August 8, 2025 • 39 mins
Seg 1 – The Japanification of China
Seg 2 – China Trade and the AI Space Race
Seg 3 – China MIA?
Seg 4 – A Precarious Future for Taiwan
Seg 2 – China Trade and the AI Space Race
Seg 3 – China MIA?
Seg 4 – A Precarious Future for Taiwan
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
The views and opinions expressed on the following program are
those of the host and guests and do not necessarily
represent those of any organization, including one generation away.
Speaker 2 (00:10):
No, that's it was free freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
freedom of enterprise, and freedom is special and read.
Speaker 1 (00:17):
This is Liberty Nation with Markangeledes, a production of Libertynation
dot com, going after what the politicians really mean and
making it all clear for your freedom and your liberty.
Liberty Nation with Markangeledes.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Hello, welcome to Liberty Nation Radio her Coast Coast on
the Radio American Network. I'm your host, Mark Angelini's. We
have quite the lineup show for you today. It's going
to be great fun. Let's get started and you're back
on libitin Nation Radio Head Coast Coasts on the Radio
American Network. I'm your host, Mark Anthony's and we're having
a wonderful conversation about international economics. Don't tune out just now.
(00:55):
It's it's fascinating and you're gonna love it with Liberty
Nations economics editor guru and expert on all things fiscal
mister Andrew Moran. Thanks for being here.
Speaker 3 (01:05):
Andrew, I would to say I'm amazing I.
Speaker 2 (01:09):
Didn't say you're amazing. He's to me, he's pretty amazing.
He has the numbers at his fingertips and and his
fingertips at the end of a Google search. So let's
carry on with this CHATBT chat tp oh dear No.
So what we want to talk about today, Andrew, is
is China. And that's the overall theme, what's happening with
(01:30):
the Chinese economy? Because I mentioned to you not long
ago that and I'm not an economist and I don't
follow the data other than I read your pieces on
liutination dot com, but it seemed to me that China
is slowly slipping into what Japan used to be the
Japanification of the Chinese economy. And you said that that's
(01:54):
something that's actually doing a buzz around. Now, what are
the data points involved in that?
Speaker 3 (02:00):
Well, so there are anything. So first, is that child
is actually facing deflation. That's something that that that that
Japan has struggled for a long time, not so much
as of late, but overall. Yes, you see the last
several months of CPI data and even the proof Producer
Price Index, it's all slipping into deflation.
Speaker 2 (02:16):
Treat me like I'm a rather slow five year old
and explain deflation to me.
Speaker 3 (02:20):
So price deflation is when you have declining prices across
the board. So there's not a lot of consumption going on,
there's a lot of domestic demand happening across the countries.
Therefore prices are falling. But even on a foreign demand
level too, you see, which is that there are another
aspect of this jimpanification. You're seeing four demand for Chinese
goods actually declined. So for example, the Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index,
(02:43):
that's they have two versions. They have a government version,
they have a private sector version. Both show contraction, meaning
that perhaps President Donald Trump's tariffs are weighing on the
Chinese economies and its manufacturing prowess and exports. Another thing
is the aging population jamand for so long has struggled
with eating demographics. China, despite its recent endeavors of let's say,
(03:04):
removing the one child policy and try and present usually
been calling people saying, hey have some babies. Nobody's having
babies at all. So those are the three aspects of
weighing on the Chinese economy.
Speaker 2 (03:15):
So there's actually on this thing about the shrinking population
that there having in China when they introduced the one
child policy, there were some exemptions to that, and that
was quite If you were a farmer and your first
child was a daughter, then you could have another one.
(03:37):
If you had plenty of money, you would take on
a second wife as it were, and then have another child.
But this was very limited to people, and of course
tragically resulted in a massive fanta side of unborn girls.
But what happened was it became so coultural that to
(04:02):
only have one child across the board from most people,
and then you ended up with it was the eight
four to one situation. So there's the eight great grandparents,
the four grandparents, two parents, and then it's down to
the one. Now, because of how the Chinese system is
set up, that meant that the one at the bottom there,
(04:25):
the one child that they end up having, has to
essentially support everything going up those tiers. But and so
you think, well, it's better to have more kids, right,
But these people they are too busy to have kids
because they've got all this family to support. It's kind
of put them into it almost I would say, a
(04:46):
bottleneck in terms of being able to get out of it.
But I mean in Japan's not really matched to turn
that around it either, has it.
Speaker 3 (04:55):
I would say most developed countries have struggled to encourage
more people have a children, no matter what they're doing.
Even these Eastern European countries that are that are trying
that have been open about trying to welcome all people
to have more kids, or you know, change a tax policy,
it's not working at all. Nobody wants to have kids
these days, maybe because the high cost of living. You know,
maybe this whole was the climate change, and for years
(05:18):
we talking about overpopulation, how we need to depopulate the world.
It's all backfired, and everybody, you need to have the
children if you want to sustain all these entitlement programs
and the economy and everything that we've become so accustomed
to for the last several decades.
Speaker 2 (05:34):
So let's let's go back specifically to China. We've got
the deflation, we've got a disastrous birth rate.
Speaker 3 (05:41):
Don't forget the doubt is the debt is the thing
you have to do.
Speaker 2 (05:43):
Right the debt. Tell me about the Chinese debt.
Speaker 3 (05:46):
The federal debt isn't so much a problem. It's the
municipal debt at the stay local level, they have really
accumulated so much debt to facilitate stimulus projects to create
more infrastructure. So when you see on if you go
on X, you see all these wondrous things that China
has all over the country that has been fostered by debt.
And the government actually recently came out well probably a
(06:09):
year ago, I was to say, and they said that
we're not going to bail out any local governments anymore.
It's all up to them to pay off these debts.
So what are they doing. They're issuing more bonds. But
with the global campanal markets already in none dating, with
a huge supply of government bonds and debt, no one
is buying it. So that's going to cause even a
greater issue. Another issue in China is the collapse of
(06:29):
the residential property market. Property values have gone down twenty
percent since the days of when that property collapse happened
a couple of years ago, and then of course the
one that happened up before the coronavirus pandemic. So you
have a cascading of issues festering in the world's second
largest economy, and you know, with your panification, I guess
it's going to happen in the next few years unless
(06:50):
they turn things around, which at this point doesn't seem
very likely.
Speaker 2 (06:53):
So I have some insight into what's been happening with
that acumend debt from the provinces, having spent many, many
years in China. So what happens is the central government
when it's having let's say cash issues, it releases a
massive round of quantitative easing. Then that gets funneled out
(07:17):
to the state adjacent banks let's call them, and then
the banks have a responsibility to give the lion's share
of this new fiscal product that they have out to
state owned enterprises. Now, state owned enterprises are they're the
really big ones. They're the ones that have full government support.
(07:38):
They're the ones that are placeholders for the cousin of
a cousin of a cousin of a third cousin twice removed.
And these people have to be paid. They have to
have the nice officers, they have to have the nice
cars with the drivers, and so this money is just
being pushed out to the state owned enterprises on the
understanding that because it's a state owned enterprise it is
(08:00):
a technically a business. They never have to pay back
the money. Yeah, so the money doesn't come back in
once it gets loaned out, it's just gone. It has
to go on somebody's books. And who is that, Well,
that's the state and province books that were so generous
in feeding out the government money under instructions to these
state owned enterprises. It's a bit of a pyramid scheme,
(08:22):
I think, Andrew.
Speaker 3 (08:23):
Yeah, absolutely right. I remember writing this article many years
ago before the coronavirus pandemic, and it talked about how
the Chinese economy is hauffered from the zombie economy because
these companies, no matter what, they will get bailed out.
If a smaller company fails, it will just be absorbed
by a larger, as.
Speaker 2 (08:36):
You say, state owned enterprise.
Speaker 3 (08:38):
So there's a lot of there's so yeah, the jipandification
once you have the zombification of the Chinese economy. And
the other challenge too, is that for the People's Bank
of China, the country central bank, is that they've already
stimulated the economy to death during the coronavirus pandemic and
they're trying to do it again during these child during
this face off with President Trump. I don't know how
much more they have left, and the arsenal to achieve
(08:59):
this is but if but so far, I mean, the
numbers point that to diable to achieve the central government's
GDP growth rate, but whether it's based on actual fundamental
growth that is doubtful this point. But for the deflation part,
you know that has been that has been really setting
to watch unfold in real time.
Speaker 2 (09:18):
And if that.
Speaker 3 (09:19):
Happens the next year, Treasury Secretary spot Usin's uh uh
assertion that the that's actually in the depression, that could
that could be actually reality.
Speaker 2 (09:29):
We're going to continue talking about what could happened to
China after this shortbreak. Don't go anywhere.
Speaker 1 (09:41):
For your freedom and your liberty. Liberty Nation with Mark Edgelitis.
Speaker 2 (09:46):
And you're back on Liberty Nation Radio. We're continuing our
conversation with Economics editor Andrew Moran. So earlier we were
talking about the deflation, the population problem and the debt
explosion taking place in China and how it's leading tom
what could be a lost decade much the same as Japan.
So the Japanification, how realistic do you think a lost
(10:09):
decade for China will be? With that I remember reading
many many years ago while I was living in China.
I think it's Gordon Chang's The Coming Collapse of China,
and then of course, but even then it was a
few years old the book, and you see Gordon Chang
and about quite a lot as the China expert, but
(10:29):
I think he may have actually been spot on, if
not a few years late.
Speaker 3 (10:36):
Well, Della doesn't seem very strong at all, particularly if
you have that as psience alluded to the shrinking ice
ice cube, whereby China and other country economies would be
the consuming countries and the item would be the key manufacturer. Remember,
for so long many countries were already leaving, were already leaving. Actually,
many companies were already leaving China and heading for greater pastures,
(10:57):
whether that's the Vietnam or whether that's India. Because yeah,
I mean I think it was Tim Cook, the Apple CEO.
He was on stage at a reason unfortunate that a
couple of years ago, and he said that labor costs
are not attractive anymore in China. How they're already rising
because they're growing middle class. So if more companies are
fleeing China, that's one disadvantage against against the Chinese economy.
(11:19):
Another thing too is you know I just alluded to
you know, these what are these small companies producing anything?
Are these medium and large companies producing anything at all?
If they're constantly getting bailed out, then they can there's
no incentive to either improve their products or or or
or try try to you know, bolster their companies. What's
in any way possible. At the same time, you have
to look at there could be positive. So one thing
(11:40):
they're really doing well in is artificial intelligence. They're really
investing heavily in AI. And you see that, you see
a deep seek for example, that was a small that
was a small that was a small enterprise. And you know,
there's been some discussion about how exactly achieved you know,
producing AI at the level of chat Shept with fewer resources,
fewer men power, a little less energy overall, you see
(12:01):
all the stuff coming up of China. AI is really
the robotics are they're doing really well. So I guess
Jijiping is betting on that to facilitate economy, the Chinese economy.
The number two positions in the world.
Speaker 2 (12:12):
That's it's actually quite similar to the Donald Trump position,
isn't it that you know each country needs to be
the leading player in global AI. And I'm wondering if
that's not a case of too many eggs in one
fragile basket. Well, if you look at so many one basket,
many baskets in one fragile egg, even if you.
Speaker 3 (12:33):
If you look at so many reports, if you look
at the White just just from the White hunts itself,
they're expecting tens of trillion dollars and economic growth coming
from AI and robotics and and and all the new
technologies that they'll be born from these two areas in
the in the coming decade. And that's just absolutely sounding,
I mean robotically, I mean that this is a different
top subject, but that's going to really transform the global economy, uh,
(12:56):
in both China and the United States, either you know,
on the and the aggregate level or on the individual level,
because these robotics are going to improve everyone's life in
many different ways.
Speaker 2 (13:08):
So yeah, that kind of brings up a question that
that ties into the theme you've been saying that certain
manufacturings are leaving Manufacturers are leaving China anyway because of
the labor costs as in tariffs and tariffs of course,
and so what's happening is everything's getting shipped off to
Vietnam where where manufacturing, processing, labor costs are still very
(13:28):
very low. But then what's happened, and this is notable
with Trump's recent Vietnamese trade deal, which wasn't about tariffs
at all, but rather about products that are largely produced
in China then ships through to Vietnam so they can
avoid the tariffs on China that they're applicable to Chinese product.
(13:51):
That's the end of the road, now, isn't it with
this new trade deal?
Speaker 3 (13:55):
Well, at least I mean for now. I mean that's
a ford. So under Trump's deal, the transshipment goods from
China to Vietnam would be stopped with forty percent tariff. Now, Vietnam,
to its credit, it has been trying to grapple this
situation for a long time by you know, stopping manufacturers
from you know, repackaging or relabeling. But it's such an
immense industry that it's very hard for the Vanniamese officials
(14:17):
to to wrestle with with with this product. But you know,
we'll we'll China just you know, look for a different
location or will Trump impose you know, the these trends
transhipment tariffs on every neighboring country in the region. I
think that's that's a more likely assessment for the transhipment problem.
Speaker 2 (14:36):
Two things on that. One, I think you're at three points.
Speaker 4 (14:38):
One.
Speaker 2 (14:38):
I think you're absolutely right too. I think that Vietnams
I'm also right. Well, no, number one, you're right, I'll
go over that. Number two. The Vietnam is also looking
because there's always because of all this work that's coming
in from China as it's trying to avoid that's also
raising the labor costs, and so they're looking to feel
(15:00):
out to a what do you call it, a fourth
party country or something so that they're looking to actually
become a powerhouse themselves, which is why I think they
were so eager to do a good deal with the
United States here, because they don't want to be the
manufacturing They want to be something else, something beyond just
a manufacturing basin. And the third point, Donald Trump.
Speaker 5 (15:23):
Will probably the White House will probably be pursuing a
similar trade arrangement to stop transhipping from China with all
the surrounding countries.
Speaker 2 (15:34):
I think that's absolutely right, and it seems to me
that this is designed not so much to level trade
with those countries, but to trap China into a landlocked position,
as it were, where it just has to do some
kind of deal with the United States to get its
(15:54):
products out of the country.
Speaker 3 (15:57):
Well, I'm curious about with China with their whole AI
is if they're going to really expand their manufacturing base
through AI. What I mean that they're they'll displace a
lot of human workers and embrace the artificial intelligence to
combat that labor costs. So if companies are leaving are
fleeing of one of the reasons companies are fleeing China
(16:17):
is because of labor cost factor, will robotics and AI
force encourage them back to China? Because because yes, US
and China are our powerhouse when it comes to AI investment.
But is Vietnam, is Thailand is in the are they?
Are they mirroring US and China when it comes to
AI robotics investing as I obnou seen numbers, But I
(16:38):
doubt it considering of they're spending trillions or perhaps they're
spending a few hundred billion.
Speaker 2 (16:45):
You mind look at it like and tell me if
I've got this wrong. But it's it's the new space race, right,
and so just the fact that they've got two major superpowers,
both rushing towards the the same goal. No matter who
actually gets to the finish line. I don't think you
really can get to a finish line with with AI
(17:08):
as it is. It's not going to be one person
gets this kind of AI and well we may as
well give up and just go with that one. I
think there's always going to be innovation within this particularity.
It's not like who can get to space first, right,
It's very well.
Speaker 3 (17:21):
I mean they're already cracking down on deep Seak. I
mean I think that the administrations banned government officials from
actually using the deep seek AI model are like large
language model. But there, I mean, there's so many AI
chat boss out there. I think I'll think deep seek
is a concern. But what I mean by that is
just that if there were administrations already worried about deep Seek,
and I'm sure they'll also be concerned about other AI
(17:42):
country of origin products.
Speaker 2 (17:45):
But I wonder what this looks like on the other side.
Wants AI is at the point where investors particularly want
it to be. Well, we have a what we see
China with a leveling off of its economy. Me where
does it go from? Their final thoughts on that.
Speaker 3 (18:03):
Well, I mean, for now they have to they have
to crap with the short term challenges which are purely
deaded deflation. But long I mean, who knows if they're
going to be able to flee from that. But if
you want to talk about JAPANI vacation. Japan was stuck
in the world's number three economy for so long, it
actually went down number four. I've heard which which organization
it was, but it projected, it projected that India would
(18:26):
be would become the world's number two economy, and so
that means China we could number three, number four. So well,
let's you know, somehow it resolves those issues, those long
standing fundamental problems. It's hard to see it maintain its
number two p hours.
Speaker 2 (18:39):
Well, let's hope for the almost a billion wonderful middle
class folks in China that things do get themselves sorted out.
Andrew Bran, thanks ever so much for joining us. You
(19:00):
know that it was free freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
freedom of enterplase and freedom is special and.
Speaker 1 (19:06):
Read this is liberty Nation with Markangeldes, a production of
libertynation dot com going after what the politicians really mean
and making it all clear for your freedom and your liberty.
Liberty Nation with Markangeledes.
Speaker 2 (19:24):
And we're continuing our China special with Liberty Nations National
Security correspondent Dave Patson. Thanks for being here, Dave. Thank you, Mark. So, Dave,
China is it's kind of having some strange, strange outlaid
patents on the world stage. There's a couple of data
(19:45):
points that I want to drop down, a couple of
pens and if you could sort of navigate surround those,
if you don't mind. So Number one, they've been strangely
absent from the entire Iranian affair.
Speaker 4 (20:00):
Yes, they have, and I think it's very simple from
their perspective. They have quite a bit of quite a
bit of at stake in terms of the oil they
get from Iran, you know, data point one, right, and
they're not sure exactly how to respond to the US
(20:21):
versus Iran, but they know they don't want to do
anything that will.
Speaker 2 (20:27):
Stop the flow of that oil. They know that. Yeah,
so that there's a I believe it's Iran produces three
million barrels a day. Much of that goes to the
Asian market, whereas and that's an exposure for China, Whereas
the US doesn't really rely on Iran for it's oil
(20:50):
capacity or production. So one could argue, if we're one
more conspiratory minded, that a good way to slow down
the Chinese engine of industry is to hit out at
its energy supplies. And so yeah, it kind of puts
them in a tricky position, right, They can't really side
with the US against shutting down what is essentially a
(21:13):
rogue state with the potential for nuclear weapons. But at
the same time, they don't annoy a rand too much, right.
Speaker 4 (21:22):
That's right. I mean so because Iran quite frankly is
the portal for China into the Middle East, and and
and they've they've milked that pretty pretty well. I mean,
the fact that they brokeered the peace agreement that may
be too strong a term, they brokeered the renewal of
(21:43):
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and so that
was a that was a big door opener for them.
And now they're again they're conflicted because where they can't
they can't support her and too heavily here because if
they do that, the United States will simply cut that
(22:05):
oil off. Yeah, and so they have to. They're walking
a fine line here with Iran. But what do you expect.
It's the Middle East?
Speaker 2 (22:13):
Right, Yes, allegiance has changed rather swiftly. And just for
those who may be interested before recording, David and we're
having a debate discussion on the various herods, Herod Agrippa
and whatnot, and how these power plays were taking place,
(22:34):
because you know, we don't have enough to do with
our lives other than discuss two thousand year old Middle
Eastern history. So the second to as point to drop
in on this is China avoided the recent bricks. That's worry.
Speaker 4 (22:53):
Yeah, Fushion being decided not to attend and that and
his presence really has traditionally been the glue that holds
it all together. And I mean, you've got Brazil and
India and China and Russia and Spain.
Speaker 2 (23:14):
How do you figure that one?
Speaker 6 (23:16):
I don't know, right, that's a joke, right, right, Yes,
you're re had me, okay, but it's quite many of
the pundits think that there's something going on internal to
(23:36):
China in terms of power plays and leadership changes.
Speaker 4 (23:40):
And they've just fired one of the ministers in China
most recently, and so it may be that the turmoil
within China's leadership has caused Presence she to take the
course of minding his own store before he starts to
(24:03):
mind the world.
Speaker 2 (24:04):
Well, yeah, that's that's a good point. There's also from
a strategic point of view, is we we we say
we say bricks and obviously not including Spain. I remember
the reference now it was it was it was it
Donald Trump in the Oval Office. Yeah, and that we've
(24:25):
always from the outside of those those countries, we've always
looked at it as this is a coherent block that
are all working to maintain separate but together economic power.
But it could be now and I may have this
(24:46):
on the wrong but each of these individual nations now
that they're at the point where they don't need the
cooperation so much, and so now they've become active economic competitors,
and therefore Chinese involvement with them as competitors it is
not as conducive to leading the group now because they're
(25:07):
each wanting to lead their own path rather than rely
on China. And so if President's in Ping went there
and he's got these other nations saying, well, we're actually
forging this path. It might be quite embarrassing in terms
of and I'm sure embarrassment itself is not a big issue.
Is he's a very thick skinned guy. She chi in pain,
(25:29):
but in terms of it would look like a loss
of face if he goes there. And then each individual
branch is leading. It is kind of its own path
through the economic jungle, as it were, And so by
not being there, he can say, well, you know, they're
free to go their own way now, rather than cominion.
Speaker 4 (25:47):
A good example would be, you know Brazil, Brazil has
a lot of rare earth minerals.
Speaker 2 (25:53):
Yeah, so does China.
Speaker 4 (25:55):
So who needs China, right, you know, And and that's
a marketplace in which Brazil competes actually better.
Speaker 2 (26:06):
And of course for President Trump, with this ongoing tires
or the rare earth minerals on it, that's a huge
point of contention because pretty much everything requires them now.
Speaker 4 (26:21):
And the sad part about that, and it's not true
about all of the rarer resources, but enough of them
to be significant, and that is that we have the
very same thing in the United States, but we have
been loath to exploit it to the extent to which
we could build a competing market. I think that's changing.
(26:44):
But up until recently we have all of this this
land in California and Arizona, and I think in New
Mexico as well, that is quite rich in the kinds
of things that we need. But it's it takes so
much effort to get it out that until recently it's
(27:04):
not been economically feasible.
Speaker 2 (27:07):
But now it is. Well, it's funny, and this is
very much a tangential point. The United Kingdom. My home
turf has such natural gas resources absolutely that it could
become a net exporter of energy in a very short
(27:28):
space of time because it's not that difficult to set
up mini mini plants at the main deposit sites, and
it could do it. I'm saying twelve months you could
have production started on these things. But it chooses not
too politically, and therefore Britains pay the highest energy prices
(27:50):
in the world because of green levees, subsidies, weird tax
breaks for green energy companies, and we end up buying
our energy from overseas when we have such resources under
the ground, and it's crippling the UK economy. This failure
(28:11):
to take advantage of the resources you have.
Speaker 4 (28:14):
Well, that's what Trump ran on and that was one
of the key elements to I think that helped him win,
as this idea of energy and dependence. And to follow
up on that a little bit, and it doesn't take
but about a couple of data points to pull the
thread through this and to see Donald Trump's Executive Order
(28:39):
for the Enhancement of Nuclear energy and particularly small modular reactors. Yes, yeah,
and quite frankly, from an actual security perspective, having a
small modular reactor in you know, at each of the
bases would absolutely free them from any problems with big
(28:59):
g rid issues and it would make the energy issues
for the major major bases and military installations uh, far
far better than they are now. And uh and I
think that that's something that that we need to watch
very carefully. But it also represents a hedge against China.
Speaker 2 (29:24):
Yeah, yeah, it's uh, it's it's whoever makes the most
Who was it who said whoever makes the most steel
wins the war? But I guess that was whoever can
produce the most energy has the the advantage there, Uh, Dave,
I just want to go into one more thing before
we finish up, and that is there was a one
(29:46):
more answer that what a great congruence. So there was
a recent story in the New York Times a couple
of weeks ago about an alleged eight page document from
the FSB, the Russian Secret Service, and it was that
they're beginning to worry, the Russians, beginning to worry that
(30:07):
China's setting its eyes northwards to Siberia rather than focusing
southward to southeastwards towards Taiwan in terms of resource exploitation.
Speaker 4 (30:20):
Well, I think that after always realize that, you know,
if true, China has a very long, long term framework,
a decision horizon, and I don't think that Russia has
to worry about anything within the next two weeks. Sure,
but it's entirely possible that FSB is correct about China's
(30:43):
long term designs on their neighbor to the north. This
is not new. This has been a concern for the
Soviet Union and for Russia after nineteen ninety that China
would see Siberia, particularly as a target for exploitation. And
(31:09):
you think back, you know, Gramco and all of the
leadership in the Soviet Union, this was a concern of
theirs for a very very long time.
Speaker 2 (31:21):
Yeah, valid point day, we're going to be back with
Dave Pats and after this short break, don't go anywhere.
Speaker 1 (31:31):
For your freedom and your liberty. Liberty Nation with Mark Edgelities.
Speaker 2 (31:37):
And you're back on Limit Nation Radio Head Coast to
Coast and Radio America Network. I remain Mark Andlese. We're
continuing our conversation with Liberty Nations National security correspondent Dave Patson. Dave,
we've been talking about various date points on the on
what's happening with China, but we can't really avoid talking
about Taiwan. And although China has been very quiet in
(32:01):
recent weeks and months, as it's I guess it's battling
with the Trump tafting because with that, without an economy
that they can't really folks on anything else, or without
thriving e company, they can't really folks anything else. But
the flybys into Taiwanese airspace, those pretty much continued on
(32:23):
a baited town. They yes, they have.
Speaker 4 (32:26):
And you know when we say that China has been quiet,
you know that's a relative quiet. Sure they've been quiet
in Iran, in the Middle East, but if your Taiwan,
if you're Philippines, they've not been quiet. I mean, they
continue to do what they've been doing. There is an
interesting you know, we talked a little bit of there
with the potential leadership turbulence within China, they're maybe having
(32:50):
to take their eye off the ball with regard to
how soon or if they will step up their aggression
against Taiwan. And of course the aggression that we do
not want to see is a blockade because blockades tend
the league very quickly to war and uh and but
(33:11):
China has been practicing the blockade, so that's what you
would expect to see first if there was going to
be anything that was on towards toward h.
Speaker 2 (33:19):
Toward Taiwan.
Speaker 4 (33:21):
And and we haven't seen that kind of aggression. We
saw one exercise that looked like it, but it's not
been persistent.
Speaker 2 (33:31):
So that's actually that that's a really important point, is
it's not been persistent. And again that's a very relative
term because yeah, for for a very very long time,
there have been these the the i'd like almost call
them training operations that have been taking place, and each
(33:54):
of these training operations has been based on that, well,
how would we annex Taiwan? And you don't train for
something unless you anticipate the necessity of it coming to fruition, right,
because you would never practice that kind of thing to
protect Taiwan from some external threat. So I guess the
(34:18):
importance is why hasn't anything happened here? Why is it?
Why is it just these training exercises, these mild incursions,
these uh, these fancy flybys are they they're testing how
how Taiwan respond, They're testing how the US would respond.
What's the what's the deal with it?
Speaker 4 (34:40):
Well, it's entirely possible that China does not want and
I believe this is true. They do not want to
fighting war or Taiwan. I mean that that's counterproductive. They
would they would suffer terribly in that case, we would too,
but nonetheless we would.
Speaker 2 (34:56):
I think we've come out on top.
Speaker 4 (34:59):
But what they want to do is they want to
soften Taiwan up. They want to soften the antagonism that
Taiwan has against China and soften their resilience and their
resolve to fight the Chinese off on the beaches. And
the way they think that the way they're going to
(35:20):
do that is to show how horrible to a how
effective and immense the Chinese people's liberation Army, navy is
and how they would be defenseless in Taiwan, and therefore
Taiwan gives up. They just say, well, we see the
(35:40):
handwriting on the wall. We would be totally destroyed. Therefore
we give up. Well, that's not going to happen anytimes.
Speaker 2 (35:50):
So that that raises two points there, Dave. The first
one is America has committed to protect Taiwan. Do you
think that commitment still holds strong under the non interventionist
or it's a slight interventionist I guess you'd call it
nowadays Trump administration.
Speaker 4 (36:13):
I think that the agreement that between the United States
and Taiwan, and the one China policy that the United
States has held low these many years, stands in the
way of this notion that the United States is obligated
to come to the defense of Taiwan.
Speaker 2 (36:35):
No, we aren't.
Speaker 4 (36:37):
What we have picked up is the obligation to support
Taiwan in its defense against China.
Speaker 2 (36:43):
Those are two different things, very true, very true. So
that brings me to the second thing, which again is
a bit tangential, but those are my favorite kind of conversations.
There's a psychology of status, and when you said about
how China is trying to do is demonstrate that we
are this mighty force and eventually, hoiwan, we'll just say
(37:07):
there's really nothing we can do about it. We may
as well, you know, get in under our own terms
rather than be forced to. Now this is it pops
into my mind that this is a status battle. So
there's two ways to really gain states. And status is
always something that's awarded to you, right. It's not something
that you can put on you, So you can't say, oh,
(37:28):
I have status today. It's given from other sources. And
the two ways of getting it. One is prestige, which
is by being particularly good at something, and the other one,
which is more important here, is the ability to dominate,
and that's how status achieved. Now, long term, that kind
(37:49):
of strategy doesn't hold. I think that's probably right. It
doesn't help if you're gaining your status by being dominant,
and dominance here means if you don't do what I
tell you, I can hrry you. That's the essence of dominance.
It doesn't last. It's not a lasting proposition because at
(38:13):
some point people are going to push back against that,
and so I wonder if they can't. I don't think
China can really achieve its goals here, at least in
a long term. They may have short term victories, but
considering it's a nation and the people that are very
very long term planners, I think that's quite a short
(38:36):
sighted view. You find a word on that your thoughts something.
Speaker 4 (38:38):
I think that that is a short sighted views. As
you say, I think that the real lasting power of
a nation is the perception that they are a force
for good in the global economy, both military economy and
the financial economy, and China has yet to breach that capability.
(39:05):
They're not seen They're seen as a pragmatic often opportunity,
but they are not seen as a force for good
in the on the global stage.
Speaker 2 (39:17):
Words of advice for President she do please get in touch.
Dave Patterson, thanks ever so much for joining us. Yes,
thank you for your consideration in this matter. And that's
all we've got time for on this week's edition off
Libutination Radio. Thank you to our guest today Andrew Moran
and Dave Patterson. Thanks to you the listeners the time
for taking the time to tune in and join us.
(39:38):
Please remember, Libertination does not endorse candidate's campaigns or legislation
and this presentation is no endorsement
The views and opinions expressed on the following program are
those of the host and guests and do not necessarily
represent those of any organization, including one generation away.
Speaker 2 (00:10):
No, that's it was free freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
freedom of enterprise, and freedom is special and read.
Speaker 1 (00:17):
This is Liberty Nation with Markangeledes, a production of Libertynation
dot com, going after what the politicians really mean and
making it all clear for your freedom and your liberty.
Liberty Nation with Markangeledes.
Speaker 2 (00:34):
Hello, welcome to Liberty Nation Radio her Coast Coast on
the Radio American Network. I'm your host, Mark Angelini's. We
have quite the lineup show for you today. It's going
to be great fun. Let's get started and you're back
on libitin Nation Radio Head Coast Coasts on the Radio
American Network. I'm your host, Mark Anthony's and we're having
a wonderful conversation about international economics. Don't tune out just now.
(00:55):
It's it's fascinating and you're gonna love it with Liberty
Nations economics editor guru and expert on all things fiscal
mister Andrew Moran. Thanks for being here.
Speaker 3 (01:05):
Andrew, I would to say I'm amazing I.
Speaker 2 (01:09):
Didn't say you're amazing. He's to me, he's pretty amazing.
He has the numbers at his fingertips and and his
fingertips at the end of a Google search. So let's
carry on with this CHATBT chat tp oh dear No.
So what we want to talk about today, Andrew, is
is China. And that's the overall theme, what's happening with
(01:30):
the Chinese economy? Because I mentioned to you not long
ago that and I'm not an economist and I don't
follow the data other than I read your pieces on
liutination dot com, but it seemed to me that China
is slowly slipping into what Japan used to be the
Japanification of the Chinese economy. And you said that that's
(01:54):
something that's actually doing a buzz around. Now, what are
the data points involved in that?
Speaker 3 (02:00):
Well, so there are anything. So first, is that child
is actually facing deflation. That's something that that that that
Japan has struggled for a long time, not so much
as of late, but overall. Yes, you see the last
several months of CPI data and even the proof Producer
Price Index, it's all slipping into deflation.
Speaker 2 (02:16):
Treat me like I'm a rather slow five year old
and explain deflation to me.
Speaker 3 (02:20):
So price deflation is when you have declining prices across
the board. So there's not a lot of consumption going on,
there's a lot of domestic demand happening across the countries.
Therefore prices are falling. But even on a foreign demand
level too, you see, which is that there are another
aspect of this jimpanification. You're seeing four demand for Chinese
goods actually declined. So for example, the Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index,
(02:43):
that's they have two versions. They have a government version,
they have a private sector version. Both show contraction, meaning
that perhaps President Donald Trump's tariffs are weighing on the
Chinese economies and its manufacturing prowess and exports. Another thing
is the aging population jamand for so long has struggled
with eating demographics. China, despite its recent endeavors of let's say,
(03:04):
removing the one child policy and try and present usually
been calling people saying, hey have some babies. Nobody's having
babies at all. So those are the three aspects of
weighing on the Chinese economy.
Speaker 2 (03:15):
So there's actually on this thing about the shrinking population
that there having in China when they introduced the one
child policy, there were some exemptions to that, and that
was quite If you were a farmer and your first
child was a daughter, then you could have another one.
(03:37):
If you had plenty of money, you would take on
a second wife as it were, and then have another child.
But this was very limited to people, and of course
tragically resulted in a massive fanta side of unborn girls.
But what happened was it became so coultural that to
(04:02):
only have one child across the board from most people,
and then you ended up with it was the eight
four to one situation. So there's the eight great grandparents,
the four grandparents, two parents, and then it's down to
the one. Now, because of how the Chinese system is
set up, that meant that the one at the bottom there,
(04:25):
the one child that they end up having, has to
essentially support everything going up those tiers. But and so
you think, well, it's better to have more kids, right,
But these people they are too busy to have kids
because they've got all this family to support. It's kind
of put them into it almost I would say, a
(04:46):
bottleneck in terms of being able to get out of it.
But I mean in Japan's not really matched to turn
that around it either, has it.
Speaker 3 (04:55):
I would say most developed countries have struggled to encourage
more people have a children, no matter what they're doing.
Even these Eastern European countries that are that are trying
that have been open about trying to welcome all people
to have more kids, or you know, change a tax policy,
it's not working at all. Nobody wants to have kids
these days, maybe because the high cost of living. You know,
maybe this whole was the climate change, and for years
(05:18):
we talking about overpopulation, how we need to depopulate the world.
It's all backfired, and everybody, you need to have the
children if you want to sustain all these entitlement programs
and the economy and everything that we've become so accustomed
to for the last several decades.
Speaker 2 (05:34):
So let's let's go back specifically to China. We've got
the deflation, we've got a disastrous birth rate.
Speaker 3 (05:41):
Don't forget the doubt is the debt is the thing
you have to do.
Speaker 2 (05:43):
Right the debt. Tell me about the Chinese debt.
Speaker 3 (05:46):
The federal debt isn't so much a problem. It's the
municipal debt at the stay local level, they have really
accumulated so much debt to facilitate stimulus projects to create
more infrastructure. So when you see on if you go
on X, you see all these wondrous things that China
has all over the country that has been fostered by debt.
And the government actually recently came out well probably a
(06:09):
year ago, I was to say, and they said that
we're not going to bail out any local governments anymore.
It's all up to them to pay off these debts.
So what are they doing. They're issuing more bonds. But
with the global campanal markets already in none dating, with
a huge supply of government bonds and debt, no one
is buying it. So that's going to cause even a
greater issue. Another issue in China is the collapse of
(06:29):
the residential property market. Property values have gone down twenty
percent since the days of when that property collapse happened
a couple of years ago, and then of course the
one that happened up before the coronavirus pandemic. So you
have a cascading of issues festering in the world's second
largest economy, and you know, with your panification, I guess
it's going to happen in the next few years unless
(06:50):
they turn things around, which at this point doesn't seem
very likely.
Speaker 2 (06:53):
So I have some insight into what's been happening with
that acumend debt from the provinces, having spent many, many
years in China. So what happens is the central government
when it's having let's say cash issues, it releases a
massive round of quantitative easing. Then that gets funneled out
(07:17):
to the state adjacent banks let's call them, and then
the banks have a responsibility to give the lion's share
of this new fiscal product that they have out to
state owned enterprises. Now, state owned enterprises are they're the
really big ones. They're the ones that have full government support.
(07:38):
They're the ones that are placeholders for the cousin of
a cousin of a cousin of a third cousin twice removed.
And these people have to be paid. They have to
have the nice officers, they have to have the nice
cars with the drivers, and so this money is just
being pushed out to the state owned enterprises on the
understanding that because it's a state owned enterprise it is
(08:00):
a technically a business. They never have to pay back
the money. Yeah, so the money doesn't come back in
once it gets loaned out, it's just gone. It has
to go on somebody's books. And who is that, Well,
that's the state and province books that were so generous
in feeding out the government money under instructions to these
state owned enterprises. It's a bit of a pyramid scheme,
(08:22):
I think, Andrew.
Speaker 3 (08:23):
Yeah, absolutely right. I remember writing this article many years
ago before the coronavirus pandemic, and it talked about how
the Chinese economy is hauffered from the zombie economy because
these companies, no matter what, they will get bailed out.
If a smaller company fails, it will just be absorbed
by a larger, as.
Speaker 2 (08:36):
You say, state owned enterprise.
Speaker 3 (08:38):
So there's a lot of there's so yeah, the jipandification
once you have the zombification of the Chinese economy. And
the other challenge too, is that for the People's Bank
of China, the country central bank, is that they've already
stimulated the economy to death during the coronavirus pandemic and
they're trying to do it again during these child during
this face off with President Trump. I don't know how
much more they have left, and the arsenal to achieve
(08:59):
this is but if but so far, I mean, the
numbers point that to diable to achieve the central government's
GDP growth rate, but whether it's based on actual fundamental
growth that is doubtful this point. But for the deflation part,
you know that has been that has been really setting
to watch unfold in real time.
Speaker 2 (09:18):
And if that.
Speaker 3 (09:19):
Happens the next year, Treasury Secretary spot Usin's uh uh
assertion that the that's actually in the depression, that could
that could be actually reality.
Speaker 2 (09:29):
We're going to continue talking about what could happened to
China after this shortbreak. Don't go anywhere.
Speaker 1 (09:41):
For your freedom and your liberty. Liberty Nation with Mark Edgelitis.
Speaker 2 (09:46):
And you're back on Liberty Nation Radio. We're continuing our
conversation with Economics editor Andrew Moran. So earlier we were
talking about the deflation, the population problem and the debt
explosion taking place in China and how it's leading tom
what could be a lost decade much the same as Japan.
So the Japanification, how realistic do you think a lost
(10:09):
decade for China will be? With that I remember reading
many many years ago while I was living in China.
I think it's Gordon Chang's The Coming Collapse of China,
and then of course, but even then it was a
few years old the book, and you see Gordon Chang
and about quite a lot as the China expert, but
(10:29):
I think he may have actually been spot on, if
not a few years late.
Speaker 3 (10:36):
Well, Della doesn't seem very strong at all, particularly if
you have that as psience alluded to the shrinking ice
ice cube, whereby China and other country economies would be
the consuming countries and the item would be the key manufacturer. Remember,
for so long many countries were already leaving, were already leaving. Actually,
many companies were already leaving China and heading for greater pastures,
(10:57):
whether that's the Vietnam or whether that's India. Because yeah,
I mean I think it was Tim Cook, the Apple CEO.
He was on stage at a reason unfortunate that a
couple of years ago, and he said that labor costs
are not attractive anymore in China. How they're already rising
because they're growing middle class. So if more companies are
fleeing China, that's one disadvantage against against the Chinese economy.
(11:19):
Another thing too is you know I just alluded to
you know, these what are these small companies producing anything?
Are these medium and large companies producing anything at all?
If they're constantly getting bailed out, then they can there's
no incentive to either improve their products or or or
or try try to you know, bolster their companies. What's
in any way possible. At the same time, you have
to look at there could be positive. So one thing
(11:40):
they're really doing well in is artificial intelligence. They're really
investing heavily in AI. And you see that, you see
a deep seek for example, that was a small that
was a small that was a small enterprise. And you know,
there's been some discussion about how exactly achieved you know,
producing AI at the level of chat Shept with fewer resources,
fewer men power, a little less energy overall, you see
(12:01):
all the stuff coming up of China. AI is really
the robotics are they're doing really well. So I guess
Jijiping is betting on that to facilitate economy, the Chinese economy.
The number two positions in the world.
Speaker 2 (12:12):
That's it's actually quite similar to the Donald Trump position,
isn't it that you know each country needs to be
the leading player in global AI. And I'm wondering if
that's not a case of too many eggs in one
fragile basket. Well, if you look at so many one basket,
many baskets in one fragile egg, even if you.
Speaker 3 (12:33):
If you look at so many reports, if you look
at the White just just from the White hunts itself,
they're expecting tens of trillion dollars and economic growth coming
from AI and robotics and and and all the new
technologies that they'll be born from these two areas in
the in the coming decade. And that's just absolutely sounding,
I mean robotically, I mean that this is a different
top subject, but that's going to really transform the global economy, uh,
(12:56):
in both China and the United States, either you know,
on the and the aggregate level or on the individual level,
because these robotics are going to improve everyone's life in
many different ways.
Speaker 2 (13:08):
So yeah, that kind of brings up a question that
that ties into the theme you've been saying that certain
manufacturings are leaving Manufacturers are leaving China anyway because of
the labor costs as in tariffs and tariffs of course,
and so what's happening is everything's getting shipped off to
Vietnam where where manufacturing, processing, labor costs are still very
(13:28):
very low. But then what's happened, and this is notable
with Trump's recent Vietnamese trade deal, which wasn't about tariffs
at all, but rather about products that are largely produced
in China then ships through to Vietnam so they can
avoid the tariffs on China that they're applicable to Chinese product.
(13:51):
That's the end of the road, now, isn't it with
this new trade deal?
Speaker 3 (13:55):
Well, at least I mean for now. I mean that's
a ford. So under Trump's deal, the transshipment goods from
China to Vietnam would be stopped with forty percent tariff. Now, Vietnam,
to its credit, it has been trying to grapple this
situation for a long time by you know, stopping manufacturers
from you know, repackaging or relabeling. But it's such an
immense industry that it's very hard for the Vanniamese officials
(14:17):
to to wrestle with with with this product. But you know,
we'll we'll China just you know, look for a different
location or will Trump impose you know, the these trends
transhipment tariffs on every neighboring country in the region. I
think that's that's a more likely assessment for the transhipment problem.
Speaker 2 (14:36):
Two things on that. One, I think you're at three points.
Speaker 4 (14:38):
One.
Speaker 2 (14:38):
I think you're absolutely right too. I think that Vietnams
I'm also right. Well, no, number one, you're right, I'll
go over that. Number two. The Vietnam is also looking
because there's always because of all this work that's coming
in from China as it's trying to avoid that's also
raising the labor costs, and so they're looking to feel
(15:00):
out to a what do you call it, a fourth
party country or something so that they're looking to actually
become a powerhouse themselves, which is why I think they
were so eager to do a good deal with the
United States here, because they don't want to be the
manufacturing They want to be something else, something beyond just
a manufacturing basin. And the third point, Donald Trump.
Speaker 5 (15:23):
Will probably the White House will probably be pursuing a
similar trade arrangement to stop transhipping from China with all
the surrounding countries.
Speaker 2 (15:34):
I think that's absolutely right, and it seems to me
that this is designed not so much to level trade
with those countries, but to trap China into a landlocked position,
as it were, where it just has to do some
kind of deal with the United States to get its
(15:54):
products out of the country.
Speaker 3 (15:57):
Well, I'm curious about with China with their whole AI
is if they're going to really expand their manufacturing base
through AI. What I mean that they're they'll displace a
lot of human workers and embrace the artificial intelligence to
combat that labor costs. So if companies are leaving are
fleeing of one of the reasons companies are fleeing China
(16:17):
is because of labor cost factor, will robotics and AI
force encourage them back to China? Because because yes, US
and China are our powerhouse when it comes to AI investment.
But is Vietnam, is Thailand is in the are they?
Are they mirroring US and China when it comes to
AI robotics investing as I obnou seen numbers, But I
(16:38):
doubt it considering of they're spending trillions or perhaps they're
spending a few hundred billion.
Speaker 2 (16:45):
You mind look at it like and tell me if
I've got this wrong. But it's it's the new space race, right,
and so just the fact that they've got two major superpowers,
both rushing towards the the same goal. No matter who
actually gets to the finish line. I don't think you
really can get to a finish line with with AI
(17:08):
as it is. It's not going to be one person
gets this kind of AI and well we may as
well give up and just go with that one. I
think there's always going to be innovation within this particularity.
It's not like who can get to space first, right,
It's very well.
Speaker 3 (17:21):
I mean they're already cracking down on deep Seak. I
mean I think that the administrations banned government officials from
actually using the deep seek AI model are like large
language model. But there, I mean, there's so many AI
chat boss out there. I think I'll think deep seek
is a concern. But what I mean by that is
just that if there were administrations already worried about deep Seek,
and I'm sure they'll also be concerned about other AI
(17:42):
country of origin products.
Speaker 2 (17:45):
But I wonder what this looks like on the other side.
Wants AI is at the point where investors particularly want
it to be. Well, we have a what we see
China with a leveling off of its economy. Me where
does it go from? Their final thoughts on that.
Speaker 3 (18:03):
Well, I mean, for now they have to they have
to crap with the short term challenges which are purely
deaded deflation. But long I mean, who knows if they're
going to be able to flee from that. But if
you want to talk about JAPANI vacation. Japan was stuck
in the world's number three economy for so long, it
actually went down number four. I've heard which which organization
it was, but it projected, it projected that India would
(18:26):
be would become the world's number two economy, and so
that means China we could number three, number four. So well,
let's you know, somehow it resolves those issues, those long
standing fundamental problems. It's hard to see it maintain its
number two p hours.
Speaker 2 (18:39):
Well, let's hope for the almost a billion wonderful middle
class folks in China that things do get themselves sorted out.
Andrew Bran, thanks ever so much for joining us. You
(19:00):
know that it was free freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
freedom of enterplase and freedom is special and.
Speaker 1 (19:06):
Read this is liberty Nation with Markangeldes, a production of
libertynation dot com going after what the politicians really mean
and making it all clear for your freedom and your liberty.
Liberty Nation with Markangeledes.
Speaker 2 (19:24):
And we're continuing our China special with Liberty Nations National
Security correspondent Dave Patson. Thanks for being here, Dave. Thank you, Mark. So, Dave,
China is it's kind of having some strange, strange outlaid
patents on the world stage. There's a couple of data
(19:45):
points that I want to drop down, a couple of
pens and if you could sort of navigate surround those,
if you don't mind. So Number one, they've been strangely
absent from the entire Iranian affair.
Speaker 4 (20:00):
Yes, they have, and I think it's very simple from
their perspective. They have quite a bit of quite a
bit of at stake in terms of the oil they
get from Iran, you know, data point one, right, and
they're not sure exactly how to respond to the US
(20:21):
versus Iran, but they know they don't want to do
anything that will.
Speaker 2 (20:27):
Stop the flow of that oil. They know that. Yeah,
so that there's a I believe it's Iran produces three
million barrels a day. Much of that goes to the
Asian market, whereas and that's an exposure for China, Whereas
the US doesn't really rely on Iran for it's oil
(20:50):
capacity or production. So one could argue, if we're one
more conspiratory minded, that a good way to slow down
the Chinese engine of industry is to hit out at
its energy supplies. And so yeah, it kind of puts
them in a tricky position, right, They can't really side
with the US against shutting down what is essentially a
(21:13):
rogue state with the potential for nuclear weapons. But at
the same time, they don't annoy a rand too much, right.
Speaker 4 (21:22):
That's right. I mean so because Iran quite frankly is
the portal for China into the Middle East, and and
and they've they've milked that pretty pretty well. I mean,
the fact that they brokeered the peace agreement that may
be too strong a term, they brokeered the renewal of
(21:43):
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and so that
was a that was a big door opener for them.
And now they're again they're conflicted because where they can't
they can't support her and too heavily here because if
they do that, the United States will simply cut that
(22:05):
oil off. Yeah, and so they have to. They're walking
a fine line here with Iran. But what do you expect.
It's the Middle East?
Speaker 2 (22:13):
Right, Yes, allegiance has changed rather swiftly. And just for
those who may be interested before recording, David and we're
having a debate discussion on the various herods, Herod Agrippa
and whatnot, and how these power plays were taking place,
(22:34):
because you know, we don't have enough to do with
our lives other than discuss two thousand year old Middle
Eastern history. So the second to as point to drop
in on this is China avoided the recent bricks. That's worry.
Speaker 4 (22:53):
Yeah, Fushion being decided not to attend and that and
his presence really has traditionally been the glue that holds
it all together. And I mean, you've got Brazil and
India and China and Russia and Spain.
Speaker 2 (23:14):
How do you figure that one?
Speaker 6 (23:16):
I don't know, right, that's a joke, right, right, Yes,
you're re had me, okay, but it's quite many of
the pundits think that there's something going on internal to
(23:36):
China in terms of power plays and leadership changes.
Speaker 4 (23:40):
And they've just fired one of the ministers in China
most recently, and so it may be that the turmoil
within China's leadership has caused Presence she to take the
course of minding his own store before he starts to
(24:03):
mind the world.
Speaker 2 (24:04):
Well, yeah, that's that's a good point. There's also from
a strategic point of view, is we we we say
we say bricks and obviously not including Spain. I remember
the reference now it was it was it was it
Donald Trump in the Oval Office. Yeah, and that we've
(24:25):
always from the outside of those those countries, we've always
looked at it as this is a coherent block that
are all working to maintain separate but together economic power.
But it could be now and I may have this
(24:46):
on the wrong but each of these individual nations now
that they're at the point where they don't need the
cooperation so much, and so now they've become active economic competitors,
and therefore Chinese involvement with them as competitors it is
not as conducive to leading the group now because they're
(25:07):
each wanting to lead their own path rather than rely
on China. And so if President's in Ping went there
and he's got these other nations saying, well, we're actually
forging this path. It might be quite embarrassing in terms
of and I'm sure embarrassment itself is not a big issue.
Is he's a very thick skinned guy. She chi in pain,
(25:29):
but in terms of it would look like a loss
of face if he goes there. And then each individual
branch is leading. It is kind of its own path
through the economic jungle, as it were, And so by
not being there, he can say, well, you know, they're
free to go their own way now, rather than cominion.
Speaker 4 (25:47):
A good example would be, you know Brazil, Brazil has
a lot of rare earth minerals.
Speaker 2 (25:53):
Yeah, so does China.
Speaker 4 (25:55):
So who needs China, right, you know, And and that's
a marketplace in which Brazil competes actually better.
Speaker 2 (26:06):
And of course for President Trump, with this ongoing tires
or the rare earth minerals on it, that's a huge
point of contention because pretty much everything requires them now.
Speaker 4 (26:21):
And the sad part about that, and it's not true
about all of the rarer resources, but enough of them
to be significant, and that is that we have the
very same thing in the United States, but we have
been loath to exploit it to the extent to which
we could build a competing market. I think that's changing.
(26:44):
But up until recently we have all of this this
land in California and Arizona, and I think in New
Mexico as well, that is quite rich in the kinds
of things that we need. But it's it takes so
much effort to get it out that until recently it's
(27:04):
not been economically feasible.
Speaker 2 (27:07):
But now it is. Well, it's funny, and this is
very much a tangential point. The United Kingdom. My home
turf has such natural gas resources absolutely that it could
become a net exporter of energy in a very short
(27:28):
space of time because it's not that difficult to set
up mini mini plants at the main deposit sites, and
it could do it. I'm saying twelve months you could
have production started on these things. But it chooses not
too politically, and therefore Britains pay the highest energy prices
(27:50):
in the world because of green levees, subsidies, weird tax
breaks for green energy companies, and we end up buying
our energy from overseas when we have such resources under
the ground, and it's crippling the UK economy. This failure
(28:11):
to take advantage of the resources you have.
Speaker 4 (28:14):
Well, that's what Trump ran on and that was one
of the key elements to I think that helped him win,
as this idea of energy and dependence. And to follow
up on that a little bit, and it doesn't take
but about a couple of data points to pull the
thread through this and to see Donald Trump's Executive Order
(28:39):
for the Enhancement of Nuclear energy and particularly small modular reactors. Yes, yeah,
and quite frankly, from an actual security perspective, having a
small modular reactor in you know, at each of the
bases would absolutely free them from any problems with big
(28:59):
g rid issues and it would make the energy issues
for the major major bases and military installations uh, far
far better than they are now. And uh and I
think that that's something that that we need to watch
very carefully. But it also represents a hedge against China.
Speaker 2 (29:24):
Yeah, yeah, it's uh, it's it's whoever makes the most
Who was it who said whoever makes the most steel
wins the war? But I guess that was whoever can
produce the most energy has the the advantage there, Uh, Dave,
I just want to go into one more thing before
we finish up, and that is there was a one
(29:46):
more answer that what a great congruence. So there was
a recent story in the New York Times a couple
of weeks ago about an alleged eight page document from
the FSB, the Russian Secret Service, and it was that
they're beginning to worry, the Russians, beginning to worry that
(30:07):
China's setting its eyes northwards to Siberia rather than focusing
southward to southeastwards towards Taiwan in terms of resource exploitation.
Speaker 4 (30:20):
Well, I think that after always realize that, you know,
if true, China has a very long, long term framework,
a decision horizon, and I don't think that Russia has
to worry about anything within the next two weeks. Sure,
but it's entirely possible that FSB is correct about China's
(30:43):
long term designs on their neighbor to the north. This
is not new. This has been a concern for the
Soviet Union and for Russia after nineteen ninety that China
would see Siberia, particularly as a target for exploitation. And
(31:09):
you think back, you know, Gramco and all of the
leadership in the Soviet Union, this was a concern of
theirs for a very very long time.
Speaker 2 (31:21):
Yeah, valid point day, we're going to be back with
Dave Pats and after this short break, don't go anywhere.
Speaker 1 (31:31):
For your freedom and your liberty. Liberty Nation with Mark Edgelities.
Speaker 2 (31:37):
And you're back on Limit Nation Radio Head Coast to
Coast and Radio America Network. I remain Mark Andlese. We're
continuing our conversation with Liberty Nations National security correspondent Dave Patson. Dave,
we've been talking about various date points on the on
what's happening with China, but we can't really avoid talking
about Taiwan. And although China has been very quiet in
(32:01):
recent weeks and months, as it's I guess it's battling
with the Trump tafting because with that, without an economy
that they can't really folks on anything else, or without
thriving e company, they can't really folks anything else. But
the flybys into Taiwanese airspace, those pretty much continued on
(32:23):
a baited town. They yes, they have.
Speaker 4 (32:26):
And you know when we say that China has been quiet,
you know that's a relative quiet. Sure they've been quiet
in Iran, in the Middle East, but if your Taiwan,
if you're Philippines, they've not been quiet. I mean, they
continue to do what they've been doing. There is an
interesting you know, we talked a little bit of there
with the potential leadership turbulence within China, they're maybe having
(32:50):
to take their eye off the ball with regard to
how soon or if they will step up their aggression
against Taiwan. And of course the aggression that we do
not want to see is a blockade because blockades tend
the league very quickly to war and uh and but
(33:11):
China has been practicing the blockade, so that's what you
would expect to see first if there was going to
be anything that was on towards toward h.
Speaker 2 (33:19):
Toward Taiwan.
Speaker 4 (33:21):
And and we haven't seen that kind of aggression. We
saw one exercise that looked like it, but it's not
been persistent.
Speaker 2 (33:31):
So that's actually that that's a really important point, is
it's not been persistent. And again that's a very relative
term because yeah, for for a very very long time,
there have been these the the i'd like almost call
them training operations that have been taking place, and each
(33:54):
of these training operations has been based on that, well,
how would we annex Taiwan? And you don't train for
something unless you anticipate the necessity of it coming to fruition, right,
because you would never practice that kind of thing to
protect Taiwan from some external threat. So I guess the
(34:18):
importance is why hasn't anything happened here? Why is it?
Why is it just these training exercises, these mild incursions,
these uh, these fancy flybys are they they're testing how
how Taiwan respond, They're testing how the US would respond.
What's the what's the deal with it?
Speaker 4 (34:40):
Well, it's entirely possible that China does not want and
I believe this is true. They do not want to
fighting war or Taiwan. I mean that that's counterproductive. They
would they would suffer terribly in that case, we would too,
but nonetheless we would.
Speaker 2 (34:56):
I think we've come out on top.
Speaker 4 (34:59):
But what they want to do is they want to
soften Taiwan up. They want to soften the antagonism that
Taiwan has against China and soften their resilience and their
resolve to fight the Chinese off on the beaches. And
the way they think that the way they're going to
(35:20):
do that is to show how horrible to a how
effective and immense the Chinese people's liberation Army, navy is
and how they would be defenseless in Taiwan, and therefore
Taiwan gives up. They just say, well, we see the
(35:40):
handwriting on the wall. We would be totally destroyed. Therefore
we give up. Well, that's not going to happen anytimes.
Speaker 2 (35:50):
So that that raises two points there, Dave. The first
one is America has committed to protect Taiwan. Do you
think that commitment still holds strong under the non interventionist
or it's a slight interventionist I guess you'd call it
nowadays Trump administration.
Speaker 4 (36:13):
I think that the agreement that between the United States
and Taiwan, and the one China policy that the United
States has held low these many years, stands in the
way of this notion that the United States is obligated
to come to the defense of Taiwan.
Speaker 2 (36:35):
No, we aren't.
Speaker 4 (36:37):
What we have picked up is the obligation to support
Taiwan in its defense against China.
Speaker 2 (36:43):
Those are two different things, very true, very true. So
that brings me to the second thing, which again is
a bit tangential, but those are my favorite kind of conversations.
There's a psychology of status, and when you said about
how China is trying to do is demonstrate that we
are this mighty force and eventually, hoiwan, we'll just say
(37:07):
there's really nothing we can do about it. We may
as well, you know, get in under our own terms
rather than be forced to. Now this is it pops
into my mind that this is a status battle. So
there's two ways to really gain states. And status is
always something that's awarded to you, right. It's not something
that you can put on you, So you can't say, oh,
(37:28):
I have status today. It's given from other sources. And
the two ways of getting it. One is prestige, which
is by being particularly good at something, and the other one,
which is more important here, is the ability to dominate,
and that's how status achieved. Now, long term, that kind
(37:49):
of strategy doesn't hold. I think that's probably right. It
doesn't help if you're gaining your status by being dominant,
and dominance here means if you don't do what I
tell you, I can hrry you. That's the essence of dominance.
It doesn't last. It's not a lasting proposition because at
(38:13):
some point people are going to push back against that,
and so I wonder if they can't. I don't think
China can really achieve its goals here, at least in
a long term. They may have short term victories, but
considering it's a nation and the people that are very
very long term planners, I think that's quite a short
(38:36):
sighted view. You find a word on that your thoughts something.
Speaker 4 (38:38):
I think that that is a short sighted views. As
you say, I think that the real lasting power of
a nation is the perception that they are a force
for good in the global economy, both military economy and
the financial economy, and China has yet to breach that capability.
(39:05):
They're not seen They're seen as a pragmatic often opportunity,
but they are not seen as a force for good
in the on the global stage.
Speaker 2 (39:17):
Words of advice for President she do please get in touch.
Dave Patterson, thanks ever so much for joining us. Yes,
thank you for your consideration in this matter. And that's
all we've got time for on this week's edition off
Libutination Radio. Thank you to our guest today Andrew Moran
and Dave Patterson. Thanks to you the listeners the time
for taking the time to tune in and join us.
(39:38):
Please remember, Libertination does not endorse candidate's campaigns or legislation
and this presentation is no endorsement
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