April 16, 2020 • 13 mins
Theodore Roosevelt has been in the news lately, thanks to a ship with a cargo of coronavirus and a leaked letter to the navy. But more than 100 years ago, TR—that ship's namesake—engaged in a controversial letter-writing campaign of his own, one that incensed the highest levels of government.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
History Versus is a production of I Heart Radio and
Mental Flaws. Theodore Roosevelt has been in the news lately,
not the president, but the ship named for him. There's
no question that the novel coronavirus has radically changed the
lives of millions of people around the globe. As medical
(00:23):
professionals fight to save lives in overcrowded hospitals, and as
delivery people and grocery store employees had to work every
day to make sure we have the supplies we need.
Many non essential workers have stopped going into their offices
and are instead working from home to try to slow
the spread of the virus. I'm recording this episode of
the podcast in my closet because close muffle echo, so
if things sound a little weird or different, That's why.
(00:45):
Even Navy ships have felt the effects of the virus,
perhaps none more so than the USS Theodore Roosevelt, a
Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft carrier that was launched in
the ship was at sea in the Pacific Ocean with
more than four thousand crew members on board when COVID
nineteen began to appear among the sailors. After the outbreaks started,
the ship was docked in Guam, but the disease continued
(01:06):
to spread. Alarmed by the situation, the ship's commander, Captain
Brett Krozer, wrote a letter to senior military officials. He
pointed out that in the cramped conditions of a Navy ship,
social distancing and fourteen day quarantines were not possible, which
meant Kerzier wrote that the spread of the disease is
ongoing and accelerating. He asked that the USS Theatre Roosevelt's
(01:28):
crew members be allowed to disembark in Guam due to
the rapidly deteriorating situation, writing, removing the majority of personnel
from a deployed US nuclear aircraft carrier and isolating them
for two weeks may seem like an extraordinary measure. This
is a necessary risk. Keeping over four thousand young men
and women on board the t R is an unnecessary
risk and breaks faith with those sailors entrusted to our care.
(01:52):
He ended by writing, we are not at war. Sailors
do not need to die. If we do not act now,
we are failing to properly take care of our most
trusted asset, our sailors. The letter, which Crozier email to
senior military officials, was leaked to the San Francisco Chronicle
and published on March thirty one. Then Acting Secretary of
(02:12):
the Navy Thomas B. Maudley, removed Crozier from command on
April two. As Krozier disembarked the aircraft carrier, sailors cheered
him from the deck. Captain Crozer, who has reportedly tested
positive for COVID nineteen, was forced out because, according to
the New York Times, Maudley had lost confidence in Crozier's
ability to command the ship effectively as it dealt with
the evolving crisis after Crozer sent a letter on an
(02:34):
unclassified email system to twenty to thirty people, which Maudley
said caused unnecessary alarm about the operational readiness of the
ship and undermined the chain of command. After Crozer's removal,
Maudley went to the USS Theadore Roosevelt to assess the situation,
where he made disparaging remarks about Crozer, which were leaked
to the public. Under pressure, Maudley resigned on April seven.
(02:56):
The actions of Crozer, Maudley, and the Navy are obviously
be hotly debated, and there will probably be more developments
between when I record this episode and when it goes out.
I'm not an expert in the Navy or in the
military chain of command, so it doesn't feel appropriate for
me to dig into any of that here. But the
current news does give me the opportunity to discuss an
(03:16):
interesting historical precedent for this situation, one that involved Theodore
Roosevelt himself. I'm your host, Aaron McCarthy, and in this
bonus episode of History Versus, we're going to look at
the round Robin letter incident of the Spanish American War.
(03:36):
During and after the Siege of Santiago, one of the
last major operations of the Spanish American War, US troops
stationed in Santiago to Cuba were beset by malaria and
yellow fever. Thousands of men were sick and dying, but
the McKinley administration planned to keep the troops in Cuba
until peace talks were over and until they were healthy.
According to some sources, there was a real fear that
(03:58):
six soldiers would come back to this States and start
a yellow fever epidemic. But the situation was growing untenable,
and near the end of July, General William shafter commander
of the Fifth Corps gathered all of his commanders to
discuss it. Roosevelt later recalled in his autobiography that although
I had command of a brigade, I was only a colonel,
and so I did not intend to attend. But the
(04:20):
General informed me that I was particularly wanted, and accordingly
I went. As Edmund Morris wrote in the Rise of
Theodore Roosevelt, all agreed that it was critical, and that
the War Department's apparent unwillingness to evacuate the army was inexcusable.
Somebody must write a formal letter stating that, in the
unanimous opinion of the Fifth Core Staff, a further stay
in Cuba would be to the absolute and objectless ruin
(04:42):
of the fighting forces. None of the regular officers wanted
to risk his career by writing such a letter, and
suddenly the reason Roosevelt's presence had been requested became clear.
He was a volunteer who had quit his post as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in order to fight, and
he intended to go right back to being a civilian
after the war. He had much less to lose by
offending his former boss, President William McKinley and McKinley Secretary
(05:05):
of War Russell Alger to incur the hostility of the
War Department would not make any difference to me, whereas
it would be destructive to the men in the regular army.
Roosevelt later wrote, I thought this true, and said I
would write a letter or make a statement which could
then be published. Theodore Roosevelt obviously wasn't afraid to speak up.
Theodore Roosevelt wasn't afraid of anything except in action. As
(05:29):
Alfred Henry Lewis would write of Roosevelt, Mr. Roosevelt has
often shown that it is better to do the wrong
thing than do nothing at all. The best thing is
to do the right thing. The next best is to
do the wrong thing. And the worst of all things
is to stand perfectly still. We'll be right back. In
(05:59):
an effort to or the McKinley administration to action and
bring American troops back to the States before they were
decimated by yellow fever, a plan was hatched. Roosevelt would
write an initial letter addressed to the General, which would
then be followed by a round robin letter, a method
typically used to conceal the identity of the ringleaders of
a movement which would be signed by Roosevelt and the
(06:19):
other commanders. Then they would leak those letters to the press.
In his letter, Roosevelt wrote that to keep us here,
in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or
a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There
is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire
command north at once. All of us are certain that
(06:40):
as soon as the authorities of Washington fully appreciate the
condition of the army, we shall be sent home. Roosevelt
noted that in the Cavalry Division, at least, there were
no true cases of yellow fever, but there were cases
of malarial fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it,
he wrote, But the whole command is so weakened and
che mattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten
(07:02):
sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic instead of a
fake epidemic like the present one, strikes us, as it
is bound to do if we stay here at the
height of the sickness season August and the beginning of September.
Quarantine against the malarial fever is much like quarantining against
the toothache. If we are kept here, it will, in
all human possibility, mean an appalling disaster. For the surgeons here.
(07:23):
Estimated over half the army, if kept here during the
sickly season, will die. The men were unable to penetrate
into the interior, and moving them around the island, Roosevelt said,
only sickened them further. To delay sending the men home
was not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual
lives lost, Roosevelt wrote, but it means ruin from the
standpoint of military efficiency of the flower of the American Army,
(07:46):
for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you.
He closed by saying that I write only because I
cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely, and
who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplaining, lee
go to just struction, without striving so far as lies
in me to avert a doom as fearful as it
is unnecessary and undeserved. Roosevelt's fellow commanders then signed their letter,
(08:10):
which noted that they were all in agreement that the
army must be moved at once or perish, adding as
the army can be safely moved. Now. The persons responsible
for preventing such a move will be responsible for the
unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are
the result of careful personal observation, and they are also
based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with
(08:32):
the Army, who understand the situation absolutely. There are differing
accounts of what happened next, but according to Roosevelt, he
wrote his letter and an Associated Press reporter tagged along
when he went to give it a General Shafter, who
promptly pushed it into the hands of the reporter. As
Roosevelt later recalled, I presented the letter to General Shafter,
who waded away and said I don't want to take it,
(08:54):
do whatever you wish with it. I, however, insisted on
handing it to him, whereupon he shoved it or the
correspondent of the Associated Press, who took hold of it,
and I released my hold. Something similar happened with around Robin,
And when the letters said the press, it caused a sensation.
The McKinley administration was incensed by the letters. According to
(09:15):
historian Louis L. Gould, the day after the letters were published,
McKinley wrote a letter to shafter that denounced the round
robin as most unfortunate from every point of view, adding
the publication of the letter makes the situation one of
great difficulty. No soldier reading that report, if ordered to
go to Santiago but will feel that he is marching
to certain death. According to Marris, some within the administration
(09:38):
even suggested court martialing Roosevelt for his letter. The administration
had reason to be irritated. On August third, the day
before the round robin hit, the press alta edition in
order for the army to be moved back to the
United States, which meant that many newspapers printed Roosevelt's letter
right next to an announcement that the troops were being
brought back to the public. It looked at the Roosevelt's
(09:59):
letter and around Robin had forced the McKinley administration to act,
which wasn't the case. By August seven, the first troops
were heading back to the States to quarantine in Montauk
on Long Island in New York. Nothing ever, came of
the suggestion to court martial Roosevelt. Instead, Secretary Alger published
a private letter in which Tier bragged about the rough
rider's performance, saying they were as good as any regulars
(10:21):
and three times as good as any state troops. Well.
Alger might have hoped that the letter would threaten Tier's
chances of getting the governorship of New York. His tactic failed,
Roosevelt returned to war hero. He became governor, and then
Vice president and then president. He didn't, however, get the
one thing he desperately wanted, the Medal of Honor. Though
(10:42):
some believe he was denied the honor because of the
publicity stunt he had pulled, as Mitchell Yokelsen writes for
the National Archives Prologue magazine, there's no evidence for that.
Exactly why the Brevet Board denied Roosevelt the award is
not officially documented. Yogilsen writes, Certainly no evidence exists to
support the contention that Alger held a grow edge over
the round Robin affair or Roosevelt's testimony to the Congressional
(11:03):
Committee on the contrary, letters from the War Department to
Roosevelt indicate that they were more than willing to assist
him in getting the Medal of Honor. One can only
assume that the Brevet Board came to the conclusion that
the Roosevelt's conduct in Cuba was quite admirable, it was
not worthy of a Medal of Honor. Later, Roosevelt would
write that I was recommended for it by my superior
(11:23):
officers in the Santiago campaign, but I was not awarded it,
and frankly, looking back at it now, I feel that
the board which declined to award it took exactly the
right position. Around a century after his experiences in Cuba,
Tierra would finally be awarded the Medal of Honor. Back
to the present day, We've talked before on this podcast
(11:43):
about how it's impossible to know how Tier would have
reacted to situations today. In this case, however, one of
Roosevelt's descendants has a different opinion. In a piece for
The New York Times, Tweed, Roosevelt, TR's great grandson and
chairman of the Theatore Roosevelt Institute at Long Island University,
wrote about Captain Krozer and the situation on the U
S S. Theodore Roosevelt, as a descendant of the namesake
(12:07):
of Captain Krozer's former command I often wonder in situations
like this what Theodore Roosevelt would have done, Tweed, Roosevelt wrote,
in this case, though I know exactly what he would
have done, he found himself in almost the exact same position.
In this era when so many seemed to place expediency
over honor. It is heartening that so many others are
(12:28):
showing great courage, some even risking their lives. Theodore Roosevelt,
in his time, chose the honorable course. Captain Krozer has
done the same. Before we go, I want to say
a huge thank you to the medical professionals and the
essential workers who are out there risking their lives for us,
and to all of the History Versus listeners. I hope
(12:49):
you're well and safe and healthy. Please hang in there.
We'll be back soon with another bonus episode of History Versus.
History Versus is hosted by me Aaron McCarthy. This episode
was written by me, with fact checking by Austin Thompson.
The executive producers are Aaron McCarthy, Julie Douglas, and Tyler Klang.
(13:10):
The supervising producer is Dylan Fagan. The show is edited
by Dylan Fagan and Loeberlante. If you want to find
out more about this episode and Theodore Roosevelt. Visit mental
flaws dot com. Slash History Versus. History Versus is a
production of I heart Radio and Mental Flaws. For more
(13:34):
podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app,
Apple podcast, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,
History Versus is a production of I Heart Radio and
Mental Flaws. Theodore Roosevelt has been in the news lately,
not the president, but the ship named for him. There's
no question that the novel coronavirus has radically changed the
lives of millions of people around the globe. As medical
(00:23):
professionals fight to save lives in overcrowded hospitals, and as
delivery people and grocery store employees had to work every
day to make sure we have the supplies we need.
Many non essential workers have stopped going into their offices
and are instead working from home to try to slow
the spread of the virus. I'm recording this episode of
the podcast in my closet because close muffle echo, so
if things sound a little weird or different, That's why.
(00:45):
Even Navy ships have felt the effects of the virus,
perhaps none more so than the USS Theodore Roosevelt, a
Nimitz class nuclear powered aircraft carrier that was launched in
the ship was at sea in the Pacific Ocean with
more than four thousand crew members on board when COVID
nineteen began to appear among the sailors. After the outbreaks started,
the ship was docked in Guam, but the disease continued
(01:06):
to spread. Alarmed by the situation, the ship's commander, Captain
Brett Krozer, wrote a letter to senior military officials. He
pointed out that in the cramped conditions of a Navy ship,
social distancing and fourteen day quarantines were not possible, which
meant Kerzier wrote that the spread of the disease is
ongoing and accelerating. He asked that the USS Theatre Roosevelt's
(01:28):
crew members be allowed to disembark in Guam due to
the rapidly deteriorating situation, writing, removing the majority of personnel
from a deployed US nuclear aircraft carrier and isolating them
for two weeks may seem like an extraordinary measure. This
is a necessary risk. Keeping over four thousand young men
and women on board the t R is an unnecessary
risk and breaks faith with those sailors entrusted to our care.
(01:52):
He ended by writing, we are not at war. Sailors
do not need to die. If we do not act now,
we are failing to properly take care of our most
trusted asset, our sailors. The letter, which Crozier email to
senior military officials, was leaked to the San Francisco Chronicle
and published on March thirty one. Then Acting Secretary of
(02:12):
the Navy Thomas B. Maudley, removed Crozier from command on
April two. As Krozier disembarked the aircraft carrier, sailors cheered
him from the deck. Captain Crozer, who has reportedly tested
positive for COVID nineteen, was forced out because, according to
the New York Times, Maudley had lost confidence in Crozier's
ability to command the ship effectively as it dealt with
the evolving crisis after Crozer sent a letter on an
(02:34):
unclassified email system to twenty to thirty people, which Maudley
said caused unnecessary alarm about the operational readiness of the
ship and undermined the chain of command. After Crozer's removal,
Maudley went to the USS Theadore Roosevelt to assess the situation,
where he made disparaging remarks about Crozer, which were leaked
to the public. Under pressure, Maudley resigned on April seven.
(02:56):
The actions of Crozer, Maudley, and the Navy are obviously
be hotly debated, and there will probably be more developments
between when I record this episode and when it goes out.
I'm not an expert in the Navy or in the
military chain of command, so it doesn't feel appropriate for
me to dig into any of that here. But the
current news does give me the opportunity to discuss an
(03:16):
interesting historical precedent for this situation, one that involved Theodore
Roosevelt himself. I'm your host, Aaron McCarthy, and in this
bonus episode of History Versus, we're going to look at
the round Robin letter incident of the Spanish American War.
(03:36):
During and after the Siege of Santiago, one of the
last major operations of the Spanish American War, US troops
stationed in Santiago to Cuba were beset by malaria and
yellow fever. Thousands of men were sick and dying, but
the McKinley administration planned to keep the troops in Cuba
until peace talks were over and until they were healthy.
According to some sources, there was a real fear that
(03:58):
six soldiers would come back to this States and start
a yellow fever epidemic. But the situation was growing untenable,
and near the end of July, General William shafter commander
of the Fifth Corps gathered all of his commanders to
discuss it. Roosevelt later recalled in his autobiography that although
I had command of a brigade, I was only a colonel,
and so I did not intend to attend. But the
(04:20):
General informed me that I was particularly wanted, and accordingly
I went. As Edmund Morris wrote in the Rise of
Theodore Roosevelt, all agreed that it was critical, and that
the War Department's apparent unwillingness to evacuate the army was inexcusable.
Somebody must write a formal letter stating that, in the
unanimous opinion of the Fifth Core Staff, a further stay
in Cuba would be to the absolute and objectless ruin
(04:42):
of the fighting forces. None of the regular officers wanted
to risk his career by writing such a letter, and
suddenly the reason Roosevelt's presence had been requested became clear.
He was a volunteer who had quit his post as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in order to fight, and
he intended to go right back to being a civilian
after the war. He had much less to lose by
offending his former boss, President William McKinley and McKinley Secretary
(05:05):
of War Russell Alger to incur the hostility of the
War Department would not make any difference to me, whereas
it would be destructive to the men in the regular army.
Roosevelt later wrote, I thought this true, and said I
would write a letter or make a statement which could
then be published. Theodore Roosevelt obviously wasn't afraid to speak up.
Theodore Roosevelt wasn't afraid of anything except in action. As
(05:29):
Alfred Henry Lewis would write of Roosevelt, Mr. Roosevelt has
often shown that it is better to do the wrong
thing than do nothing at all. The best thing is
to do the right thing. The next best is to
do the wrong thing. And the worst of all things
is to stand perfectly still. We'll be right back. In
(05:59):
an effort to or the McKinley administration to action and
bring American troops back to the States before they were
decimated by yellow fever, a plan was hatched. Roosevelt would
write an initial letter addressed to the General, which would
then be followed by a round robin letter, a method
typically used to conceal the identity of the ringleaders of
a movement which would be signed by Roosevelt and the
(06:19):
other commanders. Then they would leak those letters to the press.
In his letter, Roosevelt wrote that to keep us here,
in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or
a brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There
is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire
command north at once. All of us are certain that
(06:40):
as soon as the authorities of Washington fully appreciate the
condition of the army, we shall be sent home. Roosevelt
noted that in the Cavalry Division, at least, there were
no true cases of yellow fever, but there were cases
of malarial fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it,
he wrote, But the whole command is so weakened and
che mattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten
(07:02):
sheep when a real yellow fever epidemic instead of a
fake epidemic like the present one, strikes us, as it
is bound to do if we stay here at the
height of the sickness season August and the beginning of September.
Quarantine against the malarial fever is much like quarantining against
the toothache. If we are kept here, it will, in
all human possibility, mean an appalling disaster. For the surgeons here.
(07:23):
Estimated over half the army, if kept here during the
sickly season, will die. The men were unable to penetrate
into the interior, and moving them around the island, Roosevelt said,
only sickened them further. To delay sending the men home
was not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual
lives lost, Roosevelt wrote, but it means ruin from the
standpoint of military efficiency of the flower of the American Army,
(07:46):
for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you.
He closed by saying that I write only because I
cannot see our men, who have fought so bravely, and
who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplaining, lee
go to just struction, without striving so far as lies
in me to avert a doom as fearful as it
is unnecessary and undeserved. Roosevelt's fellow commanders then signed their letter,
(08:10):
which noted that they were all in agreement that the
army must be moved at once or perish, adding as
the army can be safely moved. Now. The persons responsible
for preventing such a move will be responsible for the
unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are
the result of careful personal observation, and they are also
based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with
(08:32):
the Army, who understand the situation absolutely. There are differing
accounts of what happened next, but according to Roosevelt, he
wrote his letter and an Associated Press reporter tagged along
when he went to give it a General Shafter, who
promptly pushed it into the hands of the reporter. As
Roosevelt later recalled, I presented the letter to General Shafter,
who waded away and said I don't want to take it,
(08:54):
do whatever you wish with it. I, however, insisted on
handing it to him, whereupon he shoved it or the
correspondent of the Associated Press, who took hold of it,
and I released my hold. Something similar happened with around Robin,
And when the letters said the press, it caused a sensation.
The McKinley administration was incensed by the letters. According to
(09:15):
historian Louis L. Gould, the day after the letters were published,
McKinley wrote a letter to shafter that denounced the round
robin as most unfortunate from every point of view, adding
the publication of the letter makes the situation one of
great difficulty. No soldier reading that report, if ordered to
go to Santiago but will feel that he is marching
to certain death. According to Marris, some within the administration
(09:38):
even suggested court martialing Roosevelt for his letter. The administration
had reason to be irritated. On August third, the day
before the round robin hit, the press alta edition in
order for the army to be moved back to the
United States, which meant that many newspapers printed Roosevelt's letter
right next to an announcement that the troops were being
brought back to the public. It looked at the Roosevelt's
(09:59):
letter and around Robin had forced the McKinley administration to act,
which wasn't the case. By August seven, the first troops
were heading back to the States to quarantine in Montauk
on Long Island in New York. Nothing ever, came of
the suggestion to court martial Roosevelt. Instead, Secretary Alger published
a private letter in which Tier bragged about the rough
rider's performance, saying they were as good as any regulars
(10:21):
and three times as good as any state troops. Well.
Alger might have hoped that the letter would threaten Tier's
chances of getting the governorship of New York. His tactic failed,
Roosevelt returned to war hero. He became governor, and then
Vice president and then president. He didn't, however, get the
one thing he desperately wanted, the Medal of Honor. Though
(10:42):
some believe he was denied the honor because of the
publicity stunt he had pulled, as Mitchell Yokelsen writes for
the National Archives Prologue magazine, there's no evidence for that.
Exactly why the Brevet Board denied Roosevelt the award is
not officially documented. Yogilsen writes, Certainly no evidence exists to
support the contention that Alger held a grow edge over
the round Robin affair or Roosevelt's testimony to the Congressional
(11:03):
Committee on the contrary, letters from the War Department to
Roosevelt indicate that they were more than willing to assist
him in getting the Medal of Honor. One can only
assume that the Brevet Board came to the conclusion that
the Roosevelt's conduct in Cuba was quite admirable, it was
not worthy of a Medal of Honor. Later, Roosevelt would
write that I was recommended for it by my superior
(11:23):
officers in the Santiago campaign, but I was not awarded it,
and frankly, looking back at it now, I feel that
the board which declined to award it took exactly the
right position. Around a century after his experiences in Cuba,
Tierra would finally be awarded the Medal of Honor. Back
to the present day, We've talked before on this podcast
(11:43):
about how it's impossible to know how Tier would have
reacted to situations today. In this case, however, one of
Roosevelt's descendants has a different opinion. In a piece for
The New York Times, Tweed, Roosevelt, TR's great grandson and
chairman of the Theatore Roosevelt Institute at Long Island University,
wrote about Captain Krozer and the situation on the U
S S. Theodore Roosevelt, as a descendant of the namesake
(12:07):
of Captain Krozer's former command I often wonder in situations
like this what Theodore Roosevelt would have done, Tweed, Roosevelt wrote,
in this case, though I know exactly what he would
have done, he found himself in almost the exact same position.
In this era when so many seemed to place expediency
over honor. It is heartening that so many others are
(12:28):
showing great courage, some even risking their lives. Theodore Roosevelt,
in his time, chose the honorable course. Captain Krozer has
done the same. Before we go, I want to say
a huge thank you to the medical professionals and the
essential workers who are out there risking their lives for us,
and to all of the History Versus listeners. I hope
(12:49):
you're well and safe and healthy. Please hang in there.
We'll be back soon with another bonus episode of History Versus.
History Versus is hosted by me Aaron McCarthy. This episode
was written by me, with fact checking by Austin Thompson.
The executive producers are Aaron McCarthy, Julie Douglas, and Tyler Klang.
(13:10):
The supervising producer is Dylan Fagan. The show is edited
by Dylan Fagan and Loeberlante. If you want to find
out more about this episode and Theodore Roosevelt. Visit mental
flaws dot com. Slash History Versus. History Versus is a
production of I heart Radio and Mental Flaws. For more
(13:34):
podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app,
Apple podcast, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,
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