S3E5 - NATO and Disinformation

The COVID-19 pandemic has focused the attention of many to the ongoing challenges of disinformation, propaganda and misinformation and the potential harm it can inflict. Disinformation seeks to deepen divisions within and between Allied nations, and to undermine people’s confidence in elected governments. In order to counteract this, NATO publicly refutes false claims, debunks the main disinformation narratives aimed at the Alliance and coordinates to share information, insight and best practice. Joining us for today’s episode is Colonel Sönke Marahrens, a career Air Force officer who previously served as Head of Research for Strategy and Armed Forces at the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies in Hamburg. He was deployed with NATO to Bosnia and Kosovo, and in 2020 served as Branch Head for Transition at HQ Resolute Support in Kabul, Afghanistan.  Media Minded explores the bizarre world of misinformation and conspiracies. Following on from the success of the first season in 2019, each episode platforms a different subject who has previously been a victim of, or a willing participant in, a conspiracy theory… but these lines may be more blurred than you think. Ex-cultists, anti-vaxxers and more describe their slow descent into the untrue, and those who experience the brunt of the lies and hatred explain the effect that the proliferation of these ideas has. All the while, industry-leading academics and experts provide theoretical justifications for the actions taken by all parties. Presented by Matteo Bergamini Edited and recorded by Sabina Mckenzie Brown. Season 3 of this podcast is made possible thanks to the kind support and sponsorship of the U.S. Mission to NATO.

Episode Transcript

(00:00):
This episode contains strong themesthat some may find disturbing listener
discretion is advised.
Welcome to season three of media minded.
The show guiding you throughthe age of this information.

(00:22):
This season is a little bitdifferent. It's all about NATO. Yes.
The north Atlantic treatyorganization with the help of media
and defense experts will be breakingdown what NATO is all about.
We'll be focusing on cyber attacks,decision making public policy,
crisis management, and you know,it wouldn't be media minded.

(00:45):
If we didn't sprinkle in alittle disinformation mix,
this podcast is produced by chat UK,
the leading political andmedia literacy organization,
and is made possible by the generoussupport and sponsorship of the us
mission to NATO. I'm your host,
Matt founder and CEO ofchat UK here to teach you

(01:08):
more about global security throughthe lens of NATO. Let's get to it.

(01:28):
Hello everyone. We arejoined by colon sunk, uh,
who is a, uh,
career air force officerpreviously serving as head of research for strategy and
armed forces at the German Institutefor defense and strategic studies in
Hamburg, as well as holding afull diploma in computer science.
He holds a master's degree from the Royalmilitary college in Kingston, Canada,

(01:52):
and another from the university ofthe federal armed forces in Hamburg.
He was deployed with NATOto Bosnia and Kosovo,
and in 2020 served asbranch head for transition
at HQ Ute support in Kaul Afghanistan.
Um, hello, thank you forjoining, uh, me today. Um,

(02:14):
tell me what, what, what isthe branch head for transition?
Hi, good morning. Um,the idea this was, uh,
introduced in 2020 whenit was clear that, uh,
native and United States would leave inAfghanistan after the us Taliban talks,
which came up with a contract on the28th of February mm-hmm .
So, uh,

(02:35):
the chief of staff of the HQ andthe commander decided that next to
the planning group, they want also haveone team who's doing transitioning.
So what are we doing with capabilities?We have enough Afghanistan,
how we can hand over them back to theAfghans. How will, uh, training go,
uh, go on what we did parallelto the missions, for example,

(02:56):
sending people to the NATO schoolin Obama, Al um, and so on.
And this was part of my,
my duties when I was in Afghanistanfor three months in 20, uh, 21.
Wow. Uh, sorry. In 2020.
Yeah. Um, wow, amazing. And, um,
as much as I'd love to talk moreabout, um, Afghanistan, I am,
I am gonna Dera that conversationslightly, cuz I want to talk about, uh,

(03:20):
disinformation. Um, and obviously,I mean, we, we, we've all,
I think because of the pandemicexperience misinformation, um,
in one form or another, be it,you know, online, be it, you know,
your, uh, or your randomauntie or some, some, uh,
ALO family member who has sent yousomething about COVID that, uh,
turns out to be completely untrue.Um, we've all experienced. It.

(03:43):
We've all seen it. We've allbeen potentially affected by it.
I know for once I remember at thebeginning of the pandemic, um,
someone in my family who shall remainnameless, sent me this one, uh,
little tidbit saying that, oh, um,
if you hold your breath for 10seconds and you don't cough,
then you don't have COVID.
And I remember at the time kind of doingit and kind of halfway through
thinking, why am I doing this?

(04:04):
Cuz the government wouldn't bespending so much money on testing kits.
If this was how easy it was totell you'd had COVID or not. Um,
but that's misinformation,you know, which, which is, um,
incorrect information shared, but not,not for any nefarious purpose. Right?
It's, you know,
they're sharing it because they thinkit's true and they wanna help you.
So it's, it's not done out of amalicious intent, but tell me,

(04:26):
what is this information?
Yeah. This, this informationis like you said,
there is a malicious intentbehind it it's sent de to you.
And uh,
unfortunately it doesn't have tobe always clear that it's wrong.
Mm-hmm could bealso a mixture of 80%, uh, true.
And then they just put in 20%, uh,

(04:47):
which is not clear so that thenormal listener saying, yeah,
but the rest is true. And thenthis part must also be, be true,
but this is really,
there's a malicious intent in this isstand deliberately on purpose by someone
who is an, uh, who has aninterest to influence you.
Mm-hmm could be either a state,
but could also a non-state actor andsometimes even in advertisement mm-hmm.

(05:08):
yeah, no, definitely.And, and it's interesting,
is it cuz that's the most powerfultype of this information, isn't it?
It's the one that,
that has that hint of truth or that kindof element of truth just because it,
it almost LUS you into a sense ofcredibility, doesn't it? Where you,
you know, you see this onestatistic, which you know, it's true.
So then you kind of automaticallykinda lower your guard and think, well,

(05:28):
the rest is obviously gonna be gonna.
Be also true. Yeah. And, and,
and nobody of us is immune againstthis mm-hmm mm-hmm
it goes to the, to thehighest ranks, it goes to the, to the MPS.
It goes to every everyone of us, you know,
something shown to you and youhave a clearer understanding.
This is where you come from.And especially if you have a situation like COVID,

(05:50):
you know where science says,okay, today, this is correct.
And now we have a new study andeverything is changing on the next day,
which is normal for a scientist.Mm-hmm , mm-hmm,
grasping more knowledge,but now people go back today and saying,
yeah, but yesterday this was correct. Andnow you're telling me that is correct.
Mm-hmm even this alreadycounts as a kind of this information,

(06:12):
because you're not tellingabout the, the state of the,
the art or of the sciencemm-hmm and, and,
and the people stuck in between notknowing what is now correct, what is now,
right?
Mm-hmm I mean, that,that's really interesting that you,
you say this because, um, ina lot of our work outside of,
outside of this podcast, we do, we,
we run media literacy programs insecondary schools and colleges.

(06:34):
And one thing that we always comeup as this idea of, you know,
how science kind of flip flops or, orchanges. And obviously, as you say,
for a scientist, this is normal becauseyou, you understand something, um,
in the current state and then asyou learn more or as you gauge more
information, or as you discovermore things, you know, that, that,
that thing that, you know, changes andessentially progresses and, you know,

(06:55):
things that you thought were right,were turned out to be wrong, et cetera.
Like this is normal as you say, fora scientist. But I think for us, um,
for lack of a betterterm, ordinary people,
don't understand the completefall on the science. Um, you know, you,
this is, this is problematicbecause in our day to day,
we understand well fact of facts andthey, they shouldn't change. And then as,

(07:17):
as you kind of see scientists evolvingor you see a certain thing in,
in science evolving, um,
I think that almost in a strange waymakes them lose credibility to certain
people because of that, that change.
Yeah. Because it's normal for a humanyesterday, everything was greater.
The world was better somehow. Mm-hmm,

(07:38):
remembering the formertimes when everything was good the times
before Corona, the times before, uh,
any crisis we had had before,but that's new, uh, normal,
that's human mm-hmm .And I think another complication of,
of today's also, forexample, if you're a, uh,
just an epi epidemiologistand you're looking in Corona,
but you are not a social science,uh, scientist, mm-hmm ,

(08:02):
you can't,
you are not looking into whatare the other problems of Corona,
for example, social problems, maybepeople getting lonely and stuff,
stuff like that. So these kind ofside effects of, of a network society,
and even of network sciencein there, and this goes,
information goes directly to theconsumer on the, on the other side.

(08:23):
And you said, now, who am I, wheream I? And what are we talk talking,
uh, about? So, so I wouldn't call thisa crisis of science. This is normal for,
for science, and I've never seenscience so far. Uh, so fast,
like in the last two years,developing, uh, a couple of, uh,
vaccinations looking intosomething brand new and finding

(08:45):
solutions. But on theother hand, this is, uh,
a large scale worldwide crisiswith also other other effects.
And this is overwhelming people.And then at the end, when you are,
are sitting at home quarantineor isolated for 10, 15 days,
then you ask yourself what's going, uh,
on around me and that causestrouble for, for people.
And then you try to graspinformation and then you might be

(09:08):
very fast. The, uh, thevictim is for misinformation,
like you stated in the beginning,which is not deliberately,
or if someone wants to senda message because he has, uh,
another malicious interest, maybe youwant to change your, uh, the way you, uh,
your campaigning or your, uh, will votefor the next, uh, uh, elections. Mm-hmm.
. Yeah. And it's almostlike it's a crisis of, of misin, of,

(09:29):
of information or almost a crisis of,
of communication between between differentaspects of society. And like you say,
you know, you, you're stayingat home and obviously, you know,
maybe a couple of, uh, glasses of wineor whatever you're drinking later, a,
a trip down that rabbithole that let's be honest,
we've all done on YouTube where youend up on those really strange videos.
And you know, that, that kind of onething leads to another. Um, and obviously,

(09:52):
you know, we've, we've mentionedmisinformation and disinformation and, um,
I think we,
we can all all agree that it's becomequite prevalent in our society now. Um,
how does this informationpose effect to democracy?
Democracy is, uh,
leading by the people through the peoplemm-hmm and this is built

(10:13):
on trust. Well, this is, we wantto trust the one we are voting for.
We want to trust those are,who are elected, uh, people.
And then we get Sunday information, uh,
this information misinformationon how they behave. We have, uh,
moral conduct what we expect ourleaders to be, or to look like. And,

(10:34):
uh, if you put in thisinformation on this, this,
this goes directly at the heartof democracy at the trust idea,
if you're not trusting, and then youask yourself, who can I vote for?
Because everyone is, is not on my moralstandards. Mm-hmm and Dr.
YouTube and Dr. Google and Dr.
Somewhere will tell you another story.
And it's not like inform times whenyou just had certain kind of newspapers

(10:58):
where, you know, when you looked at them,
what kind of information theywill transfer now, everything is,
is equal.
All the information channels have thesame value as an input channel for you.
So it's very hard to select whichone is the one I can inform myself.
And then you might slide itinto a into corner where,
where I didn't expectyourself one year ago. Mm-hmm.

(11:20):
, mm-hmm .Yeah. And it's, and it's, and it's quite,
quite terrifying where,where as you say, you know,
you put all of these channels on a, onthe same kind of pedestal, cuz you know,
newspapers, TV channels, and soforth. There was an element of, of,
of misinformation in there, inthere. Sometimes, you know, that,
that they're not always gonnagive you for full level of facts.
You still need critical thinking whenyou're dealing with mainstream news.

(11:41):
The only difference is that there arechecks and balances in terms of things
like, you know, regulators and whatnot,
whereas the Internet's kind of likea free for all. Um, where, you know,
you could literally say anythingonline and as long as people believe
it, then it's some portion of societywill see it as fact. And obviously we've,
we've seen this through, you know,
we've seen this phenomenon thanks to thekind of advancement in technology that

(12:04):
we've seen in the 21stcentury. Um, tell me,
how is NATO respondingto these kind of, I mean,
lack of better word threatslike this information.
Uh, NATA was, uh, hit by thisinformation. For example,
if you go back to Afghanistan at themoment you had an airstrike the next
morning you got pictureson, uh, Facebook, Twitter,
and wherever that NATO or theUnited States has bombed a,

(12:28):
uh, marriage ceremony.
And those 40 guys were just firingtheir rifles in the air to celebrate
marriage and, and, and stuff likethat. At a certain point in time,
you could see a pattern thatthis happened every, every time.
And this was useful because itdelivered a message back to, to Europe,
right? And, and cutting the, orcutting on the connection between, uh,

(12:50):
Europe and the soldiers or UnitedStates states and the soldier.
So the public opinion. Andyou could also see that, uh,
when we deployed to, um,
to the BIC states immediately,the, uh, the Russians tried to,
to interfere with, uh, with media,
by sending stories thatGerman tanks ran, uh,
over a Jewish cemetery orthey showed one of the,

(13:14):
I think it was a Canadiancommander in a sauna sauna sued
ridiculed on the, on the internet. Wow.
So this started immediately and, um,
especially the boarding states there,they had a good concept. They were, uh,
no, this kind of shit storm, they werewaiting for it. And they had a 24 hour,
seven hour watch for it so theycould, uh, hit immediately.

(13:36):
So there was one storythat two German, uh,
corporates raped a young, I think itwas AIAN girl. And then they came,
came immediately back. Theywent to the, uh, uh, to the, uh,
house where the, uh, girlwas living assumed to live.
And they talked to the people and theycame up with the story and saying, no,
that's not wrong. That's made up and soon. But for this, you need awareness.

(14:00):
What is going on around you? And, andthis happened, um, to NATO and to,
uh, cover cover this NATO has a, uh,
one set of excellence forstrategic communications in rigor.
And they're working on this mm-hmm and they also have now
so-called counter hybrid threatteams so that a nation can ask for,

(14:20):
for advice because normaladministrators normally are not, uh,
working in, in that depth. Ifyou're a government civilian,
you try to make everything happen foryour citizens, but you're not expect that,
uh, someone is spoilingwith your messages and,
and for this data providesteams and support.
That's amazing. And yeah, no, of course.I mean, you don't, again, this is,

(14:40):
you know, this informationis not a new phenomenon.
Like people have been Pam for the thingand propaganda spreading for, you know,
as long as humanity's beenable to read and write,
basically we've been spreading the poorlives to some extent, um, unfortunately,
but you know, with the 21st century,
we've really seen an uptakein this and not just that,
but how easy it is to spread thiskind of stuff. You know, you,

(15:01):
you can be anybody and start, you know,
creating disinformationabout your government,
someone else's a government abouta person, a company, an individual,
it really doesn't matter. Um, and it'sinteresting, you mentioned that, um,
was it in, in, in Bosnia that you saidthat they were ready for this? Um.
No. Laia, Laia thes in thes mm-hmm.
. Um, so what,um, what prompted them to, um,

(15:26):
to, to prepare for this? Likewhat, what prompted them to, um,
to have that kind of set upready? Would you say you could.
You could say a longhistory living under, uh,
in the Soviet union and understandingwhat the Russians were capable to do with
propaganda. And like you said, this isnothing, it's nothing new. It just, uh,
with new method, uh, methods we havewith social media and, and other stuff,

(15:47):
it's like the, the box of Pandorawhich was opened and it has,
has also advantages, not fordemocracy, know that you see what,
what the government is is doing, buton the other hand, it also allows,
and that's the, uh, the balancebalancing. So who guards,
social media and who guards the guardian.
Yeah, no, of course, ofcourse, which is a, um, um,

(16:09):
a really interesting, interestingprospect. I think that we,
that we're gonna be faced with more andmore so probably as, as, as, you know,
technology advances even further, correct.
Knows what we'll be inabout 10 years. .
Keep in mind without thosekind of technologies.
We wouldn't have this podcast today.
Exactly, exactly. And that's, andthat's one thing that I've always, um,
I think the,
think's important to remember when we'retalking about this stuff that it's not

(16:32):
at, at least in my view, it's not aboutthe tools themselves, like they already,
the end of their day tools likesocial media. Um, the, these are,
these are tools.
And although obviously in the contextof spreading this information,
they're seen as negative.
It's not the tools themselves thatare the problem in my view, it's,
it's how we use them. Right.Because, you know, there's,
there's tons of examples where thesekind of tools have been used in a very

(16:55):
positive light, um, in terms of.
Connecting. It's like, it'slike the knife in your kitchen.
Exactly.
You can use it for cooking and youcan use it for killing your neighbor.
It's your choice.
It is very true. ,it's very, very true. Um,
so your field of expertise, um,
is around sort of modern forms ofconflict and hybrid warfare, um, cyber,

(17:17):
yeah, cyber security. Canyou define what these,
what these threats are or whatthese, what these types are?
Okay. So, uh, cyber cyberthreat is the earliest one,
which came up is kind of newtech technology. After we,
we started to connect the computers thatsomeone else from the outside without
entering your house couldlook into your house,
could look into your datamm-hmm and, uh, can get it out of it.

(17:39):
And there are, um, different levelsof, of cyber. It might be, uh,
the hardware which I can attack. Uh,
it might be critically infrastructureif I take out the, the pump of a,
a water facility,
not just by disconnecting thesteering computer and so on,
but this goes up to the level of, uh,
that I go inside the information that Iplug in other information information,

(18:01):
you don't don't want tosend mm-hmm ,
but which suddenlybecomes your information.
So if I take over your Twitter account,for example, it's also cyber risk. And,
uh, sending out in information, I willruin your credibility within 10 seconds.
I can make your right wingradical or a left wing, radical,
and whatever you like.
Maybe even both.
Yep. at the same time. and, and that, uh,

(18:25):
that's part of the cybercybersecurity and, and out of this,
of this higher connectivity in the world,
that came also the idea of hybridand it a hybrid compromise us
around since 2006. That's the firsttime we talked about hybrid warfare in,
uh, in, uh, in the science.And the idea is people are,
there's one hard red line, andthis is UN car article 2.4,

(18:48):
which states all member states refrainfrom, uh, attacking each other.
So on a positive way, thereshould be no world war worldwide.
And the next sentence says,
and they also re are restrainedthemselves from interfering into internal
affairs of other countries. Butnow with this kind of technology,

(19:10):
right, you can do this.
And as long as not the other side isnot willing to insist that this is a,
a break off the red line. You createsomething like the so-called gray zone.
We also talk about sometimes if youtalk about hybrid threats and this could
also be done by, by military means.So if you go back to premiere 2014,
what we call the little green men,everyone knew they were Russians,

(19:33):
but they never wear the Russian flagon their uniform, not at the beginning,
or are we talking now about little bluemen, sea men in the Southeast China sea.
Everyone knows where they comefrom. So they're military means.
And normally you would say that's anact of war, but yeah, it's article 2.4.
That's the gray zone. And ofcourse, if I use this information,
if I start to change or tocampaign against someone like it happened to Hillary

(19:57):
Clinton, when, when, uh,her service were hacked,
her email service were hacked and thedata was put on, uh, on, on the table,
right? This is interferingin other, uh, nations.
But if you are not goingafter, that's a gray zone,
and this is what we calltoday as high hybrid threads.
And there must be a state ora non-state actor behind it.
It's not the Norma criminal who's sendingout randomware and now give me 500

(20:21):
Bitcoins. Or at the moment with thiscourse, five would be enough, right?
So there's still adistinct, uh, there's a,
there's an interest there's strategicinterest behind this ki kind of actors.
With what you've just mentioned.What would you say the biggest, um,
hybrid or cyber threatsfacing democracy today?
Is there one particular one that that'skind of the most dangerous? We say, I.

(20:43):
Think it, it creates instabilityit's and, uh, going back,
it creates distrust inthe states. And, uh,
if you don't have trust in your state,how do you trust the rules we have? Mm.
And then we are living in a moreindividualized, uh, society.
More people come to power, whichI also see an advantage in that,
because it's not thesolution can be, uh, uh,

(21:06):
created by a more diverse truth. So thismakes it harder for an attacker. Now,
if you only attack, uh, gray, oldmen, that's a different attack vector.
If you are, uh, try to attack adiverse society. But if it, uh,
attack a diverse society, there'sa lot of taboo in those kind of,
of society things weare not talking about.
And then you can fuel up thisvery easily. And, uh, that,

(21:28):
that that's the problem.
So that this kind of internal stabilityor even instability between former
allies. Mm. And then, sorry,go ahead. Fake news media. No,
the way Trump handled, uh,the media and former times,
we always called mediaand journalists. Uh,
the force are the fifth poweras a regulation power. And, uh,

(21:50):
he discredited, uh, the,the common media. Totally.
So today journalists in the west gethit by anti-vaxxers and so on, on the,
on the road and on the streets.
And that's dangerous because weare losing Demora demo democratic,
uh, structures in there.
Yeah. And, and, and that's, andthat's a really, really, um,

(22:11):
important point because like, like yousay, you know, journalists used to be,
you know, used to be seenas the, kind of the, the,
the industry that was meant to holdgovernment to account that meant to hold
certain, empower us to accountand democracy as you, I mean,
you keep mentioning the word trustand that's exactly what it is.
Isn't it like democracy and multiculturalside. They they're based on trust.

(22:31):
You know, you, you trust yourneighbor, you trust the other side,
you trust the government.
You not necessarily trust everything thatthe politicians say, cuz I think that,
that that's unrealistic and frankly,that's not the way it should work.
You know, you need to be criticallyanalytical as to what they say, and then,
then make your own mind up in the ballotbox. But in terms of trusting that, um,
they're not always lying to you becausethey're not always lying to, you know,

(22:53):
sometimes there is, there is mistruth.Sometimes there are lies like you,
you've gotta be critical when, when,when analyzing things. But when,
when we come at it from an nihilisticperspective of all journalists at this or
politicians at that,
then it it's the same as believingeverything that someone tells you because
you, you are not thinking criticallyabout that certain bit of information.
You're just, you're just blanketcovering everybody with the same brush.

(23:15):
And you know,
when you sew that kind of level ofdistrust in a specific industry like
journalism, um, you are kind of stuckon where you get your information from,
and then you kind of rely onother less credible sources,
but you think they're morecredible because you know,
they've got half a million likes onYouTube, for example, or however many, um,
streams, ONT TikTok orwhatever, um, which, you know,

(23:38):
yeah. Is great that popular.
And there's a lot of, uh, psychologyin there as well. For example,
cause regards to bias, not unspokenbias bias, you're carrying with your,
your yourself. For example,if they put in a TV show,
now you have 99 expertssaying that's correct.
And you have one expert saying the otherside and now you just put twin the one

(23:58):
expert who's against it. And the oneexpert and this creates balance, no,
which is called false balance at a certaincertain point in time because he has
just one other opinion against, uh,the mainstream opinion of that kind of,
of, of science. And this is alsosomething where we have to look into it,
especially if you look and you wereasking for, for new tech technology,
artificial intelligence, whatwe see for, for, for the future,

(24:21):
they are just algorithmsmm-hmm and they have to work with the
data they're getting. And ifthe data is already biased,
if you're not take all the data or you'renot taking care of what kind of, um,
data you are collecting, for example, inthe United States, they, they set up a,
uh, a crime forecast system.
But if 99% of your datais African American,

(24:45):
how do you think that an even fairalgorithm could come up that the
next perpetrator would bea white male, 25 years old?
Mm-hmm so that'sthe data bias, what we see.
And then on the other, uh, other side youmight have, uh, algorithmic bias. Now,
if everything's written by males,well, how, how should we take care for,
for female needs ifyou're not aware of it.

(25:07):
And there's a great case in the military,you always call, uh, talk about,
you know, when we had, um,
females joining the militaries and wehad this kind of safety west mm-hmm
and I just look for thedata and females are a little bit smaller,
so we need more S west smaller ones mm-hmm and would need advance
that's the simplestalgorithm. Yeah. But, uh,

(25:29):
females look different inthe best part than males.
A little bit. Yeah. And yeah.
And SMA and S west might killa female because it's, uh,
the vest is not made for her. So youneed more data in your algorithm.
You need a different algorithm to findout what are the, the rights and, and,
and that's something they have to seein the, in the future, uh, as well,

(25:51):
know what kind of data and what kindof algorithm we are, uh, looking for,
because at the end CV and name them,
they will present you what's in the data.And there was this great case of this,
uh, language, uh, artificial intelligence,
which became not by the, by theusers, uh, a right wing, radical,

(26:12):
well, putting out racist slurs, becausethat was the data that was filled in.
Yeah.
Well, and that's, that's the riskof modern tech, uh, tech technology.
And we would see this in, uh, insocial media, there's in Facebook,
there's an algorithm and other therealgorithms behind it and they present you
what you want to seeat a certain point. It,
no CATA pulls you into a bubble mm-hmm.

(26:32):
, mm-hmm .Yeah, no, exactly, exactly. And then,
and that's, that's the danger, isn'tit? That at the end of the day,
these technologies are presenting,um, aside from what we want to see,
but also what we're inputtingand, and, you know, if it is,
if what we're inputting isnegative, then, then of course,
they're going to learn those, thosehabits and perpetuate them towards us.
And obviously that that's coupling inwith, you know, uh, confirmation bias.

(26:54):
So say for example, you know,if you like a certain thing, um,
like I like chocolate, right? And I,and I see an article or whatever from,
from an expert that says that, youknow, chocolate is the best thing ever.
And it's, and it's, you know, and itis gonna prolong your life by 20 years.
You're gonna be more likely to believeit because you want that thing to be
true. Um, whereas if you know, you, you,

(27:14):
if you hate say chocolate, like you,you're gonna be less likely to believe it,
you're gonna be more criticaltowards it. So it's also about.
Um, well,
you have a di pathologist showing up andtelling you that this might ruin your
health over the next 20years, you might live longer,
but it might be not thelife you are expecting.
.
So what are you choosing?
Right, right, right. Um, so, um, obvi obviously we've,

(27:37):
we've regards to these emerging threatsthat we've, that we've spoken about.
Are there, do you, do you feellike they're still rooted in,
in geopolitical conflict,like geopolitics as a whole?
Yeah. Yeah. You could, uh, youcould see this. And I think, uh,
one part of it is also that it's notonly in the military or in the security
domain, it's also in the economicsdomain, for example, when we had this, uh,

(28:00):
problem with the ship inthe canal and we saw, oh my.
God, the one that got stuck inthe middle of the, uh, yeah, yeah.
And, and PlayStationfive came late, or the,
the new iPhone came late by two months. so, but that's only, you know,
that's only the surface out of it.
China is controlling the whole productionmarket. So when, when Trump tried,
tried to get some of the productionback to the United States was impossible

(28:23):
because the technology was notavailable and longer. So the idea of,
uh, where you chains worldwide,now there's a risk in it.
And when you control the end of thechain, like China is doing today,
you're controlling, uh, economics, andyou can see what they're doing now with,
uh, Lithuania, after they,uh, accept the Taiwan,
they're using economic power. Andof, of course you can use, uh,

(28:47):
diplomatic power just bythe, the way you, you go out,
you reach out that's what, whatRussia do doing at the moment.
They try to dictate, uh, thenext rules for the world on,
on their behalf and in their advantage.
So it's not the military communityonly, or the security community,
which is now threatenedthrough a hybrid threat. It's,

(29:08):
it's all of us at a certain point in time.
Yeah. And, and, and, and it'sinteresting because I think,
especially when we think of, um,organizations like NATO, for instance,
we think of, we, we think ofgeopolitics, I think for a lot of people,
it's that kind of traditionalthreat of, you know,
military versus military and kind oftraditional warfare, the things that we,

(29:31):
we basically learn often in,in, in your history class,
right over the kind of traditionalbattles of traditional fights and, um,
kind of geopolitics kindof being a reflection of,
of military strength for militarypower. But in reality, of course, um,
like you say, there are so manydifferent elements. I mean, there were,
you know,
economic powers have always been a thingrealistically to one extent or another,

(29:51):
but, um, now we're seeing allthese different types of, um,
for lack of a better termpowers, I guess, you know,
like the economic power you'reseeing, um, you know, the use of, of,
of propaganda in a completely differentway for, for this information.
And we're seeing, um, the ability ofkind of cyber power or the ability to,
to, to reflect or, or push a certainmessage out for a variety of means.

(30:16):
Um, and it's, and, and,
and it's interestingthat despite all of that,
the kind of geopolitical framework isstill kind of at the very back end of, of,
of it all. Like it's, there'sstill that traditional, um,
geopolitical sphere almost.
That's the idea of the, a Australianstate, which is still in our minds.

(30:37):
This is how we define ourself asBOS on the, on the planet night.
And this side is a good side. Andthe other side of the border is, uh,
the bedside. This is how we are,that's deepen our, our thinking. And,
and you could see how, uh,
NATO transformed since 1989 before itwas very clear who would be the opponent
now that was NA versus VA pack. Thenthe transformation reaching out, even,

(31:01):
uh, providing, uh, safety andsecurity for other states,
like in the Boan or in Afghanistan.
And now we have to provide insight.
The nations and NATO has nolegislative power, like for example,
the U or the United nations,they can't set rules.
They only can provide supportand protect their own ways of

(31:22):
command and control that they're notlosing command in a, uh, in a crisis by,
uh, for example, cyber actions are, uh,
whatever you're using electronicwarfare and, and so on.
So they have to protect themselvesand reach out to the nations.
The first line of, uh,is national resilience.
And this must be done by the nations.

(31:43):
Mm-hmm mm-hmm .Yeah, no, no, definitely. Definitely.
And also you don't,
there's often that kind of slightlysticky situation of having a,
an international organizationlike NATO, um, getting,
getting too involved in its, inits member states and you know,
what perception has that put and, and allthose kind of things that, that, that,
um, that kind of.
What I see is Russia at themoment, you know, getting, uh,

(32:04):
Ukraine away from, uh, NATO,
getting Sweden and Finlandaway from, from, from NATO.
So there's some powermm-hmm, behind the idea of, of, of NATO,
at least from the Russian perception.
I mean.
Something .
Yeah. um,
going in 2019, um, London,

(32:26):
the de 2019 is London decoration.Um, my apologies allied,
the heads of state and, and governmentsaid that NATO is strengthening.
So its ability to prepare for the deterand defend against so hybrid tactics,
as we, as we kind of spoke about, uh,
that seek to undermine oursecurity and societies. Um,
what would you say this lookslike on a kind of practical level.

(32:49):
Like, like a set, the first line lineof defense is the nation itself. It's,
mm-hmm, buildingresilience. And for this,
you have to understand resilience,which is totally different, uh,
in all NATO, uh, member states,for example, I'm, I'm now, uh,
working out of Helsinki in Finland mm-hmm they have this idea of
total defense together with, uh, Swedenor the politic states. They are de uh,

(33:12):
so societal resilience and, uh,
military deterrence is hand in handmm-hmm in the Western parts
of, of Europe. You know, when, ifdeterrents would've failed before 90, 89,
for example, Germanywould be a nuclear desert.
So what kind of resilience do you wantto teach to your society or for, uh,

(33:32):
UK? Same thing. Mm-hmm because the military would,
would act broad and, and at homethere would be a strong line of,
of defense it's tomorrow partof it, and this is something we,
we have to rebuild.
And I think this is also important thatNATO and the heads of government are
stating this,
that is still deterrence mm-hmm so you need conventional
deterrence. You need nucleardeterrence, at least until today,

(33:54):
because the potential is stillavailable. Mm-hmm ,
mm-hmm , but becausewithout it, uh, the power of the,
the one who has morepower might cut through.
But just that age, age old sayingof if you want, if you want peace,
you must prepare for war. And obviously,you know, it's unfortunate, but.
And you must, you must be willing to use,

(34:16):
use the tool at a certain point oftime. That's a motivational part of it,
but resilience goes deeper.This goes to all of, uh,
your societal sectors.
This is the way you are workingwith your minority groups.
This is the work. Uh, soin insides of society,
this is way how your economy works.
This is how your critical infrastructureis protected. Mm-hmm ,

(34:36):
you know, if I try to get out mythanks out of the barracks and,
and someone is able to, uh,hack all the fuel stations well,
after 100 kilometers, I'm done.
Yeah.
So,
so there's this kind of complexityof OV relationship and for this,
right, it's not only about the military,it's about for, uh, society in large.

(34:58):
And, and, and for this, thosecalls are from my point of view,
very important that, that we,
the citizens have to understand that wealso have a part in this kind of, uh,
resilience, uh, building mm-hmm it's our societies.
And would you say it it's it's whenwe're talking about resilience,
would you say it's, um,is it resilience to, to,

(35:19):
to, to disinformation, for example, causeit, I mean, aside from even, you know,
getting your tanks at thebarracks and someone hacking,
hacking your field stations, it's,couldn't it be considered to be even,
even more straightforward thanthat in the sense that, you know,
if someone decides to, you know, hita country with this information about,
say NATA or, or their areforces and kind of create, oh,
you don't need this anymore.Um, you can push people to,

(35:43):
to vote a certain way, arguably.
Yeah. And you could, uh,
push people to either reduce the militaryforces or they might demonstrate in
front of your barracks,
and then you can't even reach out tothose 100 kilometers away fuel states and
so on. So that's, that'sthe part, uh, that's,
that's part of the story story in there.So I think, uh, if you look in, uh,

(36:05):
Britain during world war, uh, too, whenthey had the, uh, this great pictures,
know the war don't, don't speak too much.
The war is also could also be lostat home and stuff, stuff like that.
That's part of the, the storyand that's not warm mongering.
Loose slips, sink ships, I think was the.
. Well, this is aboutunderstanding what is going,
going out that we are not, uh,the citizen is not, is part of it.

(36:28):
It's a subject to it. It's not an object.
Mm-hmm , mm-hmm and that's,
and that's a really importantpoint. Isn't it though. Cause we,
we feel like we're almost,at least for the moment,
it's almost like we're separatingourselves that we, we think of, oh,
the government is doing this and it'slike, the government is, is also you like,
this is our society. This isthat we're a part of this.
So when you're criticizing the governmentfor doing something, it's like, you,

(36:50):
you had a vote like you, you can decideto which way, which way to go. And I'm,
and I'm sorry, but I, I, whenever Iget a chance to, to do this mini rant,
I do it then it's that nottaking your votes and not,
not voting is not an act of protestthat is laziness. Like you can,
you can spoil your ballotand that's fine. Um,
and that's an act of protest cuz you don'tlike any of the candidates and that's

(37:12):
your right,
but not turning up just because you wantedto watch strictly or the Simpsons or
whatever, whatever you wanted toput on TV. That's that's, that's.
Smart. I, I totally sign up forthe render then I tell also the people,
why don't are you not going into,
into politics if you have these betterideas or if you think everyone else is
stupid. Well, so create itthat's part of democracy. Right?

(37:33):
Right.
Because the, the, the people ,we are part of the people. Right.
Exactly. Exactly. I think there's that,there's that disconnect. Um, so just,
just um, on that, and obviously we,
we we've talked about thisinformation and cyber attacks, but um,
how has this information in cyber attacksbeen used to destabilize democracy in
member states? Would you say like,are there any clear examples?

(37:54):
Yeah. Yeah. Like, like, like,like I mentioned before, when, uh,
Russia presented the data, Trump wasasking for on Hillary, on Hillary Clinton.
Mm. And uh, then you have tolook into certain campaigns.
And I think if you look into theBrexit campaign, you also saw some,
some interference from the outside.And especially when it comes like,
you know, this close, this50, 50% mm-hmm ,

(38:17):
then you could see thatinformation might have at the end,
uh,
the power to slip a total socias one society from one side,
uh, to the other side. Andwe have also seen that, uh,
in France campaign washacked. Uh, the day before the,
the elections came up andsome data was, was, uh,

(38:38):
put on it because there's a lot ofvoters who wrote on the last day mm-hmm
. So they go intothe Kevin and saying, okay, who,
who do I love today most? Andthen the last thing I've heard,
and this could be eithergood. He did something good,
or this could be this kind ofbad information coming from,
from the server coming from, uh, uh,
an email taking out of content or, orwhatever. And this might put in your,

(39:02):
uh, or might influence yourdecision on this, uh, election day.
And this is where we,we have seen. So, uh,
protecting democracy structuresand processes is very important.
Mm-hmm well, it's not given.
No. And I think, um, at leastfor a portion of society and,
and I think people are starting to seethis more and more that, that, you know,

(39:24):
democra, as you say, this is, this, isn'ta given like these, these things are,
these people were earned, um, for bloodand various of the things like the,
you know, generations before us foughtfor these kind of rights that we are,
that we are now, um, you know, veryprivileged to have in, in a lot of places,
um, by being able to have thisconversation, um, yep. Just, just simply,
you know, there there's parts ofthe world where, um, we'd be, uh,

(39:48):
we off having certain conversations.
And we still have to see the advantagesof this kind of technology and all for
grassroot mm-hmm, move right. The, the capability to,
to set up new networks, to do some,some changes. And for example,
Fridays for future mm-hmm, started with one girl. Yeah.
Now it's a worldwide, uh, widemovement. You can love it,

(40:09):
but it's part of our de uh,democratic processes now. Mm-hmm.
mm-hmm. Yeah, exactly. Um,
so what role does, um, goingback to idea of geopolitics,
what role does, does geopolitics playin emerging threats, especially because,
you know, the threats like, likethis information, for example,
can be done from simply behind a computerscreen, by, you know, an organized,

(40:32):
very well funded actor, or justby an individual, you know,
either in the country or outside.
Yeah.
At the moment we live in the advantagethat everyone is connected to everything
so that we can see things aregoing on. But for example,
when there is an intent inChina to decouple the Chinese internet or from Russia
to decouple the Russianinternet, mm-hmm, ,

(40:53):
you're building up huge cageswell, which are controlled.
And then it was over in 1984, who's a,
who described this kind of, of societyfor, uh, what is possible with, uh,
with full power control or like in Chinawith kind of social points you get for,
for well behavior. So you getbetter points than, than for,

(41:16):
for bad behavior. And, and, and so on.
So this kind of a marketon this is something, uh,
we should protect each others and thereis no, that's also the advantage of the,
the, uh, the internet thatwe can see those things.
But then the risk of this information,misinformation is shown, uh, the,
the pictures we are seeing reallyfrom that occasion, or are they,
they just made up or even createdwith an artificial intelligence,

(41:39):
having a politician sayingsomething totally stupid.
And at then you find out this was not him.
This is an artificial intelligencecreated video. And that's,
that's the problem of,
of our understanding of the environmentof the future that we might be that
may, uh, might confront it withthings we haven't seen. So,
so far their geopolitics at the endwill also play a role. But for example,

(42:02):
I see the internet as a hope forAfrica that we can see Africa
worldwide now mm-hmm .
Yeah. And just linking thisinformation, obviously back to,
um, back to it's it's, Iwouldn't say source so much,
but it's kind of like where it's, whereit, where it's kind of spread, you know,
like cuz social media is not the sourceof, um, this information, you know,

(42:24):
social media is the kind ofwhere it goes to to then kind of,
you know, spread and, and, andthen hit the mainstream almost. Um,
what challenges would you say socialmedia because of that? Um, and,
and, and reliance that wehave on it, um, posed to,
to NA and its members.We, we, you know, there's,

(42:47):
there's a double edged sword almost. Yeah.
It might, if you, if you'reable to transfer, uh, or,
um, to communicate the mission of,of nature to all the member states,
you could use social media mm-hmm, but you could also, uh,
attack natal, uncertain points.
Now where are corrects in theunderstanding, uh, of, of the, uh,

(43:10):
operational and environment. And thisgoes with the geopolitical situation,
know where you are, ifyou are 1000 or 2000, uh,
kilometers away from the Russian border,
or whether Russia is your direct neighborthat creates a different understanding
or, uh, feeling of the threat environment.And this some, sometimes we are,

(43:30):
we also miss, you know,the idea of socialist also about emotions, perceptions,
mm-hmm, this is might betotally different, uh, in, uh,
in geopolitical different, differentregions. Mm-hmm well,
I think Western Europe at themoment is more about, uh, is about,
especially Germany is more aboutCOVID than looking into Ukraine,
whereas others are acting know,like you could see over the, the,

(43:51):
the last weekend. And, um, so the,
the way we assume threats,the way we see threats,
this is something where youcould use social media also as a,
as a positive tool to, to create acommon understanding what is is going on.
Mm-hmm.
mm-hmm and,and, and, um, equally, you know, you,
you could, you could create a, um,

(44:12):
almost a completely falsified narrativeas well, if you, if you wanted to. Um,
I, I remember, um, not to,
not to necessarily quote a cartoon,
but I remember there was this oneepisode of the Simpsons years ago that I
watched where, um, the,the news reporter, um,
was to,
was reporting on the ground about awar and then the camera kind of pans.

(44:35):
And he is using, you know,
bubble wrap to make the sound of bombsand then cling things together to make
the sound so you can pretty much setup any narrative you want .
Well, and take the Russian narrative,you know, Russia surrounded by, by,
by NATO. And then, then youlook at the ma and the map,
and then you ask yourself, yeah,what are they talking about?
I think it's 6% of theborders is bordering tune

(45:00):
uhto. So what are they talking about?But now look at, uh, geo strategy.
Well, on the side, when you enterthe Arctic on the other side,
as United States, if youenter the Atlantic it's Iceland and, and, and Norway,
so you can create those just by lookingfrom different angles and different
lenses on, onto the same map.
And then geopolitics reallybecomes very important. And,

(45:22):
and the understanding of it mm-hmm,, it's important.
It's not just about us. It'salso about the way we live.
And if you look into climatechange, well, if, if,
if it might change that that would be,uh, spaces in Africa, which are not,
uh, usable for, for, forhumans any longer. No.
And I think Australia now hastemperatures about 50 degrees.

(45:43):
So how much air condition do you wantto pay for mm-hmm or will
this cause, uh, pieces ofland, which are not usable,
like they are users today,and then you have a,
a pressure of migration worldwide mm-hmm.
. Yeah.
But then also Russia comes under pressure with being the largest, uh,
uh, country worldwide.
Mm-hmm yeah, yeah,no, by, by, by far. And, uh, um,

(46:06):
it's often shocking how big it is.Actually, if you have a look at it,
it's like Christ.
Stop learning Russian.
. Um, and, um, I, I,
I, I did say we weren't go,we weren't gonna go, um,
and derail into Afghanistantoo much, but I, um, um, I,
I spread a bit of my ownmisinformation there at the beginning.

(46:28):
I do wanna ask you one question,um, about it. Cause obviously you,
you know, you, um, served in, in,
in couple of Afghanistan as thebranch head for transition. Um,
and I just wanted to know, like, werethere any examples, um, any more examples,
maybe they, they, um, youcould see on the ground of, of,
of technology or new technology,creating new challenges, opposing new,

(46:51):
new threats then that you hadto deal with, or that your,
your team had to deal with.
Yeah. One of the, uh, one of the, thethreats was using of drones, you know,
the risk that someone would use a drone,which costs your 800 euros, that's,
uh, a little piece of,um, ammunition to it and,
and, and send it to your headquarters.

(47:13):
Wow.
That's and that's a verycheap, cheap weapon.
You can order it via Amazon and Amazonwill deliver to Afghanistan. So,
and the rest you can do with a 3dprinter in your store, this 3d printer,
you can also buy on, uh, on theinternet. So everything is available.
And this is, uh,
also some kind of technology where wesee something or take 5g technology.

(47:37):
Everyone is waiting forthe new new standards,
but this will be totallycontrolled by China at the moment.
There's no Western equivalenton, on, on 5g. So at the end,
it might be the China's listening in,
into every of your phone callis looking in your mobile phone,
every telegram signal,WhatsApp conversation. No,
if I'm at the end, I might see it.
And even if I just see whom you aretalking to, it might already, uh,

(48:01):
enough. So there's a lot of thiskind of, uh, new technology,
which is not developedin the military. So as,
as a psychic of history,the first U flew in 1917,
that's 100, four years ago. And,
and today now you can have them athome and you can stop flying at Israel
within five minutes.

(48:22):
Yeah. Yeah. I mean, it's,it's, it's, it's a, um,
I wanted to use the word I wanted toavoid using the word terrifying prospect,
but , I can't quite thinkof something else to say. Um,
but it is, cuz it it's,you you've mentioned a, um,
a really powerful point that it'snot just about the technology,

(48:42):
but it's when we're talking aboutthreats and talking about things,
it's also about where the technologycomes from and the kind of geopolitical
context of that. So if it is like yousay, a country like China, for example,
um, which obviously has, you know,
a competition with the west or competitionwith, with native allies, then,
then you gotta look at whatthat technology can be used for, especially because,
um, although, um, Chinasee itself differently,

(49:06):
it is definitely not a democracy.
And if you're an authorstate, mm-hmm ,
you don't have to wait to getreelected. You reelect yourself.
So China can work in totallydifferent timelines or Russia than,
than our politicians. Our politicianshave only those four or five years,
and then they must reelect it. So at acertain point in time, they must also,

(49:27):
they're not just onlyprovide safety and security.
They must also commit to the words, knowwhat they promised and the promises.
And if you are in China orRussia, you don't have to do it.
Mm-hmm you will be elected.
Yeah. I mean, yeah., you know, it's, uh,
you vote for, for, uh, for me,uh, myself or I is kind of the,

(49:49):
um, and then obviously within that, youalso, um, aside from the kind of, um,
uh, pesky needs to get reelected,you've also got the idea that you've,
you've also got to push, you know,you've also got communicate what you've,
what you've done to your people. Andthat communication can be difficult,
especially when you're consideringthe fact that, you know,
you've got competing narrative saying,actually you've done this other thing,

(50:09):
or you've done this thing or you haven'tdone this other thing. And you know,
it, you are, you know, you're dealingwith a lot more difficulties as a,
as a politician, I'd say in a, ina democracy just because you are,
you are accountable, which isa good thing. Um, but you know,
when, when you've got the other side,which isn't accountable and has, you know,
as you say,
it's completely different timelines andcompletely different focuses on, on, on,

(50:33):
on, on, on what, what mattersto them. Um, and you know,
going back to that point oftrust, which I think is a,
a quite a powerful one to end on is, isdown to, to that at the end of the day.
And, um, when we're looking at, youknow, disinformation in emerging threats,
it seems that the erosionof trust seems to be the,
the kind of overarching narrative,whether you are in the UK abroad or in a,

(50:56):
in a, in a, in a NA member state,
or in a NATO ally or in a placewhere NA's potentially operating.
It always seems to, um,
especially when it comes to disinformationcoming down to trust. Um, but soak,
thank you so much, uh, for this, thishas been incredibly interesting. Um,
and, uh, I, uh, I, uh, hopeyou have an amazing day.

(51:22):
Thank you for listeningto season three of media,
mind the show guiding you throughthe age of this information.
This podcast is produced by chat UKand edited by Sabina McKenzie brown.
Make sure to follow chat UK onTwitter and Instagram to get updates
on all our upcoming episodes.

(51:43):
And don't forget to subscribe tothe media minded podcast on Spotify,
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