Guest Post: We The People Studios Signature Verification & Mail in Voting

Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:03):
American gangsters.

Speaker 2 (00:07):
Cools. We speak molding tripping.

Speaker 3 (00:10):
On the haters.

Speaker 2 (00:14):
It can take free from.

Speaker 3 (00:19):
The last days.

Speaker 4 (00:36):
Well, hello everybody, thank you so much for joining us tonight.

Speaker 1 (00:41):
Once again.

Speaker 4 (00:41):
I am Shelby Bush, chairman of We the People USA Alliance,
and with me today is Chris Hansel. He is the
director of IT and Data for We the People USA Alliance. Hi, guys,
So today we're going to talk about mail in valuellets.
And I know there's been a lot of controversy around

(01:04):
mail in ballots and whether or not we should as
a whole in this country except mail in ballots. And
I think there's before we kind of get into that,
we need to talk about the fact there's three different
types of.

Speaker 1 (01:19):
Mail in voting.

Speaker 5 (01:20):
Right.

Speaker 4 (01:20):
There's you got organ in Washington, which is all mail
in ballots.

Speaker 1 (01:25):
They don't even have pull centers, do they.

Speaker 2 (01:27):
Chris, that's right, Yeah, it's all mail in right.

Speaker 4 (01:30):
And then we've got a Texas model, which is absentee voting,
where you have to have an excuse, so you have
to be in the military, you have to be working
out of state, you have to be basically confined. You
have to be what they consider a confined voter, somebody
who's elderly or health is failing. And then you've got

(01:50):
places like Arizona where we're kind of a hybrid. We
still have voting centers, but we have no excuse absentee voting,
which means anybody, including clone voters or voters who have moved,
can and will receive a mail in ballot if they
sign up for it. And so when we talk about

(02:12):
mail in ballot as a whole, we're really more speaking
to mail in balloting kind of as a car blanche, right,
not including those kind of exceptions for military, which we
always want to make sure they have the opportunity to vote,
and those that are disabled or infirm it and unable
to actually go into a poll center and vote. So

(02:35):
mail in balloting as a whole, I believe personally is
it's criminal. It's truly criminal, and I think that it
is the number one way that our elections are subverted.
I think it's an affront to the American people and
the voting process to allow this kind of abuse to
occur in our system.

Speaker 1 (02:54):
What are your thoughts on all of that, Chris Well.

Speaker 2 (02:59):
Part of the part of the problem with mail in
voting is some of what we're going to talk about
today is signature verification. How do you validate that you're
getting the right ballots from the right people and that
ballots aren't finding their way in that aren't legitimate. And
you know, there's been there's been the opinion for years

(03:20):
on both sides of the aisle that mail in voting
is the easiest way to cheat, and so you want
to avoid mail in voting if you can. And here
we are in Miracle pe County as of twenty twenty,
with eighty percent of the people registered in Miracle County
to send their vote in by mail. Now that a
lot of that got to establish just because as a

(03:43):
matter of convenience during COVID nineteen. But now the county
claims that eighty percent of the population wants this just
because they're signed up for it doesn't necessarily mean that
they want that. But that's the situation that we're stuck
in right now. And the flaws, the things that make
this process wheat are in signature verification and that whole

(04:05):
process of bringing the ballots in and legitimizing them's that's
what I think is the should be the main focus
of what the public needs to hear about.

Speaker 4 (04:17):
So, you know, many people may not realize this, but
ballot harvesting has existed, you know for generations.

Speaker 1 (04:24):
This isn't something new.

Speaker 4 (04:26):
We actually had a case here in Arizona, Garamia Garamina Fuentes,
who was busted running a ballot harvesting ring her and
one of her cohorts, and this operation got caught in
the primaries by our current county recorder in Yuma County,
Arizona during the primary of twenty twenty. The investigation was

(04:51):
prolonged to such an extent that they didn't even issue
indictments until after the twenty twenty election, which means this
ballott visting operation was able to continue all the way
through the twenty twenty general election. So uh, you know,
one of our our h I'm gonna use a little sarcasm,

(05:11):
our favorite former county recorder, Stephen Richer, He put out
a statement on Twitter. Do you remember that, Chris, about
ballot harvesting kind of context.

Speaker 5 (05:21):
Of all that.

Speaker 2 (05:22):
Are you sure that that the case that you just
mentioned isn't a one up? Are you sure that ballot
harvesting really exists? Because you know, like our friend Stephen
Richard said, it's harder to find a sasquatch than it
is to find or easier to find a sasquatch than
it is to find ballot harvesting. That's what I remember
he said. So we have something about that we we do.

Speaker 4 (05:45):
So we the People Alliance issued a video back in
I believe it was twenty one, twenty two after Stephen
Richard put out this tweet.

Speaker 1 (05:55):
About it's easier to spot. I think it was it's easier.

Speaker 4 (05:58):
To spot a sasquatch than it is the mule.

Speaker 1 (06:01):
That's right, kind of making fun of the two Thousand
Mules movie.

Speaker 2 (06:05):
That's right.

Speaker 4 (06:06):
And so what we did, for those of you that
don't know. One thing our organization does is we capture
all of the live feed video footage that comes out
of not only America but county but many different county
elections departments. And there happened to be a camera on
a ballot roop box and we did catch that footage

(06:28):
during the twenty twenty two elections. So that would have
been twenty three ish, I think is when we when
we made this video, Steve, can you play number one?

Speaker 1 (06:38):
How secure is it?

Speaker 4 (06:39):
Really? So here's the tweet where he's talking about making
movies Sasquad.

Speaker 2 (06:53):
There's our friends. Well, here's the video that we captured.

Speaker 4 (07:12):
Now, I can't imagine a legitimate reason that an individual
voter would be that masked up in carrying a box of.

Speaker 1 (07:20):
Ballot unless he was potentially milling.

Speaker 4 (07:37):
So we're going to go ahead and let this roll
in the background so that we can kind of talk
you through it. But what this is is this is
essentially eight minutes of NonStop people going through the America
County drop box dropping off quite a few ballots. Now,

(07:58):
in the state of Arizona, we actually have an anti
ballot harvesting law, so, unlike some other states, it's actually
illegal to harvest ballots in Arizona.

Speaker 2 (08:10):
You can bring in ballots for your family members, right.

Speaker 1 (08:14):
And what is that? What is that kind of limited to?

Speaker 4 (08:17):
Would you say, bring in ballots for your family members.

Speaker 2 (08:21):
For your household?

Speaker 5 (08:22):
Right?

Speaker 1 (08:23):
So I can't go.

Speaker 4 (08:24):
To Tea and and you know, my uncles and all
my cousins and drive around town gathering up all those ballots, Chris,
would that be ballot harvesting?

Speaker 2 (08:34):
That sounds like ballot harvesting to me. And here we
have some pretty big families represent pretty big households. Represented
by these stacks of ballots going into the end of
the drop box. I think we'll see one here later
in the video where there's and he puts in part

(08:57):
of them some reserved. Well, we'll get to that.

Speaker 4 (09:04):
Yeah, there's there's literally and like Chris said, well, we'll
come to it, but there's one will point out to
you when we get there where they dump in several ballots,
quite a few ballots, and you can see that the
passenger sitting in the passenger seat still has a stack
of ballot that they intend to I would assume take

(09:24):
to another dropbox, or maybe they're just going to do
the loop and get back in line. I'm not really
sure what the intent is. Some of these you're looking
at four or five six ballots, some of them are
two three inches thick, and they're putting in, you know,
easily probably ten to twelve ballots at a time with
some of these stacks. And if you notice, you know,

(09:47):
we did blur faces of some of these. There we go,
how many would you guess that is, Chris, Oh my.

Speaker 2 (09:55):
Gosh, it got to be least in maybe twenty.

Speaker 4 (10:00):
Yeah, that's a pretty thick stack. And you'll see quite
a few of these people are are very happy, same thing.
And so this was during twenty twenty two, So you know,
if this was footage from twenty twenty, it might make
a little more sense, you would think if so many

(10:20):
people were wearing masks and sinched up hoodies back in
twenty twenty.

Speaker 1 (10:26):
Here's the one we were referring to.

Speaker 4 (10:28):
If you notice that image of the passenger still holding
a stack of mail and ballots, Now they've pulled up
to the drop.

Speaker 2 (10:35):
Box, putting in a pretty big stack, yeah, and still
have some left over for what else, for another drop box.

Speaker 1 (10:44):
And you'll see it again.

Speaker 4 (10:45):
It's going to flash in that window, just for anybody
who's skeptical and thinks that maybe we can't catch it.
You can see those ballots showing up again in the
window and they're going to drive off. So we know
that ballot harvesting is an issue. And when you talk
to people who maybe can see that some fraudulent ballots

(11:06):
or forge ballots get into the system.

Speaker 1 (11:09):
You always say, but that's okay, because we have.

Speaker 4 (11:14):
The final line of defense to protect the voters from
that kind of voter fraud, and that process is called
signature verification. Christ do you want to tell everybody what
that process looks like. What is the signature verification process?

Speaker 2 (11:32):
Yeah? Sure, So let's kind of follow the life of
a ballot. So after you put a ballot into the
mailbox or into a drop box like this, well specifically
into the mail if you put it in the mail,
the first stop obviously is the local post office. It
find finds its way there. Now, the law requires that

(11:52):
the county take possession of those ballots at that point
from the from the point of the post office. What
they actually do is they send employees over the post
office to pick up the ballots at the post office
and take them directly to Runback. So it's really Runback
who takes possession of them first, although technically officially the

(12:15):
county takes possession of them because it's it's the county
employees who pick them up. Now, they're supposed to count
those ballots when they pick them up. They don't count
them at the post office. They don't count them when
they drop them off at Runback. They count them after
they have run Back actually does the count of the
ballots after they receive them, so that's really the first

(12:36):
time they get counted. So there's really no chain of
custody in between the post office and run back.

Speaker 4 (12:42):
Now, for those people that believe that that there is
a process at the post office, they're not counting those
ballots at all at the post office.

Speaker 1 (12:51):
Is that correct, Chris.

Speaker 2 (12:52):
They're not counting the ballots at post they're not even
scanning them. The normal process for mail is for the
post Office to scan them, and for some reason, the
Post Office has decided that ballots aren't exception to that.
They don't even scan the ballots when they come through
the mail process like they do regular mail. You would

(13:13):
think that they would be more careful with ballots, but
they're they have they have a lighter process on processing
art or scanning and evaluating ballots when they come in.

Speaker 4 (13:26):
So what you're seeing right here before we fade out
of this is Christy Passerelli, Ray Vallus Suil and some
other workers actually gathering the ballots out of the drop box.
So these are the county workers and the process that
they're using to pull all of those ballots that you
saw going into that box out of the box to
take it into the elections department. Now, this process would

(13:50):
normally result in ceialing that ben with security tags and
signing some chenea custody for at least two people to
sign it, and then that box would be taken in
and at the time that it was actually counted, transported,
et cetera, scanned and transported, those logs would be verified
and it would be open.

Speaker 1 (14:11):
They actually don't.

Speaker 4 (14:12):
Seal this bend, and they will it into the elections
department where it sits in a hallway unattended for several
hours before those ballots are pulled out of that bend.
So you can see the bend right there. That's another
camera view when it's coming into.

Speaker 1 (14:29):
M Tech.

Speaker 4 (14:30):
It had sat there if you look at the time
stamp nine fifteen thirty two, So they collected those ballots
at seven pm and at nine point fifteen that that
ben was finally attended to. So you know, how secure
is it really? That is the question is ballot harvesting?
Is ballot harvesting real, Chris or would you put your
money on the sasquat?

Speaker 2 (14:51):
Well, yeah, I think it's going to be easier to
find that evidence of ballot harvesting. The problem is that
the county isn't more careful. They're less careful about the
way they handle ballots. The Post Office isn't more careful,
They're less careful than they could be. There's lots of

(15:11):
areas for improvement and lots of areas that are vulnerable,
especially when it comes to chaineing custody. So we got
started by talking about the life of the life of
a ballot. So once it gets to run back, the
next thing they do is they bring those ballots in
and they scan them, and they're scanning them, taking a picture.
They're scanning the barcode on the ballot, and they're also

(15:33):
taking a picture of the signature on the ballot. And
then they set all those ballot affidavit envelopes aside and
they transmit the pictures of the outside of the envelope,
including the picture of the of the signature, over to
Micktech and then that's where that's where as soon as
your verification comes.

Speaker 4 (15:54):
And for those that may not note, Micktech is Maricopa
County Election and Tabulation Center, so it's actually the County
Elections Department. M tech is a word that we used
to describe it as kind of shorthand it's internal language.

Speaker 2 (16:08):
Right right, Yeah, that's the picture of what you just saw.
The inside of mcnick on that last video. So signature
verifor take verification takes place there and uh okay, so
it's a three step process. But before that, actually, let
me let me back up a little bit. They they
hire just regular people to do the first level that

(16:29):
to do signature verification. They hire people who are you know,
patriots who care about the process, who want to be involved,
and so they sign up to do signature verf Are.

Speaker 4 (16:40):
These all just patriots who want to get involved or
you know, because I know that's the first.

Speaker 1 (16:45):
Thing, actually, right, That's that's that's the main category.

Speaker 4 (16:48):
That's the category we know and love, and we have
many friends who actually do that.

Speaker 2 (16:52):
That's right.

Speaker 4 (16:52):
There's also the category of temporary workers that to hire
from temp agencies, right, who may not even be politically
minded or engaged or even care.

Speaker 1 (17:00):
They're just collecting minimum ways they're there.

Speaker 2 (17:02):
Their primary motivation, of course, is to just have a job.

Speaker 5 (17:06):
So the.

Speaker 2 (17:08):
Staff is split between those two groups. There's the group
of people who are there because they care about the
process and they they want to be sure that the
ballots get counted correctly. And then there's the other group
who is there they may or may not care about
the process, but their primary motivation is that paycheck, because
that's how they entered the process as a temporary worker.

(17:28):
So okay, so that's how the people are. That's the
kind of people. That's the people who are doing signature
verification at the first level. So now there's three levels
of signature verification. First level is those people who have
the first look at the ballot and they do a
comparison between the picture on the of the ballot affidavit envelope,

(17:51):
that signature and the full reference file of signatures available
from voter registration, previous elections, other kinds of documents that
have come into the recorder's office with the user's signature
on it. So there's lots of exemplars and references that
they compare to. Now this is I'm describing the ideal

(18:13):
case here. So then the next level is let's say
that let's say that the signature verification person at level
one looks at that signature and they say, they say,
that looks like a match. So that's good enough. So
once once it's been matched at that first level, it
goes on to be opened and counted, and the ballot

(18:34):
gets pulled out of the envelope and counted.

Speaker 4 (18:36):
And let me just add something to that for people
that know what they're actually looking at in Maricopa County,
as they're looking at a scanned image of that ballot
Alpha David envelope. Once it gets approved and accepted, then
the physical ballot is transferred from run Back Election Services
to Americopa County. But in the interim, while the ballot

(18:57):
is being inspected and signature verified, it's being housed in
the warehouse at Runback. Now in your more rural counties
they actually have the physical envelopes, but America But County,
the physical envelopes are maintained off site at run Back
Election Services. When that first level verification occurs, where they

(19:18):
either approve it as Chris had just said, or exception it.

Speaker 1 (19:22):
And then what happens if they exception it?

Speaker 2 (19:24):
Chris right, So at that level they don't call it
a reject if they don't think the signature match is
what they call it is an exception. So they establish
whether or not it's it passes or a good signature
GS for good signature, or whether it's ex for exception.
So once if it's been accepted, and that's similar to

(19:47):
the first level person saying I think that's not a
good match. It goes on to second level. Now, second
level is populated by people who like long term employees
of the county, people have had long term experience in
signature verification, and also people who came from the first
level signature verification from that original population, who maybe have

(20:10):
more experience. This is like their second or third year
doing signature verification. They promote them up to what they
call manager's level at second level to do the final
verification of whether or not they feel that signature matches.

Speaker 4 (20:25):
And what's different other than what you would maybe consider
the experience of the signature verifier at that second level,
what else about the process is different.

Speaker 2 (20:36):
They have more exemplars, more sample signatures from the file
available to them. The first level has three signatures depending
on the year, actually it could be one signature or
three signatures. I currently Level one is three signatures, and
after that Level two, the manager's level has all of
the signatures available to them to do an evaluation of

(21:00):
that of the signature of David envelope. So that's one
of the other differences.

Speaker 4 (21:06):
And so what happens at that second level if a
manager says no, I agree with the first level, this
is just not a match.

Speaker 1 (21:13):
Then what happens to that ballot.

Speaker 2 (21:15):
If they feel like if they feel like there is
a match in the list of exemplars or a list
of sample signatures, then they will they'll approve it, give
it a GS rating, a good signature rating, and if
they also agree or if they agree with the if

(21:35):
the with a first level, then they'll give it a
QS or a question signature. And then it has to
be sent on to a process called cuing. So in curing,
and we're going to get into this more later, I
mean it's worth a conversation we're going to but curing
involves actually calling the voter or or emailing the voter
to tell them, Hey, we got a ballot here with

(21:57):
your name on it, and we feel like the signature
does match. We need your word on whether or not
to accept this ballot. So that's the process as defined.
That's the ideal process.

Speaker 4 (22:10):
Now were going to talk about the practice, right, So
in an ideal world, that process isn't so bad.

Speaker 2 (22:17):
That's three levels of evaluation. I forgot to mention I
actually have the training manual here, so I actually took
the training with the county for signature verification. This is
Katie hobbes original. When Katie Hobbs was was the Secretary
of State, she wrote the manual or had the manual

(22:37):
written for signature verification and we went through it and
it's actually a very good forensic forensic lesson on how
to do signature verification. They give you four hours of
training at the county and nobody can become an expert
in four hours, but it makes a very good attempt
at making people as expert as possible. Least give them

(23:00):
the information on how it's actually done, even if they
don't give them the opportunity to have years of experienced
to be able to be good signature.

Speaker 4 (23:08):
For those of you that got heartburn when you heard
Katie Hobbes's name, I just I want to point out
that many of the examples in this manual, most of
this training actually came from the EAC and SIS and
it was the adopted manual for Colorado elections. Not like
they're much better, but Katie Hobbs, you know, didn't go

(23:30):
get her doctorate and signature verification and actually author this manual.
It was it was part of her duties as Secretary
of state. But I'm sure people with much more experience
and wisdom actually wrote this manual. And so when Chris
is saying it's very good and very well written, I
just don't want to, you know, make anybody feel anxious

(23:51):
about the fact that Katie Hobbs did something.

Speaker 2 (23:53):
Well, we've relieved that anxiety for sure. Yeah, uh okay.
So so the training is very good. But here's some
of the problems. Some of the problems the actual practice
of signature verification. When they do the ballot, when they
scan the ballot affidavit envelope at run back, they scan

(24:16):
it a very low resolution. It's between three hundred and
three hundred and twenty dpi, so it's very low resolution.
But not only is it just low resolution, but they
take out all of their all of the gray scale,
they take out all of the all of the color,
and they take out they even take out some of
the black. If you've got wide lines, they take out

(24:39):
the middle section of that black. So let's say you
signed with a with a SHARPI or a thick black pan,
it's going to look like a kind of it's gonna
look like like like they're made out of the signatures,
made out of bars like it's hollow in the middle, right.

Speaker 4 (24:55):
Or like if you're using that MVD digital pad to
sign as many people do, that sometimes can already look
really thick and blobbish.

Speaker 2 (25:04):
Yeah, that's right. Well that's another part. That's another problem
with the process. Okay, so the signature verification that comes
from runback is very low resolution. So those files end
up being like fifteen to seventeen k bytes. They're tiny,
tiny little files, and I think maybe the original excuse
for a lowering the resolution is they had to transmit

(25:25):
these across town. But with today's technology in being able
to transfer things over the internet, I mean, there's really
no excuse for reduced taking out all of the detail
from those signatures. So actually, you know, the manual talks
about local features and broad features of a signature, and
it includes things like pen lift, hesitation pressure, so all

(25:50):
these subtleties. If you take out the gray scale and
you take out the color, all these subtleties go away.
And so the training is good. It teaches you to
look for things that are no longer present in the signature.
So that's the problem with the signatures coming over from runbecks.
The problem with the signatures. The exemplars is basically the
same thing. If you've got a hand signed form that

(26:13):
they scan and then put into the record, they lower
the resolution so you've got only the black version of
that signature. You've got no detail that you can use
your training to detect differences in the signature. The other
problem is the incoming Many of the incoming signatures today
come from the DMV, and when you go to the DMV,
you're signing on one of those digitizer pads, and everybody

(26:37):
knows how hard it is to represent your actual signature
on a digitizer pad. In fact, the actual training talks
about the fact that if you don't have elbow support,
and you're not on a flat surface, and you're not
signing with a normal pen on you know, on a
flat surface, then those are all reasons that the signature
is going to look different. So it's like it's a

(26:59):
worst case at the d m V when they force
you to provide an exemplar that's that's done on a
digitizer path. So now you've got a problem with the
incoming signatures and the Affi David envelopes, and you've got
a problem with the exemplars. It's very hard to legitimize
a match when you take out all that detail, especially

(27:20):
since that you know, the training includes all those those
details that you can look for.

Speaker 4 (27:25):
Now, we actually we have an example of both ballot
aff David envelope and an exemplar that we can show
people to kind of and you can kind of walk
through what that resolution is, like, do you want me
to Yeah, let's.

Speaker 2 (27:38):
Bring it up.

Speaker 1 (27:38):
Can we bring that up? Image one at least?

Speaker 4 (27:47):
So once we have a system that's kind of already
from the very get go designed to fail, and it's
the one A, it's all the way at the end,
it could have been the last. No, that's a different one.

(28:08):
There's one xay, Okay, let's just let's it's titled. That's
a good question. I added it in later on your
I think low resolution. So while we're waiting on that,

(28:31):
we had kind of a unique opportunity right to to
look at some of these images in a way that
I don't think historically anybody else has been able to do.
You want to kind of talk about Well, let me
start off by saying we knew there were problems, We
had some evidence that there were significant problems. In voter
registration was really one of the number one things we

(28:53):
were looking at at the time, and we sat down
with Senator Karen fan who was the Senate president.

Speaker 2 (29:00):
Right, let me touch on just a couple more things
before we get yeah, okay, so some other problems with
the signature verification process. Yeah, you got it. Great, Great,
we found it. Actually, I'm pretty sure Steve found it. Okay.
So on the left, you see the picture of the

(29:21):
ballot Afi David envelope. That's a picture that comes from
run back, and you can see that this is not
a picture of somebody's handwriting. It's like I said, it's
low resolution where they take out of the gray scale
and the color, and they even take out the black
in large black lines. Those arrows, the arrow pointing to
the left and the arrows pointing down, and the wording

(29:44):
up at the top, those are all fully black. And
so that's an example of how they even take out
some of the black in the picture to save to
save file space. And again these are fifteen seventeen K
files there, tiny by the time they take all this out. Yeah.
Oh and one more okay, So on the right on

(30:06):
the right is an example of a signature that came
from the DMV and it's hardly readable at all. This
is a this is an example of a clear mismatch
between the two. But even if there were more similarities,
it's very difficult to use the signature on the right
that came from the DMV, from the digitizer to use
that as an exemplar. It's just so small, it's thick,

(30:29):
it's it's pixelated. So so you have really a worst
case scenario just from the start and being able to
do signature verification. Well, okay, so let's see, Oh okay,
so the workers, so they they asked the workers to
do signature verification for at least a full week, if

(30:50):
not a full month. They don't they don't take part
time employees, and they so they ask people to either
take a week off work or they're they're limited to
people who are retired, so that right right from the
get go, they make it difficult for the general public
to participate. They limit it to just the people who

(31:10):
have a lot of extra time on their hands to
be able to commit to a week or two or
four to be able to do signature verification. I I
think that if if they had if they had the
opportunity that they would they should just bring on people
who are willing to do it part time and cyclists.
They have a lot more people to be able to

(31:32):
cycle through that process if they if they allowed that,
and then the accepted well, you know, we'll talk about
that later. The accepted signatures, no matter how good or bad,
they are going too the record of exemplars for the future.
But we can talk about that in a minute.

Speaker 4 (31:50):
Okay, So let's talk about Yeah, So let's let's talk
about what happened. So we were able to gain access
to what we believed was about I think at the
time we thought it was about one hundred and twenty.

Speaker 1 (32:02):
Thousand ballat Affidavid envelopes.

Speaker 4 (32:04):
And once we were authorized by the Senate to have
access to this, we recognized that the drive seemed to
be way larger than the files we were looking at.
And at that point, Chris, you want to tell them,
you know what you.

Speaker 2 (32:18):
Found for these that this information came as a result
of the Arizona audit. It was in possession of the
Senate and we were able to the Senate gave it
to us to evaluate and what we found, and what
we found was that that the reference images by about

(32:44):
five point three million reference images were also on the
drive along with a one point nine million ballat Affidavid envelope.
So we had the opportunity to completely redo signature verification
for Mirakopa County, which we did. We set up a
process at a secure location using a secure server, and

(33:06):
at the secure location, we gave everybody the same training
that was in the signature verification manual that was given
to the county, and we had our people redo signature
verification just the way it was instructed by the county.
We built the software, the screens that were used for

(33:27):
this were secure and could only be access from the
locations where we had them. And what we found was
you want to give some of the data that we
got out of that valuation.

Speaker 1 (33:36):
Absolutely sure.

Speaker 4 (33:37):
So one of the number one things we were asked
to do is report to the Senate with some of
the findings that we had in this audit that we
were commissioned to do. Steve, can you put upside number
two please some of the overall findings. And we're not
going to go into all the details of everything today,
but you know in Era sixteen five point fifty it

(33:59):
states very clearly that if a ballot aff David envelope
is not signed, it must be signed by seven pm
on election date or the vote can't count. There is
no provision to cure that or make it better, aside
from actually having it signed or having the voter go
into the polling center. And we found several unsigned ballots
that were cured and counted. In addition, we found many

(34:22):
that were signed by somebody completely other than the voter.

Speaker 1 (34:24):
These aren't these aren't forgeries.

Speaker 4 (34:26):
We're looking at, you know, voters where it's a completely
different names, such as the exemplar you saw earlier that
Chris talked about. Those were clearly two different people signing
and that ballot affidavit was counted. We found scribbles and
x's and illegible and inconsistent scribbles and marks that weren't

(34:46):
constituting signatures that were inconsistent with special election policy, violating
Ras sixteen five nine. We found many duplicate voters, and
yes it can happen, regardless of what the county tells you.
People can vote more than once in the election, and
there are many different ways that that can occur. We
found unreasonably different control signatures, and we found signatures obviously

(35:12):
that it didn't match, but then they matched several months later,
and I think all the way down to the bottom.
Most importantly, we found a significant number of what we
call egregious signature mismatches. And all together in our findings,
we found that ultimately at least nine to ten percent

(35:34):
of the ballot off of David envelopes that were accepted
in the twenty twenty election should never have been counted. Now,
how many ballots were cast in the twenty twenty election, Chris.

Speaker 2 (35:45):
That's one point nine million.

Speaker 4 (35:46):
I don't remember the exact number, but one point nine
So if you take ten percent of one point nine.

Speaker 2 (35:51):
Yeah, easy math, ten percent of two million, yeah, two
hundred thousand, right, And we found an additional ten percent,
ten to twelve percent that weren't clear egregious mismatches, but
they failed the Secretary of State standards according to the manual,
So those would have been rejected at least initially. And
so twenty percent of two million, four hundred thousand ballots

(36:15):
that should have been at least questioned, with two hundred
thousand being egregious mismatches. That's the data that came out
of our evaluation we actually got through about half of them,
but our numbers were very consistent all the way through.

Speaker 4 (36:31):
So can we put up image number three, Steve, This
is another example, similar to what you looked at earlier,
of what we called a mismatch signature.

Speaker 2 (36:41):
Yeah, I call that egregious. I would say that exemplar
on the right and the ballot Affidavid envelope signature that
came in through the mail with that signature, I don't
think those matched and those were approved. That envelope was
approved for a vote in twenty twenty.

Speaker 4 (37:00):
I want to add it was approved in the first
level of verification. This did not go through carrying. And yes,
we can tell because the metadata will tell us if
a ballot is exceptioned in first or second level. It's
actually dispositioned in the system to show that, and that
ballot ALFI David envelope is then approved and re scan

(37:24):
through the system. So you know, I know one of
the arguments Accounting has used when they've seen some of
our findings and stats as well.

Speaker 1 (37:31):
You know, there's something called caring. Yeah, we understand that.

Speaker 4 (37:33):
We're quite familiar with what caring is and we'll go
into more detail on that next week along. What's showing
you how we can tell whether a ballot went through
caring or not. To debunk some of that, Steve, can
you put up an image for please now, duplicate voters.
This is something that we want to get into way
more detail about in a future podcast and really dig

(37:57):
deep into the data. This is sort of Chris's x
pertise is duplicate data, duplicate voters. But here's an example
of a voter who you can clearly see by the
handwriting in the last four digits of the number and
this signature and even the handwriting of the date, that
this is the same person signing both ballots.

Speaker 1 (38:19):
One was submitted on.

Speaker 4 (38:20):
October twenty first of twenty twenty and the other on
October thirtieth of twenty twenty. And both of these ballot
affidavit envelopes, both of these ballots were counted. Now you
can see the big boxes with the bold outlining. I
just want to point out to you guys, our images
of that do not look like that. That is to
redact any personal protected information to protect the identity of

(38:44):
these voters.

Speaker 2 (38:46):
Yeah, to be specific, could you bring that up real quick.
I just want to make clear that a lot of
people call these clone voters. There's a the word duplicate
is used in other places in elections, so we call
these anguish these these are clone voters. So what this
is the in this case, it's the same name, the
same address, same birth date, different voter IDs. So it's

(39:10):
really a clone of the same voter record with two
different voter IDs, and both voter IDs came in with
envelopes with signatures, and both votes were counted. In this case,
we go ahead.

Speaker 4 (39:23):
And switch it to slide five. Please, Steve, here's another
example coming up on the screen of a duplicate voter,
this particular voter. You can look at it. The handwriting
I believe is similar enough where you can pretty much
easily tell that the same person authored both these envelopes. Now,
I just want to point out we go different dates.

(39:43):
We don't know whether it's the actual voter who signed
both these ballad affidavit envelopes, but what we know is
it's the same voter who's voting. These could be forgeries
that we can't say for sure, but one came in
on October twenty Seve, twenty twenty for this voter, and
then an additional one on October twenty eighth, twenty twenty

(40:05):
for the same exact voter. And again, would this be
another example of what you're calling a cloned voter?

Speaker 2 (40:10):
Yeah, yeah, exactly two different voter IDs, but all the
most of the other data is exactly the same. That's
how we found it. And then because we had access
to the ballot affidavit envelopes, were able to actually compare
the signatures. In this case, we knew from the data
that both that both voters got counted, and we knew
from the data that they were they were cloned. But
here we're actually able to see the signature and see

(40:32):
how similar they are.

Speaker 4 (40:34):
So now when we talk about, you know, the stats
that we found, and that is that nine to ten
percent were egregious, right, And Chris pointed out that that
mismatched signature I referred to. He considers that egregious I
do as well. It falls into more than one category.
It's just a lovely array of things.

Speaker 1 (40:51):
But we also have.

Speaker 4 (40:53):
Another category that was eleven percent, is that correct, Chris,
which is the failed Secretary of seat standard under twelve percent? Right,
So these are another ten to twelve percent in addition
to the egregious. So that that's for a total of
twenty one percent of the ballots that failed, Secretary of State.
But we don't consider these egregious because it could be

(41:14):
the same voter with disintegration due to age, it could
have to do with the resolution. There's a lot of
factors here, but these are ones that ye would potentially fail.

Speaker 2 (41:26):
There it is.

Speaker 1 (41:27):
And so here's one.

Speaker 4 (41:28):
If you at first glance, you look at this, and
it doesn't really look much like a match, right. Even
the way that the person dates their registration form on
the right versus the way they dated their ballot Alfie
David envelope is different, but there are some distinctions that
may indicate it's the same voter.

Speaker 1 (41:46):
So this isn't even considered egregious.

Speaker 2 (41:48):
Yeah, the point is that this should have been question
and wasn't this passed right through the system in twenty twenty?

Speaker 4 (41:54):
This did not go to kring correct right, right, So
so this is an example of the other ten percent.
So if you combine ones that we found that look
like this with ones that we found that are egregious,
you're looking at twenty percent of the ballots that just
didn't have appropriate careful consideration or somehow didn't follow the law.

(42:18):
Can you go ahead and put up number seven? And
we've got many of these images, we're just zeroing in
on one set of great interest.

Speaker 1 (42:27):
Do you want to tell everybody about this one?

Speaker 6 (42:29):
Chris?

Speaker 1 (42:29):
Why don't you talk about this one?

Speaker 2 (42:31):
I have to analyze this for a minute to see
if I see a match here. Okay, I'm done. I
don't see a match here. In fact, it's almost like
they were joking when they put this signature on the
envelope that looks there's no similarities at all between the
reference signature and those what they're calling a signature on

(42:52):
that envelope.

Speaker 1 (42:52):
Are those essays? Would you say on that ballot ALFA
David envelope?

Speaker 2 (42:56):
That's something a stylistic guess something about that on it?

Speaker 4 (43:00):
Is this particular voter that we are looking at, does
either their first or last name begin with an S?

Speaker 2 (43:05):
Oh good point? Yeah, no S is in that name?
And you're yeah, those look like.

Speaker 1 (43:13):
And did this belad Alpha David go to Curing.

Speaker 2 (43:16):
I did not. It did not. It got accepted.

Speaker 4 (43:19):
Okay, go ahead and put up number eight for me, Steve.
And we're kind of flying through these because we really
just want you guys to have an idea and I
got the point same Here here's another egregious I think
you kind of get the point here. I don't know
if that's a double la, double s, a double heart,
kissy fish. I'm not really sure what that is on

(43:40):
the left. But as you can clearly see, there's there's
not a lot of similarities between the Belad Alpha David
envelope and the exemplar on file for this particular voter.

Speaker 1 (43:52):
You can go ahead and take it down, Steve. So
you know, once we looked at all of these result we.

Speaker 4 (44:02):
Thought to ourselves, how are they signature verifying one point
nine million ballots or, in the case of twenty twenty two,
one point three million ballots in not twenty nine days.
It's actually less than twenty nine days because they don't
work every single day with you know, just a handful

(44:23):
of employees.

Speaker 1 (44:24):
How is this process really working?

Speaker 4 (44:27):
And so we decided to compare our signature verification audit
and the results of timing from a Conscientious Trains signature
verifier and compare it to what it would take to
actually accomplish the work that.

Speaker 1 (44:44):
The county has to do. Steve, can you put up
slide nine.

Speaker 4 (44:49):
So one of the things we pointed out, and this
is in reference to the twenty twenty two election. I
want to be really clear. There were one point three
million mail in ballots or in person early ballots that
came in for that election. Maricopa County had twenty eight
signature verification work stations. Twenty five of them were dedicated

(45:09):
to signature verification and three of them for curing, and
they worked two shifts. It was seven hours plus three
and a half hours, so there was a seven hour
shift in a three and a half hour shift, which
equated to a ten and a half hour work day
at each station. And there were nineteen days of work

(45:29):
starting on October eighteenth of twenty twenty two. And if
you do the mouth on this, it just doesn't seem possible,
does it.

Speaker 1 (45:39):
Chris?

Speaker 2 (45:39):
Yeah, well, it certainly raised the question, and we asked,
we asked ourselves hereone to find out how long it
actually took people to do this, how many people they
how many people worked, how many hours? And we kind
of theorized that that date is there. So what we
did is we public record requested whatever the while was

(46:01):
that was used to record signature verification when it was
all done on computer, and we thought there's a very
high likelihood that they're taking data as each person is
doing a verification, and it turns out that it was.
It took us. I'm going to I love telling this story,
so I'm going to try and tell it short with
some other time. Well, we'll do the whole thing. But

(46:24):
we did the public records requests. So they responded by saying, well,
this report doesn't exist, so we're non responsive, and we
told them that we were aware that the Attorney general
previous attorney general had written an opinion that you don't
need to be in possession of a report to be
able to have to produce it for a public records request.

(46:48):
You just had to have custody of the data. And
so now we know they have custody of the data.
So we negotiated through the process and finally help them
create a report that had all the information that we
were looking for in it. And what we learned in
that process is they had never created that report before,
right because we helped them create it the first time.

(47:09):
So in that report we got we got all the
information that we needed to be able to calculate the
time in between evaluations. Every time and a person at
first level and second level touched an envelope, we are
able to establish amount of time that they were that
they took to determine a disposition, whether it's approved or

(47:30):
exception or whatever the disposition.

Speaker 4 (47:32):
And now as we move forward, you'll hear us refer
to this in both today's podcasts and then when we
return to get into more of the details next week
as timing data. So when you hear us talk about
timing data, this is the data that Chris is referencing.

Speaker 2 (47:48):
That's right, So let's see what Oh, okay, so we
have some examples. So what we did. What we discovered
was there are several people doing what we would expect
them to do and doing the same kind of thing
that we did in our evaluation of the envelopes. They're
they're looking at the signature, comparing to the to the

(48:09):
exemplars and coming up with some kind of a failure rate.
And if they're if they're looking at if they're taking
their time to look at these signatures carefully, it could
take inbar between you know, so let's say ten and
thirty seconds to do a really good evaluation. Once you
get good at it, you can get you can go faster.

(48:29):
So we found several people taking several seconds per evaluation
and they had a rejection or an acceptance rate a
pass rate of in the range of eighty to ninety.

Speaker 1 (48:42):
Percent, which is consistent with our Audit is.

Speaker 2 (48:45):
Consistent with our findings with our people doing it without
the pressure of having to have it done, you know,
without everybody waiting for the election results to come in.
So so we found many people doing that. But then
we also found people just clicking the accept button as
quickly as the screen would update, which is not doing

(49:07):
signature verification. And this is the kind of data that
we took through the carry Lake.

Speaker 4 (49:11):
Drot And just so you guys know, I want to
make it clear to everybody, we didn't just take this
timing data at face value either. It was analyzed very heavily.
And one thing that we did, if you remember I
had told you earlier in this podcast, we capture all
of the live feed video footage from the Elections Department.
So we scoured through video footage and we compared what

(49:37):
we were seeing visually with our eyes to what the
data was telling us. So Chris would say at this
point in time, this guy is doing this, or this
gout is doing this, and we would look through the
video footage to find somebody that very specifically matched all
the way down to their break time to ensure that
the data was actually accurate and provably accurate.

Speaker 1 (50:01):
And it was. Honestly.

Speaker 4 (50:02):
One of the few things I don't think the County
has ever really been able to dispute with us is that,
you know, our method and process was extraordinarily accurate and methodic.

Speaker 2 (50:13):
So exactly so we were able to find some of
these people on camera doing what we could see them
doing in the data. So if if you want to
bring up twenty one, I'm sorry, eleven, we don't.

Speaker 1 (50:25):
Want to do the video number ten. Yeah, let's do ten.

Speaker 2 (50:28):
Ten, Yes, of course, oh yes, And here we are.

Speaker 4 (50:36):
I'm going to see literarum.

Speaker 1 (50:41):
So, like I said, you can see the nap time here.

Speaker 2 (50:45):
That's right. You can see the gap in the data
where he's not doing any evaluations. That as kind of
a pinpoint we are correlation between the data. I got
to give credit work credits do It is Steve who
actually found correlation between the data and the native our

(51:07):
producer right there in the work.

Speaker 1 (51:11):
So when you're looking at the screen.

Speaker 4 (51:12):
I want to point out the bottom left penny lead
box that you see on the bottom left of the monitor.
That is the exemplar with the signature from the voter registration.
And uh, you know, look how quickly these clickings. There's
no way there's herricon happy here.

Speaker 2 (51:31):
Yeah. Yeah, all envelope on the top, the exemplar on
the lower left. Tell me that the exemplar is so
smaller screen. And here we have his graph of his work.
So we'll take another look at the graph here in
a minute, statue says compare and is that really? Is

(51:51):
that really comparing? When you rip through the speed click
through those so quickly? Mail in voting is safe, secure
and valid. Our friend Steven Richard.

Speaker 4 (52:05):
So so that's a little taste of some of what
we were able to discover comparing this timing data to
the videos. And yes, thank you producer, Steve. You want
to say hello to everybody, Say hi to everybody Steve
for putting that video together. And I'm sorry that Chris
and I jabber job through the whole thing because it's

(52:25):
actually kind of funny.

Speaker 1 (52:26):
It's got this whole Elmer fud thing going on.

Speaker 4 (52:29):
But hello, Seeve, So see you slip that video together
for us, So thank you Steve.

Speaker 1 (52:34):
So what else?

Speaker 4 (52:35):
What else were we able to do with these times
with the timing data? Chris like, how do we map that?

Speaker 2 (52:40):
We graph that so that you know you rather than
looking at raw data, you can actually look at a
picture that represents some of what we saw on the data.
So let's take a look at number eleven. Okay, so
what we see on the left is the number of
seconds that this person took to evaluate each of those signatures.

(53:03):
Now each dot are just getting into the weeds. Each dot,
it's two undred and fifty two undred and fifty evaluations
and there those are those are average of the average
of the median or have some average of the mean.
But anyway, what you see here is the number seconds

(53:23):
that it took this person to do the evaluation. And
this person is up around ten seconds per evaluation. That
seems pretty reasonable. This seems pretty conscientious. And on the
right what you see is the yeah average of seven
point nine seconds since or seven point zero seven point.

Speaker 1 (53:39):
Nine, seven point nine seconds.

Speaker 4 (53:40):
So this is pretty consistent with some of our better
well trained staff when we performed our Audit is that
correct around around six to twelve seconds, and then some
of them took upwards to thirty seconds.

Speaker 1 (53:54):
But this is conscientious.

Speaker 2 (53:56):
This is a conscientious user. It's a good example of
conscientious using.

Speaker 4 (54:00):
Valid alpha David envelopes. Did they overall process cause look
like they did.

Speaker 2 (54:05):
Is that thirty six thousand, thirty six or is it
thirty that I can't read?

Speaker 4 (54:09):
It's either thirty five or thirty six thousand, okay, thirty
six or five?

Speaker 1 (54:13):
Thank you, Steve.

Speaker 4 (54:14):
There's and their overall acceptance rate here when they were
verifying what was the percentage that they passed through first level?

Speaker 2 (54:22):
See that top line up there as one hundred percent
pass rate and so they're well below one hundred percent there,
and their average is eighty percent pass.

Speaker 4 (54:31):
Rate and that is also one hundred percent consistent with
our findings.

Speaker 2 (54:36):
Consistent with our findings. So this is this is a
person who who evaluated like most of our people did. Okay,
so let's go on.

Speaker 4 (54:43):
So congratulations User twenty one to thank you for being
a patriot and understanding time. Yes, please please, I hope,
I hope you've been invited back, and if not, reach
out to us.

Speaker 1 (54:53):
We want you back in stiing there the.

Speaker 2 (54:56):
User let's say number twelve.

Speaker 1 (54:58):
Please, okay, now this looks very different.

Speaker 2 (55:03):
This is very different. So what we see on the
left is they take mostly about two seconds, an average
of two seconds to do their evaluations, so they're they're
only pausing. It takes the screen about a second to
upload to refresh from the last signature, and so they're
taking only about a second or two to look at

(55:25):
each one of these signatures. And then on the right,
they have a pass rate of about ninety eight percent. Yeah,
ninety nine percent pass rate, which is not reasonable. This
is what we saw throughout our evaluations is that the
data was very homogeneous. There wasn't some parts where there

(55:48):
was a lot of mismatches and some parts where there
were very many. It's all the way through this there
were about the same number, about the same pass rate.
So for anybody to come up with a pass right
like this is that's not They're not being conscientious. Can
we see number thirteen?

Speaker 1 (56:06):
So thirteen is my favorite? Yes, this is mister mcgus.

Speaker 2 (56:09):
This is a famous user number one thirty four, who
we have not named, although we know who are our
friend is, but this is the one from the video.
This is the one from the video, and he took
an average of two point four seconds to evaluate each signature,
and his pass rate was ninety nine percent. And that's

(56:33):
what we saw in the video. We saw him pressing
the accept button as quickly as the screen would come
up for most of the time that we watched him
on the video. So this is this is not a
person being conscientious. And unfortunately, we also saw managers pass
by him several times in the video and no manager
ever stopped to correct or to advise him otherwise.

Speaker 4 (56:58):
Now, I want to add here to so that during
the carry Lake trial, and you know, I wish I
would have brought that transcript up, but maybe we can
next week. During the carry Lake trial, Rave Allensuela indicated
that he was very familiar with this timing data and
that they used it to do performance analysis on signature

(57:20):
verification workers, which is quite ironic considering they didn't even
know how to generate the report until Chris literally taught
the IT team how to do that. So, you know,
a lot of contradictory behavior coming out of America Bacani
in this regard, right, Chris.

Speaker 2 (57:38):
Yeah, they did say Ray did say on the stand
that he used this data to evaluate his employees, when
we know that he produced this data for the first
time as a as a result of the public wrikers request.
Another interesting fact is when we asked for this data
for twenty twenty four, they said they had erased the

(57:59):
algorithm to produce it, and so they had to redesign
the algorithm from scratch, which means they weren't using this
data after we taught them how to produce it. They
had to reinvent the wheel when I asked for it
again in twenty twenty four.

Speaker 4 (58:15):
Now, I hate really beating a dead horse here, but
I want to play you another video. It's a brief video,
and this is signature verification occurring in Americopa County. Compared
to the timing data, every single thing you see in
here are all verifiers that verified at under three seconds
on average evaluation. Steve, can you go ahead and put

(58:38):
up thirteen X please.

Speaker 1 (58:41):
Xay? Yes. So this is ninety.

Speaker 4 (58:45):
Seconds of the signature verification process of somebody conscientious and
somebody unconscientious.

Speaker 1 (58:55):
Right, I wanted to mention that.

Speaker 2 (59:01):
This is the same user. Now, this is a close
up of his screen and it shows how fast he's
plucking these off. And I want to mention that we
decided that it's really not the responsibility of the individual workers.

(59:21):
It's the fact that they're trained and allowed to do
signature verification like this, even with managers passing by and
looking at their work. We get right next to each other.
We have somebody very conscientious doing the work on the
right and somebody just speed clicking on the left, and

(59:42):
the fact that they're sitting right next to each other
ought to be obvious to the manager if they were
passing by to correct these But the fact is that
management did not disapprove of this kind of signature verification practice.
So that's really who we hold accountable for this, and
that's why we I've protected the identities of the individual verifiers.

(01:00:03):
Although I got to give I got to give congratulations
to the one on the right because she is she's
definitely doing a good job of taking her time to
evaluate the signatures.

Speaker 4 (01:00:14):
I don't want to point something out, so if you
look at the exemplars that she's comparing it to, you
will actually see her scrolling, which means she's looking at
more than one.

Speaker 1 (01:00:28):
So if you look.

Speaker 4 (01:00:28):
At this, hundreds of thousands of signatures in twenty twenty
two were verified in less than three seconds each, which
means you couldn't have even scrolled to look at a
secondary signature in that time. And the one individual verified
twenty seven thousand signatures with a ninety nine percent pass rate.

(01:00:53):
And this user one thirty four was just one of
many examples of this kind of behavior found in the data.

Speaker 2 (01:01:01):
Yeah. No, I want to mention too, now that we're
talking about it, that in the process that we designed,
we brought up all the exemplars at what would be
the equivalent for level one. I'm not sure why the
county would limit the exemplars for level one. Why wouldn't
they let them see more than just the last three exemplars?
And one of the problems with the process is the

(01:01:23):
only the latest exemplar comes up at the bottom of
the screen. You have to be proactive, you have to
take an initiative to scroll down and look at more
than one. Even if you've got three available to you,
the first the only one is initially available to see,
whereas in our process we made them all instantly available
every time a new signature came up.

Speaker 4 (01:01:45):
I mean, why not another thing that I really want
to point out here is that when you look at
the process that we used as Chrissett, it's like your
second level and you get the process they're using at
the county. There really wasn't a lot of difference in

(01:02:07):
how it was laid out, except for I think their
ballot Affidavid envelope signature was much smaller than ours were,
and the time just wasn't possible. We didn't We did
not see anywhere in any of our users, any of
our auditors, be able to verify hundreds and hundreds of

(01:02:32):
signatures in just seconds flat. I personally did thousands of
signatures during that audit, and I was probably one of
the faster users by the end of the audit, and
I couldn't keep up that pace at all, not doing
it conscientiously. I think in an eight hour shift you

(01:02:54):
could maybe do seven hundred to one thousand max. And
we've seen and the data where some people were doing
over eight thousand signatures a day, and it's just not possible.

Speaker 2 (01:03:09):
Yeah, it's not reasonable to imagine that they're doing any
kind of evaluation or comparison as the statute requires.

Speaker 4 (01:03:17):
Yeah, So we brought this issue up in the carry
Lake trial right, We want to talk a little bit
about some of the talking points or the issues that
kind of came up during that trial as far as
the county's defense when it came to the presentation of
this data.

Speaker 2 (01:03:35):
Well, actually, let's let's take a look at the video
and then i'll kind of I'll tell you what they
said in their statements during the trial. So let's bring
up number fourteen.

Speaker 4 (01:03:46):
Number fourteen, and we're going to be quiet through this one,
because there's a lot to hear.

Speaker 2 (01:03:53):
Oh, yes, that's right.

Speaker 4 (01:04:02):
Are we really supposed to believe that.

Speaker 6 (01:04:11):
Plaintiff's chain of custody claim seems to hinge on this
notion that perhaps some number of ballots were injected into
the batches at runback. Even if there were fifty five hundred,
five hundred thousand ballots somehow injected into the process, every
ballot received by Maricopa County is processed, checked against the
voter registration record to make sure the person hasn't already voted,

(01:04:33):
and then verified by a multi level signature review process.
There is no evidence or even reason.

Speaker 7 (01:04:40):
To believe that it had any effect on the number
of votes lawfully counted.

Speaker 2 (01:04:56):
Multi level sounds very it's very impressive.

Speaker 4 (01:04:59):
Doesn't these are different signature verifyrus These are not all
mister magoo.

Speaker 5 (01:05:23):
We're supposed to believe now there's two hundred and seventy
four thousand crooks out there that all got hold the
Great Envelopes and so all these fake ballots got through.

Speaker 6 (01:05:32):
Are we really supposed to.

Speaker 5 (01:05:33):
Believe that.

Speaker 2 (01:05:42):
Those be those fake ballots?

Speaker 4 (01:05:44):
Are we really supposed to believe that, Chris, Really, we're
really supposed to believe that two hundred thousand ballots got
through the system unchecked with such a beautiful system.

Speaker 2 (01:05:56):
Are we supposed to believe that two hundred thouars and
egregious mismatch signatures made it?

Speaker 1 (01:06:03):
Look at that stack?

Speaker 2 (01:06:05):
Yeah, So what we just heard there was the county
saying or the attorney saying that even if we had five, say,
five hundred thousand fake ballots come into the system, we
have the last line of defense, which is signature verification,
multi level signature verification. So even if we do have

(01:06:28):
that many ballots, we have signature verification to protect us
from that. And then what they implied at the end was, well, yeah,
we have a bunch of people not doing signature verification
very conscientiously. But even if we had, even if we
if we had some problems in signature verification, what are

(01:06:50):
we going to assume that fifty thousand or five hundred
thousand ballots came into the system fraudulently. So really it's
a circular argument. They argue both sides without really being
able to defend either one.

Speaker 4 (01:07:03):
Yeah, this is you could always trust your election department
to lie, gaslight and ridicule anyone who dares to question them,
you know. It was It was interesting during that Carrie
Lake trial because Tom Lyddy, who is one of the
attorneys for the county, he actually went as far as

(01:07:25):
to say that if voters were disenfranchised due to equipment
failures in twenty twenty two, that was simply because Carry
Lake and other people in the AZGP had the nerve
to tell them not to vote by mail, not to
vote early. If they'd just voted early and voted by mail,

(01:07:48):
they wouldn't have had the problems on election days. So
they went from blaming groups like ours and blaming Carrie
Lake for the distrust in the election, and that's our fault,
and then the disenfranchisement of voters or the potential disenfranchisement
of voters. That's our fault as well, right, Or that's

(01:08:09):
the voter's fault, because if the voter would have just
voted the way they wanted them to instead of what
is constitutionally available to them, right, they wouldn't have suffered
so many issues in twenty twenty two. I'm yeah, I'm
speech but I'm well said, well said.

Speaker 1 (01:08:31):
So we have a little bit of surprise.

Speaker 4 (01:08:33):
I dropped my airp but that's okay, I'll find it
in a minute. We were able to get the twenty
twenty four data timing data, weren't we chrissed?

Speaker 2 (01:08:41):
After all?

Speaker 4 (01:08:41):
Do you want to talk about I think I think
it came in a little different this time, right.

Speaker 2 (01:08:47):
The twenty twenty four, Yeah, we have the Are you
guys about the twenty twenty or the twenty twenty four?

Speaker 4 (01:08:54):
Well, we've got the twenty twenty four that we're still analyzing,
right right, and we're going to bring that up next
next show.

Speaker 2 (01:09:01):
That's right.

Speaker 1 (01:09:01):
What about twenty twenty? What was there anything pro in
the twenty twenty data that we want to talk about.

Speaker 2 (01:09:08):
I'm just gonna I'm going to just give you a
little teaser here with a couple of things we want
to talk about next time. In the twenty twenty data,
we found that the first one point two or one
point three million ballots came through the process without a
single exception or without a single failure.

Speaker 4 (01:09:27):
Now there's so are you saying the first one point
two million people that got their ballot and they're just
all really honest people.

Speaker 2 (01:09:35):
Well, like I said, you know the the Yeah, that's
when the honest people voted. So there were no fraudulent
ballots in that first one point two million, and then
it wasn't until the latter seven hundred thousand that that
team started to see some problems with those ballots. So
we're going to talk more about that next time, and

(01:09:55):
we'll show you some data and give us some detailed
information on that. The other thing that we're going to
talk about next time is step three in signature verification.
We talked about UH level one and level two, and
let's put up a graphic.

Speaker 4 (01:10:16):
Yeah, producer Steve is crawling around the floor looking for
my ear piece and I found it. I found it perfect.

Speaker 2 (01:10:27):
This is live broadcast.

Speaker 1 (01:10:30):
Good stop.

Speaker 2 (01:10:31):
I love it, I love it. Okay, we're also going
to talk about step three the signature verification process, which
is curing. And we're going to talk about the intent
and the actual practice the same way we did about
signature verification. And I think this is this is the
most important potential flaw or the most important the most

(01:10:52):
important part of the process where they can catch errors
if they if they if they do it right, I mean,
if they if the process is good in that it
can be one of the most important part of parts
of the process. But according to practice, it can be
also one of the most dangerous. So that's what we're
going to talk about next time.

Speaker 4 (01:11:12):
Well, and you know, we the people USA Alliance, were
responsible for speaking out about mail in voting and about
the signature verification process, but we're not the first ones
to do this. Over the course of history, since mail
in ballots were incorporated back in the nineties, there has
been several prominent people that have spoken out about mail

(01:11:36):
in ballots, including Jimmy Carter in the Carter Center, right,
I mean, Jimmy Carter was talking about the dangers of
mail in voting even as recent as two thousand and five.
I think Brian has the you know.

Speaker 1 (01:11:55):
If Brian's available, have you talked? Yeah, let me see
if he could hop on. I know he's just.

Speaker 2 (01:12:05):
A real quick if he can get on. Yeah. I
think we've mentioned that at the very beginning, how people
have been saying for decades that mail in balloting is
is a very dangerous practice prone to the possibility of fraud. Hey, hey, yeah,

(01:12:39):
get on here.

Speaker 1 (01:12:44):
Is it possible? Is it possible for you to hop on? Yeah?

Speaker 4 (01:12:50):
Hey, Steven, Okay, he's gonna shoot you a link straight
away if you can hop on. And I'd love to
hear kind of what you know about the Carter Baker report,
because I know we were talking about that and you
were looking into it.

Speaker 1 (01:13:02):
So thanks, all right, bye?

Speaker 2 (01:13:10):
Yees out of town, isn't he That's pretty nice for
him to, Oh, well, clearly out of town.

Speaker 5 (01:13:25):
You look out of it.

Speaker 2 (01:13:27):
You look like you.

Speaker 5 (01:13:30):
I'm a ghost. No, I'm not into mine.

Speaker 2 (01:13:32):
I'm uh.

Speaker 5 (01:13:34):
I'm actually down at the US Mexico border about uh
fifteen miles east of Lukeville. I believe been uh been run,
been run. Oh ship just tripped, got my flashlight pointed
the wrong way, then uh been running running the border California, Yuma, Oho,

(01:13:59):
So really really beautiful places out there. So yeah, I
like to do what the signs tell you not to do,
which is driver the load.

Speaker 4 (01:14:15):
Are you one of these guys, Brian When they put
up signs and say do not enter, it makes you
want to enter?

Speaker 5 (01:14:22):
Oh yes, I mean and that and then gets that
gets to Stephen Richer, right and uh and the current
actual board of supervisors. You know, they say do not enter,
and it's like open that door. I want to I wanna.
I want to see what's what's behind that door. So

(01:14:43):
I don't know if you can.

Speaker 2 (01:14:44):
See the attractive nuisance, right, yeah, attractive nuisance.

Speaker 5 (01:14:52):
There's the ball nuisance. I don't know about attractive yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah.
It got dark sooner than I thought it would. I
guess I lost track of time. Yeah.

Speaker 2 (01:15:09):
And so what do you know about Carter Baker?

Speaker 4 (01:15:11):
What with the Carter Baker report in two thousand and five.

Speaker 5 (01:15:18):
Well, you know, the whole issue was, you know, looking
at whether or not we could use mail in voting
as a as a legitimate, you know, fraud fee free
form of voting because a lot of states were making
a shift to mail in bony. Arizona actually was one

(01:15:40):
of those. Arizona's actually been on the vanguard of mail
in voting. And I remember when it was really being
pushed in the nineties. I worked for the Republican Party
down in Pema County, and you know, you could tell
back then that it was just going to be rife

(01:16:01):
with fraud. And uh, you know, so so this this
commission gets together Baker, Jimmy James Baker and uh, you know,
Jimmy Carter, and they they look at what the potential
problems are with mail in voting, and you know, they
basically conclude that, you know, we should stay away from

(01:16:22):
mail in voting because the potential for fraud is absolutely incredible.
And I think we see that in Maricopa County and
I want to say.

Speaker 4 (01:16:33):
Coot, no, I think we we lost Brian. You know,
another thing, just an interesting point of fact to throw
out there, is that the Carter Center, when they issued
this two thousand and five report, they also stated that

(01:16:54):
that mail in ballot and early voting should not commence
any great raater than fifteen days before election day because
it inadvertently harmed candidate because all of the information was
not in yet, and voting too soon would cause people

(01:17:14):
to vote in ways they wouldn't naturally vote because so
much information floods in at the last minute. What is
the voting period in the state of Arizona?

Speaker 2 (01:17:22):
Pressed, what is it? Eight twenty eight days? Twenty nine
twenty nine days here in Arizona.

Speaker 4 (01:17:28):
Twenty nine days of voting in Arizona. So interestingly enough,
are you going to pull him back in if he
if he joins us again? Okay, we don't know if
Brian's coming back. But the last thing that I kind
of want to point out with this whole card Baker
thing is, oh, okay, he's got to bring him back in.

Speaker 5 (01:17:52):
What was I saying? Yeah? What was I still talking about?

Speaker 1 (01:17:59):
How Carter I Baker?

Speaker 4 (01:18:01):
The Carter Center report in two thousand and five talked
about the mail in system being ripe with fraud, and
I pointed out to everybody while you were gone that
they also recommended that early voting never exceed fifteen days.
What else do you want to add about that report?

Speaker 5 (01:18:19):
And Carter, Well, you know, I think it's I think
it's interesting that you know, did I talk about Arizona
and when it started doing it?

Speaker 1 (01:18:31):
Yeah, in the nineties.

Speaker 5 (01:18:33):
Yeah, so you get the nineties and you could tell
back then it was going to be ripe with fraud.
But what's really interesting is Jimmy Carter, who of course
opposed mail in balloting and excessive early voting, you know,
at the ripe old age of ninety five years old, right,

(01:18:55):
has a change of heart. And it's ironic that Jimmy Carter,
a big Democrat, has that change of heart. What was it?
Was it in May of twenty twenty.

Speaker 4 (01:19:10):
Right, It was a few months before the primary of
twenty twenty.

Speaker 5 (01:19:15):
Yeah, and so that was I mean, it's very telling
in that in that you have you have this huge
movement of foot in this in the United States, this
huge anti Trump movement afoot, and it's really telling that
you know, people like Adrian Fontes, Right, Adrian Fontes just

(01:19:39):
wanted to do carte launch mail in voting to every
to every voter in Maricopa County, and thank god, people
like Alex cullenon who really should be the Secretary of State,
sued him and prevented that from happening. But you know,
push comes to shove in twenty twenty and you talked

(01:20:00):
about all these numbers tonight, right, Chris, when the when
it when it appears the fraud was taking place, can
you hear me?

Speaker 2 (01:20:13):
Chris there, I was muted for a second there.

Speaker 5 (01:20:17):
I was wondering. Yeah, so yeah, so the first one point.

Speaker 2 (01:20:23):
Of that we've saved. We've saved some of that for
next broadcast. But yeah, we talked about some of that.

Speaker 5 (01:20:29):
Right, right, Yeah, And so you know, it's it's just
interesting that, you know, all of these big name lefties
have a change of heart, including the Rhinos in UH
in twenty twenty, right, and this was this was the
big anti Trump movement, right, the big anti Trump push

(01:20:52):
that took place in twenty twenty to ensure that Donald
Trump would not win the presidency of the United States
States of America. And you know, I just want to
talk about, you know, Stephen Richer and I don't think
we got to this in UH in either of our
last two podcasts with Kim and one of them was

(01:21:15):
a video we thought about playing, but I don't think
we did. And it's Stephen Richer talking about, you know,
all of the all of the things he did to
ensure that voters in Maricopa County could be sure that
their ballot was counted. Do you recall that one, Shelby,

(01:21:37):
Oh yeah, most yah, Yeah, So they created this whole
tracking system, you could track your individual ballot.

Speaker 1 (01:21:46):
Through the postal be ballot ready, be.

Speaker 5 (01:21:50):
Ballot ready, Okay, and so you know, but Stephen Richer
misses the entire point of mail in voting, Uh, especially
when you compound mail in voting with voter registration signature fraud.
Right when you start getting a significant amount of signature

(01:22:11):
or voter registration brad taking place and there's nobody really
checking the system, or you get the registration of illegal
immigrants and other people that should not vote, and we
can see what happened in Pennsylvania. You know, they've got
a big criminal investigation. I believe that was just referred

(01:22:32):
by the Pennsylvania legislature to the Department of Justice. And
so you know, the person that was doing that workout there,
that runs the companies actually out of Tempe, Arizona, used
to work for Adrian Fontes when Adrian Fontes first became
Mercopa County recorder. And then we also want.

Speaker 4 (01:22:54):
To point out Brian he's currently the vice mayor of Mesa, Arizona.
So he was working for Adrian Fontes and now he's
the vice mayor.

Speaker 5 (01:23:05):
Right, I wonder, I wonder if he registered his own
voters yeah, and so you know, it's it's just it's
just interesting that you know, after he leaves Fontest, what
does he do. He goes out and creates these don
governmental organizations to register voters. And this is what we've
been talking about our first two shows, right, were the

(01:23:27):
non governmental organizations. And so you know when you compound
voter registration with this this fraud, and then you you
compound it with just that this really crazy permanent mail
in voting list, right, you know a lot of these

(01:23:49):
people don't vote, and how hard would it be, Shelby.
I mean, you've looked at the numbers. I've looked at
the numbers I've done. You know, I've done these types
of work for candidates. But you can identify the voters
who aren't going to vote, and you could if you
could get their ballot and voted. You know the problem

(01:24:11):
is that look at twenty twenty, right, you got twenty
thousand ballots show up after the election, and these are
male ballots, and so people's concern is not really, oh well,
you know I sent my ballot back, you know, didn't
get counted. That's not really the big concern. The big

(01:24:32):
concern is who has access to a large number of
these ballots that can then be illegally voted. And we
know Steven Richard wasn't doing his job. We know they
hire people, and they've consistently hired people that sit there
to just go enter, enter, enter, And I think, I

(01:24:55):
think you're going to talk a lot about this in
the next show next week. But when they just sit
there and hit enter, enter, enter, enter, enter, right. I
started it at first by talking about Arizona is a
voter I d state, right, you got to have ID
in Arizona to vote when you go to the polls. Well,
your signature on the mail in ballot, by law is

(01:25:19):
your ID. That's your identification, right. And so when people
are not actually validating that signature against the signature on
the voter registration database, and we know they're not because
you know, you cannot, you cannot do their system as
fast as many of these people that Chris has been

(01:25:42):
able to show are actually doing it. And so you know,
but I'm guessing this is why Steven Richard doesn't want
us to have the names of these workers. I would
I would venture a guess that many of these workers
are are part of an NGO, and that NGO is
probably very decidedly anti Trump, anti MAGA, and so you know,

(01:26:06):
I don't want to spill the beans for anything we're
going to talk about next week. But when you start,
when you start just hitting in er inner inner, you've
got you got problems because you're not validating the identification
of the voter.

Speaker 1 (01:26:18):
Well, and isn't that doesn't that equate to identity theft? Brian?
If we're taking a forged.

Speaker 4 (01:26:24):
Signature and putting it into someone's record, it's like stealing
their identity, wouldn't you say?

Speaker 5 (01:26:31):
Yeah? And that's and that's something that I think, you know,
we need to make clear to the listeners is that
what's actually taking place and the law, the law doesn't
actually allow this. There is no provision in the law
that I'm aware of that allows them to take a
signature from a balid Affidavid envelope and enter it into

(01:26:55):
the voters registration record as a valid signature.

Speaker 1 (01:26:59):
But we lost Brian again.

Speaker 4 (01:27:05):
Well, we've are exceeded an hour, So I guess it's
time to let Brian get back to his border Atvengures
and wrap things up. Do you want to tell the
viewers that are left now? What we plan to go
into next week.

Speaker 2 (01:27:20):
Well, I think we teased it a little bit. We're
going to talk about the twenty twenty findings, We're going
to show some grass from twenty twenty and twenty twenty four,
and we're also going to talk about the most important,
the potentially safest, and the potentially most dangerous part of
signature verification, and that is curing. I think that's it's

(01:27:44):
going to be an important conversation, and we saved it
for a show where we could spend some time on it.

Speaker 1 (01:27:51):
So do you have any final thoughts for the viewers?

Speaker 2 (01:27:54):
That's it. I'm looking forward to next time and being
able to explain that.

Speaker 1 (01:28:00):
All right, Yeah, bring Brian in so he can say goodbye.

Speaker 5 (01:28:03):
Yeah, we were just round not well, I don't know
how long I was gone, But what was the last
thing I said?

Speaker 1 (01:28:15):
Well, we were.

Speaker 4 (01:28:15):
Talking about identity theft and you said that the law
doesn't give a provision for them to take signatures and
adopt them into the voter record.

Speaker 5 (01:28:27):
That's one correct, but I bet I would just as
a final thought, you know, I bet you if we
were to compare each voter's signatures that are in their
voter registration database in their individual record. I bet we
would start finding significant inconsistencies. And the problem with this

(01:28:49):
is is that if you get somebody that's conscientious, that
actually does their job verifying signatures, trying to identify the
identity of this particular voter, and they're looking and they
start looking at three signatures in some person's file, how
how are they to know which one's the correct one?

(01:29:11):
And so, what I think really needs to happen is
something needs to happen to compel miracle the county to
purge all of those signatures from the voter registration database
and simply use the one the voter used when they
registered to vote. And this this really should be a
wet signature on a piece of paper that is then

(01:29:33):
scanned in because you know, a lot of this I
signed with my finger, you know, it just looks like
a McDonald's signature on the on the pinpetytail.

Speaker 2 (01:29:46):
Next time, this idea of putting the an approved signature
into the voter reference file we didn't get into the
we we mentioned that briefly.

Speaker 4 (01:29:55):
I'd love to show some images next week of what
a voter record looks slight when it has five different.

Speaker 1 (01:30:03):
Styles of signatures and one record.

Speaker 2 (01:30:05):
Right, Yeah, we'll talk well in detail.

Speaker 5 (01:30:10):
Yeah, but that's what's that's what's crazy about it. But
I want to say again, phenomenal work, Chris. You know,
we the People USA Alliance, you know, we got to
keep pounding, We got to keep pushing because this is
the tool they're using to manipulate the outcome of our elections.
And if you had access to five thousand early ballots

(01:30:32):
that you could then have your crew vote your non
governmental organization, because we know this involves a lot of
left wing non non governmental organizations, then you could you
could systemically change the outcome of elections. I mean, school board,
board of supervisors. You could target one specific race and

(01:30:56):
and have an impact in that race. So so good work,
and thanks thanks for bringing me off down on the border.
Sorry it's so dark, it's actually enjoy your time.

Speaker 1 (01:31:06):
Be safe out there. We lost him again, that's okay.

Speaker 2 (01:31:15):
Yeah.

Speaker 4 (01:31:16):
Well, final thoughts for me is, look, I've said this,
I'm going to continue to say this. I don't believe
Trump won in twenty twenty four because the right figured
out how to do ballot harvesting better than the left.
I think it was a mandate from the American people
that he went and I don't think it had to

(01:31:37):
do with the fact that mail in ballot was a
part of it. Mail in ballot by all regards, I
believe is criminal and an affront to the American people.
And I will continue, as Chris will continue, and our
organization will continue to point out these flaws. And join
us next week because you're going to be really interested

(01:32:00):
in finding out what twenty twenty and twenty twenty four
look like in comparison to the timing data for twenty
twenty two, and to find out the impact of the
timeline extension bill. And we'll get into that next week, right.

Speaker 2 (01:32:14):
Chris, exactly. Sounds good to me. Let's do that.

Speaker 4 (01:32:17):
So be blessed and have a very wonderful rest of
your Monday night, and we will see you next week.

Speaker 2 (01:32:25):
Yeah, tell your neighbors we'll see you next week.

Speaker 3 (01:32:31):
Amicaan gangsters, cause we speak moldy tripping.

Speaker 2 (01:32:38):
On the haters. It can take free.

Speaker 3 (01:32:43):
From the days data.

Speaker 5 (01:33:00):
Eight

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The Male Room with Dr. Jesse Mills

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Stuff You Should Know