3-3-25 - 6am - World HIstory 101

3-3-25 - 6am - World HIstory 101

March 3, 2025 • 36 min

Episode Description

Episode Transcript

Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.

Speaker 1 (00:00):
Hey, Michael, good morning. Quite a day yesterday in the
White House Oval Office. Yeah, President's Lynsky said he wasn't
playing cards with President Trump, but what he was playing
was craps, and he came up, snake eyes.

Speaker 2 (00:22):
Here's what we're going to do today. And I don't
know how long it will take me, and I frankly
don't care, because this is we're living in a moment
of history that, to your point, could go to crap
real easily, and on the other hand, could usher in

(00:46):
a a new era of prosperity and peace, both not
just for this country but for the entire world. And
I know that even though we're focused on Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Russia,
all of the crap going on over there, what happens

(01:08):
over there also sends a strong signal over there to
Jiji Pin on the other side of the world, well
actually on the same side of the world, but opposite
directions from we. We tend to look to the east
when we look to Europe, and we tend to look
to the west, at least I do when I'm looking
over toward China. And so it's worthy I think of

(01:33):
some time to understand the history of Ukraine, the history
of the old Soviet Union, and quite frankly, the history
of the United States. I think we in fact, for me,
that's where we need to start, because Trump's attempt to

(01:54):
end this war in Ukraine has successfully managed to piss
off all of the globalists, the international the liberal internationalists
on both sides of the Atlantic everywhere. I mean, they're
pissed off here, they're pissed off in Europe, they're pissed
off probably in the Indo Pacific. They're pissed off everywhere.

(02:22):
But as Trump is prone to do, he breaks with
American presidential tradition, and he does so more in style
than he does in substance. In reality, the forty fifth
and the forty seventh president, I think is operating in
the tradition of realist presidents that goes back to Theodore

(02:46):
Roosevelt more than a century ago. The realist presidents, Theodore Roosevelt,
even Woodrow Wilson, the horrific progressive that he was, was
a rest when it came when it came to international affairs.
Theodore Roosevelt absolutely speak softly and carry a big stick.

(03:11):
Ronald Reagan be willing to walk away peace through strength,
go back to T. R. Theodore Roosevelt when when he
broke her the end of the Russo Japanese War of
nineteen oh four nineteen oh five, which he did at

(03:34):
Oyster Bay on Long Island, he accepted a sphere of
influence that the Japanese would have in Korea and South
Manchouri and the Soakolon Island. And he accepted that sphere
of influence by Japan as the price to maintain a
balance of power in the East between Russia and Japan.

(03:59):
He received the nob Peace Prize for doing that in
nineteen oh six.

Speaker 3 (04:04):
I think.

Speaker 2 (04:07):
During the lecture, I shouldn't say during the lecture doing
his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, tr said that quote,
it would be a master stroke if those great powers,
honestly bent on peace would form a League of peace,
not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent,
by force, if necessary, that peace being broken by others.

(04:33):
That's a pretty real estate view of the world. But
go back even to Woodrow Wilson. At the end of
the entry of the US into World War One. Wilson
proposed this League of Nations, and he told his what
we would now refer to as as National Security advisor,

(04:54):
a guy by the name of Colonel Edward House to
draw up plans for a post war league of nations,
and this so called National security advisor, Colonel House, told
Wilson that allegian nations, that body might be confined to

(05:16):
the great powers. In other words, maybe what we ought
to do is think about allegian nations. That is not
a league of nations, but a league of some particular nations.
And House went on to write in his diary that
why allow smaller powers to exercise a directing hand upon
nations having to furnish not only the financial but the

(05:38):
physical force that's going to be necessary to maintain the
order in peace. I'm sorry to come to this conclusion,
he wrote in his diary, because it does not seem
toward the trend of liberalism. And he meant liberalism in
the sense of the true meaning of liberalism. But housemen
maasterdized today. He then ended that paragraph in his diary
by saying that, however, the idealist who is not practical

(06:02):
oftentimes does a cause more harm than those, frankly, that
are reactionary. And of course, we know from history that
the legal nations failed to win ratification in the US Senate. Now,
why did it fail to win ratification in the US
Senate Because of the realists in the United States Senate
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. He wanted a US British

(06:24):
treaty with France that would deter, not stop, but deter
further German aggression, but thought that the League Nations was
some sort of utopian experiment that was doomed to fail.
Of course, I believe that that he's right. Has the
United Nations the successor to the idea of the Leagan Nations?

(06:45):
Has it succeeded in any way? No, it has not. FDR.
You know, FDR is put on this pedestal by the internationalists,
but was much more in the tradition of a realist
then they'd like to admit. FDR served as as an

(07:06):
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration, and
he wanted to avoid Wilson's mistakes in his own thinking
about world order after the defeat of the Axis Power.
So Roosevelt put his hopes for the post world in
the Big Four, or the four Policemen as he referred
to them, The United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and
Nationalist China, and that they would dominate their respective regions

(07:30):
while all the smaller countries might have ostensible participation. You know,
we'll let you participate, but where the powers, and we're
the ones are going to decide. The only policeman with
a democratic form of government was the United States. Churchill's
Britain ruled its empire outside of the British Isles undemocratically,

(07:57):
Stalin Soviet Russia communist dictatorship, and Chayen Kai Shak's Nationalist
China was an anti communist dictatorship. So with the Declaration
of the United Nations signed in nineteen forty one, the
Big Four signed at first, and then the other twelve

(08:18):
members of the Alliance had to wait until the following day.
May not seem like it seems like a trifling matter,
but it was of significant importance. Now, let's go to
Britain during during the Wars, because realism dominated the thinking
about the post world that was going to come after
World War Two, and just like Fdr Churchill was really

(08:41):
skeptical about all these global institutions in which each state,
no matter how small, no matter how weak, no matter
antithetical to democratic ideals, no matter how you know, abusive
of human rights they were. Churchill was really skeptical, do
you know. In nineteen forty three, Churchill proposed that a

(09:05):
Supreme World Council run by the Great Powers would oversee
smaller regional councils for Europe to the Pacific in the
Western Hemisphere. So Churchill visit Stalin in October of nineteen
forty four and Churchill came up with what he referred
to his NATI Document. And this ninety document was a

(09:26):
secret agreement that assigned shares of influence in Central Europe
and the Balkans to Britain and the Soviet Union. Greece
was to be ninety percent under British influence, ten percent
under Soviet influence. Yugoslavia and Hungary were to be fifty
percent British fifty percent, and so on and so on.
They were divided. They were dividing up the world and
their driving up the world based upon the powers that

(09:49):
had engaged in bringing down the threat of Nazism and
Japanese imperialism to freedom throughout the world. Interestingly, in our country,
FDR really wasn't all that interested. Part of that, I

(10:11):
think is because of health reasons. He delegated all of
the postwar planning for any sort of permanent but became
the United Nations any sort of permanent world organization to
a Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who was a Wilsonian,
who recreated the flawed design of the League Nations under
a new name. Cold War rivalries immediately paralyzed the Great

(10:38):
Power dominated you in Security Council because each member of
the Security Council had a veto. The Soviet backed takeover
of China by Mao's communists turned that Middle Kingdom from
an American ally into an enemy, while Britain post war

(11:00):
economic weakness left Washington Moscow as the only two global
military powers in what then became a bipolar world. It was,
and thus began the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union. But we can't you cannot ignore

(11:22):
the post war recovery of Western Europe and Japan and
the Sino Soviet split, the split between China and Japan
that led Richard Nixon to conclude in nineteen seventy one
that thought there were five centers of economic power, if
only two that had military and economic power, where do

(11:42):
you think those five were the United States, the Soviet Union,
Western Europe, Japan, and China. And according to Nixon, quote,
these are the five that will determine the economic future.
And because economic power will be the key to other
kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways,
in the last third the century is going to be
decided by those five. And Nixon back in nineteen seventy

(12:10):
one was trying to get us out of Vietnam and
trying to avoid similar entanglements. So we get end up
with the Nixon doctrine, and the Nixon doctrine basically said
that we're going to look, we shall look to the
nation directly threaten to assume the primary responsibility of providing
the manpower that's going to be necessary for its defense.

(12:34):
In other words, the Nixon doctrine said that if you're
under attack, you're going to have the primary responsibility for
providing your own defense. And then Nixon goes to China
and in what's called the Shanghai Communicay in nineteen seventy two,

(12:56):
Nixon acknowledged China's interest in Taiwan, and he said the
United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is part of China. The United States government
does not challenge that position, and thus we got the
very initial beginnings of this strategic ambiguity that we call it,

(13:18):
with the relationship between China and Taiwan and Taiwan in
the United States. So where do we end up? Where
do we end up after all of that, because it's
going to get to where we are today. Following every
single one of the three global conflicts of the twentieth century,
the two Cold War, the two World Wars, and the
Cold War, all these idealists, all these globalists, everybody else

(13:41):
started thinking about and dreaming about a new world order
where there would not be any power conflicts between the
great powers, and a lot of Americans got all got
excited about that, and of course we ended up with
the fall of the Berlin Wall in nineteen eighty nine
and then the collapse of the Soviet Union into these
independent republics in nineteen ninety one, and that led all

(14:03):
the liberal internationalists, all the liberal globalists, to call for
a new League of democracies again to do what to
police a globalized world society? And the neo cons dreamed
of a single global market and the rules based order

(14:25):
that would be policed by Washington alone as the world's
only superpower. I've talked about that American world order. They
referred to it as a rules based order in which
we would be the world's only superpower, and to some
degree we are. We're still the world's largest economy, and

(14:46):
it is us that keeps most other nations at bay,
except when we undermine our own national interests, which just
just make a footnote what I just said, when we
do things that undermine our own national interests, because that's

(15:10):
going to apply to what happened in two thousand and
fourteen when Obama and Victoria Newland and everybody else overthrew
a democratically elected government in Ukraine. But I'm gonna go
back to this other history for a moment. China under

(15:32):
shi Jingping and Russia under Boris Scheltzen and all the
successors to Boris Scheltzen rejected this idea of the American
world order or American hegemony, meaning the America being the
one that drives everything. They wanted the multipolar world in

(15:52):
which they would be the hegemonic powers in their regions.
Russia would control their region, We would control kind of
the western hemisphere in Western Europe, and the Chinese Communist
Party would control most of the Indo Pacific. It is

(16:13):
I don't think it's blaming the victim to point out
that invitations to join the US led Natal Alliance were
followed by the Russian invasions of Georgia in two thousand
and eight and Ukraine in twenty fourteen. That's the original invasion,

(16:34):
not February of twenty twenty two. The original invasion of
Ukraine occurred in twenty fourteen. But what happened between twenty
fourteen and February of twenty twenty two, Oh yeah, a
guy named Donald Trump. And that is where I get

(16:54):
to the point that Donald Trump is operating in that
idea of an American world order. But we're not going
to be the world's policeman and we're not going to engage.

(17:17):
Because he's watched Afghanistan, Iraq, he's watched what we're doing
in Syria. We're still involved in Syria. He's looking at
all these hotbeds around the country and saying, you know what,
will be the peacemaker and will do what we can.
But it's not necessarily going to be done by boots

(17:40):
on the ground. There are other ways to deal with
these aggressions than boots on the ground. And the realists
saw what was happening back in when we started expanding NATO,
a US LATO led NATO alliance began expanding with our approval,

(18:01):
in fact, sometimes with our push ourselves.

Speaker 3 (18:04):
A Michael Eric Carley and Gary magnalaire. This morning, we're
saying that Zelensky met with Democrats prior to meeting with Trump,
and that somebody Democrat tweeted or confessed that they had
advised him not to sign the deal. So did Democrats
sabotage and set up the White House fiasco.

Speaker 2 (18:28):
We're going to get to that. And yes, the Democrats,
actually I shouldn't say Democrats, a bipartisan group of congressional
critters met with Zelensky prior to the White House meeting.
So well, yeah, we'll get to that too. But it's

(18:49):
really important to understand the context of what's happening today.
And you know, I always talk about we under we
need to understand where we've been to understand why we
are where we are today, and a lot of a
lot of what I hear from people who before I

(19:13):
get back to the history, because I'm about to tell
you something about the history that you probably know, but
you don't think about it in terms of the long
running historical context of how do we get to this
place where we are today. I think when I tell you,

(19:34):
when I give you the example I'm really about to
give you, you're going to go, holy crap. And people
are bitching at Trump about what he's doing. I mean,
I really think it's kind of like it's that kind
of history that we just don't like to think about
because we are so influenced in how we view history
because we're drinking from a fire hose in terms of

(19:56):
you know, I'm going to talk about some things that
occurred in in the early eighties in the early nineties.
And you think about the early eighties early nineties, we
didn't have social media, we didn't have twenty four hour,
seven days a week cable news, we didn't have well,
we sort of had barely had conservative talk radio. Rush

(20:19):
started in August of nineteen eighty eight, August one, nineteen
eighty eight, and I'm going back to eighty nine and
ninety four for some of these or actually back to
eighty three for some of these examples. So it's a
lot of history that we've ignored. And I think the
other thing that's going on is.

Speaker 4 (20:37):
There is.

Speaker 2 (20:40):
And I really admit this, Donald Trump is a polarizing figure.
Dragon put it perfectly well for me this morning in
an example about you know, because you like pancakes doesn't
mean that you hate waffles. But I think a lot
of people look at Trump and they they hate Trump,

(21:01):
and they hate Trump so much that they're ignoring all
of the history, and they're ignoring everything that's going on,
and they're jumping to a conclusion that says that this
is going to lead to World War three of it somehow.
And this is to me, this is the worst of
all that somehow Trump is a Russian puppet. I just
I find it mind boggling. And I'll actually let you

(21:22):
listen again for what, for me will now be the
second time a sound bite from that blow up in
the Oval office that pretty much sums up exactly why
Trump's right about what he's doing. But nobody's playing it,
you know, or repeating it on air. Instead, they're going
back to the thing about the suit, or they're going
to you know JD pointing his finger or the Vice

(21:44):
president pointing his finger. It's oh, I'm just but as
frustrated as I am with this whole story, nonetheless, it
is incredibly important to the future of the entire freaking world.
What's going on right now. Don't let your either adoration

(22:12):
because I know the people that adore Donald Trump and
there are people that despise Donald Trump. Don't let either
one of those extremes get in the way of trying
to understand or listening solely to those who will tell
you one side or the other. Because the media, Oh,

(22:33):
trust me on this one. The media is trying to
drive a narrative that Trump blew this up. Some people
believe on purpose. Some people believe it was Trump being Trump.
Some people believe that, you know, when he said, oh,
this makes for great television, if that was the signal

(22:53):
that all of this was preordained, that he wanted Zelenski
out of the picture, you know, may or may not
be true. Part of me'd like to see Zelenski out
of the picture. But set all of that aside. Let's
understand the historical context of how we got here, and
then let's really think about what's really going on because

(23:16):
nobody wants to really think about what's going on, or
they've completely forgotten the near term history of Because if
I were to say, just before I get back to
the history, I want you to think about something for
a moment, what if I told you that, you know,

(23:37):
let me see if I can think of an analogy,
if if I own a piece of property, and you know,
I've seen like a next door in other places. In fact,
that's all won recently where somebody was arguing about a
fence line, and so they built their fence because the neighbor,

(23:58):
despite the surveys, despite everything else, uh maintained that no
where you want to put it is on my property.
So rather than fight it, they just said, you know what,
we're going to put the fence, you know, a foot
on inside our property. We're actually just giving up a
foot of our property over to you, tacitly doing that.

(24:19):
And let's say that they keep pushing and pushing and pushing,
You're still in our property. You're still in our property,
You're still on our property. Well that's what was happening
in this situation between these two neighbors. And then that
person went away. That was claiming that, hey, you're building
your fence on my property. That person sold their home,

(24:42):
and then when they came out and the new owners
looked for a survey, they realized, oh, actually you've built
your fence a foot onto your own property and given
us an extra foot. Well what if we kind of
took an analogy something like that? But the person didn't sell,
and you just kept pushing him, pushing and pushing and pushing.
If I were the person you finally just kept pushing

(25:04):
and pushing and pushing, I would finally just say, you
know what, you don't like it, I'm going to build
it where the survey says it is, and I'm gonna
put the fence there, and if you don't like it,
too bad. We've kind of done that with NATO. We
said more than a decade ago that and this gets

(25:25):
part of this gets back to the Budapest memorandum that
we won't expand NATO. And then what do we do?
We expanded NATO. We moved the fence line, and we
kept moving the fence line further and further and further,
and at that time Russia was actually wanting to join NATO.
Russia was like, wait, wait, a minute. You keep slapping

(25:48):
us and pushing us around, but we actually would like
to join your alliance. Because I was there, I was
a part of those negotiations, and then boom the French
and the British. Interestingly, I forget the position of the
Germans at the time, but I remember specifically because I

(26:09):
remember I remember one time sitting directly across from the
French representatives in Brussels as we were negotiating this, and
the French finally just walked away from the table. We're
not we're not even going to consider it. And I
was literally left just sitting there along not just me,
but me and my entire staff, and I thought, well,
that this is done. They've walked, they pulled the ultimate

(26:31):
negotiating tactic, and they've walked away from the discussions. You
can't you can't negotiate with yourself. Well you're a fool
if you do. But shouldn't do that. But let's go
back to the history, because we have mostly continued to
observe what was called still is called that matter of

(26:53):
the Monroe doctrine, and that means we've treated the North
American quartersphere as our own. You know that Reagan Invada
Granada in nineteen eighty three. We topple regimes that we
don't like, and we install what we think will be

(27:15):
clients or leadership, presidents, governments, whatever you want to call them,
that will be favorable to us. So Reagan invaded Granada
in nineteen eighty three, Bush forty one invaded Panama nineteen
eighty nine. Clinton invaded Hadi in nineteen ninety four in
an operation called Uphold Democracy, which is kind of funny

(27:35):
when you think about it. And then by abandoning Afghanistan
to the Taliban twenty years after warfare, President Biden pretty
much acknowledged that Central Asia is less important to Washington
than North America, Mexico, Canada, and the US. And similarly,

(27:57):
by moving Quokie to end the costly proxy war in
and opposing Ukrainian membership of NATO, Trump is signaling that
Eastern Europe is not a core American interest either. So
it's all part of that Monroe doctrine. Nor is enmity
against Russia baked into American tradition, you know, because for

(28:18):
the most part of the time since this country achieved independence,
we have been morally repelled by the autocracy that has
controlled that geographic area that is called Russia, even as
American diplomats have viewed Russia as a counterweight to powers
that posed greater potential threats. You want to go back

(28:43):
in history. During the Civil War, in order for US
to prevent Britain from intervening on the side of the Confederacy,
Abraham Lincoln invited and welcomed the Russian fleet to go
sit in American ports, including New York, where Russian naval

(29:05):
officers paraded down Broadway past cheering crowds. Harper's Magazine at
the time of pine that it would be wise to
meet the hostile alliance of the Western powers of Europe
by an alliance with Russia. Andrew Johnson, an American naval
squadron during his tenure, arrived at the Russian Baltic port

(29:29):
of Constat to a twenty one gun salute and a
display of American flags. To thwart British influence in North America,
Andrew Johnson's Secretary of State, William Sewer, did what he
bought Alaska from the Czar of Russia, and he tried
but failed to obtain Greenland for the United States. In

(29:50):
nineteen forty six, Truman tried to buy Greenland from Denmark.
In nineteen fifty five, the Joint CHIESA staff tried to
get President eisenhow to buy Greenland, and Trump revived the
idea at a time of increased tensions with Russia and China.
All of these countries, including our own, act like the strongmen.

(30:18):
We always act like the strong man and tsaris. Russia
was our ally against Imperial Germany and World War One,
and the Soviet Union was our ally against Nazi Germany
and Japan in World War Two? Does that mean that
I one month before I take a break, let me

(30:38):
just remind you that Russia was our ally against Imperial
Germany and World War One. The Soviet Union was America
and Europe's ally against Nazi Germany and Japan in World
War Two. Does that mean that I support Vladimir Putin? No,
it does not. But because you don't, I shouldn't say you.

(31:06):
But because people don't understand our history. When you point
that history out, then people say, oh, well, then you
must support Russia. No I do not. I'm just trying
to understand the history of how we got here.

Speaker 4 (31:19):
Hey, Mike, do you think Trump is playing reverse psychology?
Or three D chess. I'm temporarily walking away from Ukraine
during that meeting, causing EU and NATO to lean in
more and help out more in the Ukraine fight. It's
kind of fascinating to watch the whole thing.

Speaker 2 (31:41):
I find it all very fascinating, and there are so
many different possibilities of what's going on that any or
all of them could all be true at once. So
we think about where you are right down, because there

(32:02):
are I think arguments based on actual politics that you
could oppose Trump's strategy toward Ukraine. I actually kind of
think it's a good strategy. But I can also tell
you that there are if I if this were a
courtroom and the judge said, or it was a debate

(32:24):
proposition and you got to take this, you got to
take this part of the proposition, this side of the proposition,
or you have to take that side of the proposition.
I could probably make a case for any side of
the proposition. What I'm trying to give here is a
baseline to help you understand so that you can cut
through all the bull crap that the dominant media is

(32:44):
feeding you right now about how I mean to sum
it up, onge Man bad here's Trump doesn't know what
he's doing. Trump is a Putin stooge. Trump really wants
and is trying to, you know, coddle favor with Vladimir Putin.
I mean, it's it's it's mind boggling how the media

(33:08):
is trying to drive a political wedge and many people,
a lot of smart people are buying into that without
recognizing the history. Because the next thing we're gonna do
is we're gonna go through the history of Ukraine and
what we've done in Ukraine. Because I think most of
us we ignore the things about Abraham Lincoln or Andrew Johnson,

(33:37):
we ignore the things about our allies Stalin Stalin, of
all people, that horrific individual, one of our allies during
World War Two. But if you if you're going to
be consistent, and you're gonna be some sort of moralist
that's going to invoke American ideas, I deals, then you

(34:01):
ought to be condemning Fdr In church Hill for agreeing
to and allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe that lasted half a century after nineteen forty five.
You got to condemn Eisenhower and Johnson for failing to
take action to punish the Soviet Union from crushing democratic
rebellions in East Germany in nineteen fifty three, for crushing

(34:22):
elections in Hungary in nineteen fifty six, or Czechoslovakia in
nineteen sixty eight. You don't even here. You know why,
because Americans don't know about those things. The spasms of
Woodrow Wilson's utopianism form the exception to the rule that
American statesmen in every generation are usually guided by considerations

(34:46):
of the national interest in their dealings with other major powers,
including those whose internal regimes are repugnant to our own principles.
So Uncle Sam might engage in flowery talk, but allies
and enemies alike know that Uncle Sam. In this case,
Donald Trump drives a hard bargain, and he has to

(35:11):
because he's dealing with the guy. Let me just before
we go to the next hour, I want you to
think about something. Have you heard Vladimir Putin say that
he's willing to go sit down at a negotiating table,
And if you have, haven't you heard all of the
hard line, non starter positions he's taken. So can you

(35:35):
honestly say that Vladimir Putin is willing to negotiate a
settlement to this war or not. I don't know that
he is

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