderful? Okay, thank you. You are all set and your
vote will count this year.

Speaker 5 (01:31:51):
Oh well, wait, you said you said that my signature
didn't match. I wonder, I wonder why can I can
I see the signature that you're looking at on the envelope.

Speaker 3 (01:32:03):
Well, unfortunately, we just don't have a process for that
to happen. However, don't be alarmed. This happens all the
time where people's signatures don't match. People's signatures change frequently,
and mistakes happen. But I've seen your idea and I'm
confident this is your ballot. It has your name on it.

Speaker 5 (01:32:23):
So I was able to send you a picture of
my license, but you are not able to send me
a picture of that signature. Is that what you're saying?

Speaker 3 (01:32:32):
Yes, that's what I'm saying, and I'm not even sure
why you're asking.

Speaker 5 (01:32:36):
Well, I I so you're confident that the ballot that
you're looking at is the ballot that I sent in,
even though the signature doesn't seem to match. Is that
what you're saying?

Speaker 3 (01:32:48):
Well, yes, sir, you sent in a ballot.

Speaker 5 (01:32:50):
Correct, Yes, I sent one in.

Speaker 3 (01:32:52):
You are Jeff Brown? Correct, Yes, this ballot says Jeff Brown.
So I'm very confident this is your bat and you
voted it and your vote will count this year. Sir.

Speaker 5 (01:33:03):
Okay, Well, I know you're good at what you do,
so I guess I'm satisfied. Thank you, Thank you for
calling in making sure that my vote counts.

Speaker 3 (01:33:13):
You're very welcome, and thank you for being a voter.
Have a nice day, you two.

Speaker 2 (01:33:20):
Does that basically mean that Maricopa County thinks the voter
is incompetent to validate their own signature.

Speaker 5 (01:33:27):
It kind of means they kind of means they think
they are doing the right thing and it doesn't matter
what the voter thinks.

Speaker 3 (01:33:37):
Yeah.

Speaker 5 (01:33:38):
So what we saw there is an example of something
they do called text to cure, and I think that
it's really the best way to validate that the curing
person is talking to the right person at the other end. Now,
that's one of the ways that they validate step one.
That is, the county verifies the person, the voter that

(01:33:58):
they're talking to. But that's not the only way that
they do that verification step. It's the best way. I
think all of them should be done that way.

Speaker 6 (01:34:08):
I send it in.

Speaker 2 (01:34:10):
That's right, and so that you have to actually be
ID verified.

Speaker 5 (01:34:15):
You are actually ID verified. That's as good as it gets. Man,
You're ID verified. But that only validates that they're talking
to the right person. It has nothing to do with
the ballot they're holding in their hand, So.

Speaker 3 (01:34:29):
It's not a signature issue, right, Yeah, but we could
verify identity using tech secure with an ID, but we
still don't know that that's actually the voters signature. So
we have that issue.

Speaker 6 (01:34:42):
That's right, that's right.

Speaker 5 (01:34:43):
And the thing is, you know what, we checked with
ray Allen Zoyl about this before the twenty four election
and we verified that. Now just like that, and very
intelligent gentleman said that he is. They have the technology
for him to send a picture of his license, his
identification to the county, but the county for some reason

(01:35:05):
cannot send cannot send a picture of the ballot affidavit envelope.
They're looking at the signature that they're looking at to
the voter. Now, why would they be able to only
be able to do that one way? And in fact,
not only is not only can they not send a picture.
If he wanted to go down to the county, he
wanted to go to mictech or the recorder's office, there

(01:35:26):
is no provision for him to see that envelope. You know,
that envelope exists somewhere and in this case, it either
exists at they will it be Admittech because they don't
have envelopes when they do it at the star set.

Speaker 3 (01:35:39):
And I actually I did a tour of America the
County Tabulation Center. I think it was early twenty twenty four. Yeah,
and I specifically asked Scott Jared, what is the process
if somebody wanted to look at their ballot affidavit envelope
and confirm their own signature.

Speaker 4 (01:35:57):
What if they wanted to come in and cure it?

Speaker 3 (01:35:59):
Because if I don't sign my ballot and and they
call me and say I have no signature, I can't
physically go down. They'll have the ballot affidavit available for me,
and I can sign that train ballot AFFIDAVID envelope, so
it's physically there. It's physically available for me to sign.
But if there's a signature on there and I say

(01:36:22):
I don't believe that's mine, I'd like to come look
at it, they refuse you that ability.

Speaker 2 (01:36:28):
And when you go in, that's funny. If you don't
sign your envelope and you go in, what do you
have to show?

Speaker 4 (01:36:34):
I think you might have to show your ID ID.

Speaker 2 (01:36:37):
Verified And so we're ID verifying. We're an ID verification state.
But there are millions of ballots flooding our system that
require absolutely no identification whatsoever aside from somebody maybe given
how long is the training for signature verification?

Speaker 6 (01:36:53):
Four hours?

Speaker 2 (01:36:54):
Four hours worth of training to verify signatures, that's paid
to sit there for eight hours a day, seven with
lunch break, right and compare signatures, which would be a
mind numbing task.

Speaker 6 (01:37:09):
Yeah for sure.

Speaker 2 (01:37:10):
Yeah, and you've done it right, and so it would
be very difficult to do for seven hours. But you know,
we have all of these non ID verified voters right now.

Speaker 3 (01:37:21):
Now, we've had reports as well, so this is texta here,
but they also will call a voter and confirm them
over the phone. We've talked to witnesses that worked in
the curing department that actually worked for Americopa County as
temporary election workers, and also we've talked to a few
full time workers Americopa County that have indicated that there

(01:37:45):
have been times they've been so backlogged on cuing that
they've had people utilize workstations without computers, so they don't
even have access to the actual envelope or the personal
identifiable information required for that identity. So they're only requiring
full name and address. Is that an accurate statement?

Speaker 6 (01:38:07):
That's right.

Speaker 5 (01:38:07):
The only thing they have available to them to verify
the voter is the exact information on the envelope itself.
So all I have to do is be able to
repeat what you saw in the envelope when you fraudulently
signed it, be able to fraudulently identify yourself as the voter.

Speaker 3 (01:38:25):
Should we take a look at that video, So we've
got some more bad acting for you.

Speaker 10 (01:38:35):
Hey, sweetheart, just want to let you know. You know,
the guy we bought the house from, Larry Green, got
his ballot in the mail. Apparently he didn't forward his
mail yet, but we've known him for a long time.
I know exactly how he's going to vote. I went
ahead and filled it out for him and and sent
that one back in in the mail. But can you

(01:38:57):
check the mail and see if our ballots came in
because we need to get ours filled out too, But
just wanted to let you know in case it comes up.

Speaker 3 (01:39:16):
Hello, Yes, is this mister Larry Green?

Speaker 10 (01:39:21):
Uh? Who's calling?

Speaker 3 (01:39:24):
This is Sue with the Maricopa County Elections Department.

Speaker 10 (01:39:28):
Uh, you're calling for Larry. Hold on a minute, Okay.

Speaker 5 (01:39:36):
It's the Election Department.

Speaker 10 (01:39:41):
Okay, hello, this is Larry.

Speaker 3 (01:39:47):
Hello Larry, this is Sue with Maricopa County Elections Department. Uh.
I was just calling. Did you mail in a ballot
for this most recent election? Uh?

Speaker 10 (01:39:58):
Yep, sure did.

Speaker 3 (01:40:00):
Okay, wonderful. There was a small problem, but we will
get you taken care of. I need to verify your
identity first, so can you please state your full name?

Speaker 10 (01:40:11):
Uh, Larry Green.

Speaker 3 (01:40:13):
Okay, mister Green. And can you please state the address
where you receive your mail in ballot.

Speaker 10 (01:40:20):
Uh It's one two three, Easy.

Speaker 3 (01:40:24):
Street, Lovely. Okay, everything checks out. Unfortunately, your signature didn't match.

Speaker 10 (01:40:34):
Oh yeah, that's okay. I was in a hurry.

Speaker 3 (01:40:40):
Well you know, it happens all the time. But I
am so glad that I was able to reach you
and we can make your vote count. Thank you, Thank you,
have a good day.

Speaker 4 (01:41:00):
This is Larry.

Speaker 6 (01:41:02):
That's very believable.

Speaker 2 (01:41:04):
I know, I almost walked out of this movie.

Speaker 4 (01:41:08):
Very low budget. This this was going beyond the b roll.

Speaker 3 (01:41:15):
But hopefully it helped people to understand. I mean, this
is this is how the process works.

Speaker 5 (01:41:20):
So what our what our friends said when he was
talking to his to his honey, is he said, you know,
we we bought the house from is Larry Green was
at it. We bought the house from Larry Green, and
we know how Larry Green votes. But what if this
is really more likely that you don't know who you
bought the house from, and you know how Larry Green

(01:41:41):
should vote, and that's how that that ballot would have
gotten voted, Not the way Larry Green wanted, but the
way the way the new residents think he should have voted, and.

Speaker 2 (01:41:52):
That would be the more common Well, I think if if, if, if,
well I think if our producer was the one voting
the vote, then you know that's okay by me.

Speaker 3 (01:42:06):
Well, before we wrap it up, because we've gotten extraordinarily long,
there was one more thing we wanted to talk about,
and that was a practice that started, we believe it
started in twenty twenty two, not in twenty twenty where
ballots that went into these curing piles they got so
overwhelmed that they were actually recirculating them back again for

(01:42:28):
another first level viewers. So, if you've got conscientious signature
verifier who rejects Larry Green's ballot and it goes to
curing and it's sitting there too long they may just
throw Larry Green back into the queue, hoping user one
three four gets Larry Green's ballot and then they don't
have to mess with cuing.

Speaker 4 (01:42:48):
You want to talk just slightly about that, and then
we'll call it a day.

Speaker 5 (01:42:52):
Yeah, So yeah, So what we have here, what you've
seen is graphs of people who are doing who are
doing signature verification. They're taking several seconds per signature, and
they have an approval rate of in you know, ninety
to eighty ninety percent, so they're rejecting ten to twenty

(01:43:13):
percent of these and they're taking time to do it.
And then we've also seen a graph of people who
are just pushing the accept button as quickly as they
can with extremely high acceptance rates. So think of the
first person as a little tiny funnel where things are
leaking through, and they're leaking through. They're getting through their
process at a much lower rate because they're taking more

(01:43:36):
time to do it, and they're they're having some exceptions,
some rejections. And then picture of the other person who
is clicking that button as fast as possible as this
giant drain where just those all those ballots goes straight
down through that drain. Without any exceptions or very few exceptions,
and so which one. Let's say you threw a ballot

(01:43:59):
into the pool, which drain is more likely that that
ballot's going to go down, Well, it's much more likely
that it's going to get stuck in the whirlpool and
go down the second drain of the guy who's flicking
accept as quickly as possible, much less likely that it's
going to get caught. So what happens if you've got
way too many ballots that have been exceptioned at level

(01:44:22):
one and they're going overload at level two where they
can't or or even past level two where they don't
have enough people to cure them. What happens if they
just throw those back into the pool and see if
maybe they'll go back down through level one through the
big drain the guy who's pressing. Except so, these are

(01:44:43):
ballots that have already been rejected. They've been sitting around
waiting to be waiting to be cured. But they have
this new practice they didn't do in twenty twenty they
did in twenty twenty two and twenty twenty four where
they take these pooled ballots and they throw them back
in to see if they might get caught in the
big drain.

Speaker 2 (01:45:04):
Right, and they didn't need to do it in twenty twenty,
did they, because at least with the first portion of
that one point they done, right, They got that one
point three done. Boom, they had one big drain going right,
everybody in twenty twenty, the very first part of the
election was a drain. And so basically tell me if
tell me if I'm explaining this incorrectly, right, So they

(01:45:26):
randomly assign these two signature verifiers. The signature verifier gets
them and they exception say they exception ten out of
one hundred that they verify, and then those ten go
to level two correct, and then you know those are
supposed to be cured because they they're inconsistent signatures theoretically speaking, correct,

(01:45:48):
and so they get so busy, you know, at curing
that what they do then is they dump them back
into the random pool.

Speaker 6 (01:45:56):
That's right, the original pool.

Speaker 2 (01:45:58):
And so if half of the people you have our
speed clickers and half are conscientious, then the odds you're
going to get them approved is pretty significant, correct, right, right,
Because then they're going to randomly go back that say half,
if you got fifty to fifty half of those ten
ballots are going to wind up theoretically with a speed

(01:46:19):
clicker in the other half might get approved by somebody
else at level one.

Speaker 5 (01:46:24):
Yeah, there's a very small chance that they're going to
come there's a smaller chance they're going to get evaluated
by a conscientious evaluator. There's a much smaller chance that
they're going to come back to the same person. But
that actually happened where somebody said, Hey, what the heck,
I've seen this, I've already I've already exceptioned this signature.

Speaker 6 (01:46:44):
Why am I seeing this again?

Speaker 5 (01:46:46):
And that's how that led them and us to realize
that it's in the data.

Speaker 6 (01:46:52):
You can see where this happens.

Speaker 2 (01:46:53):
Well, maybe maybe it was that voters second ballot.

Speaker 3 (01:46:56):
Well you know, using well it's true too because we
saw more than one vote get counted on numerous occasions.
So using the drain analogy, if it's my kitchen sink
and I take the little filter out of the drain,
that's right, then.

Speaker 4 (01:47:14):
Bad foods discosal, bad food.

Speaker 3 (01:47:17):
Hairballs, you know, all the stuff you can jump down
the drain. And that's essentially what you're saying is this
is a way to remove the filter to allow more
bad signature through even when you have conscientious workers.

Speaker 5 (01:47:32):
That's right, that's right, we know more likely twenty twenty four,
we know that happening. Well, yes, in twenty yes, we
know that up.

Speaker 2 (01:47:39):
In twenty twenty two, twenty twenty four. So the arison
a legislature, what you're saying, still has a lot of
work to do.

Speaker 6 (01:47:45):
Right, They do have some problems to fix.

Speaker 5 (01:47:48):
Now, one more thing do we want to talk about
as a last subject, We want to talk about the
the use of proof signatures in the literal I mean,
in the reference signatures if.

Speaker 3 (01:48:03):
You want to touch on that real briefly before we
wrap up, and then maybe we need to do a
whole series on just voter registration.

Speaker 5 (01:48:10):
So the example that we saw, example that we saw
of Larry Green, his signature now was approved and they
have they have used ballot AFFIDAVID envelopes that were approved
in the process and put them into the Signature of

(01:48:30):
verification reference file. And in fact, that signature, Larry Green's
fall signature would be at the top of the list
for any future signature of verification. So when Larry the
new homeowner, mister Brown, when he submitted a ballot with
his signature for Larry Green, his signature would be approved

(01:48:52):
because it would match the top signature that had been
approved in the last Now.

Speaker 4 (01:48:58):
I've kind of described this.

Speaker 3 (01:49:00):
When you write a check at the bank, you you
go into cash a check, the bank teller is going
to check the signature on your bank card to ensure
that those match your your registration card your your bank
when you open your account, you have a signature card
on file, that's right, so they're going to check that card.

(01:49:21):
What Maricopa County and other counties in Arizona are doing,
by the way, not just Maricopa County.

Speaker 4 (01:49:28):
What they're doing is they're essentially.

Speaker 3 (01:49:30):
Then taking that check and now making the check the
new signature card. So if I were to forge a
check on Chris's account and the bank teller wasn't conscientious
and cashed that check with my signature on Chris's account,
now my signature becomes the primary signature, and I can

(01:49:51):
continue to forge checks on Chris's account as long as
he doesn't watch his bank account right.

Speaker 2 (01:49:58):
And there's there's there's no process in the law whereby
that is a legitimate process. The only way a signature
is allowed by law to be added to the voter's
registration record. And so by analogy, you're talking about the
bank card. When you go when you go open a

(01:50:18):
banking account, they get your signature, right, they get your
wet signature, and that way, boom, whenever your teller pulls
your account up, it's got that signature that they can
then compare to the check or the signature on the check.

Speaker 3 (01:50:33):
Right, they still ask for ID, right, and they still
they still ask for right.

Speaker 2 (01:50:37):
And so the only way they're supposed to be putting
a signature into your voter registration record, which is the
equivalent of your bank record, because that's what the reference is.
The signature on your voter registration record is if you
go into vote early, you show an ID, and then

(01:51:00):
that signature on the ballot AFFIDAVID envelope is then verified
through the signature verification process. Then that signature can be
added to your voter registration records right as a reference
signature for future elections. That's not what's taking place. What's

(01:51:20):
taking place is if is signature gets verified by what
that guy you're referring to him as Larry Green, Larry
Green or the speed clickers one thirty four. Right, if
it passes through one thirty four, they're putting it in
your votetration record to be used as the reference signature

(01:51:43):
for the next election cycle. Meaning if it got through
and it's significantly different, which we've seen thousands of different
signatures that differ significantly, then that is your new reference.
And so that's why I refer to this process as
voter identity theft, because your signature is your identity when

(01:52:05):
you vote by mail, and when that is changed by
those running your elections, they have essentially changed your identity.

Speaker 3 (01:52:13):
Yeah, exactly, And that's another reason why I think we've
used the phrase protect your identity and secure your vote.

Speaker 4 (01:52:20):
Stop voting by mail.

Speaker 6 (01:52:22):
That's it.

Speaker 4 (01:52:23):
I mean, if you want to, if.

Speaker 3 (01:52:24):
You want to ensure you know, some people go out
and they get LifeLock to protect their identity. Well, getting
off the AVIL system and voting in person is the
easiest way and it's a lot cheaper than LifeLock to
protect your identity when it comes to your vote.

Speaker 5 (01:52:41):
Yeah, I hope it's I hope it's clear that even
though we have a multi level signature verification process that
there there are so many gaps and holes in that
multi level, especially especially at the very last level, especially
the very last level of curing. That curing is a

(01:53:01):
gaping hole in the system. Anything that they got caught
along the way in the filter and get right through
curing without any problem, and then, like we said, that
becomes a permanent record for future signature. So so then
even signature of verification won't catch those future fraudulent signatures.

Speaker 6 (01:53:22):
Mic drop.

Speaker 3 (01:53:23):
Yeah, I think that's a good note to end one.

Speaker 2 (01:53:26):
So I agree.

Speaker 4 (01:53:27):
Thanks for joining us, and we'll see you next week.

Speaker 2 (01:53:30):
Oh I do got one thing right, And I just
want to say this. You know, the work we do
is not cheap, it's not free, and it's not easy.
We fight many battles. Many of us spend our own
money doing this, and so if you can contribute even
a small amount, then then that would be greatly appreciated.

(01:53:57):
Because because we have we have we mid thousands of
public records requests. We spend a lot of time using
experts as well as ourselves to help us analyze data,
and it's an exceptionally expensive process. So I would ask
that you help with the People USA Alliance. You know,

(01:54:17):
if you can, we'd appreciate.

Speaker 4 (01:54:20):
Thank you.

Speaker 3 (01:54:20):
So much guys, God blessed, have a good week.

Speaker 2 (01:55:00):
Eight eight eight

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